LIBRARY
OF THE
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA.
GIFT OF
Bancroft Library
Class

CIVILIZATION CONSIDERED AS A SCIENCE,

IN RELATION TO

ITS ESSENCE, ITS ELEMENTS, AND ITS END.

A NEW EDITION,

REVISED AND CORRECTED, WITH CONSIDERABLE ADDITIONS.

BY

GEORGE HARRIS, F.S.A.,

OF THE MIDDLE TEMPLE, BARRISTER-AT-LAW,

AUTHOR OF 'THE THEORY OF THE ARTS,' 'THE LIFE OF LORD CHANCELLOR HARDWICKE,
'THE TRUE THEORY OF REPRESENTATION IN A STATE,' ETC.

NEW YORK:

D. APPLETON AND CO.,

BROADWAY,

1873.

HM101
.H3
1873.

UNIV. OF
CALIFORNIA

TO

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE

HENRY LORD BROUGHAM AND VAUX,

ETC. ETC. ETC.,

RENOWNED ALIKE AS

AN ORATOR, A JURIST, A STATESMAN, AND A PHILOSOPHER;

THE UNTIRING ENERGIES OF WHOSE GIGANTIC MIND HAVE

FOR MORE THAN HALF A CENTURY

BEEN STRENUOUSLY AND SUCCESSFULLY DEVOTED

TO PROMOTE THE PROGRESS OF CIVILIZATION:

This Work,

HUMBLY DESIGNED TO AID IN THAT

GREAT INTELLECTUAL CAUSE,

IS,

WITH HIS LORDSHIP'S KIND PERMISSION,

Very respectfully Dedicated

BY HIS OBLIGED SERVANT AND ARDENT ADMIRER,

THE AUTHOR.

221335

Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2008 with funding from
Microsoft Corporation

http://www.archive.org/details/civilizaitoncons00harrrich

PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION.

The principal object aimed at in the following pages is to exhibit a comprehensive though concise view of the nature of civilization, to demonstrate its capacity for scientific treatment, as also for practical application, and to evince the necessity for cultivating every branch of it alike, in order to ensure the establishment of it as an entire system or condition. An attempt is thus made to effect a complete, definite, and systematic exposition of the true principles upon which the general Educational and Moral Policy of each country ought to be conducted.

As regards the plan upon which I have proceeded in the elucidation of my subject, I have, in the first part of this work, endeavoured to define and point out, clearly and correctly, the real and essential Nature of Civilization. After this, I have specified and set forth the various Elements which seemed to me to contribute to its constitution and progress; and I have concluded by demonstrating the principal Ends at which Civilization aims, and which may be attained by its complete establishment in any country.

The axioms here laid down, and the Elements of Civilization here enunciated, are applicable alike to every nation, whatever be its general condition, or the form of its constitution.

An effort is also made to trace out each of the Elements

of Civilization, and to analyze their first principles; to point out their essential qualities and constituents, to define clearly what active agents may claim to be ranked as such Elements, and to demonstrate the distinctive use and application of each. Even should these Elements be denied accurately and fully to comprehend the efficient causes of Civilization; yet it cannot be doubted that in their consideration is included every principle that extensively conduces to its promotion and perfect establishment.

It is not, however, either expected or intended that every rule which is prescribed for the regulation of the science proposed for consideration, should be always rigidly adhered to, or literally carried out. The object is merely to enunciate the leading principles generally applicable, which although varying as regards their suitableness to each special exigency, retain the same main features and characteristics, in whatever case, or under whatever circumstances they are availed of.

It appears, moreover, to be uniformly desirable, so far as circumstances may admit of its being adopted,—as I have indeed remarked in the following pages,—both in laying down and in establishing a system for the regulation of a State, that we should not only work by natural means, and as little as possible go contrary to Nature; but that we should endeavour, in all our plans and operations, to imitate and carry out the system of Nature.

On my first entering on the present subject, and endeavouring to treat upon it, it appeared to me that Civilization was mainly to be promoted by legislative measures expressly adapted for the purpose, and which I have here classed under the term "Moral Jurisprudence," and have considered it, as upon reflection I became convinced was the case, to be merely one single Element of Civilization out of several. Education next struck me as constituting the real, efficient cause, if not the actual Essence of Civiliza-

tion. But upon taking a comprehensive view of the whole matter, in all its different bearings, and with regard to all its varied requirements; the ultimate conclusion which I arrived at was, that that which is not only really needed, but what is in fact in many cases actually intended in the demands for the intellectual and moral improvement and advancement of the nation, is not Education merely, but Civilization generally. This principle, which has not been adopted without the fullest deliberation and the sincerest conviction of its truth, is the basis of the doctrine propounded in the following pages, and its recognition is deemed of the utmost consequence to the well-being of society.

Education is, in fact, so to speak, one only out of several of the chains by which the car of Civilization is drawn onwards. By applying to this one alone, not only is the machine moved very feebly and very slowly, but there is considerable danger incurred of snapping the single chain. On the other hand, by applying to them all together, it is impelled rapidly and easily, and the strain on the one chain is relieved, all the rest contributing alike their proper share in the labour.

A very moderate degree of observation and reflection will, moreover, suffice to convince us that even Education itself,—although now considered by many as the sole Element of Civilization, and consequently allowed to engross the whole attention both of the State, and of individuals anxious for its extension,—suffers in reality very largely from our neglect to resort to, and to promote the application of the other Elements of Civilization, which are essentially auxiliary to Education itself, as well as to Civilization generally.

The general correctness of the theory here maintained, receives, indeed, an important confirmation from the views on this subject expressed by that comprehensive and penetrating statesman, the Emperor Napoleon I., who, when

referring to what he had done for the cultivation of his people, remarked that he had "caused every *institution* to be formed upon a plan which offered instruction to the public. The *Museums* were thrown open to the *canaille.* All my exertions were directed to illuminate the mass of the nation."* In addition to this, we know the corresponding efforts which he made as regards certain of what I have here termed the other Elements of Civilization, in the maintenance of Religion, the promotion of Art, the establishment of a sound Jurisprudential code, and the construction of roads and other public works.

As in the allotment and determination of the studies to be followed in a university, all the different elements of knowledge are cultivated together and each aids the pursuit of the other; so in the general Civilization of a nation, the various Elements for this purpose should be adopted contemporaneously, each assisting and co-operating with, and conducing to the efficiency of the other, and contributing to promote the general object in view. Analogously, indeed, to what we see attained by certain chemical compounds of great power and efficacy, the merit of which consists in or results from the admixture, in their proper measure, of the several ingredients of which they are constituted; Civilization is completely effected, and fully established in any country, not by carrying to the utmost extreme the introduction of any one of its Elements singly,—be it Education, or Religious Influence, or Art,—but by the harmonious blending of them all together, and the adoption of each, though in due proportion.

It is in truth as unreasonable to expect a nation to advance in enlightenment and in Civilization by supplying to it only the means of Education, without affording any opportunities, through the requisite National Institutions and other Elements of Civilization, of gratifying the intel-

* *Voice from St. Helena*, vol. ii. p, 385, 6th edition.

lectual craving so produced and excited; as it is to invite a number of hungry men to a feast, and to suppose that they will be perfectly satisfied with having several empty dishes set before them. We readily supply mental dishes, but resolutely deny mental food.

To a certain extent, nevertheless, all Civilization, and every Element of it which is here enumerated, might be said to constitute, and to be comprehended in, Education; so that in one respect Education may be contended to be the only Element of Civilization. But this is true only in a particular and very limited, and by no means in a strict or general sense, and in the same way only that all nutriment, in which we might include water, and even air, may be said to be meat. Thus, every Element of Civilization conduces, more or less, to the Education of a man, as tending in some degree to influence and develope his mental and moral being. This, however, may be remarked of every single occurrence of his life, but which no one would think of classing among the Elements of his Education. So Education, as regards its application in the Civilization of a nation, has its proper and strict limits, and is distinct from the other Elements of Civilization, each of which, however, contributes to aid its progress. They are, nevertheless, in reality, no more a part of our Education, than air is a portion of our food; however necessary it may be to our preservation, and even in order to render food itself nutritious.

It may also be correctly laid down, that the only really true and legitimate mode of rendering Education compulsory, is not by legislative enactment, but by Civilization; by creating such a strong necessity for it from the general Civilization of the people through the application of its other Elements, that all, in self-defence, in order to enable them to avail themselves of these Elements, and of the sources of enjoyment thereby opened to them, will be at once voluntarily induced of themselves to seek Education,

instead of having it, as now proposed, involuntarily forced upon them.

On the other hand, the error pursued by many,—which is doubtless both very great, and very deleterious in its consequences,—in urging the excessive extension of Education of every kind upon all classes indiscriminately, has arisen from considering Education alone, and not Civilization generally, as the real requirement of the nation; in fact, from mistaking Education for Civilization. It is, indeed, possible that even Education itself,—as where it is the means of promoting a too exclusive attention to one pursuit, either in an individual or a nation, to the neglect of the other branches or Elements of Civilization; or where it tends too largely to foster luxury or refinement, as in the case of the extensive cultivation of certain mere accomplishments,—may be directly and essentially injurious to the promotion of Civilization.

Two important circumstances seemed peculiarly to point out the present period as a fit time for the publication of the following pages, which have been for some years lying by since their original composition, have occasionally received additions as new ideas presented themselves to the author's mind, and have obtained a revision as opportunity offered, or as events appeared to render this expedient:—

1. The extensive feeling now abroad in this country in favour of the Education of the people generally, and on the most comprehensive principles. 2. The great desirableness which has long been felt, and is now generally perceived and acknowledged, of some grand, and leading, and distinct elementary principles being laid down which should serve to guide the framing of any measures for this purpose.

To encourage and stimulate still further the one, and to supply in some measure the want of the other, is the reason for the appearance of the present work, and must

form the apology for its publication. Should it only have the effect of causing a yet deeper attention to the very important and interesting subject treated on, the author will not conclude that his labours have been entirely in vain. If his views are deemed by any erroneous or deficient, he trusts that this consideration will induce others to discuss the matter with more discretion and more discernment.

19 Queen Square, St. George the Martyr;
8th October, 1861.

PREFACE TO THE PRESENT EDITION.

SINCE the first edition of this work appeared before the public, although considerable activity has prevailed among those who are anxious to promote the extension of Education and Civilization, no progress whatever has been made in reducing the system to a regular plan, or in deducing any fixed and certain principles for its regulation. On the contrary, the more energetic the movement that has taken place, the more confused and chaotic have been the notions which have been put forward, and which have met with ready approval, if they have not been actually adopted. The Government and the Legislature alike, however expert on all matters of detail, appear determined utterly to repudiate or to neglect the consideration of leading principles, which ought to constitute the foundation of every solid system, and without the laying down of which it is impossible that the structure itself should stand on any firm basis. The correctness of what is here asserted is exemplified alike in matters directly relating to Education, and in those which are connected with Civilization generally, embraced in this work, such as our policy towards our Colonial connections, the want of any fixed and definite principles to regulate which has lately been acknowledged, and in consequence of which measures directly at variance with each other, and of course very disastrous, have been adopted by

successive governments, one reversing and overturning what its predecessor had done;—the natural and almost necessary consequence of attempting to act without rule, analogous to trying to navigate some strange sea without either chart or compass.

Nevertheless, although nothing has been done towards the adoption of fixed systematic and leading principles in the promotion of Civilization, but rather the contrary course is more rigidly followed, and, in consequence, the extensive and systematic general spread of Civilization is more hopeless than ever, certain particular branches of it have fructified with extraordinary vigour. Indeed, the characteristic feature, perhaps the leading defect of the Civilization of the present day, is its unequal distribution. While in some of its branches the stream is overflowing, in others the channel is left nearly dry. The object of the present work is to promote an equal dissemination of it throughout each avenue. Our aim should nevertheless be not to lessen the measure of Civilization in any particular department, but to increase the amount of all those that are deficient to the level of that which is the most abundantly supplied. As a skilful physician while endeavouring to cure a malady, aims not only at eradicating that particular disease, but at restoring the health of the entire frame; so a statesman of wise and comprehensive policy will adopt and carry out not one Element only of Civilization, but will consider the whole system together, and avail of each Element in conjunction with the others, and apply all of them to their appointed ends.

It is, however, satisfactory to the Author to be able to record that while so little has been accomplished as regards the recognition of systematic principles in the promotion of Civilization, a great number of the proposals made by him with regard to particular measures which he deemed calculated to be advantageous for the further-

ance of Civilization, but which had not before been mooted, have since been adopted by the Legislature; while others also suggested in this work are now recommended for adoption by individuals of extensive influence. This is the more remarkable from the book being mainly devoted to the elucidation of principles, rather than the development of any particular practical measures

The fact in question, the author flatters himself that he is entitled without presumption to appeal to as some proof of the soundness of his views and the practical nature of his recommendations; and this whether the measures in question owed their origin to suggestions thrown out by him, or were spontaneously adopted from a perception of their value, which of course evinces that the work itself was somewhat in advance of the period of its production.

Of one portion of this book, relating to popular amusements, an edition of three thousand copies was reprinted for gratuitous distribution by an anonymous friend to the cause of Civilization.

Isclipps Manor, Northolt,
5th June, 1872.

CONTENTS.

THE REAL NATURE AND ESSENCE OF CIVILIZATION.

	PAGE
Capacity of Man for Improvement	1
Natural Analogy between Men and States	3
Civilization of different kinds	3
Threefold consideration of Man	3
1. As an Individual	3
2. As the Constituent of a State	4
3. As the Type of a State	5
Rival and Conflicting Influences	8
Moral Influences and Causes	10
Origin of Civilization	11
Influence of External Intercourse	12
Stimulus to Civilization	13
Civilization the Natural and Proper Condition of Man	14
Essence of Civilization	14
Requisites to Civilization	15
Elements of Civilization	18
Geographical Position	19
Situation and Circumstances of Great Britain	20
Mixture of National Races	22
Influence of Climate	24
National Character	28
Influence of Prejudice	31
Letters and Language reflective of National Character	34
Ancient and Modern Civilization	37
Influence of Scientific Inventions	40
Vast Achievements of the Ancients	40
Application of Discoveries	41
Progress	42
Christianity and Civilization	42

PAGE
Chivalry and Civilization 43
Decline of Civilization 44
Effect of Luxury 44
National Wealth 47
National Poverty 49
National Debt 50
Civilization reducible to a Science 51
Duty of the State in regard to its Promotion 53
Constituents and Elements of Civilization 54

THE ELEMENTS WHICH CONTRIBUTE TO THE PROMOTION AND PROGRESS OF CIVILIZATION.

I. National Education of the People.

Education the Keystone of Civilization 57
Its Threefold Nature 59
Different Kinds of Education 59
Classical Studies 62
Principles and Objects of Education 63
Necessity for Systematic Principles 64
Education and Crime 65
Want of a suitable Literature for the Lower Classes . . . 67
Political Knowledge for the People 69
Popular Ignorance 70
Educational Fallacies 71
Extension of Intercourse between Classes 73
National Education a National Duty 73
State Provision and Regulations for this Purpose 74
Competitive Examinations for Civil Offices 75
Period and End of Education 78
Artificial Stimulus to Education 80
Religious Education 82
Threefold Results of Education 83

II. National Religious Influence.

Reciprocal Influence of Religion and Education 84
Universality of Religious Influence 84
Civilizing Influence of Christianity 85
Fundamental Principles of Religion 86

PAGE
Different Kinds of Religious Influence 86
Different Modes of its Operation 87
Civilizing Effect of Christianity upon Mankind 88
Its Aid to the Operation of the other Elements of Civilization 90
Immensity of its Influence 91
Relative Influence of Christianity and Paganism 92
Personality and Materiality in Religion 93
Priest Worship and Fabric Worship 93
Popular Instruction in the Evidences of Religion 94
Ceremonials in the Celebration of Religious Services . . . 95
Constituents of a Religious Service 96
Character of Religious Edifices 97
Morality and Religion 98
Civilized Countries and Individuals Destitute of Religion . 98
Duty of the State in the Promotion of Religious Influence . 99
Reverence and Regard to be rendered to Religion 99
State Protection of Religion 100
Avoidance of Repulsiveness in Religious Celebrations. . . 102
The Style of the Scriptures a Model for Sacred Services . . 102

III. National Instructory Institutions.

Nature, Object, and Regulation of Institutions of this Description 103
Institutions entitled to be deemed National. 103
Adaptation of National Institutions to National Wants . . 104
Counteracting Effects, and Changes in the Condition of these Institutions 105
Threefold Correspondence of Institutions of this Class, with Education. 106
Different Kinds of Instructory Institutions 106
I. A Church Establishment 107
Its Advantages Direct and Indirect 107
Tendency to Corruption, necessitating certain Safeguards . 109
Expediency of Extending the Basis of the Church Establishment 110
Futility of Tests 111
Rival Religious Bodies 112
Proposals for Pacification 113
Religious Reunion 114

PAGE
Requisite division of Clerical Duties 117
Educational and Religious Institutions and Charities . . . 119
II. Universities and Scholastic Institutions 121
Ends they ought to Serve 121
Necessity for a Systematic Plan of Instruction 123
Lectures and Readings 126
Examinations, to what purpose to be Directed 127
Requirements of Instructory Institutions generally . . . 127
Intercourse between learned Institutions 128
Suitable Local Position for Universities 129
Public Libraries 130
III. Museums and Galleries of Works of Art 132
IV. Spectacular Institutions 133
A National Theatre 134
The Stage a National Moral Censor 135
Unjust Aspersions on its Character 138
Civilizing tendency of the Stage 140

IV. National Cultivation of Art and Science.

Reciprocal Influence between Civilization and Art and Science 141
Classification and Apportionment of Pursuits of this kind. . 142
Aid of Science to Civilization 143
Influence of Art on Civilization 144
Effect and Power of Music 146
Poetry, National and Devotional 147
National Monuments 151
Partiality evinced in their Erection 152
Civilizing Effect of Monumental Tributes 153
Memorials not Monumental 156
National Buildings 157
Domestic Application of Art and Science 158
National Disfigurements 159
Ornamental Gardening. 159
State Provision for the Promotion of Art and Literature . . 160
Popular Art 161
Blending and Co-operation of Art and Science 161
State Patronage for the Promotion of Science 162

V. Liberty of the Press, and Toleration.

PAGE
Restraints on Liberty 164
Principles of Civil Liberty 165
Liberty, Physical and Intellectual 165
Civil Influence of Slavery 166
Relative Influence of Liberty and Slavery on Civilization. . 167
Different Kinds of Intellectual Liberty 168
Freedom directly conducive to Civilization 168
I. A Free Press 168
Its Independence and Influence, whence derived 169
Censorship by the Stage and by the Press 170
The Parliament, the Church, and the Press 171
Basis of the Power of the Press 171
Legitimate Restraints on the Liberty of the Press 172
Licentiousness not Liberty 174
Present Character of the British Press 174
II. Religious Liberty 175
True Principles of Toleration 176
Basis of Toleration 177
Toleration in relation to Civilization 178
Inefficacy of Coercion 178
Essence of Toleration 179
Legitimate Limits to Toleration 181
Rationale of Intoleration 181
Intoleration no Test of a True Church 184
Rival Religious Bodies. 186
Toleration degenerating into Intoleration 187
Religious Superstitions 187
Basis of Intoleration 188
Right and Exercise of Private Judgment 189
Change of National Religion 189
State Benefits resulting from Toleration 189
Instruction should supersede Intoleration 190
Summary of the True Principle of Toleration 191

VI. National Commemorations and Festivals.

Threefold Advantages of Days of Recreation 192
National Relaxation 193
The Christian Sabbath 193
Right Rule for its Observance 194

PAGE

True Principle in Sabbatarian Legislation 195
Present necessity for National Recreations 196
State Precedents for National Holidays 197
Holy-Days and Holidays 198
Commemorative Anniversaries 199
Specific Days proposed 200
Utility of these Commemorations 201
National Amusements, their Regulation, Adaptation, and Aim 202
Corrective Influence of certain Recreative Pursuits. . . . 202
Convivial Celebrations 202
Improving Recreations 204
Excitements to Emulation. 205
Demoralizing and Depraving Recreations and Spectacles . . 206
Gambling, and Games of Chance 208
Vicious and Idle Pursuits 209
State Provision for National Recreations 210
Plan for accomplishing these Proposals 210

VII. Dignities and Honorary Rewards.

Civil Distinctions originate with Nature. 211
Differences, Artificial and Natural 211
Rewards for the Masses 213
Civilizing Influence, and Moral Effect of National Dignities . 213
State Honours representative of Real Renown 214
Civilizing Influence of an Aristocracy 216
Suggestions for preventing the Impoverishment of the Peerage 217
Gentility. 218
Honours suited to a Civilized Age 219
Dignities and Rewards for Achievements in Civilization . . 220
Minor State Dignities 223
New Order of Dignities for Men of Letters 223
Revival of Extinct Orders of Nobility 224
Hereditary Honours 224
Peerages for Life 225
The End and Aim of Honorary Distinction 226
State Pensions to Meritorious Persons 227
State Rewards correspondent with their Object . . . 228
Professional Pecuniary Recompense 229
Pensions to Men of Letters and Science 229

PAGE
Dispensation of State Preferment 231
Rewards to Men of Middle Rank 232
Special Qualities requiring National Encouragement . . . 233

VIII. Moral Jurisprudence.

Nature, Scope, and Aim of Moral Jurisprudence 233
Leading Principles of Jurisprudence generally 234
Legislation and Civilization 235
Proper Sphere of Moral Jurisprudence 237
Leading Principles of Moral Jurisprudence 240
I. Systems of Civil Government 240
Essential Principles of Liberty 241
Sovereign Authority 242
Moral Influence of Sovereigns in Monarchical States . . . 243
Moral Influence of Rulers 245
Popular Tyranny 246
Representative Governments 247
True Principles of Representation 247
Mixed Constitutions 249
Rival Legislative Bodies 250
II. Objects and Systems of Laws 250
Specific Adaptation of particular Codes 251
Laws repugnant to Nature or Religion 252
Accordance with National Character of National Laws . . 254
Marriage Laws, and Influence and Position of Women . . 255
Conferring the Franchise on Females 257
Criminal Moral Codes 259
Courts of Chivalry to arbitrate on Cases of Honour. . . . 260
Leading Principle on which Punishments proceed 260
Preventative Punishments. 261
Varieties and Objects of Punishments 262
Punishments corresponding with the Crimes to be repressed . 262
Origin of Civil Punishments 262
Neglect to calculate Moral Effects 264
Moral Effect of Punishments 264
Degrading Punishments 268
Reformatories 269
Whence Punishments fail in their End 270
State Rewards for Good Conduct 271
Discouraging Punishments 272

PAGE

Oaths 272
Mode of Administering Justice 273
Necessity of a Public Prosecutor 274
Civil Disabilities 275
Revenue and other Restrictive Laws 276
Copyright and Patent Laws 277
Principle of the Poor Laws 277
Jurisprudential Changes 278
Laws repugnant to the National Sentiment 279
Moral Causes and Operations, and Moral Jurisprudence . . 280

IX. Internal Communication.

Civilizing Influence of Mutual Intercourse 280
This Element should be combined with the others enumerated 281
Amalgamation of Societies in a Nation 282
Analogy between Individual and Internal Communication . 282
Intercourse between Ranks and Classes 285
Varieties of Internal Communication. 286
Specific Modes of Intercommunication 286
National Intercommunication a National Object 288
Establishment of Railway Communication in this Country . 288
Postal and Telegraphic Communication 289
Different Points of Internal Communication. 290
Capital Cities 291
Rival Rural and Urban Interests 294
Preservation of Balance between Contending Interests . . 296
Colonial Communication 297
Principles of Colonial Relationship 298
Steam Navigation and the Electric Telegraph 300
Communication of each kind essential 301
Importance and Civilizing Influence of this Element . . . 301
Its due Regulation and proper Application 302

X. International Intercourse.

Mutual Influence of Civilization and Intercourse 303
Foreign Intercourse the Forerunner of Civilization . . . 304
Intercourse the primary Stimulus to Civilization 304
Influence of International Intercourse on National Character 306
Foreign Alliance and Interference 307

PAGE
Civilization subversive of National Barriers 309
Influence of Religion in relation to this Element 310
International Commerce 311
International Interests 311
Early Civilization of this Country by International Intercourse 312
Foreign Policy regulated by Geographical Position . . . 314
Insular Situation 314
Marine Intercourse 315
Civilization contributes to Promote Nationality 315
Various Modes of International Intercourse 316
Definition of War 317
Influence of War upon Civilization 319
International Interventions 321
War superseded by Congress 322
Influence of Civilization upon War 323
Provocations to War, and Preservatives of Peace 325
Punishment of Criminal States 326
Civilization increases Martial Skill 327
Maintenance of National Boundaries. 329
Protection of National Frontiers 330
Preservation of Balance of Power between Nations. . . . 331
International Alliances 332
International Independence 333
Intercourse through Ambassadors 335
Precautions respecting Foreign Influence 336
International Honour 336
International Enterprise 337
International Laws 338
International Language 339
Civilizing results of International Intercourse 340
Civilization of the World 341

THE END RESULTING FROM THE COMPLETE ESTABLISHMENT OF CIVILIZATION.

Correct Enumeration of the Elements of Civilization . . . 341
Incomplete Accomplishment of Civilization 342
Conjunction of each of the Elements of Civilization . . . 343
Definition of the End of Civilization 343

PAGE

Threefold Objects of Civilization 345
Happiness and Civilization 347
Changes, Material and Moral, occasioned by Civilization . . 349
Contemporaneous Co-operation of the Elements of Civilization 349
Mutual Aid to each other of different Elements 350
Proper Application of Elements 351
Threefold Results of Civilization 353
National Diseases in relation to Civilization 353
Ideal of a completely Civilized State. 354
Influence of Civilization upon Manners and Morals . . . 356
Moral Causes, and their Influence upon Civilization . . . 357
Civilization the Safeguard of Civil Liberty 358
Symbols of Civilization 360
Physical Advantages resulting from Civilization 361
Stimulus to Progression 361
Results of Civilization, Individual and National 362
Social Evils attendant on Civilization 363
No instance as yet of a completely Civilized State 364
Civilization, Past, Present, and Prospective 365
Recapitulation and Conclusion 366

THE REAL NATURE AND ESSENCE

OF

CIVILIZATION.

MAN is directly and peculiarly distinguished from every other created being in the world, alike by the superiority of his intelligent powers, as also by the capacity of those powers to be constantly advancing forward in the career towards perfection. Not only, indeed, is the mind of man thus susceptible of improvement, but the full growth and even the very development of its faculties are dependent on the cultivation bestowed upon the former. Instinctive intelligence, on the other hand, is created perfect, and neither admits of nor requires cultivation for its advancement. The capacity of the human mind to be ever progressing onward towards a perfect condition, both as respects its acquirements and its powers, has been regarded as one of the most sure and satisfactory proofs of the soul's immortality. This adaptation for improvement and advancement is moreover alike true with regard to each individual mind, and as respects men in the aggregate when united together into a civil society or state. There is also not only a growth observable in a national as well as a natural body, but in a national mind too the progress of growth and development is as plain, and as perceptible at each stage, as it is in the mind of a man: and the changes and peculiarities observable at

the different stages in each are corresponding and very similar. Both individuals and nations differ, however, one from another in many important respects, according to the various and conflicting circumstances by which they are surrounded. In the case, moreover, both of men and states, however disposed to exert themselves to further their own progression and civilization, there are certain counteracting causes ever in operation by which the course of nature is wont to be diverted or impeded. These require to be attended to, not for the purpose of constructing a new channel, but in order to restore the current to that in which it originally flowed. It is also of high importance to all who are interested in the promotion of civilization, that those great principles by which its growth is regulated, whose foundations lie deep in the knowledge of human nature, and which are as fixed, and sure, and definable as those of any other science, should be fully developed and understood.

The cause of civilization is not that of any one country, but of all mankind. It is confined to no one age, but it is eternal. Its principles are applicable to no particular race alone, as it is the birthright and the blessing of all people alike. Civilization, indeed, should extend as far as mankind have spread, and should bind all the nations of the world into one common and friendly society.

Nevertheless, although ultimately the whole world may attain civilization, yet the civilization of one country will be very different to that of another, and the civilization of each will necessarily vary according to the character and circumstances of the people, and the influences of different kinds by which they are surrounded. Different races may, moreover, no doubt, vary extensively as regards their general capacity for civilization, and the particular kind of civilization best suited for them, as do also the people of the same nation at various periods of their growth and history. But to assert that any people

are absolutely unfitted and incapacitated for civilization, is alike unphilosophical and at variance with the principles of human nature. Great Britain, and even Rome and Greece, appeared at one time as little adapted for civilization as do the savages of Africa and of the remote Indian islands at the present day, to whom, of course, a very different code of civilization should be applied, to what would be suitable for, and would be availed of by Europeans. It is, in fact, with regard to civilization, as it is with regard to education. All persons, of whatever age and of whatever capacity or previous discipline, are not fitted for precisely the same kind of teaching, although all are alike capable of being taught. So persons of all classes and all countries, although not all fitted for civilization of the same kind, are all fitted for civilization, the negro as well as the white man, the African equally with the European. Nevertheless, the cause and nature of civilization adapted for, and efficient for the one, must vary widely from that which is proper for the other. They will probably also differ a good deal as regards the extent of civilization which each will ultimately attain.

In entering upon the subject before us, it will be proper, in order to obtain a comprehensive and adequate view of the nature and essence of civilization, that we should first inquire into the capacities and adaptation of man to be influenced by it, more especially under the following conditions:—1. Man considered as an individual. 2. Man considered in the aggregate, or as collected into a society or state. 3. Man considered as the type of a state.

1. The influences produced by civilization on the individual man need not here to be pointed out. Man indeed owes everything to civilization. He is dependent on this not only for his intellectual acquirements and enjoyments, but to enable him to construct a habitation to dwell in, and even to furnish clothes to protect him

against the weather. Nay, more than this, his very corporeal frame calls for the aid of civilization, and of constant artificial appliances, in order to ensure his comfort. Animals, on the other hand, have most of these wants supplied by Nature, while man's destitution seems providentially ordered to stimulate him to those artificial resources of invention, and application, and exertion, which he, unlike the rest of the creation, is capable of putting forth. Aristotle observes in his Politics—a work alike philosophical, practical, and profound, and which forms probably the most complete and most comprehensive compendium of state-wisdom which has ever yet emanated from the mind of man:—"Perfected by the offices and duties of social life, man is the best, but rude and undisciplined, he is the very worst of animals."* In a civilized condition, moreover, every power and capacity of the mind is developed and brought into activity; while in a state of barbarism, many of these lie dead, and the most exalted may never be called upon to exert themselves. This is indeed of itself surely enough to prove that civilization is not merely the highest, but the natural condition of man; that alone in which all his endowments, and more especially the most important of them, can be exercised and perfected. In a state of barbarism, on the other hand, the animal propensities and lower impulses only of his nature,—which ought ever to be restrained and subdued,—are those which will be fully developed and brought into use.

2. As regards the influences produced by civilization upon man in the aggregate, or upon a body of individuals collected together into a society or state, we must consider on the one hand that these persons, though united into a community, are each individuals still, and retain all their particular intellectual endowments and dispositions; while, on the other hand, by being thus united they

* Book I.

are in many respects extensively affected through the influence produced by the operation of these different minds on each other, whereby various faculties, and powers, and dispositions, are developed, which, while each remained alone, or acted by himself independently, would have lain dormant. Hence the same man when in society and when in solitude, though really and essentially unchanged, conducts himself very differently.

Men join together in societies from a sense of their own individual incompleteness and insufficiency, and from a consciousness that they are but units or elements of the whole civil body. If each man was able of himself to do all that he required, he would not resort to the aid of others. Indeed we only do so now from necessity, and in those cases where we cannot effect what we wish by ourselves alone. This want it is which induces, or rather drives men into society, societies into nations, and nations into confederations; until the whole world is, to some extent at least, knit together into one grand social community. And the further that civilization advances, the more extensive in all respects will be this union; and the more extensive is this union and co-operation, the more complete is the confederation thus formed. Society is, indeed, the very soul of civilization. Without this, civilization cannot exist. And it is in a great degree, because, on account of the inferiority of their powers of intelligence, they can only enter into society to a very limited extent, that animals do not advance in civilization beyond their original condition, and are not adapted for ever attaining it in any large measure.

3. In considering man as the type of a nation or state composed of a body of individuals united together for mutual society and aid, and governed by laws conducive both to their individual and general welfare, we shall find that the resemblance extends to various and striking particulars. Both men and states have their periods of

childhood, youth, maturity, and decay; both in their early condition are comparatively powerless, gradually acquire strength, and increase by degrees in wealth, importance, and civilization; both in their progress from infancy to maturity pass through many stages and changes; both are subject to certain disorders at particular times, and at different periods of their growth are peculiarly liable to be affected by specific influences and circumstances. Demosthenes, in the second Olynthiac, philosophically compares the condition of men and states as more especially illustrated when any defect befalls either. "As in our bodies, when one is in good health, the peculiar flaws in the system do not show themselves; but if any malady comes on them, then they are all stirred up,—fractures, sprains, and whatever else is faulty; so it is with states and sovereigns." As different diseases affect or are more peculiarly prejudicial to mankind at particular stages of their career; so among states different diseases affect them, and are more peculiarly prejudicial at one time than they are at another. And young states are as little liable to many of the diseases of those at an advanced career, as young children are to gout and other infirmities of old age. Moreover, both nations and individuals during their youth are regulated by the simplest rules of conduct, as both their concerns and property are of the simplest kind, gradually becoming more complex and important as those who are interested about them advance in age. The petty quarrels of youthful states are also similar to those of children, occurring frequently, resulting in but little, and being soon forgotten. Both a kingdom and a man arrive at maturity very gradually, and both have their respective eras of rise and prosperity, and highest power, and perfection, and decline; both,—and from somewhat similar causes, from that tendency towards dissolution which is a part of the constitution of all things terrestrial,

whether physical or political,—after arriving at their point of perfection, begin to fall into decay, and gradually at length become enfeebled and die. States too, like men, have not only their periods of growth and decline, but their fatal catastrophes also; and corresponding causes conduce to the destruction of each. Nations, moreover, as in the case of men, wear out by age. And old age is as inevitable and as fatal to states as it is to men. There are also in the life of every nation, as in that of an individual, seasons of sickness and of health, of prosperity and adversity, of summer and winter, and even of day and night.

Each nation, moreover, like each man, is distinguished by some particular character or disposition and talents; and the national character of a people is as marked as that of the various individuals composing it, while both are of essential importance to be studied by those who would legislate for them. The actions of states correspond also with those of individuals, and corresponding influences tend to direct the operations and the aims of each alike. In a nation, as well as in an individual, various powers and interests will be found coexistent, each of which will be striving to obtain the ascendancy over the others, and to acquire the supremacy and rule over the whole. If we desired strictly, and to its full length, to carry out the comparison here commenced, of an individual man to a collective state, we might refer to the intellectual faculties of the former as resembling the ruling and judicial powers in the latter, among which the reason should bear the supreme authority, like the administrator of justice in a nation. The moral feelings and dispositions might be compared to the middle class and well ordered portion of society, which possess neither the authority of the highest, nor the turbulence and licentiousness of those that are depraved and disaffected, which must always form a considerable portion

of every population, and which may be represented by the animal passions and propensities. In imitation of some philosophers, both in ancient and modern times, the metaphor might be yet further followed out, by comparing the brain to the capital of the nation, the nerves to the organs of intelligence and means of communication between different parts, the limbs and natural weapons of defence to the military and naval powers, and the alimentary and other material organs to the commercial bodies of the kingdom. The muscles, and veins, and arteries, may represent the roads, and rivers, and canals, and the senses and their organs, the ports of the empire.

In a nation as in an individual, a constant rivalry and contention exist between the different powers and interests, although those of the higher order, and of superior intelligence and virtue ought to bear sway, but which are controlled in the exercise of their rule by the lower endowments, while the influence of the middle rank moderates both, and keeps each in its position. In times of anarchy, however, these several influences change place, the lower ruling in the stead of the higher, and the middle either joining with the victorious party or becoming altogether annihilated. In man the various powers, and feelings, and passions, and propensities, each contend together for the supremacy; but although in the exercise of his mental faculties he may be much biased by his animal passions and feelings, yet the former bear sway, and reason presides as the ruling power, supported by the moral endowments of the soul. When however intemperance or passion takes possession of the man, reason is driven from her throne, the animal influences usurp the authority of the intellectual endowments, and conscience and the moral influences are disregarded. In the case therefore both of men and of states, the higher influences ought to be upheld and bear rule; those of the most cultivated minds and the purest morals

should possess the supreme command; while those of depraved habits and ignorant minds, ought not to be allowed to exercise their baneful sway. The restricted influence, however, even of the lower animal impulses, if properly availed of, may be beneficial. The mind, if exerted without any consideration for the requirements of the material frame, would conduce to the disorganization of the whole system, as well as to the injury of each particular part; and in states each legitimate interest may be advantageously applied in its proper sphere. Great minds exercise an influence over those which are inferior, and over the mass of mankind, corresponding with that which man exercises over animals. But it is an influence only; the mass remains the same. We tame animals, but they are animals still, and retain all their habits and dispositions as before. What taming is to an animal, civilization is to a nation. Taming, however, blunts and weakens many of the natural forces of the animal, while civilization quickens and extends those of the nation. A body of men in a state, are therefore acted on by the authority of the leading minds who address themselves to it. But they are biased only, not changed: the course is not stopped, but merely diverted. As therefore it is not always desirable that even the highest faculties of the mind should bear undisputed sway uninfluenced altogether by the animal impulses; so it is not always expedient in a state, that those of the highest rank, whatever be their attainments or their virtues, should rule without control. Aristotle observes with characteristic penetration, that "the best commonwealth is that in which middling men most abound"* And again, "Governments are good and nations happy in proportion to the preponderancy of the middle ranks, and their ability to defy the pride and oppression of the great, as well as to resist the rapacity and

* Politics, book vi.

malignity of the vulgar."* So an individual who would regulate his conduct most discreetly, must be ruled not exclusively by the direction of his highest faculties only, but by the aid of his secondary endowments and moral powers. On the other hand, as no body can be sound when the head or any vital member is violently affected or subject to disease; so no state can be in a healthy condition when its rulers or governing bodies are depraved, or weak, or disordered. The people, too, are very apt to copy the vices and even the failings of their superiors, or at any rate to palliate their own by reference to those of the great.

The changes in condition both of men and of states form another striking coincidence between them; and on this point Aristotle, in the work already quoted from, observes, "In moral and intellectual endowments, one man is scarcely ever more different from another, than the same man is different from himself at different periods of his life."†

A nation, like an individual, may also possess property and territories of its own; may have both other states and individuals subservient to and dependent upon it, and may form treaties with or wage war against them. In each of these instances we may see how much more important is progress in civilization than mere physical strength; and what real power it confers alike on men and on states, over those who are inferior to them in this respect; how great a difference also is produced in both by intellectual and moral culture.

Thus, from the study of human nature do we learn an important lesson both in politics and in civilization, and have afforded to us an illustration how intimately connected together those important studies are, and ever ought to be. Nations and men are, therefore, influenced and ruled by the same means, and according to the same

* Politics, book vii. † Ibid., book iv.

grand principles,—a consideration which it is ever of consequence to bear fully in mind. But neither men nor nations are primarily ruled by laws. There are doubtless moral causes in their operation far more influential than any laws can be, and of these civilization, in its true and comprehensive sense, embraces all that is most important, most extensive, and most valuable. By these influences, both men and states are not only affected but changed; not merely moved but carried along.

As regards the actual origin of civilization alike among states and individuals, different opinions have been formed by those who have devoted themselves to this inquiry. Archbishop Whately has maintained that civilization among mankind would never have arisen had not the earlier inhabitants of the earth been taught this by a Divine instructor. But unfortunately for this theory, the early inhabitants supposed to have been so taught were but very partially civilized, which we can hardly suppose would have been the case, and that the Divine purpose for this end, if it existed, would have been allowed to be so very imperfectly accomplished. On the other hand, a very high degree of civilization was ultimately reached by mankind when no such Divine influence is supposed to have been exerted, which renders the Archbishop's theory still more improbable. Nor is it any proof of uncivilized nations not being capacitated to advance in civilization, that we find that in certain arts or pursuits they have not for a long period made any progress, as this may arise from peculiar circumstances quite independent of the general advancement of civilization, such as those particular arts having been brought to the highest perfection which the materials for them admitted, or which the occasions for which they were used were required. Their want of intercourse with other nations, is what is here necessary to promote their civilization. In our own country, although civilization

generally is rapidly advancing, certain arts and pursuits have nevertheless ceased to progress to a higher state of perfection.

From the circumstance that in some peculiar cases the advancement of a particular art, or of civilization in general, has been produced by intercourse with other nations, some persons have supposed that it must have been so in all cases; and they have been led to deny that, without any exception, either art or civilization could ever have originated in any people spontaneously or by their own invention. Because art in Greece was advanced by the example of art in Egypt, they have concluded that in all nations where art has advanced, its progress must have been owing to the example of some other nations. As in an individual so in a nation, any particular art or science, or other pursuit connected with civilization, may either have been invented by that people, or they may have learnt it from some other people. In most cases, however, probably part is original in the man or in the nation, and part is borrowed from others. The proportion in which either invention or imitation prevails, will be mainly regulated by the character of the particular person or people.

The main requisites for originating civilization in any nation are, in the first place, that there should be a constant and close intercourse between the people in such a state, whether arising from the extent of the population, the proximity to each other of its cities, or whatever cause, so that different minds may be both stimulated by competition, and obtain a continual interchange of ideas. Intercourse with foreign nations also conduces to civilization in a corresponding mode. But in addition to all this, it is requisite that the people in a particular nation be in a condition of such security and prosperity as to have leisure from providing for the necessities of the body, to bestow a care on the requisites of the mind.

And this intercourse of the people in a state both with one another and with those of foreign nations, forms, as I shall hereafter point out, two of the essential Elements of civilization, though but two of them only out of several others.

If it be urged that savages are not only behind other nations in civilization, but that their mental faculties are so feeble in comparison with those of cultivated people, that they are intellectually incapacitated from rising out of their rude state; I would reply, that as their cultivation advances their powers become improved, and as their powers become improved, civilization itself progresses. That which is mainly wanting in their case to advance them in civilization is, however, not power, but stimulus. They have the capacity to move, but they lack the motive to urge them to do so. Their condition furnishes them with all that they require; and until they require more, they will rest content with that condition.

Many find it easier to make than to maintain a fortune. Nations which have achieved mighty victories, not unfrequently fail to hold what they have gained. The reason of this is that in each case the stimulus that urged them on to the conquest is wanting to render that secure.

Whatever produces want, or occasions the perception of it, has a tendency to promote civilization, whether in the man or in the state, inasmuch as a feeling of the want originates at once a stimulus to supply it, and stimulus leads to exertion, exertion to progress, and progress to civilization. A person who is without wants, remains in a state of passive inaction, from which he is stimulated only by the occurrence of a want, the effort to supply which engages him in undertakings that promote his civilization. So is it also in a corresponding manner in the case of a state.

Not impossibly, indeed, almost every evil that befals society in its early condition, may indirectly tend to forward its civilization, by creating a stimulus, or an effort to escape from the evil, which in turn leads on to or produces progress, as progress does civilization. In this respect many national curses prove eventually national blessings, and temporary suffering becomes the cause of permanent amelioration.

I have already observed that civilization, although it may not be the original condition of mankind, is in reality far more their natural condition than is one of barbarism. Many of the habits and customs, indeed, of men in an uncivilized state, will, if duly inquired into, be found much more contrary to, and even more at violence with nature, than what are either ordinarily or often followed in civilized society, even where the most artificial habits have been pursued. While civilization necessarily introduces many usages which are unnatural, it also ever seeks to restore and to turn into the course of nature those which are shown to be contrary to it, and to be perversions and corruptions of what originally were attempts to follow the dictates and guidance of nature. Reason, moreover, in a state of civilized society, ever exercises her full sway, while in a condition of barbarism she is silent or unheeded.

We have next to consider in what civilization really consists; to define its actual essence, and to point out the true tests by which its existence may be ascertained.

Civilization does not consist in the "perfecting of civil life;"* as this may be effected, at any rate to a very large extent, especially as regards the social condition of a people, when civilization has made but little progress among them. Nor does it consist in "progress;"† as both nations and individuals, although in a progressive state,

* Guizot: History of Civilization. † Ibid.

may be either in a very advanced or a very low condition as regards their civilization, according to other circumstances. Progress, indeed, may exist among a people in a very barbarous state, while it may not be observable among those in a high condition of civilization. Nay, it is necessarily wanting in those who have attained the highest point. Civilization does not, moreover, consist in luxury, as this, so far from being its consummation, is but the forerunner of its decay. Nor is it even an artificial state, as it is in reality the true, and legitimate, and natural condition of intelligent beings.

Civilization is also said to consist in part in the relinquishment of barbarous pursuits, such as war, hunting, and migrating from place to place. I must, however, contend that it is not the relinquishment of these habits that constitutes, or even contributes to civilization; nor are those habits actually and necessarily inconsistent with it. Civilization, nevertheless, causes a change in these habits, and renders what before was barbarous both in its nature and tendency, far less so, and to a certain extent even refining and elevating.

War indeed, so far from being a proof of defect in civilization, is probably the best test on the whole of the actual and essential power of a nation, as in contests of this kind all its energies are called forth by being pitted against a rival; and vital interests being at stake, its very utmost efforts for success are exerted. Moreover, scientific skill as well as mere physical force is here called into requisition. The great nations of old, Greece and Rome, so renowned for their intellectual achievements, were also equally famous for their martial enterprises.

By what therefore is civilization constituted?

Civilization in the individual, immediately results from and is directly caused by the due cultivation, development, and exaltation of his intellectual and moral faculties and powers, so as not only to bring them fully

to maturity and into complete action, but also to enable them to acquire a proper and efficient control over the animal feelings and influences. And in a state, civilization results from, and is caused in a corresponding manner, by the due exaltation of those higher influences, such as talent and virtue, which ought ever to be predominant in it, and to be the characteristic qualities both of the individuals and the institutions which bear sway, so as not only to render these noble principles the most important in the state, but also to enable them to acquire a due and entire ascendancy over the influences of vice, and ignorance, and corruption, as well as over such portion of the people as are liable to be swayed by any of these pernicious influences.

The first ingredient, therefore, which is essential to constitute civilization, whether in an individual or in a nation, is the possession of knowledge, both as regards general information and the acquaintance with particular practical pursuits, and sciences, and arts. Without this, civilization cannot subsist. Knowledge, nevertheless, does not of itself constitute civilization, but is only an incipient step in that direction. The next essential ingredient in civilization, either in a man or in a state, after the possession of knowledge, appears to be the possession of a certain degree of moral and social refinement, by which the mind of each person in the nation becomes softened and elevated, and the whole community are united together in one bond of mutual alliance and friendship, the rupture of which is directly inimical to civilization. Various other causes and agencies spring out of these, the operation of which together contribute to constitute a complete condition of civilization; the ultimate result of the whole, both in the man and in the state, being that the higher endowments and influences obtain the ascendancy, while those of a lower grade and class become subjugated to them.

In order to render civilization perfect, a refinement and purification should also be effected, not only in the general manners and habits, but also in the tastes and intellectual pursuits in which the people both individually and collectively are wont to indulge, and for promoting which, as will be seen, a separate Element is here provided.*

It is essential, moreover, that civilization should be generally diffused throughout the nation, and not confined to some particular districts or individuals. In most nations there are certain persons who are more or less civilized, even while the mass remains rude and uncultivated. When we speak of the comparative condition of the civilization of any particular nation or age, this refers of course only to the state as regards civilization of the body of the people, and does not mean to imply that there are no exceptions to the condition described, or that certain persons may not be in a much more advanced and enlightened state than are the generality, while others may be in condition even below the average. Some of the greatest lights have been produced, and have shone brightly in a dark age, and periods of comparative barbarity have given birth to men of the highest genius. It is, however, the wide spread of civilization in a state, that alone constitutes a condition of this kind. Not only, indeed, should civilization be diffused through all the different districts of the nation, but among all classes also must its influence be extended, and with as great an equality as can be effected.

Nevertheless, one great and essential influence in the promotion of civilization, although not to be regarded as an Element of itself, is the concentration in one place, as a city or small district, of a great number of people into one community, by means of which their minds are brought into contact, rivalry is excited, and progress of

* Element 4.

various kinds is the result. In the case of matter, compressing it into a compact mass, gives to it that solidity and force of which it was wholly destitute while in a loose or liquid state.

It is not, however, absolutely essential for the establishment of a high degree of civilization either in an individual or in a nation, that a condition of perfect morality or freedom from crime in general should exist; and, indeed, it cannot be denied that civilization is sometimes found both in men and states coexistent with a considerable amount of crime. There are, however, certain crimes, more especially those of violence and disorder, wholly inconsistent with a complete condition of civilization; and the natural and legitimate tendency of civilization is to extinguish crime, and to lessen the influences which tend to its production.

It is not correct to divide civilization as regards its essence into that which is material and that which is immaterial, as in many cases while its essence is absolutely material, its medium may be as entirely immaterial, and *vice versâ*. So, in the case of sculpture, while the medium of this art is in all respects material, the essence of the art, in which consist its intellectual excellence and tasteful merit, is as completely immaterial.

The elementary principles of civilization, by which both its promotion and its progress are regulated, may be comprehended in the four following classes:—1. Mental. 2. Moral. 3. Legal. 4. Local.

1. Under the first of these classes, are comprehended those of the Elements of civilization contained in Numbers I., III., IV., V., VI., and VII. of the following sections, which relate to the cultivation of the national mind, the affording opportunities for intellectual improvement and refinement throughout the nation, allowing full liberty for exercising these high privileges, and the offering encouragement to those who use them aright;

each of which will be fully discussed under the sections appropriated to them.

2. The second of the above classes includes Numbers I., II., III., V., and VIII. of the following sections, which relate to the moral and religious education of the national mind, the means to be adopted for effecting this freely, and with proper regulations, as is there pointed out.

3. Under the head of Legal Elements, are comprehended those cases where legislative interference appears requisite to aid in carrying out the principles to be established, and which are discussed under Sections V. and VIII.

4. The topics embraced under the head of Local Elements, though treated on in Sections IX. and X. require some consideration while discussing the general subject of civilization, more especially as many of the causes there adverted to are such as do not admit, like the other influences here commented on, of being altered or modified according to the circumstances of the particular case, or the desire of those who have to deal with them.

A person taking up a map of the world who was ignorant of its history, would be almost spontaneously led to infer that Asia is that portion where population would at first be most abundant, and where civilization would primarily dawn; and which he might conclude from its central situation and accessibility from other countries. Europe, he might suppose, would be from its climate naturally very favourable to civilization, and Greece peculiarly so from its situation, being accessible both by sea and land from so many points, and of so salubrious a climate. Italy, also, from the same causes, would naturally be expected early to reach a high point in civilization, and to which, moreover, the moderate dimensions of these countries would much conduce. Britain, from its insular position, and owing to its being

so distant from the latter countries, would not be likely to be visited by or populated from them for a considerable time, and might, therefore, be expected to remain for a long period in a state of barbarism. It might, however, be inferred that when once civilization was planted there, it would probably soon take root, and flourish with vigour.

To her local or geographical position, Great Britain indeed owes much as regards her progress in civilization, especially in relation to the four following points:—

I. Being an island it is accessible, and yet defensible on all sides, having thus the advantage of both facility of communication with foreign parts, and at the same time of security against foreign attack. From the insular position of this country, we are not only more free from invasion than are countries which form a part of the Continent, but from this circumstance the limits of our inland territory are distinctly and finally settled, and we are consequently exempt from aggressions by and disputes with foreign countries respecting such matters, which with many nations is the source of so much and such constant contention. Another result of our insular position, which may not however influence civilization, is that from our having much less general intercourse with the surrounding nations than is carried on by continental countries, the identity of the race is preserved for a much longer period. The British nation do not intermix and intermarry with foreigners as do the people of France, and Germany, and Hungary. It has also been remarked,* that a further great advantage arising out of our insular position and character, is that our social institutions have formed themselves out of our real wants and interests. Peninsulas, such as Greece and Italy, are, next to islands, most favourable for civilization from the above causes. Large continents, like Africa, especially if not intersected

* Coleridge: Constitution of Church and State.

by rivers or seas, are the least favourable for civilization. Insular position may, indeed, in some cases be unfavourable to civilization, as impeding that freedom of intercourse with other countries which is highly conducive to it. In the case of Great Britain this has, however, been counteracted by the following circumstances:—1. Our extensive commerce leads to much foreign intercourse, and occasions our both constantly visiting foreign countries and receiving visits from the inhabitants of those parts. By this means we are also to some extent influenced by their customs and laws, and become acquainted with their opinions and mode of life, instead of living entirely to ourselves. 2. Our great naval force promotes this intercourse yet further, and obtains for us a communication with nations both far and near, and of every variety. 3. Our extensive colonial possessions occasion also a constant and a close intercourse with several foreign countries, and exercise, in a variety of ways, an extensive influence on the mother-country.

II. The size of this country is another point from which it derives essential advantages, being extensive enough to constitute a kingdom able to maintain itself, both as regards its forces for protection and its natural resources; while, on the other hand, it is not so large as to be incapable of being ruled or superintended by one government; nor are any of its parts so distant from the centre, or metropolitan district, as to be difficult of access; nor is the sea so remote from any portion of the British isles as not to be in some way available to the inhabitants of that district; while the greater part of the country is near the coast. The large extent of coast, for which Greece was so peculiarly distinguished, conduces to the promotion of navigation, which in its turn encourages many other pursuits tending to civilization. Opportunities for navigation to different parts of it are also

afforded by the numerous rivers which flow through our island.

III. The situation of Great Britain as regards its proximity to the continent of Europe, and to the most civilized nations there, is another matter of considerable importance. Its position in this respect is peculiarly advantageous; for while it is distant enough from the Continent to be secure from any unexpected annoyance from that quarter, it is near enough for all the purposes of communication; and at one point, indeed, which admits of being effectually guarded, from the nature of the spot, a direct and easy access to the Continent is opened. The geographical position of the territory of the Jews was immediately conducive to their civilization, being such as to afford intercourse with all those nations of the world, who, from their locality, might be expected to be the most civilized.

There is also another point of essential importance connected with our local position, which deserves here to be noted. It is that of the union into one kingdom of three nations, consisting of distinct and very different races of people, though their natural territories near adjoin. Varying as these people do in character, and pursuits, and turn of mind, an important influence is produced as regards the promotion of civilization, by each calling forth the energies of the other, and by which the natural defects of each may be in some measure counteracted. Their very differences in race, temperament, habits, and religion, are thus rendered beneficial in serving to develope the minds and feelings of various persons. New opinions are moreover originated by each, while they are modified by all. This conjunction of different elements is essentially characteristic of the British mind; and we see it still further carried out in the constitution of the British government, where three different estates co-exist together, rivalling and occasionally competing with each

other, but always tending to call forth the energies of their opponents. To this also rival parties and sects no less essentially contribute, while rival professions, and even individuals, promote the same end; and thus opposition becomes the parent of progression. This circumstance has probably an important influence in securing that freedom of opinion and discussion, which to so large an extent is established in this kingdom.

It has indeed been contended* that all the grand efforts in the accomplishment of civilization have been effected by mixed races, and that all the pure races have become degenerate. This theory receives considerable support from the practice we pursue in the breeding of domestic animals, where we find the mixed races very superior to those that are pure. In the case of animals, we endeavour to unite for reproduction those qualities which appear to be most valuable. So in the breeding of the human race ought the same end to be pursued; although in this case, not having the same control in the regulation of the breeding, we cannot expect that so precise a result will be produced. Possibly, however, the very mixture of races itself is beneficial even when done at hazard; and new qualities and powers, it may be, are engrafted and developed by blending races hitherto uncultivated, with those which for generations have been under the influence of civilization. Thus, as rude races derive from those that are civilized, in the course of their mingling together, a share of their mental vigour; so do they in turn communicate to them, in equal proportion, at least, their superior material constitution. A union of the two races is calculated moreover both to vary and to reproduce, and probably to invigorate also, many of the qualities belonging to both,—material, moral, and mental. Hence, by the mixture of races, and the consequent compound of the various qualities belonging to each,

* Prof. De Quatrefages. Anthropologie.

it may not impossibly happen that fresh and important elements may be originated, endowments of a new order spring up, and fresh qualities be developed, which are produced by the combination so occasioned. There may, moreover, be innate intellectual qualities of great value in the minds of many among the uncultivated races, which have never been displayed, from the want of opportunity to call them into action, and from their not having received any cultivation. By blending these untilled races with those of civilized people, qualities are communicated from the one to the other, which have not before been sown in that soil, and which may be expected to produce something beyond what has hitherto been brought forth. In the case of the people of this country, although with the exception of the admixture of those of the three different kingdoms united into one, very little mingling of races now takes place, yet from the frequent invasions of our island in ages gone by, the British race contains in its blood a mixture probably as great as could possibly be produced.

IV. The mild and salubrious climate of this country, is another point of great importance as conducive to its progress in civilization. It is at all times moderate, and yet not the same in different parts; favourable for both animal productions and those of the soil, and for these in great variety. Added to this the weather is temperate, the soil fertile, and the ground, without being mountainous, is sufficiently undulated for all purposes of commerce and cultivation, and which also ensures its being well watered. The natural productions of the soil are moreover of great practical utility.

Climate, indeed, in numerous ways, and both directly and indirectly, exercises a vast influence over the animal, moral, and intellectual condition of a people. The influence of climate upon national character varies, of course, greatly according to its quality, some climates

being invigorating, others relaxing, and producing accordingly corresponding dispositions, and also certain mental and moral qualities and endowments. As regards climate, moreover, both the condition of the temperature, and the extent of the variations of it, have an important effect upon the growth, vigour, energy, and general health, as also on the physical, intellectual, moral, and social condition of the inhabitants, which is the case too with the food that such climate yields. Texture and temperament in the human frame, are what are mainly affected by both these causes. Climate also variously affects the sensibility of the frame, and the strength of the passions. As air is so essential to life, so the qualities of the air, especially as regards its purity and its temperature, must have an important influence on our physical state, and through that on our intellectual and moral condition also. And it is from this circumstance that the influence of climate is so extensive and so powerful. Temperate climates are the most favourable to civilization, as developing the higher qualities, and not invigorating the baser feelings. Varieties of climate in the same country are also in many respects favourable to civilization. The varieties experienced in this country as regards climate, and temperature, and weather, have probably a beneficial effect upon the people in enabling them to undergo changes of this kind better than those of the Continent do generally. Hence it is that the English are less affected by change of country than most people, and bear more easily changes from heat to cold, and from moisture to dry atmosphere, and are consequently so peculiarly adapted for colonization. The health, manners, pursuits, morals, and several occupations and enterprises of the inhabitants of a country, are all more or less affected by climate. And to each race a particular climate seems specially adapted.* Both men

* The clear air of Attica, refreshed and purified by constant breezes, is celebrated as one of the chief advantages of its climate,

and animals are wont to degenerate when transplanted to a foreign soil, whose climate and nature differ from that which gave them birth. Climate, indeed, constitutes in many respects a more efficient boundary between different countries, and more entirely prevents them from intruding and encroaching on each other, than do even seas and mountains. The differences in climates constitute the real difficulty of colonization, and the variety and changes of our own climate are what enable us to do so much more than other countries can effect in the way of colonization. Indeed, although strangers may sojourn in a country with a climate which is unsuitable to them, they will not often fructify there. They may visit it as guests, but they cannot settle down as natives. Even certain of the laws for the regulation of a state may originate in the condition of its climate, as those for repressing luxury, which is more apt to affect nations of a relaxing and warm climate, than those where the air is cold and invigorating.

Many of the diseases, moreover, to which a people are liable, and the constitutional diseases to which states are subject, are more or less traceable to climate. Health is indeed as essential not only to the prosperity, but to the happiness of nations as it is to those of individuals. And in the case of each it is preserved by the maintenance and the exercise of their proper functions, and by guarding against the abuse or misuse of either. The form and manner of constructing the common habitations of the people, and their mode of dress, both which so largely influence their manners and customs, must also greatly depend on the climate of their country. On this also mainly depends the natural food which any country produces, whether animal or vegetable; and which in its turn, both as regards the manner of procuring it, as by

---

and is described by Euripides as lending a charm to the productions of the Athenian intellect.—*Müller's Literature of Ancient Greece*, 227.

hunting, fishing, or cultivating the soil, and the physical effect of it as food, extensively influences the character of the inhabitants of any nation, and that whether such food be solid or liquid. On the other hand, where a country which has but a scanty supply of natural food, is so placed that a constant supply of foreign food may be obtained; influences of different kinds will be produced through this circumstance, both by the food itself and by the intercourse thus opened with foreigners.

In regard to climate, not only is it necessary that the climate in question should be suitable to the constitution, and health, and mode of life of the people who are to reside in it, but that it should also suit the several particular animal and vegetable productions by which such people are to be nourished. Nevertheless, the influence of climate, and even that of race, must not be allowed to be so overpowering as might be supposed; but correspondingly with the several Elements of civilization, ought each to be regarded as merely one out of many that proportionally contribute to produce a particular result. This is at once obvious from the circumstance that the races who continue for ages to inhabit particular localities, widely vary during different periods of their history, in nearly every characteristic quality and pursuit that serves to distinguish a particular people, and one race from another. Indeed, through the influence of civilization, national character is much changed, and even that of races is considerably affected. Nay, even the very growth and development of each nation, and the causes which operate to produce these, are the occasion of great changes independent of any other circumstances; analogously to the mode in which the character of an adult varies from that of the boy, and is affected by several events attendant upon his growth, and education, and career. Thus, how extensively and in all respects different are the people of Greece and Rome in our day from what they were during

the era of their greatness and their glory! And the Britons and Gauls of this age are equally dissimilar to the rude races which existed when Greece and Rome were at the height of their renown and power.

Each separate nation appears to possess, as already observed, a character as marked and independent as that which belongs to particular individuals. And as in the case of individuals so in that of states, the course of conduct that is generally pursued by them will be for the most part in strict accordance with that character. The most forcible illustrations of this fact are afforded in those instances where the same object has occupied the attention of each, such as learning or religion, which seems fully to develope the peculiar genius or disposition of a particular people. A striking example of what is here asserted, is supplied by the histories of Germany, Italy, France, Spain, Holland, and Great Britain; and not least by that of individual districts in this country. Individuality of character is, moreover, observable as much in the decline as in the prosperity both of states and of men; and in the case of both, the particular language or idiom used is highly characteristic. Nevertheless it will in each instance be apt to develope itself in a very different manner according to circumstances.

Men of different nations differ, moreover, one from another as much morally and physically as they do mentally. And on each of these individuals, the different causes that influence national character more or less operate, in conjunction with the original natural constitution by which these different people were characterized. Nations too vary one from another as extensively in character as they do in language, and the difference in the latter reflects that of the former. Like men they have also their peculiar qualities, moral, material, and mental, their virtues and their vices, their fortes and their failings.

It is, nevertheless, a point of some difficulty to determine on what the character of nations mainly depends. It is not only owing to climate, as, while this remains unchanged, the character of the people may become entirely altered from particular circumstances. Nor is it altogether owing to the races of the people who constitute it, as these are often so commingled, that no distinct feature in them can be traced. Races, indeed, have an individual character, but this they owe to climate, the nature of the country from which they sprang, education, habits, and a variety of circumstances; and if these are changed, the particular character of the races in a few generations becomes also changed, independently even of their intermixture with one another; besides which, the character of a people often appears to alter from circumstances which are not ascertained. Indeed, people of different races differ not more from one another in all essential particulars, than do people of the same race, and even those of different families in the same town, or, it may be, those of the same family. Variety in capacity, turn of mind, disposition, habits, and feelings, is what constitutes the main distinction between different persons; and in these respects the difference is as great between people of the same race, as between those of different races and countries.

As regards two subjects more especially, it is peculiarly interesting to trace out the development of the national character, which is often displayed at a very early period of a nation's history, but which does not generally become fully manifested until civilization has attained a high degree of perfection. The bud is seen as soon as the shoot rears its head above the soil; but the flower does not bloom until the plant has reached a considerable height. I allude to the early characteristic traits which each nation exhibits in the infancy of its history, and to the development of the formation and growth of the

different civil institutions which serve no less than the former to mark its particular genius. As regards the manifestations of national character, the courage, the generosity, the independence, the energy, the ingenuity, and, I must add, the superstition, too, which were displayed by our rude forefathers, may have constituted the germ of the nobler, or, rather, more perfect qualities of the same kind which at this day characterize the inhabitants of this country. The same spirit of commercial enterprise which animates us now, was also a marked feature in the ancient Britons; and the habit of travelling about, and of wandering abroad to explore new countries, for which Englishmen are so remarkable, we may have derived from the predatory Saxons and Danes, whose blood was mingled with that of the primitive people of this country. In many nations in whose character there are very marked features, it is curious and interesting to trace to how large an extent the history of their country accords with the early exhibition of that character.

With respect to the civil institutions of this kingdom, many of those which are not only now in use, but the most highly prized among us, had not merely their type at an early epoch in our history, but the germ of these institutions was then fully developed. I may especially refer to that boasted institution, so conducive to the liberty of this country, and which sprang from that ardent love of freedom so peculiarly characteristic of the people of this land at every period of their career, the trial by jury. The holding of free Parliaments was also an institution of our Saxon ancestors; and even the mode of conveying property, and the principles for its regulation, were very similar to those now recognized, and formed, indeed, their foundation. It is interesting moreover to observe the care taken in the judicial proceedings carried on in those rude times, to promote the investigation of truth, the anxiety with which it was sought out, and the skill

with which they directed the measures devised for its discovery. On the whole, we may, I think, not unreasonably infer that the ultimate effect of the mixture of different races in our own nation has probably been, in many important respects, to correct the characteristic defects, and to develope the characteristic virtues peculiar to each; and that the rivalry of different institutions borrowed originally from various nations, has, in a corresponding manner, tended to improve and perfect each other.

Considering all these circumstances one with another, the character of a nation appears to me to depend in part on the climate of the country where it is situate, in part on the geographical structure and position of its territory, in part on the natural productions of the latter, and in part on the character of the surrounding nations. According as any of these change, the character of the people changes with it, and it is affected by each modification of any of these causes. In addition to this, there is probably some peculiar original characteristic belonging to each race of people, corresponding with what each individual exhibits, which is independent of those causes for its origination, but is nevertheless liable to be extensively modified by their influence. The most striking original natural qualities of a people, as serving to mark their national character, are intelligence, activity, energy, and the peculiar proneness to certain habits and pursuits. These are the primary elements of national character, but they admit of variety in every possible mode of combination.

Long established habits and customs have also an influence in a nation corresponding with what they have in an individual, and however apparently trivial in themselves, produce many actions and many results, which are ultimately of the greatest importance. In each case, moreover, those habits and customs are of all things most

difficult to eradicate. Nevertheless, so long as they do remain, their influence operates, and that widely and incessantly.

Two very strong concurrent opposite influences appear, however, to be ever in operation, and each to be very forcible and very extensive. The one is the proneness to abide by whatever posterity has determined, and to adhere to whatever is ancient and long established. The other is the inclination to alter every thing which we find has been long constituted. We continue the laws and customs of ages long past, entirely different to our own, and with exigencies entirely different. We seek to alter every thing that we find established by our ancestors, however useful and efficient, and sometimes it would seem from the mere love of change. Possibly different orders of mind are influenced by each of these propensities, and not unfrequently the same individuals are affected by both, and by both contemporaneously. Some consider whatever is old as necessarily valuable. Others deem all that is old to be necessarily worn out. These are two opposite errors, perhaps equally prejudicial, and both calculated to retard the progress of civilization. Every institution and custom, whether young or old, ought to be weighed and valued entirely and solely by its own merits, and its applicability and utility to the age in which it exists, and should be abolished or continued accordingly.

Events in their career affect the character of a nation, in a manner corresponding with that in which they do the character of an individual. They do not so much alter as influence, not so much divert as develope certain talents or propensities in each, though their result may be both as extensive and as lasting as the endowment with original traits. These causes of different kinds have, moreover, a reciprocal influence on each other. Thus, original individual character has its influence on each of these changes, and each of these changes influences

original character. They affect, too, the mode in which the change operates, and give a bias to each diversion that it pursues in its course. But while changes in the circumstances of a country produced by civilization occasion a corresponding change in the character of the people; yet the original characteristics of each nation are not affected by this fact, and remain ever unaltered, as we see strikingly exemplified in the case of the Jews. Moreover, the changes which take place in the character of nations at different periods of their growth, nearly correspond with those which occur in the case of individuals. Thus, England was, in every respect, as regards external character and manners, very different at the Conquest, at the time of Henry V., Henry VIII., Queen Elizabeth, Queen Mary, Queen Anne, and Queen Victoria. Her internal original character was nevertheless precisely the same at each of these periods. As in the case of an individual, so in that of a nation, the leading natural traits will ever remain the same; but events in the career and the progress of civilization will so affect her whole character as completely to change her external and perceptible, if not her internal and essential nature. Perhaps, indeed, the best exemplification of the mode and of the extent to which the characters of nations change during the course of their career, is afforded by the animal creation, in which we see different kinds of animals much affected by change of climate, and habit, and food, but at the same time retaining all the distinctive characteristics and marks of their original nature and species. So both nations and persons, however affected and even changed by climate and custom, still exhibit the characteristic traits which first distinguished them.

To how remarkable an extent nations may retain the leading features which distinguish their character through all the changes which circumstances cause in them, is exemplified in the case of the Jews, who have probably

been more powerfully operated upon by events than has been the lot of any other nation, more especially in the fact that although possessing a peculiar attachment to their own country, they have, from necessity, been constantly obliged to be denizens in foreign states. This people has also served to illustrate how very soon the individual character belonging to a nation, which adheres to it throughout its career, is displayed, correspondingly with the case of an individual, and the extensive result in the case of both produced by early influences. Thus, the germ of their national avarice was evinced by the children of Israel selling their brother Joseph into Egypt; and their wanderings in the wilderness, seem to have had an influence in producing that restless disposition for which they are still distinguished. The people, too, of the United States of America, still retain much of the original character for which their ancestors, the first settlers there, were remarkable. Civilization effects a greater change than is ever caused by any variety of races. In each particular country of Europe, the original races are, moreover, now too much intermixed to admit of any individual character being very discernible. The distinction which is attributed to race, often, in reality, arises from education, or habit, or local position. Where however the race is kept pure, and does not mingle with others, as in the case of the Jews, all its distinct features and peculiarities are at once perceptible. Probably language, and also accent, serve as long as any other circumstances to perpetuate the distinction between original races.

The use of letters, or rather the manner of using them, is what mainly distinguishes civilized from barbarous people; the variety of tongues spoken exhibits the distinction as regards the degree and quality of their civilization, and their intellectual character also, between those of different races; and the various idioms and terms

made use of in the same language, distinguish people of different characters among the same race. Letters indeed form a kind of intellectual coinage for the interchange of thoughts between different minds, and from the nature of the currency in use we may judge somewhat as to the traffic carried on. The language spoken by any nation, has a vast influence upon its advancement in civilization, especially as regards the facility of it for holding intercourse with other countries around it, and also with respect to its capacity for conveying ideas of terms in science or art, or for being the vehicle of those great works in literature which contribute alike to the improvement of the people, and the glory of the nation in which they sprang. The language of this country, from its being derived so extensively from that of nations who were peculiarly celebrated for the purity, grace, and power of their mode of speech, from its very mixed character, and from its extensive adaptation to modern requirements, in many respects possesses important advantages. It is moreover to a singular extent representative, or rather reflective, of the character of the people; particularly as regards the great varieties of races which are intermixed and blended into one, the opposite qualities which are by this means brought together, and the new productions of each kind which are the ultimate result of this amalgamation.

Language, as is also the case with each of the arts, appears to reflect, as it were, the feeling, -and tone of thought, and manners of a people; and in its turn influences each of these to a certain extent. Indeed, there is a mutual reciprocal influence between the two. Not only, moreover, is language indicative and reflective of the character of a people, but the very mode and tone of speaking the same language, the degree of emphasis which is resorted to, and the comparative stress laid on particular expressions and parts of speech. are so also.

In this respect language may become indicative as well of the character of an individual. Language must always more or less necessarily direct, and may either extend or limit the expression of ideas; while the expression of ideas in its turn, on the other hand, in a corresponding manner influences language. Language may therefore be regarded as not only the vehicle, but the reflection of thought. And it is the sole medium of communication both of thought and feeling from one man to another, and also between bodies of persons. Hence is derived the influence of language not merely on individuals but on nations. Nevertheless, language cannot be regarded as constituting a certain proof of the particularity and identity of any individual race, inasmuch as it is evident from history both that race changes more or less, if not entirely, while the language remains the same; and that the language sometimes changes while the race remains the same.

Closely connected with, and indeed a branch of the subject of language, is the application and use of epithets, by which certain actions have a particular and indelible moral character of one sort or other affixed to them, and never cease to be so regarded. This is a matter which may exercise extensive influence over the feeling, and even over the conduct of a nation, and as such is calculated to produce an important result in regard to its civilization. An epithet is, indeed, sometimes so pregnant with ideas that, directly it is uttered, like a bomb thrown into a besieged town, those ideas fly out with the greatest force, and enter the mind of the person to whom it is addressed. To select these words properly, and to use them in the right place, is the province of eloquence, which constitutes as it were the artillery of the soul, of which words are the martial implements.

Language has moreover a great effect in binding people together, not only socially but intellectually; and

to a large extent it has an influence in causing the same sentiments and feelings to arise and to be diffused throughout the nation wherever it is spoken.

In considering the subject of civilization, especially with reference to the nations of old who have been distinguished in this respect, and comparing them with those of our own times, it is essential to bear in mind the vast changes that have been effected in our whole social condition, more particularly as regards their influence on the state of civilization. The grand causes of this revolution are the four magnificent inventions of (1) printing, (2) gunpowder, (3) steam, (4) the compass. Other causes and inventions have also aided collaterally in producing the changes that have been wrought. The first of these inventions affects us principally as regards our intellectual and moral condition. The second mainly as regards our relation with other countries, and in totally changing the art of war. The third and fourth have produced an effect both as regards our intercourse with other countries and with different parts of our own, whereby our social condition is changed. The first has tended to equalize the distribution of knowledge; the second the power of arms; the third and fourth the advantages of local position. Out of these have sprung innumerable other changes, which must necessarily be produced by such a revolution and disorganization as would be thus occasioned; and yet we still go on framing laws and rules of conduct exactly in accordance with the circumstances existent and the principles adopted ages ago, as though none of these mighty changes had been wrought; and in many important respects we are even now acting as though neither printing, nor gunpowder, nor steam, nor the compass had ever been discovered.

The following appear to be the principal alterations and revolutions effected by these inventions, and comprise the operations resulting from them:—

1. By the discovery of printing, books became generally diffused, instead of being confined to a few, and deposited only in colleges or cities. Newspapers are circulated among all classes, and almost take the place of lectures and orations. All ranks have nearly equal opportunities for acquiring knowledge and cultivation; and laws and political measures are discussed by all, instead of being tacitly obeyed, or their consideration limited to a very small class.

2. By the invention of gunpowder, all nations are rendered more nearly equal as regards their martial power and resources than they were before. Advantages of position, and castles, and fortifications, are of but little value. The whole art of war has by this means been changed, and many of the institutions and social relations originally connected with it, have been rendered altogether obsolete.

3. By the invention of steam, distance between different countries, and between different parts of the same country, has been, for all practical purposes, immensely lessened, and each country, for all the essential ends of government, greatly reduced in dimensions. Man is no longer dependent on the condition of the elements as regards his locomotion; and, by the same means, mechanical power of a much greater force is substituted for animal and manual labour, which both increases the extent of our operations, and renders the manufacturer less dependent on the assistance of other hands.

4. By the discovery of the compass, an infallible guide is afforded for the traverse of the whole world throughout, independent of natural observances, so that in all seasons and weathers alike the work of navigation may proceed; and thus a social compact is established, which includes in its mighty bonds every nation on the face of the earth.

Another grand invention, which in its consequences—

indirect, at any rate, if not direct—may be regarded as almost equally important with those already enumerated, is that of the telescope. In peace and in war, and to science also, the aids conferred by this discovery can hardly be over-estimated. The microscope, which is indeed but a branch of the same invention, has also contributed extensively to the advancement of science.

Yet with all these grand discoveries, and the undoubted vastness of their results, a great many things remain the same as before, and have made but trifling, perhaps, no progress, for centuries, or indeed since the time of the ancients. It may be questioned whether even in the science of medicine, any substantial and radical improvement has been effected; while the metaphysical sciences, and those of morals and pure mathematics, have scarcely, if at all, advanced. The fine arts of each kind have receded rather than progressed. Travelling and navigation have not been invented, but have only been improved and extended since the discovery of steam and of the compass. As regards war, the method of carrying it on is that only which has been changed; it still exists the same in all its most important features and events. With respect to the diffusion of knowledge by the means of printing, perhaps Aristotle had as much real information as any one of the moderns, and he was here but a sample of his contemporaries. From all these grand discoveries, indeed, there appear to emanate no absolutely new Elements of civilization; modifications only and recombinations of old Elements are effected. Railways have not so far exceeded the rapidity of coaches as to produce any material change from their establishment, nor steamboats that of sailing vessels. Nor were the galley-boats with which Cæsar invaded Britain, more at the mercy of the waves than are modern steamboats of the present day. In many cases, indeed, the main result of any new discovery, or the development of a new element or principle

in any science, is to counteract that of some other; and this is essentially so in the science of civilization. Thus, the compass and steam, by bringing distant nations nearer together, as they practically do, counteract the effects of redundancy of population, and prevent any particular country from concentrating itself into one great city, by diffusing its population, whenever they become too dense, over the face of the earth.

The effect produced on the world by these discoveries, is probably analogous in the main to what would be wrought in an individual by the attempt to supply the loss of, or a defect in some natural organ by artificial means, which may in some cases more than compensate for the loss sustained, while new independent powers are conferred and effects produced which were not calculated on. Many of these grand inventions have but corrected existing wants, or little more than adequately supplied the place of acquirements which they superseded. Thus, railways supplied the place of coaches; gunpowder that of archery; printing that of copyists; the compass that of the observation of the planets as nautical guides.

But, perhaps, we somewhat overrate both the greatness and the importance of the discoveries made, while we at the same time underrate the powers possessed by the ancients in comparison with those of the moderns. Vast, indeed, and astonishing, if we fairly examine them, were the operations effected in days of old ere steam had displayed its stupendous powers, or the thunders of gunpowder had roared over the plains. By the ancients, deep mines were sunk, the pyramids were upraised, exceeding in the greatness of their operations our longest railways; castles, and cathedrals, which excite our astonishment, were erected; grand inventions in science of amazing variety were effected; and we seldom discover a new country, or penetrate further into the recesses of old ones, but we are startled by finding that the ancients have been

there before us, and were not only familiar with what we so pride ourselves on having first explored, but have left monuments there of their skill and their power. And all this was accomplished by them without the aids of science which we receive.

Not only, however, the extent as regards their result, but also the very effect of modern discoveries, may be overrated. So far, as we are sometimes told, from gunpowder having decreased war, the most sanguinary and the most keenly-contested battles have occurred since its discovery. And it was, indeed, long posterior to the invention of printing, that the representative system in government, which, some assure us, it has rendered practically obsolete, was reconstructed and perfected in different countries. So far, moreover, from printing having rendered unnecessary the delivery of lectures, and sermons, and orations; this is peculiarly the age in which they appear to flourish. Before steam was applied, the remotest shores of the globe were familiar to our sails; intercourse had been established with each nation under heaven; and distant colonies planted in every part of the world: and much of this was done even before the compass was invented.

It is not, indeed, the knowledge, but the mode of applying discoveries of this grand nature, that promotes the advancement of any nation in civilization. The principles of all or most of the foregoing inventions were more or less known to other nations long before we became acquainted with them; and the Chinese are said to have possessed a knowledge of printing, of gunpowder, and of the magnetic needle, centuries before we did. They failed, however, to cultivate these advantages, which thus became comparatively lost to them.

As there are certain periods in the life of a man which are peculiarly favourable for great efforts, although the achievement, and even the attempting of these, must

necessarily a good deal depend on circumstances; so in the life of a nation, particular periods during its advancement are especially favourable for grand enterprise, although here, of course, circumstances, both internal and external, must contribute much to determine the precise period at which these exertions shall be put forth.

Almost every thing in the way of action which is effected in society, contributes more or less, and either directly or indirectly to its progress. Thus, even the outrages of its members one against another, whether by war or robbery, aid in this progress, and incite them to the invention of arts of defence, and the formation of a code of laws, by which a mighty stimulus to civilization is created. Stagnation is that which is most inimical to civilization, and which tends to the corruption of the social state, especially in its early stages. Progress of any sort does not, moreover, rest with itself, but occasions many acts and operations, independent of its own mere motion, which, both directly and indirectly, and in several respects, very powerfully tend to civilization. For instance, improvement, invention, intercommunication, experience, and many other circumstances invariably accompany, and are the necessary consequences of progress, all of them highly favourable to civilization. So the course of a stream tends not only to increase its bulk, but purifies and fertilizes the land through which it flows, and becomes a medium of communication also for traffic and for travel.

Probably the most important event in modern times tending to the progress and to the perfection of civilization, is the establishment of Christianity. Religion, in general, has ever been favourable to, and, as I shall hereafter show, its influence is an important Element in civilization, being the friend of order and good government, and tending to ennoble and refine those who are regulated by it. But the Christian religion is in a variety of ways

eminently conducive to civilization from the purity of its precepts, the intellectual nature of its instructions, the high tone of its morals, and the noble and sublime nature of its scheme as a whole. Eminently, indeed, as has been observed by distinguished writers on this subject,* was Christianity adapted to complete what the enlightened influence of Greece and Rome had commenced in the career of civilization. Many of its institutions are also highly conducive to civilization, and exhibit the extent to which the essential Elements of civilization are blended in its theory.

Throughout the sacred volume, exhortations applicable both to individuals and to nations, in favour of intellectual and moral culture, are to be found; and the attainment of knowledge, the punishment of error, and the exaltation of the higher influences, both in men and states, over the lower, are repeatedly enjoined; while the right exercise of reason with candour and care is made a positive duty.

Nor less by its precepts does Christianity exert itself to oppose the corruptions of civilization, through the warnings that it repeatedly gives against those vices, and those indulgences, which both in men and states conduce to its decline. And it may in truth be said that as with regard to individuals, "reason is the glory of human nature,"† so with regard to nations, Christianity is the perfection of civilization.

During the Middle Ages, chivalry no doubt contributed largely to the progress and the establishment of civilization. Nevertheless, chivalry can have no claim to be considered as either essential to, or as a distinct Element of civilization; but, on the other hand, in the constitution of chivalry, many of the Elements of civilization will be found united, more especially so far as chivalry promoted

* Dr. Arnold, M. Guizot, Bishop Temple. † Watts.

art, and to some extent education, and moral jurisprudence, as also intercourse both foreign and domestic, each of which I have considered as Elements of civilization. The age of chivalry, which was a very imperfect one of civilization, has, however, now, and for ever passed away; and the age of civilization, when the latter has attained a very high point, has arrived. Those Elements of civilization which chivalry contained, remain, although chivalry itself has become obsolete, except so far as it may in some respects be considered to continue to exist in those Elements.

Civilization does not, however, always necessarily advance with the age and growth of a nation. It may decline in two ways, either by direct retrogression, or by becoming corrupted. An instance of the first is afforded in the history of several once civilized nations. An illustration of the second is supplied whenever luxury extensively prevails among any people. And civilization is more or less subject to partial disease, it may be to corruption also, which is but the ultimate stage of disease of every kind, wherever luxury exists, which will be generally discovered to be lurking in the frame of each civilized state.

Indeed, every terrestrial institution, as soon as it has reached its highest condition or climax, begins at once to decline. A stationary position seems not to belong to establishments of this class. Consequently, an inquiry into the more immediate causes of the decline and decay of civilization is not inappropriate here, and is indeed necessary for a complete consideration of the whole system. Among the foremost and most predominant of these causes, luxury must be ranked. As civilization consists essentially in effecting the supremacy of the higher and intellectual and moral powers over the lower and animal impulses; so luxury consists in rendering these nobler endowments of man's being subservient to the

cravings and desires of the baser part of it, by inducing the former to minister to their wants. This, indeed, only arises at an advanced stage of society, as during barbarous periods the soft refinements of luxury have hardly been brought to such a degree of excellence as to enable them to exercise any important influence; nor is the intellect of the nation then sufficiently cultivated to apply itself to obtain more than the rude necessaries of life. Both in man and in states, at an advanced period of their career, their intellect and their energies are but too often perverted to devise means for pampering the appetites, and are employed not to resist but to encourage and aid them, by heightening the pleasures and temptations in which they are wont to revel, and thus in the end become subservient to them. Luxury is indeed a disease which affects and debilitates each member of the state alike: the sovereign influence, the nobility, the commercial interests, and the martial power of the state are each degenerated and enfeebled by it. Its effects, moreover, on a nation and on an individual are in a striking manner correspondingly similar. Luxury is to civilization what superstition is to real knowledge. Both have a tendency to lead us away from the pursuit of what is pure and solid, to that which is worthless and perishable.

Luxury consists in the deliberate and determined feeling of preference for ease and pleasure above what is sound, and useful, and profitable, whether in the acquirement of knowledge or the occupations of life; and is the consequence, alike in the individual and the nation, of a certain debility and degeneracy, mental, moral, and material, which induces to pursuits of this character, and tends to the neglect of those which are invigorating and of real value. It is remarkable, moreover, how in an age in which luxury obtains the main influence in the direction of the national mind and the national conduct, such a condition is manifested in a variety of ways, and seems to exhibit

itself in the same manner consistently and uniformly in all the different operations which have any relation to it. Thus, in theology it is exhibited by minute attention to trivial matters of detail, in regard to forms, and ceremonies, and costume, diverting thereby from the consideration of grand and leading topics of vital importance, which should chiefly engage the thoughts and abilities of men occupied in such a pursuit. In jurisprudence grand and leading principles are neglected, and the attention of its followers is called only to forms and precedents. In legislation also great and important principles and comprehensive measures are disregarded, while minute attention to trifling matters of detail will engage the main attention of the senate. The result of this proceeding as regards legislation, has been fully dwelt upon in the course of these pages. But in art too precisely the same course is adopted. We neglect great subjects and great principles, and are occupied with trifling matters, and about tints and petty effects, instead of the grand and leading characteristics which have exalted art, and rendered it worthy of representing human nature. In philosophy too, especially as regards the highest department of it, the science of man, a corresponding and consistent course has been followed. We devote ourselves to trivial matters of detail, to the neglect of those exalted topics which are alone worthy to engage the noblest capacities and the severest study of the most gifted of mankind. In general literature, also, an exactly similar line is followed. Great works on great subjects are neglected, while trivial productions on trivial topics engage all the attention. As a sagacious statesman* observed, men in these days do not read books, but the newspaper. Luxury has emasculated the national mind, which shrinks from grappling with deep questions requiring toil and thought, and is engaged with those which are

* Mr. Cobden.

pursued without trouble, and yield only pleasure, not profit, in return.

Probably, both in men and in states, luxury is of all vices the most difficult to restrain or repress, although the manner in which this is indulged must necessarily vary much in different ages of the world, and among different nations, according as the materials for supplying it are afforded.

The further society advances in its progress, the greater is the inequality in the distribution of wealth, one portion of the people having barely enough for subsistence, while the other portion are surfeited to excess, and indulge in every kind of luxury. In a primitive state of society there is enough for the wants of all, but for their wants only. Luxury and indigence are alike strangers here. As the world progresses, wealth seems, moreover, to undergo a change both as regards its own nature and its tendency to promote civilization. Thus, in earlier times, land and vassals, or villeins, formed the chief possession of a man of substance: now money and securities are as complete a property as is land; and even knowledge itself is deemed a capital; as, for instance, the acquisition of skill in a profession or art.

The distribution of wealth among the people of a nation is so far conducive to civilization, as it tends to excite to exertion and to enterprise, without which there can be no great progress in civilization, although at the same time it must be acknowledged that these do not by any means necessarily produce the latter. It must, consequently, follow that the more free and general is this distribution of wealth, and the more accessible it becomes to those of all classes, the greater and more extensive is its influence in favour of civilization. No state, indeed, ever became highly civilized that did not resort to the use of money; and the further it advances in civilization, the greater are the varieties of money in use, which reflect as it were the

different exigencies of the nation with regard to wealth. Nevertheless, neither in nations nor among individuals is the mere possession of wealth any proof of intellectual riches or of advancement in civilization; nor, on the other hand, is the want of it any test of deficiency in this respect. That both individuals and nations may be possessed of enormous wealth, and yet be in a condition of very imperfect civilization, might be exemplified at once by the instances of several Indian native princes, whose treasures are of almost inestimable value, but whose minds are quite rude and untutored, and whose subjects are almost in a state of barbarism.

Power and wealth, moreover, are not necessarily co-existent in the same nation or in the same individual, although they frequently aid one another. Nevertheless, many poor states and many poor persons are very powerful, while those of affluence are comparatively impotent.

Doubtless, however, the possession of wealth does afford alike to nations and to individuals great advantages in the acquisition of knowledge, and all the arts of civilization; and the want of it must ever, more or less, retard their progress in both these respects. Athens was, nevertheless, comparatively poor when at the highest point of civilization, and as far below many states in riches as she was superior to them in intellectual wealth. Aristotle, in his Politics, observes that "excessive wealth and excessive poverty are equally productive of that restless temper which subverts laws and ruins states."* While the enjoyment of excessive wealth may induce both states and individuals to indulge too much in luxuries; the pressure of poverty will constrain both a person and a state to confine themselves to the mere necessaries of life, and will exclude them from participation in many of those refine-

* Book vi.

ments and intellectual pleasures which most conduce to civilization.

Although amassing wealth for its own sake, both in men and in states, is inimical to civilization, and is calculated to induce sordid feelings, and to lead to the exaltation of the lower influences over the higher; the acquisition of it and dispensing it in the promotion and patronage of art, and science, and learning, is of course extensively conducive to the improvement of the people. Hence wealth, if regarded as an end, is debasing and injurious to civilization; but if regarded only, as it ever ought to be, as merely the means for attaining great and noble objects, it is directly advantageous to it. Indeed, the sordid desire of wealth, for its own sake, is as depraving and demoralizing in a nation as it is in an individual, and as many crimes are committed through avarice as through want, both by men and states. Most true indeed was, and most abundant are the illustrations in support of St. Paul's declaration, that "*the love* of money is the root of all evil."* While wealth fosters luxury, civilization, by strengthening the mind, induces man to practise self-denial, through which the enervating effects of luxury are counteracted.

As wealth does not of itself produce civilization, so poverty does not necessarily prevent it. Nevertheless, wealth tends, as already pointed out, though indirectly, to the promotion of civilization by the means that it provides for this purpose; while poverty, for the same reason, tends to barbarism. Nor is this circumstance altered by the fact that not only among individuals, but among communities, and even nations, the richest have sometimes been the rudest, and the poorest the most learned and polite. Probably, indeed, civilization conduces as much to prevent poverty, as poverty does to prevent civilization.

In a republican government, the main distinction between

* 1 Tim. vi. 10.

individuals arises from the amount of wealth that they possess, which operates in a most unfavourable manner as regards the intellectual and moral tone and civilization of the nation, inasmuch as to the acquisition of riches, the mind and energies of the most able will be in such a state mainly directed. To correct this evil, the distribution of rank and honours, especially when they are instituted as the rewards for talent and virtue, is most efficient and beneficial.

But an opposite evil, both in nations and individuals, to that of covetousness may sometimes prevail, and is as inimical to civilization as the other. This is a heedless disregard of wealth altogether, by which not only poverty but debt, and all its attendant ill consequences, are occasioned. Frugality and economy are, nevertheless, not unfrequently not only not the same, but the very opposite to each other. Bad economists sow chaff instead of corn. The chaff is doubtless the cheapest to buy; but it never comes up like the corn, or makes any return to the buyer. The immense national debt incurred by this country is productive of a vast variety of evils both direct and indirect, with regard to which the position of the nation bears a near resemblance to that of an individual thus unhappily circumstanced. The limited means of the man prevent him from the enjoyment of many of those intellectual pleasures and recreations in which it is desirable for him to participate, his physical necessities requiring that all he has to spend be devoted to them. Just so is it in the case of a nation whose resources are crippled and encumbered; the intellectual and moral wants of the people are disregarded amidst the pressure for supplying the physical exigencies of the state; besides which, all articles of refinement are severely taxed, so as to debar any but the wealthier classes from their use. In addition to this, great moral evil is produced by the national example afforded to individuals by the state. Individual profligacy finds an apology in national extravagance.

Although men readily follow the example of the state by running into debt, they do not always follow it as regards paying what they owe. The disaffection, moreover, that is occasioned by the taxes necessary to support these burdens, is no slight moral evil. The pernicious effects of war are thus made to extend over the periods of peace Our needful repose is disturbed by the consequences of what, during our martial turmoil, we engaged in. In Athens, the weight of the public burdens depressed all private fortunes, and reduced many to indigence. Both example and experience loudly warn us of the evil of this condition.

There is still, however, one very important consideration which requires to be dwelt upon before bringing the present section to a close, and that is the inquiry how far the subject of civilization is entitled to be regarded in the light of a science. What Aristotle observes of legislation may equally well be applied to civilization:—"If legislation be a science or an art, must it not partake of the same nature and follow the same progress with all other arts and sciences, which, being founded on observation, have been reared, extended, and perfected by experiment and reflection? That it does partake of the same progress, civil history affords the most convincing proofs."*

What, indeed, are the elementary principles essential for the constitution of a science? These may be defined to be as follows:—1. That our knowledge of its nature and essence be certain and absolute. 2. That that knowledge be capable of being practically applied. 3. That the principles to be applied be certain and practical. 4. That, as a whole, it be a matter of practical application as regards its operation. In all these respects, civilization appears entitled to the rank of a science. Our information on the subject is at least as extensive as that on most of the other sciences. And that that

* Politics, book ii.

information admits of practical application, is attested not only by general history, but by every day's experience. How far the principles for the regulation of the science are capable of being reduced to a certainty and of exact application, it is the main object of the following pages to evince. If in this I prove successful, and demonstrate, moreover, the practical use and pursuit of civilization as a whole; then, comparing civilization with the other sciences, and bearing in mind the real essence and principles of each, we cannot hesitate to class civilization among the sciences, to a rank in which it is moreover pre-eminently entitled, on account of its vast importance and its extensive utility.

Nearly every other practical subject of human pursuit, whether physical or moral as regards the nature of its operation,— Theology, Jurisprudence, Medicine,— has been reduced to a science. Why should not civilization, which is equally practical in its application, equally certain as regards its principles, and, doubtless, fully as important in its nature as either of the above, with them also take rank as a science?

If however, civilization is capable of being practically applied, the mode of this application must necessarily vary according to the person who applies it. And if the mode of its application varies from the above cause, it follows that the efficiency of it must in some cases be more, and in others less perfect. And if the efficiency of the application varies as regards its degree of perfection, it must vary according as it is followed; and consequently there must necessarily be some systematic plan, founded upon and regulated by specific principles, for directing its due and regular application. And if it is so capable of being carried out on a systematic plan, it inevitably follows that it is fully and completely capable of being reduced to, and considered as a science.

Nor is it any proof that a particular system is not

reducible to a science, because it has been for a long time, and even among civilized nations, and by distinguished statesmen, followed without this axiom being adopted, or even recognized, and as though it were incapable of being formed into a practical or scientific system. No one in these days would question the capability of Law to be reduced to and dealt with as a science. And yet for ages, and among many nations, it was followed as though it neither recognized nor was controlled by any definite rules, and was regulated by no fixed principles; and as though the wisdom or will or caprice of the ruler formed its spirit and essence. Under King Nebuchadnezzar, Law possessed as little of a scientific character as regarded the monarch's mode of dealing with it, as civilization does under Queen Victoria. But neither in one case nor the other does this circumstance conclusively prove that they are both, or either of them, incapable of scientific reduction or treatment.

If, however, civilization be, as is here contended, strictly reducible to a science, and be also capable of practical application, it remains to determine the precise duty of the state as regards the promotion of the civilization of the nation. This duty corresponds pretty nearly with that of the wise head of a family, in the superintendence of the intellectual and moral, as well as the physical development and welfare of each of his children. Such a course he should endeavour to direct or to supply, according to the exigencies of each, the variety of their characters, and the defects which require to be counteracted. A question may, nevertheless, arise, how far the duty of the state extends in the active promotion of civilization, and in what cases it ought to exert itself, whether to originate or to aid different undertakings and institutions connected with civilization, or whether it should be merely their director and superintendent. It seems to me, however, that all that can be legitimately in such cases demanded

of the state is, that it assume the general control of the institutions and other Elements and means of promoting civilization, but without interfering with their ordinary, proper, and natural operation, which should be left to the guidance of those who are their members and supporters, affording them, however, such legitimate and necessary aid as they may fairly ask for, and as may be required of the state for their maintenance. The duty of the government here, is, in fact, closely analogous to that of the driver of a steam-engine which draws a railway train, and whose business is not to construct or to propel the engine, but only to guide it aright, and to see that it is supplied with proper fuel, and with the elements requisite for its due operation. So the duty of the state is not arbitrarily to force on or to compel the progress of civilization, but to supply all the necessary means and elements within its power for encouraging its promotion, and for affording it the opportunity for advancement. The basis of our policy as regards all matters of civilization, should moreover be, as far as possible, to follow nature as our pattern, both with respect to the measures we adopt, and the mode of carrying out our undertakings. We should both work and progress after the manner of nature, while our aim should be not to counteract or even force nature, but to aid her in her efforts and her operations, and to remove those obstacles to her endeavours which an unnatural state of society has imposed. Nature should in all cases be alike our model and our guide.

Having thus far considered the nature of civilization, and the adaptation of man both as an individual and in his political capacity to be affected by it; we have next to inquire into those leading principles or essential Elements, by which its operation and progress are regulated, to which I have already adverted in the foregoing pages, and which may be comprehended under the several divisions contained in the sections which follow.

It is here, however, important to note that certain of the actual constituents of civilization, which are essential for its very existence, are also, on the other hand, no less essential as Elements to support and promote its stability and progress. Thus, knowledge is essential to the existence of civilization, and education is no less necessary as an Element. So also with regard to religious influence, moral jurisprudence, and intercourse of different kinds, which are equally essential as constituents to form, and as Elements to uphold and promote civilization. Nevertheless there are certain Elements which are very efficient to promote civilization, and to render it permanent, which are, however, not at all of themselves necessary to constitute it, and without which it may exist as completely and as efficiently as though they had never been supplied. Thus, for instance, a nation may be highly civilized in which there are neither national institutions, nor honorary distinctions; and indeed, owing to peculiar circumstances, it may be able entirely to dispense with such aids to civilization. But this militates nothing against the efficiency or the necessity of these Elements to secure and promote civilization in certain other cases where by circumstances they are required.

It may be contended, however, that certain or all of the Elements here enumerated, are not in reality the causes of civilization, but merely its effects.* To some extent they may be said to be both the causes and the effects. They spring out of the civilization of a country in the first instance; while, on the other hand, they contribute to, and are essential to complete that civilization.

Independent, indeed, of the Elements of civilization, and as the agents through which they operate and produce the results they are calculated to effect, are certain important moral causes which are ever in operation, the influence of which will be pointed out in the following

* Buckle's History of Civilization, Introd. p. 232.

pages, and the full benefit, and force, and efficiency of which, the establishment and mutual co-operation of these several Elements of civilization alone can secure. In addition to all this, the efforts of those minds of great power, which have been duly cultivated, and which are, moreover, devoted to the intellectual and moral improvement of their fellow-creatures, are the real engines by which the progress of civilization is accelerated, and by which its several Elements are acted upon for this purpose. Like the influence of the planets rolling through their orbits in the celestial spheres, by which certain mighty changes in the terrestrial world are, though silently and unseen, ever ordered and controlled; so the sway that is exercised by those sublime souls, directs and urges onward the flowing tide of civilization, which both from them receives the guidance that regulates its course, and reflects on its glowing surface some faint shadow at least of those glorious beings by whom its career is animated.

THE ELEMENTS WHICH CONTRIBUTE TO THE PROMOTION AND PROGRESS OF CIVILIZATION.

I.—NATIONAL EDUCATION OF THE PEOPLE.

If, as has already been observed, states, which are composed or made up of individuals, are benefited by civilization, it must be of great consequence to secure this advantage to each individual member of a state, whatever be his condition or pursuit; and it must also be one of the first and most important duties of a state to provide such a requisite, considering that the mental and moral exigencies of its members, as intellectual beings, demand equal care with their physical wants.

What civilization effects for the state, education should do for the individual. The cultivation and exaltation of his intellectual, and moral, and higher powers, and their complete development, so as to give them the entire ascendency over the gross animal feelings and propensities, should be the result of education. As knowledge is the first Element in the imparting of education, so education, by which knowledge is attained, is the first Element of civilization. But as knowledge does not of itself constitute education, neither is education the only Element of civilization. Education, although not of itself constituting civilization, as many appear erroneously to regard it, forms, nevertheless, as it were, its keystone. It lends its

support, and gives stability to all the other Elements. While education is the main trunk which nourishes the whole tree, the several other Elements of civilization represent the branches, without which neither leaves, nor flowers, nor fruit can be produced; although, on the other hand, the branches could not be put forth without the trunk. So education is necessary to originate the other Elements, and they are essential to perfect education; while the due promotion and operation of the whole together, result in the complete establishment of civilization.

That education and civilization are very different even in the case of an individual, is proved by the fact that a man may be very learned and yet at the same time very barbarous, alike as regards his manners, his tastes, and his tone of feeling. Even gentility does not necessarily imply civilization, though probably it does so more than education alone. But education and gentility combined do not either effect or constitute civilization; and a man influenced by both, may be very deficient as regards his general character in this respect.

While the object of education is to qualify the individual to exert his powers to the utmost advantage, the object of civilization is to obtain the accomplishment of the very purpose for which the other adapts us. While education is the preparation for, civilization is the actual consummation of the work of refining and extending the intellectual powers. Education teaches us how to learn; civilization is the result of having learnt.

The first of the several Elements which contribute to the civilization of a nation, both as regards the direct nature of its influence, and the importance of its results, must consequently be the education of the people of such a nation; education being indeed the first step towards the civilization both of a nation and of an individual. Ignorance and barbarism are as opposite to civilization

as darkness is to daylight. The education of the people, and the national provision for this by the state, is therefore not a mere measure of expediency, but it is one of real and actually national necessity, if the establishment of civilization in such a country is made a matter of concern.

As states, like men, have their periods of infancy, youth, maturity, and age; so in states as well as men, the period of youth is that which is peculiarly fitted for instruction and civilization, when the national mind is most capacitated to receive it, and after which it is difficult successfully and extensively to implant it.

Education is of three several distinct and independent kinds, which may be severally classed as mental, moral, and manual; or, of the head, of the heart, and of the hand, 1. Mental education, or what is commonly comprehended under the term instruction, consists in imparting knowledge, storing the mind with ideas, and disciplining and cultivating it so as to adapt it for engaging in intellectual studies and pursuits. 2. Moral education, or that which is comprised in teaching men their duty, consists in the inculcation of correct principles of action, and training the disposition and moral habits. 3. Manual education, is that which consists in teaching the occupation, professional employment, or trade which each person is to follow as his calling in life.

This division of education into different kinds, holds good with regard to persons of each class alike, although the actual quality of the education adapted for different classes is necessarily very different, corresponding of course, both as respects the knowledge to be conveyed, and the discipline to be instilled, with the duties which each have to discharge. In the case of all, however, the legitimate leading object of education is not so much to store the mind with knowledge, as to cultivate and discipline it, and fit it for the task of imbibing knowledge in

future, as also for applying that knowledge advantageously. It is rather the tilling than the sowing of the soil that education effects.

As regards the precise nature of the education which should be imparted, general elementary instruction and discipline and cultivation appear, in the first place, essential, as they are what all persons alike, of whatever class or calling, require, in order to develope their mental powers, to raise them to the rank of intelligent beings, and to prepare them for whatever walk in life they may hereafter seek to engage in. In the next place, such instruction should be given to each individual, as is especially suitable to the particular occupation which he is intending to follow.

Both the quality and the extent of the mental education that each person should receive, must of course mainly depend upon the nature of his pursuits in after-life; and the quality of the manual calling in which he engages, is that by which his mental education must be mainly regulated. For instance, with those whose manual occupation is principally of a laborious or servile kind, not much opportunity for mental cultivation can be afforded. Those, on the other hand, whose manual or professional calling is of a learned nature, may and indeed must necessarily devote a considerable portion of their time to mental education, which with them is in fact the same as that which is manual. Those, however, whose manual pursuits prevent them from obtaining a complete mental education, should aim especially to cultivate those mental pursuits and studies which will be at once both most mentally improving and most practically manually useful. The excessive cultivation of certain branches of mental education which are not of this description, especially of the kind which are rather ornamental than useful, and which are ordinarily termed accomplishments, to the neglect of those that are solid and valuable, often proves

(as already stated)* a serious bar to the progress both of education and of civilization. To all alike, moral education is, however, equally essential; and it varies little either as to the quality or the extent of it adapted for those of each class. The proper moral education of each, and the due cultivation and training of his dispositions and affections and qualities, is, indeed, of the highest importance both to his happiness and his welfare, and to the comfort and convenience of all those with whom he is connected or associated, who, like himself, are members of a civil society. Incident to this, are also the cultivation and regulation of the manners and habits and tastes of the persons instructed, and which are, indeed, both indicative of, and are ever regarded as serving to develope their particular character and disposition. In order, however, to a complete moral education, in addition to the mere inculcation of moral principles, moral discipline, moral training, and moral trial and experience also should, if possible, be introduced; so that the future pilgrim through the world, who will be beset at every stage by so many moral dangers, may be not only told what weapons to use, but taught the proper use of them, and qualified and drilled for encounters of this kind. For this end, the ordinary daily habits of practical school social life may to a large extent be made to serve.

So soon as, and provided that each of the before-mentioned essential educational objects are secured, and these initiatory stages are passed, such departments of knowledge may be pursued by each, according as his peculiar taste and capacity, and the extent of his leisure will allow.

With respect to the pursuit of particular branches of knowledge, certain of the Elements of civilization here specified, provide for and promote this requirement; as,

* *Vide ante*, Preface.

for instance, Element II., Religious Knowledge; Element IV., the Study of Art and Science; Element X., the knowledge of Foreign Languages. Other Elements promote and encourage study generally; as Elements III. and VI., by affording leisure for intellectual occupations; Element V. secures freedom for thought and discussion; and Element VII. supplies patrons for the encouragement of art and learning generally. Each Element should, moreover, contribute to the aid and support of the other, to extend its influence, and invigorate its operations.

One most important and essential part of, or perhaps, rather adjunct to education, is that which consists in securing for the bodily frame and limbs such an amount of regular and healthy exercise and recreation, as will prevent them from suffering any injury from the too great attention to mental education; and in the acquirement of such a habit of physical discipline as will through life be most serviceable and efficient for this purpose.

Education, even that which is intellectual and moral, may be imparted by many other means besides books. Pictures, maps, and lectures, especially the latter when accompanied by experiments, are equally available for this purpose, and for some ends are far more efficient. This however must of course depend upon the particular description of teaching to be inculcated. Variety of mode as well as subject, often adds to the agreeableness of instruction, and its agreeableness to its efficiency.

No doubt can be entertained as regards the desirableness of classical learning forming an essential part of education, not only to store, but to cultivate, and enlarge, and refine the mind. It appears to me, however, that there is also as little doubt that this most important branch of education would be far more efficient than it now is, if followed in a more enlarged and complete manner, attention being directed to the qualities and excellences of an intellectual nature and of the highest

order, to the feeling, and beauty, and pathos, and imagination, contained in the writings of the ancient classics, and which would be alike interesting and improving to juvenile minds, and tend more than anything to their cultivation and development, especially of their highest faculties; instead of confining their attention so much, and indeed so exclusively, to the dry and unattractive topics of the grammatical structure of the sentences, and the technical rules of prosody and syntax, the main result of which is in most cases entirely to repel the student from recurring to these pursuits, which have been rendered so dreary and so repulsive, after he has passed through the period of pupilage.

Nevertheless, however desirable it may be to render learning attractive, it does not follow that it is advisable to make it too easy, or to attempt to abridge as much as possible every effort of the mind, which may be in itself as serviceable as the very knowledge that is imbibed. Even the newspaper, which in many respects so essentially and so extensively contributes to the promotion and the advancement of civilization, on the other hand in certain respects tends to its corruption and decline, by the easy and alluring manner in which it communicates information, thus deterring persons from severer and more abstruse studies, which invigorate as well as store the mind. In a luxurious age, as everything is attained with ease, whether as regards learning or travelling, so no pains are incurred, but which, however disagreeable at the time, greatly invigorate both mind and body, and fit them for any enterprise they may be called upon to fulfil.

The leading principle to be observed in education, considered independently as an Element of civilization, is that it should be so adapted as both to improve and exalt the minds of the individuals to whom it is applied, and also at the same time to qualify those receiving it for being advantageously influenced by each of the other

Elements of civilization, or such of them as in the peculiar circumstances of the case may be resorted to; and that it should enable every person properly to perform the duties allotted to him.

Education, in order to be efficient, should not only be conducted according to the principles, adaptation, and exigencies of human nature as regards our various faculties, and qualities, and requirements, intellectual, moral, and physical; but its leading aim should ever be to develope and to bring to perfection the endowments of the person who is being educated; and both by cultivating excellences and correcting defects, to raise him to the noblest condition at which he is capable of arriving. Education, moreover, with reference to the particular country in which it is carried on, should be so especially framed and adapted as to counteract the errors and remedy the defects, whether intellectual, moral, or social, existent among any people, arising from any peculiarity in the national character, the situation of the country, its climate, the pursuits mainly followed, or those belonging to its system of government. Thus, in a commercial country, an avaricious spirit should as far as possible be counteracted or softened by liberal educational influences. In an inland country, the people should be made acquainted with the geography and history of other countries, which they have but little opportunity of learning by intercourse with them. Where art is followed with avidity, science should be cultivated, as its accompaniment and corrective; and where science engrosses the chief attention, its pursuit should be mollified and refined by the study of art.*

In whatever country or situation any one may be placed, education ought, however, to be conducted on a systematic principle, so as to qualify the man for the highest

* *The Theory of the Arts;* or Art in relation to Nature, Civilization, and Man. By George Harris, F.S.A. Vol. I., Chap. i.

efforts and duties in life which he may be called upon to fulfil. The education of each person must, moreover, have regard to others as well as himself; must not merely fit him for mental cultivation as an individual, but must also adapt him for being a useful member of society. As an independent person by himself, and having relation to no other being, it might be sufficient for a man to cultivate only his intellect, or to pursue that branch of education alone which I have classed under the head of mental. As owing allegiance to a superior Being, and also as a member of a social community, and therefore connected with and necessarily more or less dependent upon others, it is however essential that moral education as well should receive a due share of his attention.

Two important, and indeed fundamental rules with regard to education, ought ever to be kept in view, but which it is to be feared are entirely neglected in many systems. The first of these is the inculcation, together and in conjunction with mental instruction, of correct and definite principles of conduct in the different courses of life in which the persons educated are likely to be called upon to act. The other is the supplying proper and wholesome food for the intellectual craving which education has called forth, such as suitable libraries for the people would afford. To the neglect of these two *desiderata*, most of the evil results of which education has in any case been accused, may be clearly traced.

With regard to the first of these rules, although a doubt may be expressed as to how far among those of the humbler ranks and necessarily laborious occupations, pursuits of the highest mental order can be followed extensively; there can be none as to the great extent to which, and the immense benefit with which moral education and discipline may be there carried out. Indeed, mental cultivation has a tendency to raise the moral character so far that thereby low and sensual gratifications lose their attrac-

tion. From their being early habituated to the pursuit or virtue and to shun vice, it is alone, however, that the people can be efficiently trained in this course, and sound principles of conduct instilled into their minds. Moreover, by being taught to reason correctly, they are fortified against the fallacies of insidious writers. As an actual preventive to crime, education, if rightly directed, operates very powerfully, and is indeed the only sure protector; and there can be no doubt that it is from not having received a proper and sound moral and religious education, that crime is so prevalent among the poorer classes. Indeed, as regards the difference in this respect between them and persons of the higher and middle ranks, it is not by the absence of want, or the difficulties of escaping detection, that the latter are deterred from the commission of crime. On the contrary, their exigencies are frequently equal to, if not greater in comparison, and more urgent than those of the poor; and they have more constant and better opportunities of supplying them criminally, without being found out. From the education, however, which they have received, right principles have been instilled into their minds, and they would suffer as much from the consciousness of committing crime of a base and dishonourable nature, as from the fear of discovery. And even in those cases where education may indirectly facilitate the commission of certain crimes, by the skill that it supplies, and may also aid the perpetrator in escaping detection; it has, on the other hand, supplied the means of detecting offences in a variety of ways. It is, moreover, only from the defective nature of the education of any individual, that it becomes in the least degree conducive to crime. If it be urged that although the higher classes are not addicted to thieving, there are other crimes to which they are as prone as the poor are to pilfering, but which are not opposed to the feelings instilled by education; this may be regarded as an additional proof of what education may

effect, accompanied by a regret that its moral results are not uniformly successful in the restraint of crime of every variety.

With regard to the second of the fundamental axioms which I have laid down as necessary to be observed in framing a complete system of national education,—that a supply should be furnished to those educated of intellectual and moral food to satisfy the craving which has been called forth;—it is a great misfortune, and proves a great neglect, that in the present day the poorer classes, when their education is finished, are left entirely to their own discretion, or rather, want of discretion, as to the books they will read; the art of reading correctly comprises nearly the whole of the education that has been imparted to them; no effort is made to point out the path which they may follow with the greatest advantage and improvement; no direction whatever to their future studies is afforded; but they are launched out into the world without chart or pilot to direct them in their course. As the almost necessary consequence of such a system, they are carried away by the first current into which they float; they become the easy dupe of the first designing essay fraught with pernicious principles that falls in their way. Many of these works, not only from their nature and the subjects on which they treat, form alluring baits for the inexperienced in such matters; but from the specious style and the captivating manner in which they are composed, they are especially calculated to arrest the attention and please the fancy of readers of this description, to whose taste and comprehension they are adroitly adapted, contrasting in this respect very favourably with the dry and laborious moral treatises which well-intentioned persons may have placed in their way, and which are apt to be regarded as the only fit works for the humbler classes to be entrusted with.

It cannot, therefore, be doubted, that people in the

position described, are exposed to an evil of a most serious nature, and one which it is all-important to remedy. Two modes only exist of effecting this end. We must either suppress altogether the dissemination of pernicious publications, or supplant them by supplying those of a better tendency. To accomplish the former is impossible, and it would not be a legitimate, even if it were a practical course. The other plan is not only quite legitimate, but may be carried out to the full; and not merely with entire success, but the most benefical consequences may be anticipated from its adoption.

It is hardly possible, indeed, to over-estimate the importance of supplying to the poorer classes a literature at once attractive in its nature, and combining intellectual instruction with moral improvement. This is a measure worthy of the attention of the greatest philanthropists; and it is a *desideratum* so extensive, that it surely ought to be made a national object. Whether it could not at once be attained by issuing, at the expense of the state, a cheap reprint of works particularly adapted for the purpose, and which might be furnished gratis, or at a very low cost, to all parochial libraries, I would here beg to suggest.

Many of the poor, especially during the long winter evenings, have abundance of leisure at their disposal, which, if it is not well spent, is either wasted in idleness, or passed in profligacy. By acquiring a habit of study, and following the pursuit of useful and entertaining knowledge, both the advantage and the happiness of themselves and their families would be extensively promoted. Moreover, from not being able to enter into the expensive amusements of the rich, they peculiarly stand in need of some recreation of this kind. A sound maxim for the regulation of life was laid down by Locke,—that persons of sedentary occupations ought to adopt active amusements, and those who follow active laborious oc-

cupations, amusements of a sedentary nature. In this respect, study suits well with the occupations of the poor, most of whose employments are of an active character.

Equally absurd and noxious is it, to consider the more engaging and attractive branches of literature, such as poetry and the other arts, general history, and romance, as unfitted for and improper for the perusal of the poorer classes; and that those works only which are dull and dry are adapted for their pursuit. From hence it is, that the poor find so little pleasure in the cultivation of their minds. Their only experience of this is in the slavish drudgery of learning to read, and in the dreary, unattractive books which they have had placed before them. They have no conception whatever of the intense delights which the capacity of reading they have already acquired is capable of conferring upon them, and this is a secret which a large portion of them never discover.

There is, however, another very urgent reason for advocating the general education of the people, quite independent of the essential advantages which it confers on themselves. I allude to the benefits that are thereby derived to the nation itself. The people of this free country, forming an essential branch of the Constitution, and being by law invested with important political privileges, it becomes not only expedient, but essential, that they should be instructed aright in the use of those privileges. By depriving them of the knowledge that would serve them for this purpose, while you thereby abridge not in the least their actual power, you deprive them of the means to exercise it rightly; you surrender them to the influence of those whose only desire is to lead them astray. By placing proper treatises before them, you enable them to teach themselves. And self-instruction, as it is ever received without suspicion, so is it the most influential on the mind of the recipient. It is surely of the very highest importance, in a political point,

that the people at large should be early imbued with correct notions respecting the rights and duties of property; and should be taught not only to reverence and obey the Constitution and the laws of their country, but the reasons also why they are entitled to this homage and this submission.

It may, nevertheless, again be urged, as it formerly used to be, although of late this argument has become much out of fashion, that by educating the lower classes you afford them the readiest means of being led astray. Could we, however, be persuaded that those only who are instructed in the common rudiments of education are rendered liable to be assailed and misled; even this would not be sufficient to justify the withholding from them all the advantages which result from education; and which would be, indeed, detaining them in a state of almost animal imbecility, for the sake of guarding against certain evils for which the inculcation of sound and correct principles is the only sure remedy, and for which the other false and unnatural antidote would prove wholly inefficient. Constituted as our nature is, it is easier to imbibe wrong tenets than those which are right. Most men have, therefore, enough cultivation to enable them to be led astray. The only difficulty is to afford them sufficient teaching to fortify them against fallacy. By the instillation of sound principles, and the storing their minds with knowledge, they would be less liable to be misguided by erroneous doctrines, and would detect the sophistries by which they were sought to be seduced.

Perhaps, indeed, the most perilous condition of all in which a human being can be placed, is when he has been taught to read and write, and is turned out upon the world without any direction how to use his acquirements properly. This is somewhat like starting an express train in full speed upon a railway, but without supplying an engine-driver to direct it. What is the remedy for

this emergency? If you stop the train suddenly, you overturn it, and produce at once all the worst consequences that can be caused by the careless act in question. If, however, you can by any means supply an efficient engine-driver to the train, all danger is at once removed. So in the case of education, it is impossible to quench the little knowledge that has been imparted, or to paralyse the powers that have been called into exercise. The only resort left is to give that knowledge a right direction, and to apply those powers to their proper purpose.

Nor does popular ignorance supply any safeguard whatever against political disaffection or tumults, or serve to prevent the people from uniting in seditious societies, or lawless combinations. On the other hand, it only subjects them the more easily and the more completely to be led away and controlled by some designing demagogues. Does history, indeed, record any single example of the barbarity of a people being adduced as a proof of their loyalty? And I would appeal with confidence to the experience of all those who have studied the history of the tumultuous times of this or any other country, whether the danger of popular outbreak is really more to be apprehended among a people who are truly enlightened, possess a correct knowledge of the nature and extent of their rights and duties as citizens, who are fully acquainted with the privileges they enjoy, who have been taught to respect the laws under which they live, and who must, from their superior education, be little liable to be imposed upon, if not from the soundness of their principles indisposed to be so;—than among a body of people who neither value nor even know the privileges which they own, who are unable to reason aright on any great questions, who misunderstand their position in society, and are under delusions of every variety with respect to their claims and civil duties, possessing, as they do, only

so much information as is sufficient to render them liable to be led astray, and whose brutality when excited is restrained neither by reason nor right moral feeling. Are not popular tumults, in the great majority of cases, to be traced to popular ignorance, and to the multitude having been misguided? Has the superior enlightenment of the people ever been suspected to be the cause?

The most plausible argument which has been urged against the extensive education of the lower classes is, that it raises them above their station, and unfits them for manual labour; that it, in fact, destroys the proper balance in the state, as regards the influence from superior intelligence which ought to preponderate in the case of the higher classes over the lower. To all this, however, it may be satisfactorily replied, that many of those among the higher classes whose minds are extensively cultivated, engage in arduous manual labour, which affords, indeed, a recreation to their minds; and that if the mass in general are well educated, those among the poor who are of superior endowments will be but on a level with them, and will be less inclined unduly to over-appreciate their own acquirements, and so less likely to despise their ordinary and necessary avocations. Indeed, the only legitimate mode to prevent an undue preponderance on the part of the lower classes from their extensive intellectual acquirements, is to increase those of the rich, for which this mental progress of their inferiors would form a very wholesome stimulus; and who, from their superior advantages and much greater leisure, ought ever to be far in advance in respect of mental cultivation and acquirements. Thus, the education of the poor is not only beneficial to themselves, but contributes also essentially to the intellectual progress of the rich.

So far, however, from any among the poorer classes being led, on account of their improved education, to endeavour to exalt themselves unduly above their superiors,

and to obtain situations and positions to which they have no legitimate claim; they would then be taught that such high and important offices can be filled only by persons of extensive endowments and qualifications, and they would no longer envy the holders of them as they now do.

One great bar to the civilization of the populace in many nations, is the difficulty which exists of a free and full intercourse and interchange of ideas and feelings between them and the rich, which is to a large extent owing to the difference in the dialect and even language by which the two classes carry on communication. Hence a gulf between them is fixed, which the education of the poor alone can fill up, by familiarizing the latter with the language of the former. The civilizing influence of those of superior acquirements, would then first be experienced by the people at large, who would also be able to enter into the thoughts and feelings of the former, and to understand works produced in their purer and classical style of composition, which to many of them are at present incomprehensible.

Not only, therefore, is it essential that education of each of the foregoing kinds should be supplied to every member of the state; but no well-regulated state will omit to provide for this necessary end. In neglecting to do so, the nation is guilty of a crime corresponding with that committed by the father of a family who fails to educate his own offspring. Nevertheless, the state, in aiming to produce moral effects, should never attempt to interfere with the natural inclinations of the people, or act in a compulsory manner; but its clear duty appears to be to exert itself so far as to prevent the natural disposition of its members from being counteracted or impeded by obstacles which arise out of the artificial state of society in which they are placed. To the extent already specified, education is essential, and therefore

thus far it is the duty of the state to supply it, or to provide for its being supplied.

Nor, in a case of this national necessity, ought the state to trust to the charity or bounty of individuals to carry out such a measure, any more than it relies on the chance generosity of the public, or a portion of it, for supplying the resources to carry on a war. Moreover, by rendering a system of education national, it becomes engrafted on the constitution, and forms an essential part of it, and is prevented from decaying when the fashion or feeling of liberality which originally supported it may have died away. The inconsistency is doubtless great of those who uphold and argue in favour of a system of national education, and who talk loudly of the duty of the state to provide for the intellectual and moral as well as the physical wants of its members, and yet deny the necessity of an established church. But the inconsistency is even greater of those who profess to value this church, and are yet opposed to the establishment of a national system of education, whereby the benefits of the former would be much extended, both alike largely and essentially contributing to the civilization of the nation.

As regards the particular mode in which the state should exert itself to promote the education of the people, this may be effected by the three following measures:— In the first place, the state should provide by a grant of money ample means for the general intellectual and moral instruction of the poorer classes, so that all persons, of whatever degree, may be able to obtain a suitable education, according to their station and requirements. The state should take care that facilities for this object are afforded, which it is bound to supply not merely for the sake of the individuals so to be benefited, but for the sake of the nation itself, and on account of the advantages that it derives from the proper education of its members, and the disadvantages which it must experience from their

education being defective. The general mode in which national education is conducted, should also be placed under the control, inspection, and regulation of the government.

In the second place, the state should issue such regulations as to the proper qualifications, both moral and intellectual, to be possessed by all those who desire to become professional instructors of youth, as appear to be expedient for obtaining efficient officers, and those only, to be appointed for this purpose. Teaching ought equally with preaching to be confined to persons who are licensed as duly qualified for so important a duty.

In the third place, the state should hold out such inducements to those of all classes to obtain an efficient education, as will operate as due and reasonable stimulants to that end, on account of the advantages accruing therefrom. For instance, the public offices in the state should be confined to those who can adduce proof that by intellectual endowments they are duly qualified for filling advantageously such employments. Public oral examination ought not, however, to be the only test here afforded; nor is it by any means in every case a fair mode of ascertaining the real merits of a candidate. On the contrary, in some cases, from his peculiar constitution, or, from other causes, it may be a very unfair mode. Were the ministers of the crown, and bishops, and judges, selected according to their qualifications displayed on a *vivâ voce* examination, conducted before the lords of the privy council, what a singularly unsatisfactory mode of choosing them would this prove! In point of mere mental acuteness and readiness, they would doubtless prove all that was desired. But in regard to their physical, moral, and even general mental qualifications, no satisfactory test would be afforded. Probably, in certain instances, and with certain persons, one mode is the most efficient, and in others another mode. An examination is,

nevertheless, an essential portion of, or rather adjunct to education, constituting perhaps not so much a part of education itself, as a test of its extent and efficiency. It forms, in fact, not the filling of the vessel, but the gauging of it in order to ascertain the amount that it contains. In each case examinations should be adapted alike to the subject to which they are applied, the quality and attainments of the students, and the end for which the particular studies in which they have been engaged are being followed. Probably, therefore, the correct principle as to the sum-total of the value of examinations for public offices, is as follows. They are very efficient to exclude incompetent persons from such places, but they are by no means sufficient to secure the choice of such as are competent and deserving. For the latter purpose, some additional process is required, which may effect a point beyond the reach of examinations, in enabling us to select out of those who have been examined, and been proved not to be disqualified, the individuals who are in other respects, and beyond what the examination could testify, the best qualified for the offices to be filled. From the whole, I therefore conclude that a mixed mode is that which is the best calculated for general adoption; being one which is carried out in part by oral and in part by written examination; in part by testimonials as to past conduct and general qualifications, and in part by the written compositions of the candidate made at the time.

But as intellectual education is not the only kind of education which each person ought to receive, so an intellectual test is not the only test of many a person's fitness to fill certain offices. Moral and even physical qualities are often as requisite for this purpose as are those of an intellectual nature, which, although unquestionably the highest, are doubtless not the only endowments to be considered. Hence a public examination of candidates for state offices, and electing them

according to the credit with which they passed such examination, may often fail to ensure the fittest persons to fill those offices, although probably in nine cases out of ten it will succeed. Where, however, it does fail, it fails entirely. It will succeed in all cases where intellectual qualifications are mainly required, and the candidate has no physical impediments which may interfere with his examination, and no moral disqualifications to impair his efficiency. It will fail in all cases where moral and physical qualities and endowments are equally requisite with those of an intellectual nature.

The plan of promoting candidates for civil offices by examination as to their qualifications, is doubtless, however, directly conducive to civilization. It gives to intellect and education the supremacy in the affairs of state; in some respects indeed, as already observed, conferring upon them even a greater degree of influence than by right they are entitled to possess, inasmuch as moral as well as mental qualifications ought to be considered here, and to have their due weight, but which they will not obtain if the choice of the candidate is determined solely by his intellectual capacities and attainments.

Manual education, or that which is intended to adapt various persons for the particular professions and callings they are respectively intended to follow, does not require any state provision to be made for its promotion, inasmuch as all those who are interested in gaining such instruction will naturally be led to secure it without the interference of the government. So far, however, as regards making provision for this instruction being placed under proper regulation where such is necessary, it is essential for, and it is the duty of the state to interpose, especially where this is required in order to prevent the nation from suffering through ignorant, or unskilful, or unprincipled practitioners. As respects this matter, both the teaching and the pursuit of certain callings demand, of course, more

imperatively than do others, to be placed under government control, according to their relative importance and quality. Such, in particular, are those professions by which may be placed in jeopardy either the life, the property, or the liberty of the public. The state may fairly and advantageously interfere to frame such precautions with respect to these professions, as in its wisdom it sees most fit.

Education which is of a merely ornamental kind, such as refined accomplishments, may be left to the taste or particular requirements of each individual, who will obtain this according to his necessities or his means, without any state provision being made for its establishment. Such an education should, however, be placed within the reach of every one, as will supply him with the elements of knowledge and learning, and capacitate him for further progress in this respect; as will train him in correct moral and religious habits, and fit him to be a useful member of society, and to employ himself in some advantageous office, profession, or calling.

In the case of each individual, moreover, his education ought not to cease with his school career, but should be continued and carried on alike by means of the national institutions which every state is bound to provide for the intellectual and moral education of the people, and by the development of various kinds which intercourse with society tends powerfully to promote. And, on the other hand, education ought to qualify the youth both for availing himself of the institutions of the nation provided for adult instruction, and for conducting himself with propriety and advantage during his intercourse with the world in after-life. Thus considered, indeed, education continues through life itself, and ceases only with the entrance upon eternity, which is the period of harvest when its fruits will be gathered in.

In general education, it is advantageous that the ele-

ments of each branch of knowledge should be taught, in order to show how vast is the expanse of knowledge which may be traversed; and also to prevent the relative importance of those special departments of it which the individual is mainly following, from being overvalued. We can only judge adequately and accurately of the advantages of a particular locality which we think of choosing, by taking a survey of the country adjacent from an elevated spot, and viewing all the features of the surrounding district.

The Spartan system of education consisted not so much in communicating the knowledge of a great variety of subjects, as in forming the passions, sentiments, and ideas to that tone which might best assimilate with the constitution of the state. The object of education, indeed, should ever be twofold:—1. To make good men. 2. To make good citizens. It ought to lead individuals to consider themselves not merely as such, but as members of a state; should inculcate not only private but public virtue.

As regards the mode of instruction in each case to be pursued, this owes its value not to the quantity of knowledge that may be imparted, or to the strictness of the discipline followed, but to the development and cultivation of the faculties effected, and the result produced on the moral habits and disposition by the principles taught.

Indeed, one very essential matter, and which relates to domestic education, is the maintenance of, and the inculcation of the duty of respect to rule among the different members of a family, which is the first and most important lesson on the subject of obedience to constituted authority, the very basis of society and civil government. Discipline in education is as needful as instruction, with which it should be made to go hand in hand. Parents and masters, as the recognized rulers, and as the oracles of wisdom and virtue, should have a due influence alike as regards them-

selves and the doctrines they instil; and good sons are the most likely to make good subjects.

Our policy should moreover be not to compel, but to encourage education: not to force people to learn, but to induce them to do so by persuading them of its advantages, and by affording every means through the other Elements of civilization for pursuing a course which will prove advantageous alike to themselves individually, and to the state of which they are members.

A very important question here arises, to what extent, and in what respects, it is desirable to further the progress of education by resort to artificial stimulus. For this purpose, the readiest means seem to be the examination of students either verbally or by writing, and the institution of certificates or classes of comparative merit, by which an emulation between them is created, and they are urged forward to exertions which they would not otherwise undertake. The defect, however, of the stimulus in all these cases is, that it is not the desire of study, or of obtaining knowledge, which is the ultimate or real object aimed at, but the desire of acquiring superiority over those with whom they compete; and that immediately the stimulus to exertion called forth by this emulation is withdrawn, the zeal for study at once also ceases. The application of this stimulus is somewhat like the process of placing seeds in a hotbed, by which their early growth is much accelerated, but the eventual vigour of the plant is correspondingly decreased. So with regard to the emulation produced by examinations and class lists, the desire to excel in competition urges young men forward to succeed here, but damps their ardour in study beyond and independent of this incitement; and they are too frequently led to regard success in the class list as the ultimate object of study, instead of as a mere inducement to enter heartily upon its career. So far, however, but so far only, as the latter purpose is attained, the stimulus is efficient and expedient.

The principle upon which prizes of different kinds are given, and the theory of their beneficial operation, I take indeed to be this :—That it is desirable to create a stimulus to follow a certain pursuit, which nothing in the pursuit itself is likely to excite, at least in the case of the particular individual engaged in it, and which is as it were transferred from the prize to the pursuit itself, so that the latter is followed with zeal and energy, although not for its own sake, yet for that of the prize, and by means of which all the advantages are secured in regard to the artificial stimulus so created, which the ardent pursuit of the object itself for its own sake, or for the solid advantages it will ultimately bring, and not for the sake of the prize, would secure.

Aristotle says that "until the age of seven complete, the school for children ought to be the father's house." * The tone of mind and cast of thought which are formed at this early period, depend much on the precepts and example enforced by those whose influence must naturally be the greatest; and although no new faculties or dispositions can be conferred by this means, the due development and cultivation of those existent at such a juncture is of paramount importance. More especially as regards the inculcation of sound moral principles, fortifying the mind against error, and preparing the child to enter upon the world, it is that the education conferred by the mother is most valuable, and most essential. By this means, moreover, he is fitted for the more enlarged and extensive education which he acquires at school, in which mental training and moral discipline are alike to be imparted, and which, as a little world in itself, prepares him for the duties and the dangers of that great and real world through which he will hereafter have to direct his course.

In order, however, to urge forward the people as a mass

* Politics, book iv.

to take a very decided interest in the education of their children, you must convince them of the great advantages that would result from obtaining that education. These results being in their effects unseen, require very clearly to be demonstrated. The more extensively these advantages are pointed out, the more active will be the efforts made to secure them.

Of all moral education, religion is the most important, the most comprehensive, and the most efficient. The most important, because duty to God as well as to man is enjoined by it; the most comprehensive, because actions of every kind are the subjects of its control; and the most efficient, because by its influence the heart is not only regulated, but changed. This alone is able to control the actions of the body, by influencing the impulses of the mind. It directs the working of the machine by acting on the mainspring. It is essential, moreover, that not only both education and religion should be inculcated, but that they should be inculcated together. Education should unite with it the teaching of religion; and with the teaching of religion the inculcation of knowledge and of education generally should be followed. Enlightenment and religion should ever proceed hand in hand together. Religion as regards its general influence over the mind of a nation, apart from and independent of religious education, forms a separate and very important Element in the promotion of civilization. The Christian religion, as has already been remarked, is in its nature extremely favourable to the civilization alike of individuals and of states, and both intellectually and morally. The knowledge that it teaches is the highest and most elevating; and the principles that it enforces are the purest and most comprehensive.

The beneficial effects resulting from the general education of the people, are threefold, corresponding with the nature of education itself;—raising the national mind;

improving the national character; providing means of general subsistence to each and to the whole by instructing every individual in an occupation. By education, moreover, the people are rendered independent of unprincipled demagogues and seditious teachers, and thus the higher influences in the state are raised above those which are demoralizing and base; just as in the individual man, education renders him less subject to the control of his animal passions and propensities. For the sake, therefore, of the state as well as of the several individuals who compose it, it is essential that a due system of education be established in every nation. The histories of nations, and the histories of individuals, alike bear testimony to the importance of this principle, in each case.

But Education, although an important and essential Element in the civilization of a nation, is but one Element only. It is not the consummation, but merely the commencement of civilization. It is not the reaping, or even the sowing, but merely the tillage of the field. By it the hard ground is broken up, and rendered fit for the reception of seed. On the other hand, unless this preparatory step is adopted, and efficiently carried out, the other Elements of civilization about to be discussed can hardly be brought into action, or be availed of with success. According as the national mind is prepared by Education for their application, may we anticipate in proportion that they will contribute to the complete civilization of that particular nation.

II.—NATIONAL RELIGIOUS INFLUENCE.

While inquiring into the Essence of civilization, I referred to the effect produced by Christianity upon its progress. We have now to consider the general influence that religion exercises over a nation, and upon mankind at large, and which, as I shall show, constitutes one of the

most important and essential Elements of civilization. At the same time, it is necessary to be borne in mind that Religious Influence, although so leading and powerful an Element in the constitution of civilization, is not and does not of itself amount to civilization, nor does civilization consist of Religious Influence. The two may be much alike, and are often mistaken for each other; but they are, nevertheless, wholly independent and totally different. Both are, however, important mutual aids to each other; and without each other's assistance, neither can attain a high degree of perfection, or produce very extensive results.

But, notwithstanding the importance to civilization of the Element of Religious Influence, I have placed Education as the first Element, inasmuch as Education must necessarily precede and lay the foundation for Religious Influence; for it is difficult, if not impossible, to suppose the existence of Religious Influence without the inculcation to some extent of Education, although there may be Education to a considerable extent, however defective, and civilization also, without Religious Influence. Ignorance is equally opposed to the teaching of religion, and to the progress of civilization.

There is, moreover, a mutual reciprocal effect upon each other produced both by religion and Education. And, probably, Education, according to its quality and tendency in any particular case, produces quite as great an influence upon religion, as religion, according also to its quality and tendency, does upon Education.

Religious Influence is not only one of the most important of the Elements of civilization, but it is one of the most powerful, and exercises its sway in the most direct manner, by raising man from the condition of a mere animal and terrestrial, to that of an intelligent and immortal being. It conduces, moreover, to the regulation of every part of his conduct, and forms the rule and

supplies the ultimate object by which all his actions are controlled, and to which his highest aims are directed. I may further observe that there is no nation whatsoever either in ancient or modern times, that has reached a high degree of civilization, which has not been to a large extent influenced by religion also. On the other hand, all those nations which have been the most barbarous, have been in a corresponding manner signally wanting in the exercise over them of religious influence. But if religion, so falsified and corrupted and distorted as was that which prevailed in Greece and Rome,—although it may not unreasonably be surmised that even here the Almighty deigned to permit some faint shadow of his attributes, and of the duties which religion enjoins, to be cast among these people, who had no direct revelation made to them of the true religion,—could work such wondrous effects, and be regarded by their rulers as so important an element for the regulation of the state; how much more important and influential must be the true religion itself, whose principles are so pure, and whose teaching is so ennobling! If the mere rude semblance is so sublime, what must be the glory of the real substance.

As the influence of each kind of religion is powerful and civilizing according to its truth, so the influence of the Christian religion, which alone is that which is wholly true, is the best adapted to the exigencies of human nature, and the most calculated to promote civilization. Even among barbarians, the influence of religion, so far as it has extended, has been all-potent; and both among them and civilized people, its indirect and unseen influence is probably greater than that which is direct and open. This of itself has been able to tame the fierce spirit of savage tribes, to subdue the lawless passions of the most untutored races, and to restrain the excesses of the most rapacious. Among civilized people, religion has ever commanded the regard and the veneration of the

wisest. In the government of a nation, moreover, whether rude or refined, the influence of religion has always been found most powerful, and in this respect it has been extensively conducive to the promotion of civilization. It alone has been able to control the actions of the body, by ruling the impulses of the mind. It is able to still the raging of the storm, by its power over the elements which contributed to its excitement.

The two fundamental principles of religion are the acknowledgment of the existence of a Supreme Being, and the doing Him homage in the way deemed most suitable. Where no revelation exists, reason alone must direct man, both as to the nature of the Supreme Being, and the form best fitted for His worship. Where revelation is afforded, it may be presumed that it will instruct man both as to the nature of the Being to be adored, and the mode of worshipping Him most proper to be followed. In all cases, reason should both test the authority and the truth, and should also aid the interpretation of revelation, which, without this process, degenerates into superstition.

Religion, as regards its influence, might be distributed into three different kinds or classes, corresponding with the three different classes into which education has been divided. As, for instance, intellectual religious influence, or that which consists in the understanding and the reason being thoroughly informed and convinced in regard to its principles, which is, indeed, necessary as a stable foundation for all real religious influence. In the next place, moral religious influence is that which is required, constituting indeed the influence of religion over all questions of duty and action. And, in the third place, this influence should not only regulate our notions of social duty, but it must be practically applied and carried into the habits and occupations of everyday life, corresponding with the mode in

which education should be made useful in our professional or other ordinary employments, as well as being desirable as an intellectual or mere ornamental acquirement. Religious influence should control the actions and the hearts of its votaries, and sway powerfully the current of desire and determination.

In three distinct and independent modes, moreover Religious Influence contributes to the civilization of a nation, both as regards men individually and men in the aggregate. The first of these is by raising the minds of the people to a sense of their own natural dignity and importance as immortal beings, and as allied to the great Creator of all things. The effect of this influence is very different from, and, indeed, directly opposite to pride and vanity, which spring from the supposed individual superiority of one man to another, and not from any opinion as to the dignity of the whole race. The second of the modes by which Religious Influence contributes to the civilization of a people, is by instilling into their minds the consciousness of a constant observer of all their actions, to whom they are accountable for every deed. And the third of those modes, is by the establishment of a strict and unerring rule of the highest authority for the direction of their conduct on all occasions, both as to principle and practice.

As all law derives its authority from God, so is each law dependent for its force and efficiency on the support that it derives from the same source. Hence religion has ever been seen to be most powerful and influential in disposing men to submit to rule; and, indeed, without the aid of religion, it has been found impossible to govern them. So far, indeed, has this been the case, that for lack of a true religion, men have even invented false ones, which inculcated belief in a superior over-ruling power, and by which mankind have been controlled and kept in order.

Another grand civilizing influence of religion, arises from the tendency which it has to create an impression on men's minds that virtue is desirable to be followed, and will be productive of reward; while vice is undesirable, and will be productive of punishment.

Religion both elevates and inspires the soul. The most magnificent works of art have been instigated by the influence of religious fervour, and the noblest and sublimest ideas have been afforded by religious subjects. Religion has, moreover, ever been the soul of poetry, and of productions in each of the sister arts. The use and influence of art in its turn to aid religion, as well as to promote civilization, I shall advert to when treating of the promotion of art as one of the Elements of the latter.* The Christian religion is, indeed, and in many and various ways, through the influence that it exerts, directly conducive to civilization. The injunctions contained in the Bible for the improvement of the mind by obtaining knowledge, and for subjecting the lower and baser influences of our nature to those which are higher and purer,—the body to the soul, the passions and desires to the intellectual and moral endowments,—directly each contribute to the promotion of civilization.

As containing the purest and most perfect system of ethics which has ever yet been framed, and which is, moreover, fully adapted for practical guidance and conduct, the moral influence of Christianity must necessarily be very powerful and very extensive. If these precepts fail in any respect, this is not from being at all defective in themselves, but from their being too exalted and too refined for human nature. Many human and even Heathen systems appear in several respects practically more efficient, because they were more implicitly followed;

* See also on this subject *The Theory of the Arts;* or Art in relation to Nature, Civilization, and Man. By George Harris, F.S.A. Vol. I., p. 110. Vol. II., p. 225.

which was from their being less refined and exalted, and from the less sublime and extensive nature of their aim. Not only the morals, but the manners and customs of every civilized nation, are more or less influenced by the religion embraced by that people. And not the general tone merely but the direction of each particular act is thus swayed.

Christianity has also a direct tendency to promote civilization, from the manner in which it enjoins amicable unity, and social communion, and good fellowship among different people. It strives to join together, in one vast community, or rather fraternity, the whole family of the human race, and impels us to endeavour to disseminate through the remotest regions of the world the blessings of true religion. This principle, from which, indeed, springs the very foundation of civilized society, Christianity carries out further than does any moral or constitutional code that has been established in any nation. While science and intellect induce us to extend the pale of our sympathies to all those of our race who are capable of partaking of, or of appreciating our efforts in the cause of learning or art; Christianity leads us to extend it to all who belong to the common race of mankind. And while the former urge us from a feeling of connection, Christianity constrains us from a principle of duty. In the promotion of general benevolence among mankind, Christianity has done much for civilization; as also, in conjunction with it, by the numerous charitable, educational, and religious institutions which it has been the means of founding. In this respect, the indirect influence of our religion, independent of its direct effects, in promoting mutual goodwill among the several members of society, both in our own country and in foreign nations, by the exertions which it calls forth to alleviate their wants, and to minister to their necessities and comforts of each kind, of itself causes Christianity to have a powerful civilizing influence over the whole world. No other religion has

produced this great effect; it alone has accomplished it perfectly.

So far as Religious Influence contributes to unite together in amicable union the different members of a state, it may be considered as aiding the efficiency of Element IX. of civilization, that of Internal Communication. To some extent, it so far aids Element X. also, which is that of International Intercourse. More especially in the case of colonies belonging to any state, how important is it that the same principle of religion should unite the two, which is the strongest bond of union that they can possess, and the want of which must necessarily occasion a tendency to separation. This has been peculiarly evinced in the case of India, the conversion of which to Christianity, we must now be convinced, alone can closely connect it with this country, and the accomplishment of which is consequently most important, not only as a matter of duty, but as a principle of state policy.

It cannot, indeed, be doubted that the greatest conquests over human nature which have ever been effected, and the completeness of which is most fully evinced, as in the case of other conquests, by the entire change in heart, and habits, and customs, and conduct, which is produced, are those which have been accomplished by the influence of Christianity. Nations and individuals alike attest the truth of this proposition. In fact, the world at large may be appealed to for this purpose, in which the most extensive moral revolutions that have ever been wrought, have been effected through this medium alone. And the direct and powerful tendency of religious influence to promote civilization, is conclusively proved by the circumstance that wherever, throughout the world, Christianity has taken root, there civilization, imperfect indeed it may be, has been at once established. Christianity is, indeed, as it were, the moral sun by which alone the darkness of

ignorance and superstition has been effectually dispelled, and from which the bright and genial beams of civilization have been generally diffused.

One immense, and indeed incalculable advantage which Christianity possesses as regards its influence, over all the Pagan and Heathen systems, is, that those who are its teachers, and who take the lead in its propagation and ministration, sincerely believe in all that they teach and inculcate, and are not imposing a belief upon others with which they themselves are not impressed. Sincerity in the advocates of religion is essential for its support. Where this is wanting, neither energy nor vitality can be found. According, therefore, in each sect, as the teachers of religion are imbued with and evince sincerity, will be the power with which their followers will be impressed. If, however, Heathenism and Paganism have in some instances appeared to exercise a more striking and more extensive influence over the minds of their votaries than Christianity has done; this is not because Christianity is in reality less influential than those systems, but because the people of the present day possess less of Christianity, than the people of past ages did of Paganism or Heathenism. The laxity of Christians is not from any defect in Christianity itself, but from their own defect as regards the limited extent to which they are really endowed with it.

The Pagan system of mythology had a civilizing effect, especially as regards the intellectual and moral stimulus which it excited, by raising up and placing ever before the eyes of the people as models by which to regulate their conduct, and as examples for imitation, their various deities, who were the incorporations, as it were, of great and noble qualities; and also their various heroes exalted into deities, who were regarded as so much god as to command the general veneration of mankind, and as so much man as to inspire each with the hope, as well as

the desire, of imitation. With respect to the moral effect produced by such a system, Christianity supplies us with examples for imitation in the lives recorded in Holy Writ of those good men whose actions are there set forth, and whose humanity places them on a level with ourselves, while principles of the loftiest and purest nature are promulgated with regard to our conduct: and the Deity whom we are taught to adore, is not only in His nature far more sublime, and in His attributes far more perfect than any of those of Pagan invention; but to His loftier and diviner qualities of omnipotence and omniscience, they never even pretended to aspire.

In two important points, Paganism doubtless possessed a great advantage over Christianity, as regards the direct influence upon its votaries which it was capable of exercising. In the first place, the personality which attached to the objects of its adoration, stimulated the interest of its worshippers. And in the next place, the material nature of its associations gave vigour to their feelings with regard to it. From the first of these circumstances, by investing all its deities with personal human characters, the people were induced to enter fully into its principles. From the other of them, this religion was rendered comprehensible to every understanding, and became the subject of sensation as well as intellect. In the early ages of the world, the principle of personality in the religion of the Almighty was supplied by the frequent personal manifestations of Himself which He was pleased to make, as when He appeared to and held personal intercourse with Adam, and with Abraham, and Moses, and many other of the ancient patriarchs and prophets. This was also especially effected by the personal appearance among us upon earth of the Saviour of mankind. In later ages, when these personal manifestations have altogether ceased, and the record of them only remains to be referred to, and as the education of the world, both religious and intellectual, has advanced and

has grown more refined and elevated, religion itself became more exalted and more spiritual. We are taught to adore the Deity as an invisible being, and as a spirit; and the influence of the Holy Spirit is that by which we are immediately affected, and who is the Being with whom alone we now hold direct personal communication. Of either of the persons in the Trinity, we have no sensual perception whatever.

The partiality of mankind towards materiality, even in religion, and the innate proneness to materialize every subject of whatever nature, which is, indeed, an inclination that developes itself in many other pursuits besides religion, is exhibited by the people of every age and country alike. It is this which has mainly conduced to lead mankind to invest different deities with material frames, who stand as the representatives of particular qualities; and which is also evinced in the tendency to idolatry in their religious services which, from the earliest ages of the world, all nations alike have uniformly displayed. Not only was a material character in early times given to the Deity, whatever form of religion was in vogue, as also to religion generally; but His actions were considered to be more of a material than a moral nature, and with regard to the former character was their importance discussed. And the disposition to introduce personality into religion, was no less plainly exhibited by the proneness alike to deify those renowned persons whose qualities they admired, and also to personalize the very deities whom they regarded as objects of adoration.

In one particular mode it may, perhaps, be said that, in later days, we are peculiarly prone both to personalize, and also to materialize religion. And that is, that in many cases we are disposed to pay to the ministers of religion too much of that homage which is due to the Deity alone; and that we regard too much the edifice

erected for its celebration, instead of the celebration itself. To some extent, indeed, both the personality and the materiality which have been arbitrarily by man attached to religion, may appear to be sanctioned, or rather, permitted by God, in compassion to the infirmity of our nature. Thus, in the reverence enjoined to the priests and prophets under the Jewish dispensation, a certain degree of personality was introduced and allowed; while in the importance attached to the material structure of the Temple at Jerusalem, and the figures and ornaments carved upon it, and the adoration enjoined to the Brazen Serpent, which was a material type of the only true object of adoration, materiality in religious service and its objects was also sanctioned. On the other hand, the carrying to too great an extent, and the abuse of both these principles, was especially guarded against, and balanced and counteracted, by the promulgation of the first and second commandment in the Law given by Moses on Mount Sinai.

In proportion as religion is less personal, and is deficient as regards its hold on the popular mind by not affecting the senses, should the evidences afforded of its truth, and which the people should be taught during its inculcation, be more striking and convincing, and which may serve to counterbalance its want of influence in other respects. Thus, while the evidence obtained through the senses, such as that of miracles, and the personal appearance of the Deity and of angels, is less strong than what was formerly supplied to mankind; that afforded by the reason, from reflecting on these miracles and appearances, is more influential, inasmuch and in proportion as the reason is a far more exalted endowment than are the senses.

It may perhaps, however, be urged against the popular teaching of the evidences of religion, that it is best not to disturb the absolute and unhesitating acquiescence which

persons in general naturally possess in the truth of religion through their education, and without even a suspicion that it may not be unimpeachable. But in this case, their religion is based rather upon prejudice than upon conviction; on ignorance more than on knowledge. Although the foundation may serve very well so long as fine weather lasts; yet, directly that a storm arises, of which many are hovering around, it must inevitably give way. It is surely, therefore, expedient to blend with the teaching of the principles of religion, the evidence of its truth. And while inculcating its doctrines, we ought, doubtless, to fortify the mind against the attacks of infidelity. Moreover, pretty exactly in proportion to the strength of our conviction of the truth of religion, will be the extent of its influence over the mind.

Religion and philosophy should, moreover, not merely both be cultivated, but should be cultivated together, and should confirm, and invigorate, and improve each other. Religion should correct and soften philosophy, and philosophy should regulate and strengthen religion. Thus religion should be rendered rational, conformably with reason; and philosophy should be made humane, conformably with religion.

Not only does it appear expedient for aiding the influence of religion, but also reasonable in itself, that religion should be celebrated with a due degree of ceremony and even pomp. It is this which affects the multitude; and though it may be through their frailty that they are thus moved instead of by more important matters, yet it is owing to their natural constitution that this is the case. And further than this, in the ceremonial for the administration of religious rites framed by God himself, and ordained for His chosen people,—whose religious influence and civilization were immediately superintended by the Almighty,—a large measure of this pomp was not only permitted, but expressly commanded: a concession,

it may have been, to human infirmity. Even in heaven also, according to the description contained in the Apocalypse, great pomp attends each exercise of worship. Nevertheless, it is an important point to be kept in view in the ordering of religious ceremonies, that they do not detract from more essential matters, but, on the contrary, aid their observance, and add effect to their celebration.

Indeed, the danger to be apprehended in a religious service which is conducted with an extensive degree of gorgeous ceremony, is that the attention and feeling of the congregation will be drawn off from the service itself to the ceremony with which it is celebrated,—from that which constitutes the worship of God, to that which is intended for the stimulation of man. And this is the case alike, whether the service be scenic, or the sermon sensational.

Public worship appears to consist of the four following principal essentials or acts. 1. Recognition and adoration of the Supreme Being. 2. Prayer to Him for benefits desired. 3. Thanksgiving for benefits received. 4. Penitence for pardon of sins committed. Every liturgy or religious service, for whatever body of Christians or religionists intended, should embrace these requisites. As regards the principles on which the conduct of church services, and the composition of a liturgy ought to be framed, such services should be at once sober and interesting, calculated alike to stimulate devotion, and to be in themselves agreeable. They should be sufficiently ample to afford full opportunity for expressing all that is needful on such an occasion, and yet not so long as to produce weariness, or detract from the vigour with which they ought to be carried on. While nothing of value should be omitted, repetition, where unnecessary, should be carefully avoided, and the whole should be regular without being constrained. The liturgy which is used should combine all that is required alike of prayer,

humiliation, and praise. Instruction should be also blended with these services, particularly from the inspired volume on which our faith rests. The sermons, or other instructorial addresses accompanying the services, should serve to aid rather than to incumber them. And in their nature they should be fervent and striking, but not theatrical or sensational; interesting and instructive, but not merely entertaining.

Nevertheless, although our worship is Divine, our mode of conducting it is human. Our aim should ever be to render our adoration suitable to, if not worthy of the Being to whom it is paid. Our utmost efforts here will necessarily fall far short of rendering it becoming for such a purpose. All due dignity and decorum should surely be resorted to on occasions so sublime and so solemn.

Moreover, according to the magnificence with which we erect temples devoted to the worship of the Almighty, will the importance of this worship be judged of by the multitude; and the cost bestowed upon our religious celebrations, will afford them a sure proof of the value we attach to the faith which we profess. If we ourselves seem to sacrifice nothing to religion, we cannot expect others to give up much to follow our precepts.

The character of the structure devoted to public worship, may also produce an important moral effect upon the worshippers within its walls. A church should not only be of a different nature to ordinary buildings, but should exceed them both in its extent and its dignity, as the purposes for which it is used are superior to those of common dwellings. The antiquity of the pile may contribute to remind us of the lasting nature of the religion to which it is consecrated, and of the veneration paid to it by the people of past ages as well as by those of the present. Its solidity may lead us to reflect on the eternity of that religion, and its splendour upon its importance. So also may the grandeur and beauty of the edifice itself serve to

typify the solemnity and purity of the religion to which it is devoted.

As in this place we have to consider rather the influence upon mankind of religion than its actual essence, the due and legitimate pomp and ceremony attendant upon its celebration must necessarily be taken into full account. It is by this mainly that the multitude are affected.

In conjunction with religion, it is essential that morality also should be inculcated; for although morality may be unstable which is not built upon religion, yet that religion can possess but little influence or genuineness which is not supported by morality.

But it may be said that some of the most highly civilized men, and bodies of men, are wholly, or at any rate to a large extent, destitute of religion; and that if this is the case, its influence cannot be essential or even very important in the civilization of a nation. In these cases, however, although the practice of religion may have been abandoned, the influence of many of its most striking precepts, and of its moral obligations, is still retained and acted upon: and civilization is here existent, not, indeed, because Religious Influence is not an Element in its constitution; but civilization exists in such a case only imperfectly, because it is wanting in this Element, except so far as any of it remains as one of its ingredients. On the other hand, no instance is on record of a highly civilized nation or individual who has never adopted any religion at all. Where they have once embraced, but have afterwards wholly or partially renounced or neglected it, of which instances are not infrequent, much of the influence that religion is calculated to produce would continue to operate long after its abandonment.

Having now examined generally the nature of Religious Influence as it affects a nation at large, more especially in the promotion of civilization, and the extent to which it is exercised; the next question is, how ought this influence

to be extended and secured, and what is the duty here of the state? How is Religious Influence, which is by all persons of intelligence, and by all the most civilized nations, acknowledged to be so important, so essential, nay, so paramount an Element in the civilization of a state, to be duly availed of so as to render it of the utmost value, and to turn it to the fullest account?

The state is bound alike by duty and by interest to provide for the dissemination of this influence throughout the nation, which can only be effectually secured by the aid of appointed teachers for the purpose, who, as in the case of the instructors in education, should be so far placed under the regulation of the state as to ensure duly qualified persons only attaining to this office. In most civilized states, Institutions have been established for the supply and support of teachers of this description; and to the consideration of Institutions of this class, which form a separate Element of themselves, our attention will presently be directed, when their necessity will be pointed out. As regards such Institutions, I need here only observe, that it is the duty of the state to protect and maintain them, on all occasions, in all their integrity, and also to adopt such measures for their regulation as may appear to be desirable for rendering them as efficient as possible. It is not, nevertheless, by any means, the duty of the state to interpose as regards the particular mode in which Religious Influence shall be disseminated through such an institution, which often suffers essentially, and the operation of its machinery is disordered, by such interference.

In the first place, however, it is the duty of the state and is, indeed, a necessary initiatory and preparatory step to what has already been considered, to render to religion on all suitable occasions its due share of honour and reverence, and to acknowledge its importance both in public and private transactions. Religion may also fairly

claim to be protected by the government, so far as regards securing it against common obloquy. A reverential respect to religion by the state, is but the just rendering to it of the tribute which is its due by right. It is surely fitting that the Governor of all things should receive proper homage from the government that He supports; that the fountain of all authority should be acknowledged by the authorities of a state; and that the only source of all power should be honoured by the powers which are but the delegates of His sway. Moreover, as all rule and all authority originate in obedience to God, so to the promotion of this duty ought all rule and all authority in every state alike to contribute its efforts, and to consider it as among its paramount requirements.

By two modes, more especially, may the state legitimately and constitutionally interfere with respect to the support of religion, and the extension of its influence. 1. By publicly maintaining and enforcing the regard and veneration which are due to religion. 2. By endeavouring to promote generally an attachment towards it. For the furtherance of each of these ends, measures, both positive and negative, may be resorted to. The proper conduct for rulers with regard to the first of the modes referred to, is plain and obvious, and on them it depends mainly whether this principle shall be observed; and here the duty is directly positive. The second of these modes is perhaps chiefly to be effected, so far as the interference of the state can avail, by negative means; by repressing and punishing every attempt to throw odium or ridicule upon religion, or upon the institutions or officers connected with it.

The duty of the state as regards the protection of religion from undeserved censure and obloquy, the degree of licence to be allowed in the controverting any of its tenets, and the propriety of punishing direct attacks and aspersions upon religion, will be more particularly con-

sidered while discussing the Element which embraces the subject of Toleration.* As regards the principle on which this duty rests, the aim of the state should be to maintain the proper dignity of religion, and also to secure it from undue aspersion. A deep reverence towards it is all-essential for the very existence of religion; and a due respect and regard for it are necessary to ensure both its observance and its possession of any influence whatever over its votaries. Whatever, therefore, is calculated to detract from its position in this respect, is fatal to the character, and consequently to the influence of religion, although in reference to a private individual such an attack upon his character may fall quite harmless. Nevertheless, in the case of religion, an essential distinction should ever be made between the ridicule of religion itself, and the ridicule of its corruptions, or of false pretences or pretenders to it, which, though avowedly and apparently a part of it, are in reality its most inimical parasites. A great difficulty frequently here arises, both in legislation and in the administration of justice. Thus, many superstitious customs appertaining to religious ordinances might be satirized with advantage to religion, provided that in doing so you could avoid satirizing religion also. But unless this can be effected, you will often be obliged to spare the parasitical plant, for the sake of the tree to which it clings. Nothing is so injurious to religious influence, and, indeed, to religion generally, as a discordance and opposition of sentiment between its different teachers. This creates suspicion, and shakes all confidence, as regards the truth of its principles. The remedy for this evil will be considered when treating on the National Institutions for the support of religion and education, which contribute to form Element III. It is, moreover, of the very highest importance for the influence and interest of religion, that

* Element V.

its professors should not only evince sincerity in their minds, but should be also correct and consistent in the conduct of their lives.

In order to promote and advance the due and legitimate influence which religion ought to possess in every state,—and in doing which the authority of the state may doubtless be constitutionally employed,—care should be taken that, on the one hand, religion be rendered as little repulsive, and that on the other hand it be rendered as attractive, as possible; and this both as regards the explanation of its general principles, and the celebration of its outward ordinances. Thus, all unnecessary austerity and severity in its doctrines, and all needless prolixity and repulsiveness in its services, ought alike to be avoided. On the contrary, these should be made as impressive and as agreeable as can be contrived, without, on the one hand, sacrificing anything to truth, or on the other hand, doing anything that may tend to lower its dignity and importance, so as to lessen its influence upon the national mind. In the public services of religion, whatever is needlessly irksome should be carefully excluded, inasmuch as this tends to weaken its influence, both by deterring people from attending them, and by exciting a feeling of aversion or apathy in the minds of those who do attend. On the other hand, by rendering them attractive, you both increase the attendance, and render that attendance a matter of delight; and whatever is pleasing is necessarily, and indeed naturally, influential. Sermons, tedious and commonplace, are, especially on this account, to be avoided; while music, conducted with due dignity and devotion, is peculiarly suitable as an aid and accompaniment. The style of the sacred Scriptures affords, indeed, the most perfect model for the regulation of sacred services. Here the loftiest strains of poetry and the finest passages of eloquence are interspersed with examples of the noblest nature, and accompanied by

precepts of the purest kind. Information of the highest interest is contained in its pages, and the sublimest notions are instilled into the mind concerning both religion itself and its Divine Author. Hence arises the impression produced upon those who duly study its Divine revelations, with which the National Influence of Religion, resulting conjointly from its appointed services and its efficient teaching, should closely correspond.

III.—NATIONAL INSTRUCTORY INSTITUTIONS.

The important Elements in the promotion of Civilization, which fall under the denomination of Education, and Religious Influence, having now been examined, it will be proper, next in order, to consider as the third Element of Civilization, those peculiar Institutions belonging to a nation, which are requisite for the support and furtherance, more especially, of the foregoing Elements, as also of civilization generally, and which constitute of themselves quite a distinct Element of civilization, wholly independent of the two already considered, with which they are connected. Both Education and Religious Influence may, indeed, be inculcated, and be to a certain extent existent in any country, in the absence of the Institutions most efficient to promote them; besides which, these Institutions serve to promote Civilization in many other ways beyond those in which they are directly intended to effect it.

It is very desirable, but, at the same, very difficult to decide, precisely and satisfactorily, what Institutions of this class ought to be considered as national, and which of them should be left to private patronage. Some of them are, doubtless, best adapted for, and thrive the most under public, and some under private patronage; while certain of them may require a share of this support of

both kinds. As regards the general principle which ought mainly to determine whether an Institution for the purposes here mentioned should be maintained by the state, or left to private patronage, it may be laid down as a rule that, when an Institution is of public national importance, affecting the whole body of the community, and where its proper regulation is of that general consequence to the country that it calls for state interference, such an Institution ought to be placed under the control of the state, and ought to be supported by the nation. When, however, Institutions, although directly conducive to civilization, have for their immediate object some end of mere partial interest, they have no claim to such benefit, nor is there any occasion for placing them under such restraint.

National Institutions should, moreover, be so far national as that the nation at large is benefited by their existence, although each individual in the state may not directly participate in that benefit. He may profit nevertheless, indirectly, by the advantage derived therefrom by the state of which he is a member. Conferring a national benefit entitles an Institution of right to national protection and national support. And receiving national protection and support, subjects an Institution to the control and regulation of the state.

A perfect state should by its Institutions aim rightly to influence the mind, and disposition, and conduct of its members; and here the concerns of eternity are surely entitled to an equal consideration with those of time. But it may be said that the concerns of eternity affect not the state, which is merely a temporal establishment for temporal purposes. This, is, however, an erroneous view, inasmuch as those who are the best men make the best citizens; and the best men are those whose actions are guided by religion. Not only, indeed, are men in the aggregate, as well as man individually, influenced by

religion; but, as regards its external effect and operation, religion is probably even more influential upon men than it is upon man.

Two grand principles ought to be kept constantly in view with regard both to the constitution and the operation of National Institutions of the class here described. The one is, to render them as efficient as possible for the promotion of civilization. The other is, to render them also as generally available, and as extensively useful as possible, to the community at large. In the management of Institutions of this character, we must, moreover, be careful so to direct their adaptation, lest, as in the case of some medicines administered for the cure of certain bodily ailments, while they cure one malady, they create another in its place. So with regard to National Institutions of different kinds, certain of these, while they promote learning, they also produce pedantry; while they preserve the correct rules of art, they also prevent original effort; while they encourage talent to a considerable extent, they also damp real genius. The provision of an efficient counteracting remedy in these cases, is sometimes as important as the carrying out of the original design of the Institution; and without the former, the operation of the latter will fail to be satisfactory. In addition to this, the change in the character of the times necessarily caused by the growth of a nation, and more especially its advancement in civilization, must render necessary many changes both in the constitution and management of its Instructorial Institutions. As well might we consider the regulations adopted for the government of a child proper to guide the conduct of a grown-up man, as the laws and regulations of a barbarous age fitted for one of an advanced period in civilization. At the same time, in reforming these Institutions, the object should be, not to alter their original constitution, but in reality to prevent its being

altered through circumstances, by adapting it as perfectly to the new state of things as it was to the old.

The most important element, therefore, in the civilization of a state, next to the education of its members, and the promotion of religious influence among them, is the establishment of National Institutions of the class here described, the object of which is to inculcate instruction of different kinds. These Institutions, correspondingly with education itself, are in their nature and objects, either mental, moral, or manual. Mental, are those whose object is to promote the intellectual cultivation and advancement of the persons who are connected with them. Moral, those whose object is to further the moral and religious instruction of their members. Manual, such as are adapted to afford manual or professional employment to those belonging to them. Of the different National Institutions which conduce directly either to produce or to promote civilization, some may, accordingly, be classed as entirely and solely mental, or which contribute to promote learning and intellectual pursuits among the people, such as Museums, and Royal Academies of Art. Others may be classed as entirely and solely moral, such as Church Establishments, and Religious Societies. Many institutions are, however, partly mental and partly moral, and some of them partly manual also, such as Universities, Libraries, and Schools. All these Institutions conduce more or less, either directly or indirectly, in some way or other, to the production or promotion of civilization; and although those which may be termed mental contribute most directly to this end, yet those also which are moral have an important effect here, and operate largely upon the national feeling and the national mind.

The National Institutions of a country connected with civilization, may be comprised under the four following heads:—1. A Church Establishment, which is entirely moral in its direct object. 2. Universities, Libraries, and

Scholastic Institutions, which are partly mental, partly moral, and to some extent manual also. 3. Galleries of Art, and Museums, which are entirely mental. 4. National Spectacular and Theatrical Institutions, which are both mental and moral.

I. If education, especially of a moral kind, is entitled to be considered a matter of national importance; an Institution, such as the Church, which is peculiarly adapted to promote it, and to inculcate that branch of moral education which is the most efficient, must surely be deemed to be of the highest benefit, independent of the divine origin of such an institution, the consideration of which is necessarily without the province of the present work. Its most direct and important object, however, is to aid and support the furtherance of religious influence, which has already been considered as a separate Element of civilization. The end of Church Establishments in any nation, and whatever religion is professed, is to instruct mankind in the knowledge of the Supreme Being, and to point out the mode of worshipping Him most proper to be followed, to regulate this mode, and to provide an order of men expressly for this purpose. Viewed, nevertheless, merely as a National Institution for the advancement of civilization, the Church is one of the most efficient that could have been devised for this end. Its influence is not only extended throughout the land, but in every parish it is planted; and in its ministers, men of learning, virtue, and energy are stationed in each district, whose lives are devoted to promote its ends, and who, both by their education and their example, exercise an influence alike powerful and beneficent, in favour of civilization. On the other hand, as each member or officer of this Institution is under the control of some superior, and the whole body under one head, it acts with vigour and unanimity. Being established and recognized as a National Institution, it acquires a due importance as

such, and testifies the national respect paid to religion by the state.

Nor are the indirect influences exercised by the establishment of this Institution less beneficial or extensive than those which are direct. The important moral effects which are produced by the inhabitants of each place assembling weekly together for the purpose of public worship, independent of the religious duty of such an observance, ought not to be lost sight of. The public and national recognition of a Supreme Being, a moral Governor of the universe, to whom everything is owing, and who rules over all, is moreover most influential in its moral results. The solemn nature of the services which are celebrated in these temples to the Creator; the example afforded to join in those services, and the lessons inculcated on such occasions, are all highly adapted to produce effects of the utmost importance as regards the moral improvement and civilization of a nation.

Indeed, the very congregating together for sacred purposes, on solemn days set apart, of the whole inhabitants of a district, whereby opportunities are afforded of reminding them not only of their immortality but of their mortality, by observing the increasing decay of nature, and the sure progress of death among their contemporaries; where each successive assembly presents to us the grey hairs and gradually enfeebling form of the aged, until laid within the precincts of the edifice, rendered yet more sacred as containing the remains of those who for successive generations preceded us in assembling here, whose mementoes surround us, and whom we soon must follow to their last home; the exhibition on these occasions of the constant changes in nature from youth to age, from health to sickness, from old-age and from youth alike to death; the religious services connected with those changes; and the associations recalled by each of these events; are calculated to produce effects on the minds of each, and

on the people at large, which are at once highly moral and extensively civilizing.

But however desirable it may be that our youth should be instructed in the principles of the Church, and although it is essential that they should be taught the doctrines of religion; yet the Elements of Education, of Religious Influence, and of National Institutions, ought to be kept distinct and independent, each of these Elements being allowed to exercise its proper influence, but being at the same time restrained to exerting itself within its legitimate sphere. Each of these Elements should also be corrective of, but without creating any confusion with regard to the other. And it is more especially as a corrective authority that the efforts of the Church are most valuable in repressing error, and in conflicting heretical opinions.

All institutions are, however, alike liable to become corrupt and to decay, or to be perverted as to their end and object, the origin of which may be traced to the constitution of human nature, rather than to any particular defect or bias in the institutions themselves. Thus, fanaticism, intolerance, and superstition are clearly not confined to either Papists or Protestants; nor are bigotry, corruption, or tyranny the exclusive vices of one political party beyond another. But as each religious or political party supplants the other, and obtains the opportunity for displaying its inherent failings in this manner, it hesitates not to do so, however loudly it had inveighed against that which it has overcome, for so acting, and by exposing whose misdoings in this respect its triumph over it may have been mainly accomplished.

Hence has arisen the necessity for, and the introduction of certain strict rules and specific forms and observances in the Church, by which its ministers and members are alike required to be bound, and by which alone abuses and corruptions of the nature referred to, can be avoided;

and its officers are thus not only prevented from being affected by the changing spirit of the day, but all belonging to the establishment are also secured against this evil.

Regulations of this description are essential to preserve such an institution from fanaticism and superstition on the one hand, and from formalism and rationalism on the other; as our constitutional code is in like manner efficient to protect the subject on the one hand against tyranny and arbitrary power, and on the other hand to protect the state when in danger of lawless attack or restless innovation.

It would be very erroneous, and wholly contrary to experience, to assert that the benefits of such an institution as the National Church, so far as regards the promotion of civilization, have been confined solely to those individuals who are actual members of the establishment. Although the latter alone may appear to be directly benefited, yet all persons in the state, more or less, indirectly, reap advantage, and that to an extensive degree, both by the benefits which it confers on the state in the promotion of civilization, and from the manner in which, also, many individuals with whom they are closely connected and who are members of it, are immediately benefited, and by whose advancement in civilization the former gain. How different, indeed, would be the general condition of civilization in this country, supposing that no such institution as the Church existed!

Considering, however, the Church as a grand National Institution, the object of which is to benefit all classes and parties alike, it does appear most desirable in every way to extend to the utmost its sphere of utility and operations, by enlarging the basis upon which it is founded, and thereby, instead of endangering its existence, securing its permanence. However necessary may be the introduction of certain specific forms and articles

of belief and doctrine in an institution of this kind, yet the inutility, nay, absolute futility of strict tests, embracing a wide range of minute and abstruse doctrinal points, and of matters of credence and opinion, has long been evinced by the conduct of many who subscribe to them, but who hesitate not to break through these trammels, whenever they possess a predilection for any particular tenets to which these tests are opposed. Tests are mainly efficient to serve as scarecrows to men of conscience. The bold and unscrupulous soon learn to pass them unheeded, and to treat them with familiarity and derision. Tests are like fetters made of flowers, which, though quite strong enough to bind the willing captive, are wholly unavailing to chain those who desire liberty. Thus, while the virtuous are kept out of office by them, the bad obtain a ready admission. Tests and restrictive laws conduce moreover, beyond anything, to perpetuate and keep up party distinctions, and often serve for this purpose long after the principle which afforded vitality to the latter has been abandoned or forgotten. And exactly in proportion as any particular theological system is precise and complicated as regards the principles which it enjoins; in an inverse ratio ought the declaratory stipulations which its members make for their observance, to be comprehensive and liberal. It may possibly be impractical in any Ecclesiastical Establishment to dispense with all rule as to the conduct of religious services, and with all tests as to the opinions of its members. But the less of these impositions and restraints there are, not only the greater is the liberty of their members, but their divisions are less, and their principle of comprehension is more extensive. The general conduct of mankind, which is the most important of all matters, is regulated by no specific laws at all, beyond their own conscience and good sense.

As among political and commercial bodies, a certain

degree of rivalry, when amicably conducted, is good in itself, and conduces to a wholesome stimulus to activity in each; so is it also among religious bodies, each of which is alike intent on the same ultimate object, the worship of God in the mode which, to that particular party, appears the most appropriate. This rivalry however becomes pernicious when it degenerates into actual hostility. But there is in reality no more necessity for such a result, than that rival nations should be always at war, or that rival men in the same profession should be ever in hostility. Moreover, religion, one of the leading principles of which is the inculcation of good will between man and man, ought least of all to set the example of ill-feeling and animosity. Nevertheless, as among states, civil war is always that which is the most pernicious, so among Christians the evil that is done to the common cause of Christianity, the welfare of which each Christian professes to be desirous of promoting, by the contention of Christian sects, and the aspersions which they cast one on the other, is in reality far greater than all the combined efforts against Christianity of infidelity and heathenism.

If among states a universal peace is hailed as a cause of general rejoicing, and is indeed one of the sublimest ends which Christianity shall eventually accomplish; how much more desirable and how much more noble will be the attainment of a universal peace among Christian communities themselves.

The extraordinary mode in which various bodies of Dissenters are now in the habit of systematically assimilating both the structures of their sacred edifices, and the form of their worship to those of the established church, may be regarded as indicative of an instinctive desire for union; which is also further evinced by the proneness of many clergy of the establishment to copy both Roman Catholics and Dissenters (according to their respective

tendencies) in their ordinances and manner of celebrating religious services. Indeed the main and leading differences at the present time are not those of doctrine, which however alone are essential, but those merely of ceremony and form of government, which are unessential, and admit of easy compromise.

More especially is it remarkable to observe how eagerly certain bodies of dissenters are following the members of the church, and of that party in it the furthest removed from dissent, not only in the structure and the architectural decorations bestowed on their buildings, but in the introduction of choral services and other devices to make their worship attractive, as also in the desire to have a liturgical form of worship. On the other hand, certain members of the church make every attempt to render their buildings as much as possible like dissenting chapels, and to have the service as plain as possible, in the style ordinarily adopted by dissenters, with the introduction of extemporary prayer and extemporary preaching. If the individuals belonging to these opposite and long contending interests thus desire to conjoin and to amalgamate; surely the state should evince a corresponding spirit of conciliation, and second the proffers of union thus voluntarily and decidedly held out.

Where different bodies agree in fundamental principles, disagreement on minor and immaterial points ought not to operate as an insuperable bond of union. Moreover, if rival states, instead of waging war one with another, can consent to settle their differences by arbitrations and congresses; doubtless rival bodies in religion, who ought to be rivals in reality only as regards the desire of each to follow the course most efficient for the spread of Christianity, should be at least correspondingly willing to refer their nonessential points of disagreement to a congress representing fairly the opinions of each section, and to

be united in one common bond of fraternity by the arbitration to be by this means effected. On this ground, a general union of Christians generally, ought surely to be no difficult task to accomplish; and the value of it in enabling those who thus enter into fellowship, to resist the attacks of infidelity, which their disunion and mutual aggressions do more than anything to favour, ought far to outweigh the petty obstacles, arising from the selfish desire of some to follow a different discipline to what others prefer. As in every society, and indeed in every family, freedom and diversity of opinion on minor matters must be allowed to each member, but which need not at all interfere with the friendliness and desire for co-operation which characterize the whole body; so in a union into one church of a body of Christians of different denominations, liberty must necessarily be allowed as to minor matters of opinion, and practice, and discipline, while the fundamental principles on which their faith is established, are acknowledged and followed by all alike.

When the preliminaries of peace are signed, there is great hope that peace itself will shortly be established, inasmuch as all the main points deemed essential for its consummation are agreed upon. So among churches, if the leading points of doctrine form no obstacle to union, we ought not to be debarred from a peaceful conjunction by the consideration of points that are non-essential, and of but secondary importance.

Unity in the case of a church, or of the several churches of a nation, will however be promoted and ensured, not so much by a precise unity of belief,—much less by a strictness of discipline which enforces the semblance of, while it cannot procure the essence and reality of this unity—as by a unity of feeling, which can only be attained through the doctrines of such a church being so obviously based at once on the principles of human nature and

Divine Revelation, that all will agree in their truth, and consent to act in accordance with them.

If it be objected, however, that dissent has spread into so many ramifications, and assumed so many forms, that it would be impossible to comprise it in one establishment; it may be replied that the differences of opinion among the members of the established church are really almost as numerous and quite as essential as are those among the dissenters. In neither case is a complete and undeviating uniformity of opinion to be sought for, or even desired, but a liberal and enlightened toleration of differences on nonessential points, which might easily be attained by requiring, as proposed, only one general comprehensive test as to principles deemed essential to be subscribed to by all.

The most comprehensive and complete, and indeed the only real and essential classification of religionists of every description, and which would extend to the people of every nation and of every age, would be that of Atheists, Deists, and Revelationists. The first comprises all those who altogether deny or disbelieve in the existence of a God, and which is the smallest body of all, and is chiefly composed of those whose very limited intelligence has but inadequately qualified them to receive ideas of this sublime order. The second is the most numerous, and comprises all those who believe in the existence of God and adore Him as such, but without believing in or accepting any revelation from Him. Such were the Pagans of old, as are also the heathen nations, in general, of our own day, and all those of each country (an immense body it is to be feared), who habitually omit all attention to religious worship of any kind. The third comprises those who believe not only in God, but in the revelation which He has made to us of Himself, and habitually profess and endeavour to follow the injunctions which such revelation contains.

The church visible and established, in this and every civilized country, ought to be co-extensive with the church universal, embracing, in the truly catholic language of the English church, "all who profess and call themselves Christians;"—all who receive and believe fully the inspired Scriptures. Our efforts and our ingenuity should be directed not to narrow to the utmost, but to extend as widely as possible, the limits of our church; and we should ever seek not to discover differences of opinion and causes of separation, but points of agreement and bonds of union. The church, indeed, ought to bear the same relation to the state, and to the country generally as well as to the government, that a pastor does to his flock; should be its counsellor and teacher in cases of difficulty, to which appeal may be had in questions of doubt and intricacy, which the common order of men have not either the learning, the leisure, or the ability to unravel. It is a sort of theological supreme court of justice, by whose decrees important matters of doubt are to be determined.

Singular, indeed, it is that, not only Christianity, which ought to be the bond of union among all Christians, and whose principles so exhort and so conduce to union, should peculiarly provoke discord; but that the church of Christ, which was ordained as a focus for union, should be regarded as a main barrier of separation: that the fold which was made to hold all, should be converted into an exclusive privileged circle, which but few are permitted to enter.

Another great advantage which would be obtained by a general fusion of all the different religious communions into one, is that by this means each would in time lose its asperity and peculiarity, which are extensively invigorated and developed by its conflict with other sects. And in addition to this, the energy and activity which are expended in these encounters, and against each other, would

then be spent in the service of religion generally, and in opposing error and infidelity.

From whatever cause, sermons seem certainly to fail in producing their desired effect. Nor is this to be wondered at when we consider the course that is pursued with regard to them. In the first place the faculty of preaching is as much a peculiar gift as is that of producing poetry; and consequently, those only who possess it should be appointed to this department of ministration, which is, nevertheless, now discharged by all alike, whether capacited for it or not; and to which laymen, who are duly qualified, might, on certain occasions, be advantageously admitted. On the other hand, many who are well qualified to preach, are not well adapted for other equally important ministrations in the church. In the profession of the Bar, where success is dependent on the capacity of the individual for the avocation which he pursues, a division has been made into different departments, by means of which each person may adopt the particular line for which he is qualified, and need not necessarily engage in undertakings for which he is not naturally fitted. Thus, one gifted with high oratorical powers takes the lead in a case, and addresses the court. Another, who is not so qualified, examines the witnesses. And those who are not calculated to excel in public efforts of this kind, confine themselves to advising upon evidence, getting up the case ready for trial, or drawing legal instruments. How desirable it appears that a corresponding division of labour, in accordance with their individual capacities, should be made by the clergy, instead of each person alike undertaking duties of every kind, whether adapted for them or not.

Probably, however, one great contributing cause to the commonplacedness of sermons, so generally complained of, is the custom of making them all of nearly the same length, so that whether the preacher has much or little

to say, and whatever be the subject on which he treats, he must extend or limit his discourse to a certain period, in either case necessarily much to its detriment; while an extemporary speaker, or the writer of a letter or essay, takes the space requisite for his purpose, and ends at once when he has said all that he thought essential or proper.

A concise and simple explanatory and applicatory comment preceding each of the portions of Scripture appointed to be read, and varying in duration, as the occasion required, from five to ten minutes, would probably be far more useful than a regular sermon, would command more attention, and would be more deeply impressed upon the minds of the hearers.

Connected with this part of the subject is the importance of a good delivery, clear, impressive, and emphatic, by those who are appointed to minister in the church, either in the reading of the services, especially of the Holy Scriptures, or the composition and delivery of sermons. Bishops would do well to make an infrangible rule to refuse ordination to all except those who are able to read and write.

It is essential also to provide for the due regulation and government of all national institutions of this class. The governing body of every church or ecclesiastical establishment should be of a three-fold nature, doctrinal, representative, and judicial. The doctrinal branch should consist of its ecclesiastics or clergy alone, whose sole, exclusive, and entire province and duty it is to interpret the Sacred Scriptures, and to lay down the tenets to be deduced from them which are to be taught to the members of such churches. Its representative body should be elected from all those who are regular and complete members of the church, whether clergy or laity, whose interests alike claim to be represented in the legislative assembly. The judicial body should consist of such men, members of the

church, who alone by their learning and jurisprudential ability, are able to interpret the laws governing the church, and to pronounce with authority their meaning and intent.

Closely connected with, and to a certain extent, indeed, originating in the church establishment of a nation, are the different subordinate and voluntary institutions and societies in relation to education and religion which are maintained in a country. These bodies have an important influence in furthering the promotion and progress of civilization, both as regards their direct operation, and the extensive moral effect produced by their existence and action. Charitable institutions for the aid of the sick and poor, although not directly of the class here comprised, have also a humanizing social influence. Societies for the support of religion and education, whether at home or in foreign countries, have a civilizing effect in three ways:—1. They have a direct influence in civilizing those towards whom their energies are directed. 2. They have an indirect influence of no mean importance, as regards the civilizing effect which they produce on the minds of those who support them, who become necessarily interested in the subjects for which they are formed. 3. They promote civilization, generally, by uniting different bodies of people, and also different nations together by the mighty bond of Christianity and social community. This, indeed, is a catholicity which no difference of opinion ought ever to disturb. By this means, moreover, aid is afforded to the operation of Elements IX. and X. In these cases, however we may doubt as to the efficiency in some instances of the religious conversions effected, there can be none as to the benefits conferred by the spread of civilization, and the dispersion of barbarism which is thus achieved. The contributions, moreover, for charitable ends which are collected by benevolent societies, are as morally beneficial to the donors, as

they are physically advantageous to the recipients of them.

On the other hand, the moral effect of public charitable institutions, which are supported by voluntary subscriptions, is undoubtedly injurious so far as they lead different persons to contribute to them, for the purpose of ostentation, what they ought to bestow in a private manner; and as inducing them to give what they can spare for the support of these public institutions, to the neglect of domestic demands upon them, which must be allowed to possess a prior claim. This is, perhaps, a defect inseparable from these societies, and is a necessary part of their constitution. Indeed few if any terrestrial institutions, however good, are without some alloy of evil in their nature.

Whatever, moreover, tends to generate a spirit or a feeling of dependence in any one class towards another, is necessarily vitiating to that society in which it is introduced, even though, as in the case of the rich helping the poor, it is actually based on the duty of the former towards the latter. But in helping them we should aim to benefit without injuring them. And as the best help of all is that which enables them to do for themselves; so the worst of all is that which contributes to establish, or to confirm them in their own helplessness. Charities and institutions to aid the poor should, therefore, be so constituted as that while they render to the poor that assistance which without them they could not obtain, and which it is the duty of the rich, or of such institutions to afford; they also stimulate them to exert themselves in the way in which it is both their duty and for their benefit to do. They should thus serve to develope, instead of tending to paralyse their powers. Bestowing charity on the poor should be somewhat analogous to watering a plant, which we do not do to enable it to thrive without soil and air, but by this means it is revived and

invigorated so as to be qualified to avail itself of its own resources and energies.

II. The National Institutions of a country which rank next in importance to the Church, as regards its civilization, are the Universities and scholastic establishments or seminaries for education which it contains. These comprise alike the institutions for the instruction of the people generally, and those also for each profession in particular, in which a full knowledge of it may be acquired. In every country, Universities have a double use and aim as National Institutions of the nature now under consideration, both of which are of high importance in the promotion of civilization, and both of which it behoves the state to see fully and fairly carried out.

1. The first of these objects is to serve as institutions for the education of those who from their station are likely to fill places and positions of trust, and authority, and influence in the state, and of those too who intend to become instructors of the people generally of each class, as also to such other persons as desire to receive an education of this high and complete order; and who should be able to obtain at the national universities the most perfect elementary education that the times can afford, so as to qualify them for the pursuit of those important avocations in life, and their high position in society, for which their mental culture and moral training adapt them.

2. The second use of universities, is to afford to the nation a constant supply of, and to secure the maintenance of men of learning, ability, and high acquirements, who are thus brought together, and both reap important advantages from each other's society, and are best able to instruct those who are students at such an institution. It is the peculiar result of universities, not only that a number of such men are brought together, but that a number of them are placed upon an equality, whereby the utmost

freedom as regards social, moral, and intellectual intercourse is obtained, and the largest amount of influence from such society is accordingly produced. In a metropolis, the assemblage of distinguished men is probably ordinarily greater than it is in a university: but the union between them, and consequently the influence exerted, is not the same.

Those who are placed at the head of universities should be men of that eminence as not only to be qualified to instruct others and to command their reverence; but, from their acquirements and their success, they ought to serve as examples and as stimulants to those whom they teach, to follow in their course. They should not themselves be aspirants to distinction, but persons who have already attained it to the full.

The professors of the different arts and sciences, and branches of learning, in our universities, should of course consist of the men who are most eminent in those particular departments, and who will be regarded as the leading authorities on the subjects which they teach. But, in order to ensure this object, university professors, both as regards their rank and their emolument, should be raised to a position equal to that of any of the judicial or political state dignitaries in the nation. Unless this is the case, we cannot expect that these professorships will be always worthily held, although in some instances, it may so happen that individuals will be found to occupy them who, from their peculiar circumstances, are independent of such inducements. That the professorial chairs should in every case be filled by persons duly qualified for such important offices, and by such persons alone, is of the utmost consequence, not only to the universities which they adorn, but to the whole nation, whose instructors they are, or ought to be regarded.

A university should also be a receptacle for all the most learned and valuable works of the age, to which

those who belong to this institution may at once have ready access, and be at all times able to refer.

The necessity, therefore, of establishing, maintaining, and duly regulating such institutions as these is obvious. They are essential not only that education may be diffused, but that it may be inculcated correctly and on regular systematic principles, instead of being left to the caprice of individuals, or the fashion of the times. Nor ought we to express disappointment that these institutions do not of themselves invariably produce men of genius. Their object is not to originate, but to nurture talent. They are to a nation what a garden is to a mansion, where the choicest fruit and flowers are cultivated, and with great care brought to perfection, but it is not expected that they should grow there spontaneously. We look to various foreign climes or distant districts for their discovery, and only expect to bring them to perfection by transplanting them to a congenial soil. As plants young and tender are trained, and pruned, and watered, and nourished, and protected in a nursery garden; so young minds are cultivated, and disciplined, and stored, and strengthened, and fortified in a university. Like young trees too, our youth by this means are fitted for planting out, and to be ornaments to the neighbourhood where they are placed. Many men of genius have developed their powers to the full without having recourse to an institution of this kind, as many fruits and flowers in a wild state have reached perfection; but this does not prove, either in the one case or the other, that the artificial means resorted to are not generally advantageous. These institutions are also valuable as the store-houses of learning; and, especially, to effect the preservation and cultivation of many departments of knowledge which, although of great importance, are not of sufficient practical utility to promote their study. They serve to keep alive, as it were, each branch of education which might otherwise in

time be forgotten or neglected as it grew out of fashion. And they ought also to ensure a proportionate deference and due share of attention, according to their relative real value, being given to each pursuit.

Scholastic institutions, of whatever kind, should be calculated to afford both discipline and instruction to all the youthful members of the state. The discipline should be such as effectually to restrain and deter not only from all violations of morality, but from all breaches of rule; while it must not be so severe as to create an aversion to the system itself. The teaching should both impart useful knowledge, and also serve to lay the foundation for future acquirements, which the student may either follow up and complete at the university to which he is removed after the period when his schooling terminates; and should aid in the study for the peculiar calling or profession to the acquirement of skill in which his mind will be especially devoted. The end of both scholastic discipline and tuition is to qualify the person receiving it for the duties of after life, and to fill his position as a member of civil society.

It appears, however, to be a great desideratum in educational institutions of this nature, that they should define and establish a mode of education which would comprehend a complete system of knowledge and teaching, so as to bring each faculty of the mind properly into cultivation, and efficiently to train the dispositions and the feelings.* And though the object of these institutions ought to be rather the preparation of the mind for study, than the storing it with learning; yet surely a proper chart should be afforded as to the road most desirable to be followed, so that chance or prejudice may not be left to point out the way. Foundations by private munificence for the promotion of particular studies, will, in some institutions,

* See on this subject ANATOMH ΔΙΑΝΟΗΤΙΚΗ. *A Philosophical Treatise on the Nature and Constitution of Man.* By George Harris, F.S.A. B. 3. c. 7. (Preparing for publication.)

more or less interfere with this design, and perhaps give an undue preponderance to pursuits of a particular kind, and thus lead to the disregard of certain others, or to the neglect of a due distribution of the whole. This to some extent undoubtedly detracts from the great benefits which they otherwise confer.

The different schools existent in a nation should, of course, correspond both with the different kinds of education that are to be inculcated, and with the several classes of persons to be instructed, more especially as regards their respective stations in society, and their various general occupations.

The studies pursued at the several universities and scholastic institutions in the same country, need not necessarily be identical; but, on the contrary, it is desirable that they should so far vary one from another as that the peculiar turn and adaptation of different minds may meet with their suitable encouragement and cultivation. Between these different bodies, as regards their mode of instruction, a generous rivalry may exist, each not only emulating, but learning something from the other.

The invention of printing, already referred to,* has, in many respects, affected the character of some of our educational institutions, especially as regards certain of their foundations. Our universities are no longer the only receptacles for libraries, as books are now generally circulated; nor is verbal communication the chief means of diffusing knowledge. This may also occasion a change as regards the residence necessary at these institutions, during the period of pupilage, to acquire actual instruction; although, on the other hand, there are many collateral advantages resulting from such a residence, in the discipline enforced, the strict moral training pursued, the influence exerted by contemporaries, access to libraries,

* *Vide ante*, pp. 37, 38.

the presence of and reference to tutors and experienced authorities, and also attendance on lectures.

Lectures, indeed, seem now mainly useful where experiments in illustration of them have to be exhibited, or plans or pictures shown, which could not be obtained for each reader of a book; but where these are not required, the latter mode of study appears the most efficient. Lectures are also very serviceable in affording a general comprehensive view of certain branches of knowledge, the details of which may be afterwards pursued as opportunities offer. They are of advantage, too, in showing the relative importance of different subjects, and in preventing us from setting too high a value on any one department alone. Instruction by lecture is, moreover, so far more influential than that by books, as it is more lively, and is also more personal. You are brought into immediate contact with the mind of the author; and the effect of his voice and gesture, and appearance, serves to enforce the sentiments that he utters. On the other hand, instruction by books affords more freedom of thought concerning, and more opportunity of research into the subject before us. In the one case the feelings are enlisted in the cause of the teacher. In the other, the reason, being freed from all exterior influence, pursues more directly and energetically its proper functions.

Public lectures, as well as public libraries, on subjects of information generally useful, might advantageously be supplied by the state. They are, or ought to be, in fact, mental- and also manual-educational sermons, as those from the pulpit are moral-educational.

Near akin to the plan of instructing the people by public lectures, is the one recently set on foot by some friends to the cause of education, of giving "Public Readings" from popular authors, for the benefit of the working classes, by which a large number at once are enabled to obtain an extensive amount of information and entertain-

ment, at little trouble, and in an interesting manner. By this means, moreover, the essence of the best works extant may be brought within the reach of all.

Although the same studies and pursuits may not be suitable for all, yet discipline, both mental and moral, is essential in each case to be maintained, and is of equal advantage with the knowledge given. The examinations required of the students at these institutions, serve as important and efficient stimulants to exertion; but it is on many accounts desirable that they should in general be adapted to prove rather the industry and acquirements, than the natural talents of those who are subjected to them. Examinations at all educational institutions might in addition be advantageously established, of such a nature as would serve as a test of the real and natural ability of the examinant, and thus ascertain his capacity for any particular pursuit or object in life. For this purpose, each faculty of the mind should be acted upon and proved. Not only memory, for strength of which success in general examinations now mainly depends, but reason, and taste, and originality, should also be put to the test. Nevertheless, as already observed in a previous part of this work,* examinations are by no means in every case either the sole or the best proof of proficiency that can be resorted to. A mixed mode of testing the acquirements of the person to be examined, appears the most efficient, and the most fair.

The whole, however, that can actually be demanded of a university or other instructory institution, so far as regards the fulfilment of the object expected from it as such, is that, on the one hand, it should require from every member who passes through it, that he should possess at least a certain amount of intellectual acquirement as the minimum of his qualifications; and, on the other hand, that it should afford to all, and to every one disposed

* *Vide ante*, Element I., p. 75.

to avail himself of it, the highest amount of instruction that can be obtained, through the ablest teachers and the best treatises, on the most important educational subjects. If such an institution supplies these two requisites, it has fulfilled its own part. What more is required, the members themselves must supply.

Lord Bacon remarks, in his 'Advancement of Learning,' that the proficiency of learning would be more advanced "if there were more mutual intelligence between the universities of Europe than now there is." Intercourse and interchange of thought and ideas between bodies, especially learned institutions, correspond with intercourse and interchange of the same nature between individuals; and in both cases is not only useful, but essential to the cultivation, and advancement, and improvement of both the corresponding parties. Each not only derives wisdom from the other, but obtains warning also. With great advantage a system might be established of sending ambassadors constantly from one of these learned bodies to another, in order to report the progress in learning and scientific discovery which each has made, and to compare the researches and efforts of each with those of the others. The press to some extent, though only collaterally, effects this end; but it can no more enable universities to dispense with special officers for the purpose, than it can enable states to do without envoys. Probably, indeed, universities and other public learned bodies gain as much, and in various ways, by intercommunion one with another, and by exchange of sentiment, as do the individuals of which they are composed. There is, however, of course, much greater facility for intercourse now, and in various ways, between these learned bodies, than there was in Lord Bacon's time, while the necessity for intercourse has in several respects much increased. Indeed, so great are the facilities now, that the whole learned world might without difficulty be fused into one university.

A question may also be raised as to the most desirable local position for universities in any kingdom, whether in the metropolis, in the principal commercial towns, or in some retired rural districts remote from turmoil and excitement. Each of these situations, it must be admitted, possesses its peculiar advantages and disadvantages. If retired districts are most favourable to study, and, perhaps, to abstract speculation also; metropolitan and commercial districts are best calculated to develope energy, and to convert into active practical results the acquirements that have been conferred. The civilizing effect of such institutions upon metropolitan, commercial, and other large towns, must not, moreover, be lost sight of. Like art, they directly and extensively counteract the sordid effects of commerce and gain, and tend to refine and even ennoble pursuits of this kind. At all events, the metropolis of every kingdom should possess its university, not only for the reasons already mentioned, but also on account of its accessibility to a large number, when so placed. The most desirable plan is, no doubt, to establish several universities, so as to have them in each of these positions, by which not merely will the combined advantages alluded to be in some way, to some extent, at all events, secured; but from the different character and turn of mind possessed by these different institutions, so variously located and acted upon, a wholesome rivalry will be created between them, as well as a beneficial intercommunion, very important and very efficient for the general furtherance of civilization.

As in the case of the National Church, so in the case of National Universities, those not actually belonging to them are extensively though but indirectly benefited by them, through the advantage which they confer on the nation generally, and also on particular members of society with whom they are connected. Considering, moreover, that

universities are not only the springs but the wells of knowledge in every civilized country, it is the duty of the state to provide alike for their adequate maintenance, and for their efficient regulation.

The establishment of public libraries in different districts throughout the kingdom, and to which ready access should be afforded for the people at large, would be a measure of essential importance for the promotion of civilization. The collection contained in a public library should be of such a nature that it is capable of supplying ample information on all general matters of importance, such as history and biography, to all who desire to refer to it; and also full instruction on such particular useful and practical subjects as are most likely to engage the attention of, and to be serviceable to the class of persons for whom the library is directly intended, and who may be expected to resort to it. Public libraries, to which the poorer classes of both sexes can be admitted, either at a very low rate or absolutely free, should be set on foot not only in every town, but in every parish, and to which books ought to be supplied at the expense of the nation by the reprint of a selection of our most valuable standard works in each department of literature, including philosophy, theology, history, biography, zoology, poetry, and romance, excluding, of course, all works of an immoral or objectionable tendency. The series in question might be entitled the "Parochial Library Edition," and should be presented gratuitously to those institutions only, and not allowed to be sold, so as to interfere with the regular circulation and sale of these works. Such an effort as this would do much to promote and stimulate the progress of education throughout the country, while its cost would form but a small item in the sums annually but ineffectually dispensed out of the state coffers for the furtherance of this good cause. Books should be allowed to be taken out of these institutions for reading at home; and they

ought to be of such a character as not only to be really useful, but so as to excite an actual interest in those for whose perusal they are intended. Allusion has already been made to the necessity of furnishing intellectual food of this nature to those who have received the rudiments of education, and to the duty of the government to supply works to libraries of this class. Such institutions, being in reality for the general benefit of the state, should, as regards the establishment of them, be supported at the national expense, without relying on the chance liberality of particular districts; although, when they are once set on foot, it may fairly be left to those directly interested in them to further their progress.

Institutions of this kind are required, not, indeed, as a means of education, but in order to supply mental and moral food to those minds whose powers have been developed and brought into play, and by which they may be taught how to use the faculties they possess. The vine may be set in good soil, and may be watered with abundant care; but unless it be also properly trained and pruned after it has sprung up, it will run wild and produce but few grapes. So is it also with respect to the mind of man, both as an individual and as regards men in the aggregate. You must not only excite a wholesome appetite, but provide wholesome food. If proper study and diversion are not afforded to the awakened understanding, it will waste itself in vain and desultory pursuits, following not what is best adapted for it, but whatever may be accomplished with the least trouble; or it will be led to engage itself in vicious and deteriorating employments. The establishment, however, of institutions capable of supplying suitable mental food, and by which that only of a healthful and advantageous nature will be presented, affords at once ample and nutritious ailment to the developing intellect, and an encouragement to progress forward in the course of improvement.

III. Museums, containing specimens of productions both natural and artificial of different kinds, are very valuable, not only as sources of instruction, but more especially as aids to libraries in communicating knowledge, and as contributing to illustrate and to explain much that books without them can but very imperfectly and tediously serve to teach. To some extent they supply the want of pictorial designs in books; and they also stimulate men to the use of libraries, as both libraries and museums stimulate persons to resort to education.

A museum should comprise specimens of all such objects in natural history, whether animal, vegetable, or mineral, as will serve the general student for examples to illustrate the subject he may be studying; and will also supply, through objects of historical and scientific interest, information as to the nature of the topics which are of leading importance for persons of ordinary education to be acquainted with. A museum should be in fact to a library what pictorial illustrations are to a book. It both renders the subject more completely intelligible, as well as perfects the information sought to be obtained, and also implants the memory of the thing firmly in the mind. A museum has, moreover, a secondary use in collecting together, and securing from loss or decay, such objects of real interest of the foregoing description as it is desirable to preserve.

Galleries of works of art, containing choice and judiciously selected specimens in painting and sculpture, both ancient and modern, being models of their kind, should also be established, to which the public may have gratuitous access at all times, and which may both form and correct the national taste, and serve as studies for those whose genius leads them to the pursuit of these arts. But this is a subject which falls properly within the province of the next Element appointed for our consideration, and which relates especially to art and science. Never-

theless, institutions for affording practical instruction in art and in science of different kinds, can hardly claim to be regarded as national establishments, so far as to entitle them to the support of the state, as, however beneficial they may be to those who resort to them, but comparatively few do so, and those for the purpose of learning a professional or practical calling, instruction in which each individual ought to provide for himself; although to a certain extent, so far as is necessary for the general instruction of the people, this will be supplied by the ordinary institutions for education. The National Academy, which is the art university of the nation, must, however, to some extent, form an exception to this rule, as serving to guide and correct the national taste in matters of this kind.

IV. Both on a nation and on an individual, the amusements in which they are wont to indulge as recreations, exercise nearly as much influence, both mentally and morally, as the studies or pursuits in which they are regularly engaged; more especially as the former, from their pleasurable nature, are ever ready to seize upon and occupy the mind. National Institutions, therefore, for their promotion and regulation, are essential to every civilized state. The consideration of the civilizing effect of these amusements themselves, belongs more especially to another Element of civilization, where their nature is particularly inquired into.* We have here only to deal with the National Institutions established for their promotion.

These recreative occupations, indeed, both influence the regular pursuits of life, and are influenced by them. Public spectacles, more especially, which in every nation contribute more or less to the relaxation of the people, are always calculated to exercise a particular sway either for good or for bad. Even the assemblies for the purpose of business of great public bodies, produce a powerful effect in this respect. Of the various institutions, which

* Element VI.

both in ancient and modern times have been invented for the recreative entertainment of the people, those termed spectacular and theatrical exhibitions form the most comprehensive class, and are in their nature the most important. Under the head of the theatre may, however, be ranked the various kinds of public performances in which art of each branch is availed of, to produce a spectacle for the instruction and amusement of the people. The theatre itself, indeed, if properly conducted, is one of the most influential and useful engines for public instruction, both intellectual and moral, and for promoting the civilization of a nation, that has ever been devised. Each of the arts is here not only availed of, but each in harmony together. Rhetoric, poetry, and music, lend their aid to give effect to one another; and sculpture and architecture also find place, and contribute to the entertainment. Refinement, history, morality, are all taught at once, and in a manner the most agreeable and the most forcible. Indeed, I know of no institution which under proper regulations might be made so extensively influential and beneficial as the theatre. Surely, therefore, so powerful a moral engine as this, ought to be availed of as a National Institution; and should be adopted by the state, and supported and controlled by the government of the country. The nature of its exhibitions might then be strictly regulated, and adapted to promote great moral ends, and the utmost rigour exercised in purging it of all obscene representations. Thus only can the "national drama" be fully and efficiently restored and supported.

A national theatre should of course be proportioned as regards its size, to the extensiveness of the objects it aims to promote. The Greek and Roman theatres were capacious enough to accommodate the entire population of a city at each performance. Now, although it is on many accounts impossible for modern theatres to vie in this respect with those of old,—nor could any modern play be

efficiently acted, either as regards seeing or hearing, in so large a building;—yet if a deep impression on the mind of the people is to be created by theatrical performances, accommodation must necessarily be afforded for the generality of the people to witness them. And the greater is the concourse assembled on those occasions, the greater is the effect produced. The admission to the national theatre, if not actually gratuitous, should be so low as to enable all to visit it who feel any real interest in such exhibitions, and who may be thus drawn away from entertainments of this nature where performances of a base and demoralizing tendency take place. The building itself appropriated for a national theatre, should of course be situate in the metropolis of the empire, and its size must to a certain extent correspond with the population of that city; forming a grand amphitheatre for the exhibition of dramatic art, and where musical festivals and public meetings might also be held.

The stage serves to reflect pretty generally and accurately, the character not only of the nation, but of the age of that nation from time to time, as whether frivolous or grave, romantic or dull, licentious or virtuous. The stage ought, however, instead of merely reflecting, to be corrective of the national character, and should lead and exalt, instead of following and often debasing the taste of the people. And this should be the grand purpose and aim, and the principle to be observed in the constitution of a national theatre.

The effect, indeed, that theatrical exhibitions will produce on the public mind, must, of course, necessarily depend on the nature and tendency of the particular performances exhibited, as whether improving or elevating in their effect, or the reverse. Tragedy, and even comedy also, may be made extensively influential and beneficial. By them vice and crime have been exposed and held up to odium in the most forcible manner; and doubtless, the most

effective moral sermons emanate not from the pulpit, but from the stage. Popular absurdities and extravagancies are thus repressed, and abuses in the government pointedly attacked. The stage is, moreover, alike efficient in exalting virtue and in exposing vice; in pointing out the qualities to be imitated, and those to be shunned. It is really as useful in the former case as in the latter, although its operation there may not be so immediate or so apparent.

A great moral tragedy, such as are, indeed, the generality, if not the whole of Shakspeare's, and many others besides, is a sort of living sermon, which inculcates principles by example rather than by argument, and deters us from the commission of evil by portraying in the most forcible manner the consequences of crime. And if we admit that persons are much more apt to be influenced by pursuits which are agreeable to them, than by the dull career of business or duty; and that precepts are far more readily imbibed from our own inferences, than from the stern and suspicious teaching of books of morality,—which is a truth of which every accurate and calm observer of human nature must be convinced;—we shall at once allow the immense, and, indeed, unbounded influence of theatrical representations upon the national mind and morals.

Of all the institutions which conduce to the civilization of a nation, the theatre the most completely combines instruction with amusement, and cultivation with relaxation. To men of business, and to those harassed by abstruse or laborious pursuits, and who are little disposed or adapted for study, it affords a light, and agreeable, and exhilarating diversion, in a high degree tending to their refinement, and at the same time rendering them information. Of all the paths that lead to knowledge, this is the most alluring. The tree of knowledge is here seen to blossom and to bear fruit simultaneously. To some

extent, indeed, although not for the purposes here alluded to, the theatre, as a public moral censor, has in modern times been almost superseded by the press. This, however, is as much owing to the retrogression of the theatre as to the advancement of the press. On the other hand, all representations of a cruel and debasing kind, whether on the stage or in other exhibitions, and of obscene characters and transactions, are in every way demoralizing and pernicious, and ought to be discouraged. They give a dignity to crime, and render the perpetrators of it objects rather of admiration than of execration.

Theatrical exhibitions, therefore, exercise a far more powerful influence on the mind and morals, and civilization of a nation, than would at first be imagined. The feelings of the people are actively excited while witnessing these spectacles, and the remembrance of them is long and vividly retained, and becomes the subject of constant reflection and conversation, by which their influence is disseminated yet further.

The genius of the English nation in particular, is essentially, and to a large extent, of a theatrical tendency. The greatest tragical writer who ever lived, was a native of this country; and although the theatre, from certain causes, does not now flourish among us as might be desired, yet we see the theatrical taste and turn of the national mind constantly displaying itself in the popular theatrical style of its oratory, not only in its public assemblies but in the pulpit, as also in the senate, and at the bar. This romantic theatrical bias of the national mind is yet further evinced in the literature of the day, of which novels and imaginative stories form so large a proportion. The real spirit and taste of a people are indeed exhibited much more correctly by the spontaneous development of character in this form, than even by the zealous support of the proper and appointed exhibitions for theatrical display. Nevertheless, it is most desirable

on every account that a legitimate channel should be afforded in which the strong current of national genius may run freely. If theatrical taste and talent are not permitted to develope themselves in their proper sphere, on the stage, they will exhibit their powers in places where their very appearance is not only out of place, but pernicious. Natural and national genius, although you may repress, you cannot extinguish them. If inflammation in the human body be subdued in the limbs, it will fly to the vitals; and in the latter it will prove fatal, where in the former it might have been harmless, if not even ultimately beneficial.

Unfortunately, indeed, for the character of the theatre, and its popularity as a national institution, it is placed as it were between three several fires or opposing interests. Certain religiously disposed persons censure it unsparingly, on account of the immoral practices with which it has been associated, and which are very unfairly looked upon not as the abuse of, but as necessarily connected with the institution itself. The violators of morality and decorum, on the other hand, abhor it because in its exhibitions it exposes and denounces the vices which they pursue. Those great enemies to true religion and morality, the fanatics and hypocrites, are ever forward in condemning it, and are its natural persecutors, because their absurdities and inconsistencies afford abundant and legitimate matter for choice satire in its exhibitions. Each of these three parties, although differing on almost every other subject, coalesce here for the purpose of destroying an institution whose legitimate object is to uphold religion and to protect morality.

If, indeed, hypocrisy and false pretence are the offences which most directly tend to the subversion of true religion, it cannot be denied that one of the most valuable results of the theatre has been the exposing, in an efficient and forcible manner, these detestable vices. But, as the

participators in these delinquencies are apt to be both more numerous, and also more noisy, than the sincere followers of religion, who are ordinarily unostentatious and unobtrusive; so, from the former, have the principal invectives against the stage proceeded, to whom it is, doubtless, a natural, an implacable, and, perhaps, the only efficient foe. But these are a moral vermin, infesting religion, which it is essential to exterminate, both for the sake of religion itself, and for that of the nation in which it is professed.

Nothing can be more unfair or more unreasonable, than to condemn either the theatre, or any other institution, on account of abuses which have crept into its management, but which have no necessary connection whatever with its constitution. If licentious performances, or licentious performers, have been tolerated, the sooner that these are expelled, the better; but do not on this account destroy the institution itself, which may have been to some extent, though only temporarily, polluted by their presence. Persons of loose character, or from improper motives, may be attracted to a theatre, as to any other place of amusement, or of business, or even of public worship. Their appearance, however, does not, necessarily, destroy, or even affect the general character of the assembly. The absolute and extreme injustice, moreover, of stigmatizing the theatre as that institution which alone is liable to promote an improper intercourse between the sexes, from the circumstance of its entertainments taking place after sunset, and those of both sexes being there brought together in a large concourse; has of late years been very strikingly exposed by showing that in churches and chapels where divine service is celebrated in an evening, exactly the same evil consequences are found to ensue. If, therefore, the theatre is to be condemned on this account, public worship must also, necessarily, be condemned along with it. But if, on the other hand, the

celebration of public worship suffers nothing from this circumstance, it is surely unjust and unreasonable to censure the theatre on the same account.

It sometimes happens, especially with regard to institutions and subjects of a high moral order, that the greater is the value of the proper use of any object, in an equal proportion is the extent of the evil produced by its abuse. Thus has it been with many religious establishments, and thus has it been also with the theatre. The latter, indeed, was in its origin a religious institution, and was devoted to religious purposes, although now regarded by some as that peculiarly from whence religion is especially excluded, and which mainly contributes to minister to vice. How great are the mutations occasioned in civil as well as physical bodies by their corruption! The most useful and salutary become the most pernicious and offensive. But surely the abuse of any institution can afford no substantial argument for its disuse; more especially when a remedy is at hand for restoring it to its originally beneficent and pure condition. Indeed, one very bad consequence which must necessarily ensue from people of high moral feeling and intellectual cultivation abandoning the theatre, and leaving it to the support and patronage of those who are of an opposite character in both respects, is that the tone of the theatre itself will become lowered to suit the taste of its patrons of the latter class; and thus, instead of being one of the main elements which conduce to the cultivation and moral advancement and civilization of the nation, it will be made the engine so far, by being perverted, for its debasement. What would be the result, if, because some books are of an evil tendency, those of enlightened minds and pure morals were to refuse to purchase all books whatsoever. Our literature must, in such a case, become speedily depraved, and would adopt eventually the degenerate tone and taste of that class of persons who

alone remain its patrons. The capacity of the theatre, on the one hand, to promote those great and beneficent ends which have already been alluded to, and its present low condition so unworthy of it, on the other, alike conduce to prove the expediency of restoring and reforming it, which can only be done fully and effectually by adopting, and recognizing, and controlling it as a National Institution. How extensively and how beneficially this may be effected, the efforts in this direction which during the last few years have been made by some noble-minded individuals connected with certain of our theatres, sufficiently attest.

IV.—NATIONAL CULTIVATION OF ART AND SCIENCE.

The Element of Civilization most nearly connected with those which have already been discussed, and which seems to follow in natural order after that of Instructory Institutions, is the National Cultivation of Art and Science in any country, to which therefore our consideration must now be directed.

The arts of each kind exercise a direct and an extensive influence both on individuals and on nations; and are essential to each for the perfect attainment of civilization, and the elevation and refinement of the mind. Science is not less important for the advancement of civilization, although the operation and effect of the two in this respect are very different. Art is mainly mental and moral, as regards the influence which it exerts. Science, on the other hand, is in its nature principally manual, inasmuch as it supplies professional or manual employment both to those who cultivate it, and to those engaged in various undertakings, who are aided by its operations, which is more or less, either directly or indirectly, the case with the followers of nearly every trade and pro-

fession carried on in a civilized country. Science is, nevertheless, also mental as well as manual, so far as regards the important exercise and aid that it affords to the intellectual faculties of all those by whom it is studied.

The influence of both art and science in relation to their effect on the mind of the nation, is reciprocated by the effect of the mind of the nation upon them. They influence in an important manner the tastes, and feelings, and opinions of the people; and the tastes, and feelings, and opinions of the people in turn influence and modulate the former. In most instances, indeed, the condition of art and science is largely affected, if not mainly produced, by the condition of the public mind, and springs principally from this source; though in its turn it correspondingly influences the public mind. Thus is it also with regard to legislation, which is more frequently directed by the state of public feeling and the character of a nation, than it is able to direct them. The bias of the public mind is, moreover, reflected by the pursuits that engross the attention of the people, which appear to be striving here to take the lead, while in reality they only follow.

A difficulty may occasionally be experienced in the correct and distinct classification of particular pursuits; and it may be doubtful whether some studies belong to art or to science, and whether certain others can be properly considered as appertaining to either class. In many branches of manufacture, both art and science are employed. Language belongs as much to art as to science, and is equally regulated by, and applicable to both alike.

It might perhaps be contended that language forms a distinct and independent Element of civilization, and that it ought to be so considered. Language, however, is not of itself an Element of civilization, but only a constituent in one of its Elements. It can do nothing alone, to promote civilization; but as a vehicle in the exercise of

art, both as regards poetry and eloquence, and as aiding the means of intercourse both between those of the same country, and between different nations, it is most important.

Under the term Art, is here comprehended not only the fine arts of painting, poetry, sculpture, eloquence, music, and architecture, but whatever else contributes to the refinement and convenience of life, and is ornamental, as distinguished from what is actually necessary.

By the term science, is here meant not only experimental philosophy, but all knowledge whereby we are enabled to deal with physical subjects, and to render them applicable to the uses of life. Considered in this light, medicine, and the pursuits which are adjunctive and auxiliary to it, must, among the sciences which are necessary to the well-being of society, and also to the civilization of a nation, be ranked very high. Science is, moreover, in a great measure the foundation of commerce. By science we are enabled to avail ourselves to the utmost of the resources of a country; and according to our extent in the possession of this knowledge, we are in reality nationally richer. Science also unites with art in adding to the conveniences as well as to the necessaries of life, as in the case of dress, which is indebted as much to the one as to the other for ornament. In this respect, the costume of a country is to a large extent a test of its condition in civilization; although on the other hand this may exist in considerable splendour, as in Persia and China, where civilization is at a low ebb; because, although art and science are essential to the civilization of a country, they are not the only Elements for this purpose. Nevertheless, of all the arts, that of dress or costume, if not the most influential in itself, is probably that whose influence is the most felt, and which operates directly upon the people at large, who all more or less pay attention to it, however they neglect or may be indifferent to the higher and nobler branches of art. On dress or costume, too,

the other arts exercise an important influence, and it, in its turn, extensively influences them.

Science further indirectly aids the cause of civilization, by supplying mechanical power for use in manufactures, in the case of machinery and other efforts requiring great force for setting them in operation. In two distinct and independent modes, this conduces to civilization. It aids the production of various articles of commerce, and in many cases it also adds to the superiority of their quality. On the other hand, in all the varieties of manufacture, art should not only minister to their adornment and improvement, but should serve to carry refinement, taste, and elegance into each department of practical life. Science also aids the cause of civilization by preventing the necessity for employing human power in the most servile works. The ancients used their slaves for the latter purpose, who supplied the want of mechanical power. The moral effect of employing human labour, whether free or slave, is necessarily debasing. To some extent even compelling animals to perform it, where this is attended with pain or great labour, is brutalizing to the mind from its barbarity. Science happily has extensively relieved us from the necessity of resorting to such means.

Both art and science, therefore, being so important and so influential, are worthy of national patronage and support, not so much to preserve them from neglect, as to secure the cultivation and application of them being carried on in the most efficient and advantageous manner. This is a matter of too much consequence to be trusted to mere chance or individual caprice; while the state, being mainly interested in its due performance, is the legitimate patron of art and science.

The arts, more especially those of music, poetry, and painting, as regards their effect and power in the refinement and elevation of the mind, seem to impart a kind of natural inspiration. They are adapted essentially to aid

the operation of religion, and, in conjunction with it, to exalt the intellectual powers over the sensual and animal feelings and propensities, and to afford to the soul the most pure and ecstatic enjoyments. Nor are their effects less extensive or important on a nation than on an individual, as regards its cultivation and civilization. In one respect more particularly, the arts of painting and poetry especially, are capable of exercising a deep-felt influence in the opportunities which they offer of duly representing, celebrating, and commemorating those characters and events which are of the greatest worth and dignity, and which have contributed most to the glory of the nation. The general condition, and also the peculiar character of the arts pursued in any country, affords, moreover, the surest indication of those of the state, especially as regards its mental and moral advancement. The arts both reflect with the utmost precision and clearness the intellectual condition, and tastes, and feelings, and habits, and tone of thought of the nation, and these qualities are in turn reflected by and influence the arts. The most barbarous tribes have hardly ever, if in any case, been found entirely destitute of all knowledge of art, especially of the rudiments of poetry, music, painting, and sculpture, and also of costume and architecture. Many of these arts have indeed been to a certain extent connected with, and have both influenced and been influenced by religion. To the study of the arts of painting and sculpture, so attractive in itself, the attention of the people will be naturally turned; and the establishment of public galleries containing choice specimens of works of this nature, affords them an opportunity of cultivating their taste in this respect, and both promotes a love of art, and refines and improves the national mind and taste.

An acquaintance with the rudiments of pictorial art is, moreover, generally advantageous. A knowledge of drawing, especially, is useful to every one. One very

powerful, although perhaps indirect, mode, in which this art contributes to the refinement of each individual, as also to the general civilization of mankind, is by the effect that it produces in leading those who are imbued with its principles to the observation and admiration of nature, to love whatever is pure, and beautiful, and ennobling in her, and to engage and delight in the pleasures of taste, which draw off the mind from all sensual pursuits, and exalt it to the sublimest contemplations. An occupation of this kind not only creates a new source of enjoyment and recreation in the capacity for admiring nature that it affords, but is practically useful also, as already pointed out, in many manual operations and commercial enterprises. The value of the art of design in pictorial illustration is, moreover, every day exhibited.*

Aristotle, in the fifth book of his Politics, refers to the efficacy of music in moral discipline, and its important use to "promote moral improvement, refine the sentiments, and exalt the character." This is an art, moreover, which may be cultivated by all classes alike, and by which all alike are influenced.

The general effect of music, both upon an individual and upon a nation, is to raise and refine the mind and taste, and to purify the pursuits, in all these respects directly and powerfully contributing to civilization. Nevertheless, the character of the influence which music in any case exercises, whether upon a people or upon a person, must, necessarily, to a large extent correspond with that of the music itself. Such music should, therefore, be provided for the general entertainment of the public as will most tend at once to refine and elevate their minds, and as is best adapted to suit both their tastes and their capacities. Of all music, sacred music is doubtless by far the most ennobling and the most influential.

* *The Theory of the Arts*, vol. I., chap. 1., p. 9.

Whether, on Sunday evenings, concerts of sacred music, to which the public of all classes should be admitted gratuitously, might not with great advantage be opened, and which could be held in some of our large public buildings, may reasonably be demanded? By this means many would not only be drawn away from places of licentious amusement, but religious impressions could not fail to be inculcated, independent of the elevating, and refining, and civilizing effect of such performances.

Exhibitions of paintings from scriptural subjects might also, with considerable benefit, both as regards religion and civilization, be opened to the public on Sundays, after the hours of Divine service, by means of which teaching of a very effective kind might be imparted which can be given in no other way, and through which many might be led to meditate on subjects of the nature represented, who could not be induced to hear a sermon, or be persuaded to read a book.

The national poetry of a country is ever of the greatest importance as regards its civilization. The influence of this branch of art is exercised in two distinct modes, quite independent of each other:—1. With regard to the sentiments and principles which it serves to inculcate, as in the case of the noble spirit of nationality induced by the Jewish poetry, and that of some other countries. 2. As leading to the popular cultivation of one of the most important branches of the arts. If, however, poetry in general is influential in this respect, most especially so is religious poetry, which has the strongest hold on the feelings, aspires so high, and in every country forms the most stimulating and most sublime branch of this art. But of all religious poetry, that which is of most extensive consequence as regards its popular diffusion and influence, and which is calculated to produce the greatest effects in relation to the civilization of a people, is the devotional poetry which is adapted for congregational melody, and

which will be in the mouths, and animate the feelings of all. The Common Prayer-Book of the Church of England, exhibits an extraordinary union of the most eloquent prose, with the most prosaic verse,—the most elegant of unrhymed compositions, with the most unpoetical rhymes. Thus, while the prayers are composed in language of the highest and purest rhetorical, as well as devotional excellence; and the Psalms and appointed portions of Scripture which are translated into prose seem to show how little real poetry is dependent for its beauty on measured rhyme;—the authorised version of the same Psalms appear as though almost designed to prove incontestably how possible it is for rhyme of every variety, and on the loftiest topics, to be composed without possessing any other element of poetry than its form, and the noble themes to which it is devoted;—an inert body without life; the shape of the intellectual man, but devoid of the soul which mainly distinguishes him. The extreme poverty of our authorised devotional poetry, cannot but be regarded as a great bar to the refinement and civilization, as well as the spiritual elevation of the lower classes, whose notions of what poetry is and ought to be, are principally derived from the productions of Tate and Brady, and Sternhold and Hopkins. This, moreover, has given a low and degenerate tone to congregational melody in general. Sternhold and Hopkins might, in the minds of reasonable and moderate men, be supposed to have reached the lowest point attainable in the degradation of the sacred muse. But unhappy and later experience has proved that there was yet a profounder depth in the abyss which modern rhymers have successfully attempted to reach. In the older versions alluded to, there are, indeed, choice passages here and there of real poetry and genius, which serve to redeem the mass from absolute imbecility. In the modern effusions, however, one monotonous style of insipidity and poverty pervades the whole performance.

It would almost seem, indeed, as though in the composition of these unattractive rhymes, a minute calculation had first been made as to what are the essential elements and characteristics of the sublime productions of the sweet psalmist of Israel, and of other corresponding poetic devotional pieces in Holy Scripture; and that when this was effected, a deliberate and strenuous effort had been made to compose something as opposite to them as possible, particular care being taken to exclude every merit and beauty in the way of either feeling or poetry, by which they are distinguished. It appears, in fact, to be an established canon with some people, the orthodoxy of which it is heresy to dispute, that poetry, in order to be truly devotional, must be thoroughly doggrel!

Most unfortunate it is that the only samples of religious poetry possessed by the bulk of the people of this country, should be of this low and mean character, which are not calculated to produce any of the grand, and powerful, and ennobling results for which poetry of a genuine order is peculiarly capacitated. It is alone from the existence of these authorized barbarities, that the apparent confusion in the minds of many rational people of education can be accounted for, as to there being no distinction between mere versification and poetry. On the other hand, the hymns and versions of some of the psalms by Addison, Pope, Heber, Keble, Moultrie, Cowper, Burns, and certain other of our genuine poets, afford full proof how capable sacred poetry in our language is of attaining the sweetest and the sublimest strains. How desirable does it appear that an authorized version of the Psalms, selected from these and other productions of sterling merit, should be prepared, and should be adopted for uniform use.

Nor has any improvement of late been exhibited as regards the tone and style of our sacred poetry, but in many cases the tunes adopted are as barbarous and unmusical as the hymns themselves, so that there is at all

events the redeeming merit of uniformity and consistency between the two. In no nation of the world, however—not even among the savage islanders of the South Seas—is there so little attention paid to the very important subject of sacred melody as an aid to public worship, as in our own. Possibly, indeed, the dull, spiritless, prosaic style and tone of our religious hymnal poetry, has been chosen to adapt it especially to the character of the sermons, to many of which it must be admitted that it forms in all respects a most suitable accompaniment, as the eloquent and forcible language of the liturgy does to the reading of the Scriptures. Great and successful efforts have been made to improve church music, but none to improve church poetry, which has indeed declined correspondingly as the other has advanced.

The advice which Dr. Johnson is said to have given to an aspiring author,—that he should strike out from his composition every sentiment that appeared to him peculiarly fine, seems to have been adopted literally by the editors of certain of our congregational hymnal collections, who have either carefully and rigidly expunged all passages remarkable for their force, feeling, or beauty, or have so mutilated them that all their point and excellence have been completely obliterated, whereby the grateful task of emasculation has been successfully accomplished.

It was the fashion, not many years ago, to neglect all attention to architectural decorum, and tasteful observance in the structure of ecclesiastical edifices; but which has now happily given place to a proper regard to their erection. What formerly prevailed with respect to religious edifices, now prevails concerning one of the most important parts of religious services. Let us hope that a corresponding correction of the barbarous spirit and feeling of the time may ere long be effected, and that suitable compositions for devotional melody may be supplied.

The erection of national monuments to the memory of individuals, who by their works or their virtues have conferred benefit or honour on their country, or on mankind, or in order to commemorate important public events, are means by which the arts of sculpture and architecture produce the most influential moral effects. The great men who adorn a nation, are its noblest property, and the chief promoters of its prosperity. It behoves their country to perpetuate their name and form, as they have so largely contributed to establish its greatness and glory, and duly to honour those who have conferred so much honour on the state. These mementoes excite a laudable admiration for the good deeds which they celebrate, and testify the national respect entertained for the performers. Public monuments, moreover, give a character to a nation, and record the existence of what are in reality its noblest boast. They much influence the genius of a people, and in their turn exhibit the national feeling and genius. Indeed, the moral effect of these erections, both in ancient and modern times, has been made obvious; nor is this the less certain because, in our day, the shallow, utilitarian, and unphilosophical spirit of some, has led them to despise this mode of honouring the names of the illustrious great; and instead of raising a statue to perpetuate at once the remembrance both of the person and the performances of the individual who has entitled himself to our gratitude, his actions are sought to be commemorated by the establishment of an institution which may be wholly unconnected with the subject of his labours, and the influence of which is not national, but confined only to a limited number; and whose advantages, if real,—instead of imaginary, as is but too often the case,—are applicable to the physical wants of a few, instead of influencing the mental and moral condition of all. A monument, on the other hand, when efficiently executed, not only best perpetuates the memory of the person represented, and publicly records

his good deeds, but appeals continually to the national mind, and animates all posterity to walk in his steps. In this country, indeed, it must be acknowledged that national monuments have not been raised with any regard to the merits or eminence of the persons so honoured; and that while some have been duly thus celebrated, others of equal or less renown have been wholly neglected. Thus, to neither Bacon, Newton, Locke, nor Milton, four of our greatest names, have any national monuments been erected. Burghley, Walpole, and Burke,* so eminent among statesmen; Somers and Hardwicke, so great among lawyers; Chaucer, Spenser, Pope, and Wordsworth, such distinguished poets; Harvey and Hunter, who did so much to advance medical science; are all similarly neglected. Nor is it any excuse to say that these great men by their deeds have raised monuments more imperishable than those of brass or marble; for if the moral effects of national monuments are to be acknowledged at all, the neglect to erect them in such cases as these must be correspondingly felt. On the other hand, the number and profusion of public monuments, the large proportion of them to individuals of little note or merit, greatly destroy the effect, and mar the object of these tokens. Not to chance, nor to individual favour or caprice, but to the declared opinion of the nation, it should be left to decide when and to whom these trophies should be rendered: and the design and aim of which should be, not to raise out of their natural and appropriate insignificance those who were obscure while living; but to maintain among us in all their fame and glory, the memory of those of genius and worth when they are departed.

* Since these pages were originally written, a partial atonement has, indeed, been made for this neglect by placing the statues of some of these great men in the vestibule leading to the Houses of Parliament. This is, however, but a very small instalment of the heavy national debt of justice due to our departed worthies of each class.

Monuments are, as it were, the shadows of the great men whom they are intended to commemorate. By their means we retain the remembrance, although we have lost the presence, of the departed; and we preserve something of their influence, though they themselves have long since left us.

The essential advantage in regard to civilization, arising from the national veneration paid to heroes and great men, results from the stimulus which it excites to emulate their virtues, and to shun all those vices which are the counterpart of these qualities, by which lustre like theirs would be tarnished. The use of monuments in this respect is twofold:—1. To preserve the memory of those great men to whom they are erected, and of their virtues also. 2. To testify the regard of the nation for those great men, and for the virtues which they displayed. In both these respects, they are extensively and directly conducive to civilization; and are calculated to carry it to the highest point.

Our great poet Wordsworth, in two of his letters,* expresses his opinion that eminent poets, less than any other persons, stand in need of such marks of distinction, inasmuch as their works serve to raise more imperishable monuments to their memories than could be effected by any statues of brass or marble. He also objects to tributes to genius of this nature, as calculated to draw off attention from its claims of a more solid kind. Poets who have been cut off in early youth, before they had the opportunity of achieving for themselves lasting fame, ought, however, he considers, to be commemorated by a monument. And heroes who perished in battle should be honoured with these mementoes, because "their noble actions cannot speak for themselves as the writings of men of genius are able to do." Gratitude towards them,

* Life of William Wordsworth, by the Rev. Dr. Wordsworth. Vol. II., pp. 88, 91.

he thinks, ought to be publicly manifested. For statesmen, lawyers, and divines, and those who have devoted themselves to abstruse science, he deems monuments to be apt tributes, but not for men of genius, especially poets.

Here, however, it appears to me that our excellent poet has fallen into a double error; in the first place, as regarding monuments to be of a memorial nature only, as calculated merely to keep alive the memory of the departed: whereas their real object is not so much to perpetuate his memory, which he himself has already rendered imperishable, as to perpetuate the remembrance of the homage paid to him by his contemporaries. And, in the next place, the object of the monument is not so much to benefit, or even to add to the glory of him to whom it is raised, as it is to benefit the public at large, through the moral effect which it may produce upon them, by evincing the national homage which is paid to virtue, to genius, and to enterprise. At all events, in each case, the keeping alive the memory of the departed, is but one object only out of several, in raising a monument; and of these several objects, it is that which is the least valuable, and the least important. In addition to this, it may be observed, that it will generally happen that the more deserving any particular person is of having a monument erected to his memory, if the perpetuation of his remembrance and fame only are aimed at, by so much the less will he stand in need of it. On the other hand, just in proportion as the erection of a monument is but little needed by himself for securing this object, the more desirable is its erection on account of the moral effects, already alluded to, which such a tribute is capable of producing.

That renowned emperor, and really great man, Napoleon I., who was the highest authority on such a subject, observed with regard to monuments, that "it should be left to after ages to construct them, when the good opinion

conceived of the heroes is confirmed."* But here I must be permitted to remark, that those whose fame is so great and so extensive in after-ages as to secure a monument being raised to them by posterity, least of all, as already remarked, stand in need of a monument, their own good deeds alone sufficing to secure their honourable remembrance. There are, however, many persons of considerable worth and merit, for whom posterity may care but little, who well deserve a monument to their memory, and whose achievements are especially of that nature as to require to be so recorded, and to render it desirable that they should be thus kept in remembrance. A monument should moreover serve, not only as a memorial of the dead, but as a record of the respect entertained for him while living, by those who were contemporary with him, and which posterity is unable to afford. The opinion of posterity, as being the most impartial, is the most valuable respecting the merits of a great man, concerning whom his contemporaries may, and generally do, entertain prejudices in one direction or another. But it is rather as a tribunal of appeal than as an original court of judicature, that the sentence of posterity is mainly to be regarded. Posterity, moreover, are seldom sufficiently connected with, or interested about a man, to care to raise a monument to his memory.

Some persons have even gone so far as to contend that a national monument ought not to be capable of practical utility in any way, on the ground that it should be a sacrifice of so much in value as it costs, by the public, as a tribute to the individual so honoured. But without either adopting or repudiating the principle referred to, I would observe that, even here, what the public loses in money it gains in moral effect. The results produced by a striking monument, suitably placed, are far more

* Au Conseil de la Seine.

efficient than any which could be caused by the most serviceable substitute for it of a practical nature that might be found.

The erection of national monuments has, however, no necessary connection with or dependence upon art, inasmuch as memorials of this description, in all respects perfectly efficient, may be raised, which are quite devoid of all pretensions to artistical merit, and of all claims to belong to works of that class; as in the case of a plain pillar or column, which may have been put up to commemorate either a particular event or a particular person. Indeed, many monuments of this kind, instead of being ornaments, are gross disfigurements to the neighbourhood in which they stand, and of which it would not be difficult to cite some striking examples. It ought, however, to be so arranged that the merit of the monument as a work of art shall add lustre to the object for which it was raised; while, on the other hand, the dignity of its object adds to its importance as an artistical performance.

Memorials to perpetuate the remembrance of great men may also be obtained, as already observed, by the establishment of a particular institution, or charitable, or literary fund, to which the name of the departed may be attached. But this, for the reasons already assigned, appears to be a less legitimate and less efficient mode of recording their memory than the erection of suitable statues.

One very ready, economical, and impressive mode of honouring the memories of great men, is by calling streets and different parts of a town after their names, by which an importance is given to them, and their remembrance is respected and cherished. In choosing names for new streets, it does, indeed, seem to be an omission, and is a loss of opportunity, not always to give them designations which are either commemorative of some contemporary event, or memorial of some of the distinguished characters of the time.

The public national edifices in every country, not only admit of being, but should be properly, in each case, raised and decorated according to the principles of art. Indeed, they should not merely be erected with becoming dignity and grandeur, but should have a distinct individual and appropriate form and character of their own, according to the purposes they are intended to serve; and they should be adapted duly to influence and to be prized by the people whose property they are.

Public buildings may and ought, moreover, to be not only peculiarly adapted as regards their general form and requirements for the objects they are intended to serve, but they may, and ought to be, emblematical also of these purposes.* Thus, a church is in various ways emblematical of our holy religion, a castle of martial strength and firmness, a gaol of penitential seclusion and gloom, a college of scholastic retirement and study, a theatre of the tragic and comic events to be represented within its walls.

Many of our buildings erected at the national cost are, nevertheless, a disgrace to the national taste, even in those cases where persons of education directed their construction. Our county prisons,—some of them occupying picturesque positions which they disfigure and degrade,—from their hideousness appear as though intended to be thus additionally deterring from crime; while our lunatic asylums suggest the idea that the lunatics themselves must have been their architects.

In the proper disposition of public buildings, placing them to the best advantage, the laying out and arrangement of the streets, the artistical ornamentation to be applied to each of these structures, and the proper adornment and tasteful erection and preservation of the whole city and its buildings, the rulers of a state may legitimately interfere, and with benefit to the public; and their interference alone is capable of being efficient, and is there-

* *The Theory of the Arts*, vol. II., chap. IX., p. 114.

fore requisite. The cost of carrying all this out should also be defrayed by the state, as the state reaps the advantage which accrues therefrom.

Both art and science are, however, applicable not only to public but to private buildings; and when generally cultivated, and blended together, as they ever ought to be, they are calculated to promote the improvement of the dwellings of all classes, both as regards ornament and convenience. Art, indeed, is capable of contributing directly and extensively to the promotion of civilization, through the opportunity which it affords to the people for erecting and decorating their habitations, both externally and internally, with due regard to taste and beauty, so as to combine comfort with convenience, and refinement with utility. Hence the whole design of the building is so formed as to render it an object of pleasure as well as of use, and the furniture and domestic articles are constructed upon the same principle. From the mind being constantly accustomed to the contemplation of beauty, and order, and regularity in each object around it, even in those for the commonest domestic purposes,—which is but strictly according to the economy that nature has arranged, where beauty in each case is combined with utility—it becomes habituated not only to delight in such objects, but it learns to abhor and shun whatever is rude, and barbarous, and distasteful. Art and science may here mutually aid the efforts of each other, and may also mutually correct the deficiencies which are discernible in either.

Even in the construction of edifices intended only for commercial purposes, due attention should be paid to their being erected with the taste, and with the regard to architectural propriety, that the nature of the building allows. The sordid spirit which is apt to be generated here, ought not to be harmonized with—as appears to be the object in our day of mercantile edifices—but to be corrected and

counteracted. Napoleon, whose great mind well understood the requirements of a nation, magnanimously declared,—"The market-place is the Louvre of the common people." They should enjoy in such a place, not only the conveniences of commerce, but the social refinements of civilization.

It seems also to be both just and politic to require of all persons who erect buildings in conspicuous situations, especially those of a national or public description, as for instance, bridges, viaducts, and public offices of any kind, that they should be of such form and appearance as not to disfigure the country, or prove unsightly and displeasing to those who pass by them. The nation ought, surely, to be fully protected in its enjoyment of the gifts of Nature, among which the beauties of scenery are the most delightful, elevating, and refining. And if we rigidly enact laws against any offence of the organs of smelling, or hearing, or feeling; why should we not equally guard against the annoyance of the far higher sense of sight, the disagreeable affection of which is as injurious to our intellectual and moral, as that of the others is to our material being?

Of all the arts for popular cultivation in a nation, especially in its rural districts, that of ornamental gardening is one which is particularly adapted for the working classes, and which, as an occupation, is at once physically healthful, and mentally and even morally refining. The contemplation of nature has ever a civilizing effect; and the study of flowers, where her beauties and tasteful charms are peculiarly exhibited, is at once purifying to the feelings and improving to the mind. To those employed in artistical manufactures, such delightful studies are directly manually useful. Public walks and gardens to which the people may have free resort, and which are tastefully laid out according to the principles of this art, have also a powerfully civilizing influence upon the people of every nation, and that in a variety of ways.

It is essential, therefore, as already observed, that some provision should be made by the state for the due encouragement and support of the arts of each kind, as also of literature in general. The extensive cultivation and high perfection of art is, moreover, not only no contributor to, much less a proof of luxury, or of the decline of civilization in any country; but, on the contrary, luxury is as inimical to art in its highest state, as it is to civilization; and the decline of art is invariably contemporary with, if not in every instance the cause of the decline of the latter.* But the object of state patronage should not be to supply the place of private munificence, or of public encouragement of the arts, on which they must mainly rely, and by which alone is the influence of the arts shown to be felt and valued by the nation; but the patronage, and, indeed, the interference in any case of the state, is chiefly required here for two purposes:—1. To correct the public taste, and to direct it in that channel which is nationally most improving and valuable. 2. To afford encouragement to those works, both in art and literature, which are of real importance to the public, but which private patronage may be insufficient to secure. Such performances deserve, therefore, to be nationally encouraged. Not only, however, should the state render its support here, but its rulers individually ought to exert themselves to promote, and patronize, and encourage men of genius and of learning, which they should do, not merely as private persons, but as public men. This system ought, moreover, not only to be followed in the dispensation of patronage, but to be incorporated with it.

The state should, however, not merely promote the cultivation of art as regards the higher branches of this pursuit, but should make exertions to induce the people generally to pay attention to it, by which alone can civili-

* *The Theory of the Arts*, vol. I., chap. VI., p. 211; vol. II., chap. XIII., p. 229.

zation through this means be extensively advanced among them. If the government would undertake the expense, which would be but trifling, of issuing engravings, either plain or coloured, suitably executed, of works of art of high merit, illustrative both of scriptural and of profane history, which might serve for distribution by the clergy, or other persons, among the people generally, or be supplied to them at a very cheap rate, and which they could hang up in their houses; a vast deal would be at once effected, not only towards the popular cultivation of art, but in the promotion also of popular Education, and the extension of Religious Influence.

Considering also the importance, and the extensively beneficial and civilizing influence of music, upon the inhabitants of any nation; it is equally the duty of the state to supply this, on certain occasions, for the general benefit of the people, as also to furnish them with other sources of desirable and improving recreation. This, too, may be done at a very small expense in comparison with the good resulting from it. On festive days, more especially, should musical performances be introduced. There is this great advantage, moreover, in the state thus aiding in the dissemination of art of different kinds; that thereby not only is the civilization of the nation promoted through the influence of art, but it is still further advanced by the aid and patronage which the art in question thus receives.

Nevertheless, the arts, like the various Elements of civilization, and like civilization itself, are liable to degenerate and decay. They require to be united with other pursuits,* and especially with the different Elements of civilization. They are too refining and enervating when followed alone, not only on their devotees, but on themselves. It is therefore desirable that they should be blended with other occupations, both for the sake of them-

* *The Theory of the Arts*, vol. I., chap. I., p. 35.

selves and for the sake of civilization, in the promotion and perfection of which they form so important an Element. Followed exclusively, they are calculated too much not only to render effeminate a nation, but to call off attention from more invigorating pursuits.

That pursuit with which the arts are best adapted to be blended, is science. In every nation, genius of each kind has displayed itself about the same time, in arts, in science, and in arms.* Art is corrective of science, refines its followers, and renders tasteful its operations; and so far from being superseded by, it is at the present period more than ever essential for these ends.† Science, on the other hand, improves art, and renders it applicable for all the purposes of life.

Science being in most cases manually practical, is less dependent on state patronage than is art. Yet this is requisite, especially for two objects:—1. To aid the originators of new inventions in science, which may be of great ultimate value to the public, but which the discoverers may not be able to afford, or which it may not be worth their while to perfect. 2. To encourage experiments in science, which those practically engaged in them may not have the means, or ability, or leisure to carry out; but which it may be of the highest and most essential importance to the state to complete.

Indeed, every state that aspires to reaching a high condition of civilization, ought to provide an institution especially adapted to aid the effecting of experiments for the discovery of new inventions, and for testing their worth and genuineness, the expense of properly carrying on and bringing which to maturity should be borne by the nation, which should also afford every encouragement to men of genius to devote their energies to undertakings of such sterling and national value. In many respects, and

* Gibbon's *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire.*

† *The Theory of the Arts*, vol. II., chap. XIV., p. 257.

on several accounts, institutes of this kind may very advantageously be grafted on our universities, which contain an assemblage of learned and eminent men qualified for such efforts, and which would further attract to our universities men of the highest attainments and the greatest renown.

V.—LIBERTY OF THE PRESS, AND TOLERATION.

That Element of civilization which I have designated by the general name of Liberty of the Press, and Toleration, in which is included the right of free thought and speech upon all questions, whether political, moral, or religious; demands next to be considered, both on account of its connection alike with the preceding Elements of Religious Influence and Instructorial Institutions, as also because the principles which regulate it have reference to a portion of the subject-matter in those Elements which are to follow, and require, consequently, to be laid down and determined before entering upon the discussion of the latter.

The Element now under consideration, is as essential for the complete civilization of a state as, and in a manner corresponding with that in which, the free exercise of his judgment is essential for the perfect education of the man.

There is, however, this important difference observable in the nature of the Element now before us, as distinguished from those which have already been considered, and those which follow; that it is entirely of a negative kind, consisting not in the provision of certain aids or institutions necessary to civilization, but in the prohibition of certain acts or proceedings to which the people in each country, of whatever party or opinion, are naturally prone, and from which they require to be prevented, in order that that entire freedom of thought,

and of intellectual and moral action, may be preserved, which is so essentially conducive to a perfect, and, indeed, to a high condition of civilization. Restraint of liberty of one kind, is here resorted to, only in order to ensure the possession and exercise of liberty of another kind, in a manner the most complete.

Every one is primarily and naturally entirely free alike as regards thought, speech, and action, of every description, provided that his proceedings do not interfere with the well-being of the state, or of his fellow-subjects; and to this extent, and to this only, ought his liberty of each kind to be limited. Absolute liberty consists in the unrestrained and complete power of the individual to do whatever his inclination prompts him to, free from every obstacle, fettered by no law, and wholly independent of every consideration of right, or duty, or motive. This is an extent, it may be termed an excess of liberty, to which no created being ever attained, and which the Deity alone could be endowed with, but which even He, it may be presumed, would not deign to its full extent to exercise. In reality, probably the only being in the universe who is absolutely free, so far as freedom from all moral restraint is essential to this condition, is the Devil.

Submission to authority does not necessarily imply a restraint on liberty, or even a partial abridgment of it. By authority is strictly and properly meant the influence in regard to conduct of a man whose opinions are believed to be founded on sound reason, on which account, in forming our own, we desire to ascertain the nature of his, and to adopt them if, and so far as, we agree in the conclusions at which he has arrived. But examination of the opinions of another, of itself implies liberty to approve or disapprove of them, and by no means leads to the supposition that they are implicitly to be adopted without free choice.

The complete coexistence and contemporaneous action

together of law and liberty, is the ultimate aim of jurisprudence, and the highest object that it can attain. To enjoy both these together is the noblest condition which civil society can ensure. On the other hand, the excess of liberty is not freedom but anarchy. The passions are let loose, neither reason nor fear hold them in check, and confusion and ruin are the inevitable result.

Liberty and restraint are, indeed, hardly ever found in an entirely pure condition, the one, although it is its exact converse, being generally more or less mixed with the other, and in many cases the admixture greatly contributing, if not actually essential to its complete vigour. Liberty unchecked by any restraint, often ends in tyranny. Restraints on liberty are somewhat like rudders to ships: they may in certain instances impede the rapidity of their progress, but in all cases they promote the safety of the passage. Those restraints only which are in no respect either directly or indirectly conducive to liberty, are absolutely intolerable, and ought ever to be resisted as entirely opposed to freedom.

Civil liberty, which is the right that every individual possesses of acting as he thinks proper, except so far only as by so doing he may inflict an injury or wrong on some other member of the society to which he belongs, is of two kinds:—1. Physical liberty, or the right of performing such corporeal actions as the individual wills, subject to the foregoing restraint, which is imposed by the state for the benefit and protection of all the members of the community. 2. Intellectual liberty, or the right of exercising his mental powers, and of applying them in such manner and for such purposes as he chooses, subject also to the restraint already described.

It is not often either in the case of individuals or of nations, that subjugation can be beneficial to them, either mentally or morally. When, however, an individual or a nation is sunk into imbecility, whether from luxury,

degeneracy, or whatever cause, it may be for its advantage that some other individual or some other state, who is more highly endowed, should exercise control over it, and supply to its conduct that discretion and energy which in its own natural and unaided action is wholly wanting. Both in the case of states and persons, as a general rule, independence is preferable to dependence. But if a particular state or a particular person is too weak and imbecile to govern itself, it is better to exchange that condition by becoming dependent on another by which its affairs will be directed with vigour, and its efforts or institutions carried on with spirit. In every case, indeed, both government and liberty itself must be tested, and must be valued, not by their abstract theoretical merits, but by the results they really produce. A form of government which is perfect for one set of people may be quite unfitted for another, and the freedom which is so precious a boon to a sane man, to a maniac may prove his greatest bane.

Although slavery is generally inimical to civilization as regards its deteriorating and debasing effects on those who are the subjects of it; yet on the other hand, so far as regards its tendency to promote the cultivation of many arts, and compelling a people to active and industrious habits, it may prove, although indirectly, extremely advantageous in the promotion of civilization.

Physical slavery consequently produces results of two opposite natures, both as regards those who exercise it towards others, and those who suffer from it themselves. Thus, while the domination over inferiors is of itself directly debasing to the mind, the compelling them to do the drudgery of life both relieves those who are thus freed from it from all occupations of this kind, and allows them full leisure for refining and civilizing pursuits; so that some persons have even supposed that the existence of slavery in a state is actually essential to its citizens

attaining any very high or perfect condition, either of liberty or of civilization. On the other hand, those who endure slavery, are debased in mind by this degradation, and by the servile services which they have to undergo; though, at the same time, this very hardship itself tends to soften and moderate many of those passions and feelings which are most opposed to civilization; and the condition itself is often one of less barbarity and ignorance than that in which the subjects of it were before their captivity. On the whole, however, it cannot be doubted that physical, as well as intellectual and moral liberty, in every nation, is highly conducive to civilization. Intellectual and moral slavery, when the mind is subjected to arbitrary rule, and is no longer free to exercise itself at its will, is the most grievous of all states; and to guard against this is the main object of the Element of civilization before us. It is consequently with intellectual and moral liberty, which is the opposite, and the antidote to this condition, that we have alone here to do, as immediately connected with the subject of civilization. This is, indeed, the most valuable kind of liberty, and it is principally of two kinds:—1. Liberty of thinking, speaking, and writing concerning matters of state, and of discussing freely the laws and institutions of the country. 2. Liberty of thinking, speaking, and writing concerning matters of religion, and of discussing freely its doctrines and tenets. The two grand civil regulations which in every free and civilized state mainly conduce to establish these high privileges, are those that come under the general terms of Liberty of the Press, and Toleration.

There can be no doubt, indeed, that liberty, even in the abstract, considered by itself independently, operates as a great stimulus to education and to civilization generally; as a state of servility is, on the other hand, a severe check upon their advancement. Nor can it be denied that liberty is more extensive, and certainly more

varied, in a condition of civilization than in one of barbarism. For although in the former state many restraints are imposed, yet these are imposed only for the sake of securing still greater liberty as the price of them, and as the final result. Restraint is thus made the parent of liberty, and out of every curtailment of our freedom, fresh freedom springs. Moreover, unless a people possess liberty of action, they will not properly qualify themselves to act. Of all the different kinds of freedom, freedom of thought and speech are not only the most precious, but they both lay the foundation for, and promote the security of every other sort of freedom. Consequently, when this liberty is restricted, education is deprived of half the incentives to its progress. If, indeed, there is any right which may be strictly termed a natural one, it is surely that of Liberty of Conscience, which was given us by God, and the exercise of which is a positive and a required duty. And, doubtless, if any right is inalienable, it is this. A free government, moreover, induces the people to study the laws and institutions under which they live, inasmuch as they feel that they have both an interest in their maintenance, and an influence in their promotion.

Some of our ancient statutes appear to aspire not only at checking the expression of sentiments, but the very thought of them. And in truth, perhaps, difficult and even impossible as this may seem, it is of little use restraining the former if we cannot also repress the latter.

I. The establishment of a free and popular organ or representative of opinion in a state, is of the utmost importance and benefit to afford vent to the public feeling, and to guard against abuses and unconstitutional acts of the government. The free press of a nation corresponds with the organ and power of speech in an individual. Being allowed through this vehicle to give full expression to its sentiments, all danger of resorting to physical force,

in order to remedy each grievance, is removed, or at any rate much lessened.

Corresponding, therefore, with the general freedom of discussion which is allowed upon all matters, both of principle and of practice, should be the freedom alike of inquiry and of animadversion which is permitted to the press, especially upon political topics. Here, moreover, while all direct attacks upon the authority of the government, and all question as to the right to put in force actually existing laws, must be strictly prohibited; the fullest discussion should be granted as to the expediency of continuing or altering the laws, admitting at the same time the undeniable duty of obeying them so long as they continue to be the laws.

Although a free press tends more than anything to provoke contentions, and that among people who are of the same country, and are brought into close contact one with another; yet, on the other hand, it converts contests of arms into contests of arguments, substitutes the pen for the sword, and consumes ink instead of blood. The feeling of animosity may be as great, and the contest may be carried on as warmly as in martial encounters, but the results are vastly different. The wounds inflicted are moral instead of material, and principles, not persons, are what fall in the battle. Thus the press has ofttimes proved more powerful than artillery. While the latter attacks the bodies, the former applies itself to the minds of men.

There are two especial advantages possessed by the press as the protector of the public against oppression, and which the voice of the people declared in their assemblies would fail to obtain. The first of them is that, from the sentiments which are put forth being uttered anonymously, the utmost boldness and independence are exhibited in their expression. And, in the next place, the services of the greatest talent of which the nation can

boast among those who are skilled in literary composition, are secured to the public. The sentiments so expressed are, in reality, to be considered not those of the writer who pens them, but as those of the nation which are here reflected, and by whom they are re-echoed. And it is this consideration alone which gives them their force.

Although the press, invested as it is with so much power as a public censor, has no means of directly punishing those whom it condemns; yet it may prove very efficient in the prevention of misdemeanours, especially those of a moral and political nature, by deterring people from them, through the fear of detection and exposure which it creates. Punishment, indeed, indirectly, it may and does inflict, though of a moral kind only, by holding up to obloquy the objects of its just censure, and thus also lessening their influence and power.

As already observed in a previous Element, the Press has to a great extent superseded the Theatre, as it was availed of at Athens as a moral censor. And it is, doubtless, far better adapted for this purpose, as appealing rather to deliberate reason than to passion, and to the information of the people, instead of aiming merely at satirical effect. Although less striking and exciting than a theatrical representation to ridicule a foible, its efforts produce a more permanent result. To expose an abuse, or to point out an inconsistency, satire may not only be resorted to with fairness, but such an application of it is in reality its legitimate aim and object.

The Parliament and the Press together, through which is afforded the amplest vent for the ebullition of the national feeling, and by means of which it is expressed with the utmost freedom, fully supply the place both of the orators and the comic satirists of the days of Greece. The main difference as regards the weapons employed is, that in ancient times, eloquence and satire were principally resorted to: in the present day, reason is that which is

most used, and which is better adapted for the service of a state in a high condition of civilization; as, though all persons can be more or less moved by declamation and ridicule, those only who have received at least a moderate share of cultivation, can be acted upon by the appeals of reason. Moreover, what the orator and actor gain in force and momentary effect, the press more than makes up for by the vast number to whom it at once addresses itself, and by the permanence of the impressions which it creates.

The press, especially through the newspaper, which is one of the most extraordinary and striking features in modern civilization, and which forms a new Element of it wholly wanting in that of any ancient times and states, is also of immense use as a public instructor, both in diffusing knowledge, and in inculcating correct principles; although perhaps it is more efficient to expose those which are wrong, than to teach those which are right. In the latter respect, if not in the former, it is like a church establishment, and ought to aid the operations of that institution by pointing out error and denouncing vice. Following too in the track of the church, it assists in extending information through every part of the nation.

As regards the use of the press in aiding the communication of knowledge, and of intercourse, both between communities in different parts of the same country, and between different states, it is here extensively auxiliary to Elements IX. and X.

The real power of the press is founded on truth and on public opinion. Armed with the former and supported by the latter, its strength is immense, if not irresistible. Possessing the former, it ought also to obtain the latter. But unless it is endowed with the former, its power is more specious than solid, and in the end it must give way, however zealously the latter influence may for a time uphold it. It is, however, highly favourable to the

expression of truth, and advantageous, too, for the development of public opinion, that the different organs of the press should espouse different principles on the various political questions that are advocated, by which each topic obtains the fairest and freest discussion, and truth is most completely maintained; and by which also the most ample opportunity is afforded to the public of judging fully and deliberately on the various measures put before them. By this means also, a proper balance is preserved between the different parties and opinions in the state, and consequently no interest or institution is in danger of being overwhelmed by the press.

Such an institution, so important to the interests of each branch and party in the state, ought to be wholly free. The public are entitled to the possession of such an organ as this, for the declaration of their opinion. It is only by expressing their exigencies and requirements with freedom, that they can be well and adequately governed, and which they have a right as far as possible to secure as the very end of civil society itself.

But although the free and unrestrained discussion of state questions and general topics in this manner is most desirable, and is highly beneficial to the public; the conversion of that noble moral engine. the press into a vehicle of slander, not for the public good, but for private gain, or employing it for the propagation of immorality or profaneness, ought ever to be prohibited by the strictest laws. Even liberty in the discussion of public questions must have its bounds. The firm foundations of an established government ought not to be constantly disturbed without some adequate cause; or the fundamental principles of religion, which form the hope of the nation, exposed to doubt and contumely, merely to gratify individual vanity or caprice. These topics are too sacred, and too much bound up with the private interests and feelings of each individual, to allow of their

being unsettled in this manner. A vast distinction, indeed, is to be drawn between discussion as to fundamental points, either in politics or religion, and minor considerations of practice or theory arising out of them. The former must be, to a certain extent, held inviolable, so long as a large majority of the people not only acquiesce in them, but rely on their being upheld, and on which the safety and peace of the nation depend. To be ever questioning their propriety or soundness, would so much bring them into disrepute and contempt, and would occasion such general perplexity and distrust, as to be a worse evil than even the prohibition of discussion about them altogether. And it is ever to be borne in mind that it is fully as important, and indeed essential, to maintain truth that is already established, as to establish truth which has yet to prove its reality. The real and correct principle to be adopted in this case, appears, however, to be, not to prohibit such discussion, even as to the leading principles of religion or government, altogether; but to require this, when practised, so to be conducted as not to obtrude on the public mind, and to be pursued by its followers in private. Hence, even the questioning of fundamental principles need not be forbidden beyond the requisite bounds, when the reasons for restraining it no longer exist. All abridgment of liberty is justified only by necessity. Liberty exercised by one, ought not, moreover, to be allowed to infringe on that of another. It is essential, indeed, to obviate as far as possible the occasion for discussions of this kind; which can only be done by maintaining in their integrity the true principles of the government, and the purity of the religion established. Even if then attacked, the people, instead of joining in, will be led to repel the assault. But in all cases, minor matters of practice and detail connected with laws and religion, such as contemplated changes in legislation, or the points in difference between

sects, cannot be too freely investigated. A man in business discusses unreservedly with his friends in private, as to the particular course he shall pursue, according to special circumstances, and is glad of their advice in each case; but to be every day openly debating whether he should renounce his business altogether, or change his profession, would be unsettling to his habits, and ruinous to his prospects.

The licentiousness of the press is altogether distinct from its liberty. An individual may have entire physical liberty, although he is not allowed to molest his neighbours; or ample intellectual liberty, though he is prohibited from throwing off all moral restraint. These rational impediments do not, indeed, at all affect or diminish the real perfection of his liberty. The liberty of the press is not like that of a madman or a drunkard, but resembles the freedom of a reasonable being. Its liberty is not even promoted by its licentiousness, which is only its perversion, and is a kind of disease to which it is liable. The public, indeed, who are its patrons and protectors, will never submit to be the victims individually of its slanders; nor will they tamely allow their legitimate organ for the national good to be made a vehicle for private malice, or corrupt purposes. This, indeed, must eventually lead, not to the extension, but to the extinguishment of its liberty.

It is due, however, to the press, especially to that portion of it which is established in our own country, to observe that the influence of the newspaper is on the whole unquestionably and extensively beneficial, and in support of civilization, and this in several ways. It not only diffuses knowledge of various kinds, but the standard of its style, and perhaps of its morality too, is, at the least, on an average with, and probably much above that of the generality of its readers, and therefore advantageous both to their mental and moral progress. The precepts which

it enforces are for the most part favourable to both religion and virtue, as no public instructor, whatever he might think or feel, would venture to avow sentiments in opposition to established fundamental truths, and thus expose himself at once both to the criticism and the censure of rival journals, and of discerning readers. Heterodoxy is mainly taught, not in public assemblies, but in private conferences. With very few and perhaps unimportant exceptions, the newspaper is also on the side of order and good government; although an extensive latitude must be, and ought to be, allowed to it in the discussion of different questions, and as the organ of various parties, who all alike profess to be animated only by a desire for the public weal.

II. The free discussion of questions relating to different points in religious doctrine and practice, not affecting the actual truth of religion itself, is of the utmost importance for securing the establishment of religion in a pure form. Man has his reason given to him by his Maker, both to guide him correctly in the choice of a religion, and to guard him against errors in religion in general. And it is only by the full and unfettered exercise of that reason, that he can be expected to decide right in the one case, or to be directed right in the other. To this unrestrained and due exercise of reason, we owe it that Christianity has supplanted paganism in this land; and by stifling it it is that error, and idolatry, and superstition seek to retain their dominion over the minds of their votaries. In order also to preserve the purity and the credit of the best of all religions, it is essential that a full and free right of discussion should be allowed to all parties, and which the erroneous and bigoted of all parties alike will be found to be desirous of stifling. Toleration, which permits, and indeed leads to inquiry and reformation, constantly acts as a purifier of religion; while on the other hand, nothing so much tends to its

deterioration as the forbidding its tenets to be canvassed, and subjected to the test of reason, which operates like fire in purging away the dross, and in correcting abuses.

Toleration, nevertheless, springs as much, or indeed more, from the largeness and real liberality of the mind of the person exercising it, than from the particular creed which he professes, or the code of laws under which he may be living. Certain noble-minded Roman Catholics are full of the spirit of toleration, while some Protestants are as intolerant and persecuting as the Inquisition in Spain. Moreover, as a general, if not invariable rule, those will be found the most intolerant towards others, who are themselves the least entitled to be treated with toleration.

The two grand principles on which toleration is founded, and the soundness of which few of well-disciplined reason and extensive cultivation will be disposed to doubt, are that every man has a right to the full and free exercise of his reason in the investigation of truth; and that there are hardly any subjects of a practical nature so certain as regards their rules and application, as not to admit of controversy. The ground on which the support of toleration rests, is that it is desirable to arrive at and to preserve truth, and that this is best promoted and ensured by free discussion. Where positive truth has been attained, as in the case of the received veracity of the Holy Scriptures, it is consequently not essential or expedient to extend toleration to its open and popular investigation. But any point short of this, even to the free questioning of the best form of religion, and, indeed, every topic of this kind which is open to doubt and debate, should be within the scope of toleration, and be allowed to be argued freely. Correspondingly, indeed, with the preservation of the balance of power among states, the rivalry and opposition to each other, and the competition without restraint or interruption, of different contending political and religious sects, has the beneficial effect of

securing each party and doctrine from being put down or overwhelmed by a powerful and persecuting opponent; and prevents the suppression of truth, and of whatever opinions may be advantageously promulgated for the well-being of mankind.

Religious liberty must be based on the same foundation, and regulated by the same principles, as liberty of every other kind. The ultimate end and aim in this, as in political and moral liberty, must be to relieve the agent from all undue restraints, and to retain such only upon his conduct as will prevent him from doing injury either to himself or others. From restrictions of this kind, no good, no reasonable, no sane man will desire to be free. Reason should be allowed to have full sway, and the conduct to be guided by its dictates; but even then it must be subject to the restraints referred to.

The real basis of toleration consequently resolves itself into the following axiom:—that as every man is answerable to God and his own conscience alone for all his acts, and as the aid or intervention of no other man can exonerate him or even relieve him from this obligation; so ought each individual to be allowed, to the fullest extent, and in the freest manner, to perform his duty as his conscience dictates to him, and without the interference of any other person. While, however, on the one hand, the greatest amount of toleration and political liberty to which any one can reasonably desire to attain, is to be entirely free to act according to the dictates of his conscience; yet, on the other hand, the severest restraint under which all alike are placed, results from the allegiance which they owe to that most absolute of despots, who of all rulers is the most arbitrary, and whose decrees far exceed in severity and rigour those of any state, either ecclesiastical or civil. Conscience, indeed, is like a demagogue tyrant, who repudiates all authority except his own, while he uses his power with a despotic sway, far exceeding that of the

tyrannies against which he declaims. Ought we then, it may be asked, in the regulation of the discipline of a state, to be more tolerant towards each other, than is our own conscience towards ourselves?

Here, however, I would observe that it must necessarily follow that the more strictly are we bound, and the more extensively are we influenced by the laws of conscience; in an equal ratio do we the less stand in need of legislative or other civil enactments to bind us. According as each individual is guided by conscience, may he be allowed a larger amount of civil toleration, and of religious liberty. Thus, toleration not only conduces to civilization, but the greater is the amount of civilization enjoyed by any people, (more especially as regards the moral discipline and cultivation which they have received), the greater is the amount of toleration which they are fitted to possess. Hence, that which toleration should not only allow but absolutely secure to us, is liberty of conscience, especially in matters of religion. If its limits do not extend to and fully embrace this object, such toleration is incomplete. If they exceed this bound, they are superfluous, and tend rather to licentiousness than to real liberty.

The resort to coercive measures, and to penal enactments of any kind, in order to change or enforce religious opinions, must in almost every case be not only absolutely unjust, but wholly inefficacious; as if any effect is produced, this is the result not of the persuasion of the reason by such means, but of the dread of persecution which prevails over the mind of the person so oppressed. Whatever his external conduct may exhibit, no internal conviction will have been wrought, but which alone is the aim of those who coerce him. And so far from intolerance being a test of the truth of any particular tenet, it will ever be found that those who are in the wrong are the most likely to resort to such a mode of enforcing their doctrines, which recourse to fair argument has failed to

effect. Besides which, oppression and cruelty are always more eagerly availed of by the bad than by the good, and are the legitimate weapons only of the former.

Toleration, as has already been observed, is rather negative than positive as regards its essential nature. It consists, in reality, more in the absence of intoleration than in the presence of any actual system or code of laws; just as liberty itself consists, not in the presence of any particular privilege, but in the mere absence of restraint. In its active efforts, too, as well as in its actual essence, toleration is rather negative than positive. Thus, though the existence of toleration may not produce good feeling among rival religious bodies, the existence of intoleration is quite certain to excite animosity and ill-feeling. In many cases, and as regards several of the Elements of civilization, all that we can reasonably hope to attain is achieved, if we do but entirely banish deleterious influences, and leave a free course open to those that are beneficial. As regards the management of our own physical frames, although we are unable to render them vigorous and healthy, we may nevertheless do much to protect them against infection, and cold, and laceration.

The leading principles of toleration may, therefore, be determined to be as follows:—Every one ought to be allowed freely to hold and to profess whatever religious opinions he pleases, and thinks right; and no one should be allowed to interfere with or annoy another on account of, or in regard to his religious opinions and observances. Each individual should be permitted to worship God as he deems best, although no person should be suffered openly to disseminate doctrines actually revolting to the religious feelings and opinions of others. Consequently, to a certain extent, even toleration itself is restrictive, as well as affording protection from restraint.

It is, moreover, of the essence of toleration not only that every one shall be permitted to hold what religious

opinions he pleases, and to serve God in the mode which he deems best; but that no one shall be liable to any civil injury or disqualification, on account of his religious opinions or form of worship, provided of course that he be a real believer in the truth of Christianity, which is essential in order to constitute a member of a civil Christian community. Here, however, it is of great importance to keep in view the wide and essential distinction between any opinion or doctrine being actually and diametrically contrary to Scripture, and its being merely contrary to the strained and false interpretation which ignorant, or fanatical, or superstitious zealots may have presumed to put upon it. Although public teaching contrary to the former may fairly be prohibited by the state, teaching contrary to the latter not only ought not to be prohibited, but is deserving of direct encouragement.

There is, nevertheless, in certain cases, considerable difficulty in defining and determining what particular theological works or sentiments are fairly controversial, and what are actually blasphemous, or unfit for general discussion. If it be laid down that direct attacks on the Divine authority of Scripture come within the latter class, it is still difficult to specify exactly what constitute attacks of this kind. For instance, the crime of Galileo in asserting that the world moved round the sun, was considered and punished as a direct attack upon Scripture, although in reality it was only putting a different construction upon certain passages to that which had been popularly adopted. And yet if we allow full and free latitude of construction, unless we cautiously guard the line of discussion by the strictest limits, in what mode can we prevent even distinct denials of the authority of the Bible itself, however they may be construed? Probably, therefore, the only correct and certain principle to establish in these cases is that, while all direct attacks upon religion itself, or upon the truth of the Bible, ought to be strictly and absolutely pro-

hibited; all controversy respecting, or arising out of the construction of the Bible, and which does not either directly or indirectly deny or call in question the truth or inspiration of the Bible itself, ought to be permitted to the full. This is necessary for free discussion, and it is all that is really necessary. The test of, and the free resort to and exercise of reason, form the only sure safeguard for the security of religion.

Toleration, however, like every other principle both in government and in morals, must have its defined and reasonable limits, beyond which it is neither necessary nor expedient that it should be carried, and by extending it beyond which its objects are not really promoted, but are abridged, and even defeated.

Toleration, as regards its limits, commences at that point where any question liable to dispute can arise upon any theological tenet or doctrine, open to doubt or difference of opinion, and of which it should allow and secure full and free and unrestricted discussion and controversy to the utmost. But it terminates at that point where the discussion extends to question the truth and reality of religion itself, or of the Bible as its foundation, to the permission of which it ought not to reach, and which forms no part of the liberty essential for discovering and arriving at truth, which should be the sole aim and object of all controversy, and towards the attainment of which no impediments should be offered. Any system of toleration that falls short of this, is imperfect, and is insufficient for securing the end desired. Any system that goes beyond this, tends to promote licentiousness and scepticism, and will defeat the main object that ought to be kept in view.

If, however, strict logical reason is to be our guide, there can be no doubt that unrestricted unlimited Intoleration is in theory the real and correct and true principle to be adopted. For, in the first place, religion is of

all things to be followed according to its own strict rules. And in the next place if we entirely believe any particular line to be absolutely right, we ought to follow it at all hazards, and without any deviation whatever. And that which is entirely right for us to follow, must be entirely right for those also in whose welfare we are concerned, and for which we are responsible. And if the ordering of their conduct is entrusted to us, we are bound to direct and enforce it as we think right. Indeed, in the teaching and education of our children, we practise Intoleration in this way to the fullest extent. But as regards the world at large, and the state, it is not because Intoleration itself is erroneous that we neglect to follow and to enforce it, but because there are certain practical considerations inseparably connected with it that render it inexpedient that it shall be so pursued, and which generate results from its pursuit, in practice more prejudicial than its abandonment or extensive modification. And what is more, all religious sects and parties alike, acknowledge the truth of Intoleration, and practise it as far as they can. Every strictly conscientious man, too, is completely intolerant as regards his own conduct in respect to himself, following those religious observances, and those only, which are entirely in accordance with his creed, and absolutely repudiating and refusing to follow or to tolerate any other.

To such a length, however, have the presumption, arrogance, and dogmatism of some professed teachers of religion extended, that in certain instances they have actually had the insolence to set up their forced and unnatural interpretation of Scripture as the only correct one, and as that alone which it is lawful to follow, and have denounced as false teachers and heretics those who dare to construe the Bible according to its natural and obvious meaning.

In two especial instances, indeed, may limits be fairly

and equitably placed to the bounds of toleration. And that is where any form of religion inculcates doctrines inimical to the due regulation of the state, or to the general or moral well-being of the community. Thus, to maintain that the authority of the sovereign is not legitimate and binding on the subjects of the realm, or that morality is no part of the duty of a Christian people, may be regarded as doctrines of this kind. But even in this case, the particular tenets only that are complained of ought to be prohibited, and not the whole code of that form of religious teaching, except where the former constitute an essential part of the latter, and are inseparable from it, in which case it of course becomes necessary to prohibit entirely the opinions in question.

But it may be contended that toleration nurtures disaffection and heresy, which in time grow more vigorous, until at length they are strong enough to subvert not only religion, but every other principle of truth as well. It is surely, however, incorrect to say that toleration itself aids the growth of any opinion, which must spring up quite independent of it, and rely entirely on its own merits; although, on the other hand, intoleration may serve to check not its growth but its manifestation, which latter is really all that the civil power can effect. Right reason and truth are the only reliable weapons by which to resist the progress of wrong opinions; and by these it is doubtless better to combat them than to suppress, not their growth, (which we cannot effect,) but their publication, by intolerant laws; and which, by forbidding discussion, forbid also their refutation and exposure, which is not merely the only legitimate, but is also the only sure way to extirpate them.

If it be urged that as we properly punish children for imbibing erroneous opinions, and by this means gradually lead them to the correct course; so ought the state to act with regard to its ignorant and deluded members, who are

as it were its civil children: it may be replied, that the state does right to instruct, but has no right to coerce its citizens; that they are free and intelligent agents, which is not the case with children, who are uninformed, and of immature minds; and that, even in the case of children, we do not punish erroneous opinions, but only erroneous and immoral conduct.

But it may, perhaps, be said that if punishment is inefficacious to prevent the spread of opinions which we ought to allow to be advanced, will it not be inefficacious also to repress those which, according to the principles here maintained, must be deemed to be dangerous, and detrimental to the state? To this I reply, that the promulgation of opinions that are actually dangerous, may be prohibited as a crime against the state, and rightly punished as such, which cannot reasonably be done in the case of the others. Here also, we may fairly expect that the voice and feeling of the nation will second the efforts of the government, on which the efficiency of those efforts must mainly depend. Added to which, the general freedom of opinion, allowed as far as practical, prevents any violent repugnance to that restraint which is actually necessary.

Nor can intoleration ever be regarded as the mark, or taken as the test of a true church, inasmuch as it has not only been most fully practised in the most corrupt ages of the church, but it has also been the chief characteristic in the conduct of Heathens, and Pagans, and Mahometans towards Christians. On the other hand, it may fairly be deemed to be a sure indication of error, which only resorts to and requires force to prop it up, from reason failing to serve for such a purpose.

The most plausible excuse for intoleration and coercion in religious matters, would be that they were resorted to for the actual benefit of the coerced; and that they were necessary in order to lead them from error to truth. But,

in the first place, no one has authority in doubtful points on religious topics, to decide with absolute certainty which is the right, and which is the wrong path to pursue. And in the next place, those points about which toleration is mainly exercised, are seldom matters on which salvation is supposed to depend, but are rather forms and ceremonies which are deemed only indirectly conducive to its attainment, so far as regards the open exercise of our religious duties. Persecution, moreover, very seldom convinces men of error, although it frequently hardens them against the truth. On the other hand, all that intoleration fruitlessly aims to achieve, in preserving men from error and bringing them to a knowledge of the truth, Education and proper National Institutions ought to be able amply to effect. At any rate, that which they fail in accomplishing, intoleration is utterly inefficient to supply.

The national religion of a country, or that which is recognized both by the state and its institutions, must necessarily be that which is adopted and followed by the people at large; and for them, as already shown in a previous Element, a national church establishment, for the maintenance and conduct with adequacy and decorum of that religion, is essential. It should, however, be a leading principle in the formation of such an institution, to allow the greatest latitude of opinion and discussion to its officers and members, that is consistent with the continuance of union in the body, and the preservation of order and regularity in its operations. To those who refuse to join such an institution from conscientious motives, it is due to the religion which they in common with its members profess, that they should be permitted, to the very utmost compatible with the safety and efficient working of the established institution, not only full liberty of opinion and discussion, but also to exercise their own form of religious worship and observances as they desire. An institution for ages securely established not only by

law but in the hearts of the people, and possessing property of its own for its maintenance, such as the English church, and whose laws were framed for the general well-being of the state, and at a period long prior to the existence of the various polemical parties now in vogue; is much more likely to be tolerant towards those who dissent from it, than is a sectarian body which has but lately sprung up, which is in a constant state of mutation both as regards its principles and its position in relation to other bodies, and whose laws and regulations will be framed and varied according to circumstances, or adapted to suit individual cases. The existence, indeed, of rival religious communities, is in many respects beneficial to the church, in creating that spirit of competition so generally advantageous in a free country, but especially so as regards its institutions.

Different religious bodies and sects require, however, occasionally to be restrained, not only from persecuting and oppressing those who are opposed to them, but from persecuting and oppressing those of their own body who differ from them in opinion. In the Church of England, which is very tolerant towards all other bodies, many of its members are extremely intolerant as regards the sentiments of one another.

If merely considered as a matter of policy, the religious principles of a people are of the highest importance to the well-being of the nation, and as such demand the attention and care of the state. As already mentioned, it is mainly by this means that their moral improvement is effected, and that the higher influences are raised above those which are lower, and the latter subjugated to them. In the consideration of the differences in religion between different parties in a state, wise rulers ought in minor points at least to search rather for coincidences than for variations; especially among those whose religion is all based on the same fundamental doctrines, who all follow

the same practice in the main, and who all profess to be seeking the same object.

It is, however, essential that care should be taken in the framing of a system which is intended to ensure full toleration to the minority among several religious parties, that this is not so far done as in turn to degenerate into intoleration towards the majority, who are thereby subjected to the petty annoyances and captious aggressions of the minority. There is probably, indeed, no subject, especially a practical one, respecting which there is so much inconsistency and contrariety as there is concerning this of toleration. Thus, men tolerant of one tenet or party, are most intolerant of all others; and to secure toleration itself, there is no flagrancy in the way of intoleration that will not eagerly be perpetrated. Few, indeed, if any persons, of any age, nation, or sect, are uniformly and consistently tolerant to those of all creeds and parties alike.

But even the superstitions which religion engenders, may be sometimes turned to good account by the rulers of a state. Among a rude and barbarous people, superstition has to some extent stood in the place of real religion; so far at least as it has restrained the passions, checked the lawless outrages, and tamed the fury of the multitude. Superstition is, indeed, a kind of wild religion, possessing but few of its fruits, and those for the most part rank and poisonous. Here and there, however, on congenial soils, a certain resemblance to the legitimate production has been discovered. Nevertheless, even where superstition has sprung out of genuine religion, as is sometimes the case, it is but the corruption of it, and that occasionally of the worst and most dangerous kind. Superstition, whatever comparatively good results may be obtained therefrom, is therefore never to be encouraged; but where it is impossible to extirpate, it may be allowable to divert it. If the current cannot

be stopped, it should be turned into a more desirable course.

Not improbably those systems of religion, and those religious individuals who possess the firmest belief that their principles are right, and the strongest feeling and the deepest concern on the subject, are the most liable to become intolerant towards others. Many, doubtless, are tolerant from mere indifference about religion. On the other hand, several of those religious persons, who have been the most convinced of the truth of what they followed, and the most anxious to fulfil its duties, have been the most tolerant. The mental and moral condition chiefly conducive to toleration, consists in the possession of rational opinions, deliberately embraced, and warmly cherished on the one hand; and the desire for strict justice, and an enlarged and comprehensive consideration of what those who differ from them, may entertain and feel on the same subject, which generates due allowance for them, on the other. This is, indeed, as genuine a mark of true mental and moral greatness in a nation as it is in a man.

Every individual being solely accountable for his own opinions and acts, has a right, and is indeed bound to exercise and be guided by his own judgment. But this is not inconsistent with his being directed by other persons on topics on which they are better informed than he is, and on which he may not have the same leisure or ability to qualify himself as they possess. In many matters of the highest importance, such as the care of our health and the management of our property, we voluntarily and unreservedly place implicit reliance upon those whom we believe to be more skilled and instructed than we are ourselves. In other instances, where we are not so assisted, and act only of our own accord, not reason but fashion and prejudice order our course, and lead us wrong. Indeed, the examples are but rare where reason alone is our rule and guide. In the case therefore of religion, which so few consider that they

have leisure to study amply, which is a matter of so much complexity and difficulty, and one moreover which it is all-important to follow aright; why should we not rely on the direction of men expressly trained for and devoted to this purpose, and whose only interest it is to guide us properly?

The true line to be followed as to the exercise of our own judgment, or the resigning our opinion to that of others, appears, therefore, simply to be this: that we should rely upon ourselves, where our information on the subject is adequate, and we have exercised our reason sufficiently to enable us to act aright. Where this has not been done, we may advantageously resort to those who have thus peculiarly qualified themselves to be our guides.

It should further be borne in mind, in reference to free discussion on religious topics, that a change made in the religious opinions or tenets of a people, may be ruinous to the influence of religion generally, independent of the character of the two religions, as they may be led by this means to follow the doctrines of a new faith diametrically at variance with the institutions, and feelings, and manners of such a people, and which consequently may never be able to obtain any firm hold upon them. This principle is, however, to be maintained, not for the purpose of opposing all changes in religion whatsoever, but to evince the inexpediency of change as a general rule, and where this is not necessary from the nature of the case, or so beneficial as to counteract the weight of all these considerations together.

On the whole, it must be concluded that the benefits to a state, of toleration, are very extensive, exclusive indeed of its direct religious advantages, in promoting, by means of free inquiry and discussion being allowed, activity of mind and independence of thought, and liberty of expression on all subjects, through which truth at last comes out triumphant, and error is exterminated. As God has made

men so to differ in their nature, and dispositions, and capacities, from each other; so it is by no means impossible or improbable that He may have purposely originated different forms of religion peculiarly adapted to their several exigencies and endowments, instead of intending that all should worship Him precisely in the same mode. Or it may even be a part of His express economy, that a certain degree of emulation and rivalry should exist between various religious bodies, sufficient to produce activity and inquiry, as has been expressly instituted as regards the different races and nations of the earth.

If it be urged that the multitude at large are too ignorant and too simple to be allowed to choose their own faith, and that as it is for their own good as well as for that of the state that they should determine correctly, the state has a right so to influence, and even to coerce them; it may be replied, that it is the duty of the state to relieve them from a condition of ignorance which places them in so humiliating a position, but no part of its duty to take advantage of the latter, (which must have been more or less occasioned by the neglect of the state), in order to compel them to adopt any particular line of conduct. If they are not capacitated to discern right from wrong, they ought even then to be allowed to follow such of the authorized teachers as they may prefer, who, as remarked in a previous Element, should all be under strict state regulation as to the sufficiency of the endowments they possess; and when instructed by them, their own reason and conscience must decide on their ultimate course.

Although it is no part of the duty of the state to interfere with the opinions and actions of any persons as regards their religious observances; yet, on the other hand, it is the undoubted and positive duty of the state to provide institutions, and officers, and means for the instruction of the people, and for the due celebration of religion, though without coercing any individuals to con-

form to this or that creed. Indeed, the greater is the toleration in this respect allowed, the greater is the necessity for such institutions and means of instruction.

Intoleration, if it is not a proof of weakness in a party or a church, is at any rate a token of fear. As the body natural assumes a defensive or constrained attitude only when disorder or danger is present, so bodies ecclesiastic and politic are only induced to oppression when excited by the apprehension of some attack.

The true principle of toleration appears, therefore, to be this: that every person in the state should be allowed to the full to adopt such religious opinions, and to exercise such form of religious worship as his conscience dictates to him to be most correct, and that no one should be allowed to oppress or molest him on this account. At the same time, the latitude of toleration so granted must on no pretence be suffered to enable individuals of one creed or persuasion to give offence to those of different tenets, more especially in cases where this can be avoided without any abridgment of the essential forms in the celebration of such religion. The greater the measure of toleration that is allowed to each body, the more tolerant should that body be towards every other. It is essential, moreover, that toleration should be exercised in each direction, not only by the authoritative powers towards the subordinate, but by the subordinate towards the authoritative. And that different sects and parties should be as tolerant towards each other, as the predominant party is towards them.

Independent of the principle of toleration, the due definition and establishment of the principle on which religious bodies differing from, or rivals of, or opposed to the national established church, exist, the relation in which they stand, and the mode in which they ought to be dealt with, is of nearly as much importance, as is the attainment of a correct principle as regards the established

church itself. These rival bodies, though tolerated to the full, are not therefore, as a consequence, to be encouraged. They should be allowed every liberty necessary for carrying out their own system, so that their liberty be not permitted to interfere with the liberty and proper ordering of the church. Although rival, they are by no means necessarily inimical to each other.

As toleration was observed at the commencement of the present Element to be negative in its nature, so probably the most conclusive argument against intoleration is negative also, being that of its entire inefficiency. So far from its result being to make people think alike, it tends only to confirm them in their differences. Opinions originating merely in prejudice, obtain through the sufferings endured on their account, the support of passion. Tenets which were once objected to only from their being misunderstood, are now zealously denounced as being associated with the infliction of persecution.

VI.—NATIONAL COMMEMORATIONS AND FESTIVALS.

The Element of civilization which next in order demands our consideration, is that which I have designated by the term of National Commemorations and Festivals. The establishment of certain appointed days for general national relaxation and recreation, has a direct tendency to promote civilization, and to improve and advance the intellectual and moral condition of the people, in three distinct and independent modes. Such institutions are mentally improving, as affording opportunity for study and intellectual culture by cessation from the ordinary occupations of life. They are morally beneficial from the social feelings which they have the effect of engendering. And they are extensively serviceable in a physical sense, as regards both the rest from manual labour, and also the mental relaxations which they are the means of securing

to all classes of the people. Consequently, the institution of National Commemorations and Festivals for the celebration of particular events of general importance and interest, and by which recreation is offered to the people of whatever rank or occupation, is an Element of essential influence and advantage in the civilization of a nation. The relaxation thus allowed, if proper opportunities for applying it are afforded, which should be done contemporaneously with the institution of these days of leisure, and as a necessary adjunct to their establishment, is alike important and beneficial to those of each class. In this respect, the Element now under consideration contributes extensively to aid the operation and efficiency of several which have already been discussed, more especially those of National Education of the People, National Instructory Institutions, and National Cultivation of Art and Science; while each of these Elements in their turn also contributes more or less to aid the operation of that immediately before us.

The direct and extensive tendency of the Christian religion, and of its various institutions, to promote civilization, has been already remarked. Among the customs that have sprung up with the adoption of the religion of the Bible, the observance of a Sabbath, by which one day in seven is set apart, and when ordinary unnecessary manual occupation is suspended, is highly conducive to civilization, independent altogether of the religious advantages that it possesses. Mental and moral improvement among all classes is eminently furthered by this institution. The poorest person has once a week secured to him a day of leisure to devote to the cultivation of his mind and his morals, as well as to his religious duties, which directly tends to the improvement of the former. Such an institution is also greatly refining in its results. Each poor man with his family for that day moves in the rank of gentility, appears in his best clothes, and enjoys a period

of leisure. Not only should the Sabbath be a day of freedom from toil, but of freedom also from worldly care and anxiety. And it should supply a foretaste of Heaven, not merely as regards the religious exercises which are followed upon it, but as regards the high mental pursuits for which it affords the opportunity, the benevolent social feelings which it calls forth, and the good deeds which are done on that day. To each person, whether rich or poor, the Sabbath should be, moreover, not only the holiest but the happiest day throughout the week.

The direct object of the Sabbath is, however, not mental or even moral improvement, but religious duty. The direct object in the institution of National Commemorations and Festivals, is to promote the two first of these desirable ends. Both objects are of essential importance, and both deserve the attention of the state. It is obvious, therefore, that while the Sabbath ought still to be observed as a day of religious duty, other days also ought to be provided for the purposes specified. By omitting to keep the two distinct, and attempting to make one day serve for both, as is at present done with regard to Sundays in France, and in other countries on the Continent, you entirely fail to obtain the observance of the day either as one of solemn worship, or of improving recreation; but both these objects are alike neglected, and it degenerates into simply a day of idleness. Hence, instead of being morally or physically beneficial, it is directly prejudicial in each of these respects.

Many good and conscientious people, moreover, in this country, in their eagerness to avoid making Sunday a day of work, make it a day of idleness. In order to escape the guilt of turning the precious hours, for the proper use of which they are specially accountable to the Almighty, to any purpose in the way of occupation, however harmless or improving, they resolutely insist on wasting them altogether.

As regards the question as to the propriety or ex-

pediency of making a legislative provision for the due national observance of the Sabbath, it is here necessary to appeal to the principle of toleration and religious liberty, in order to determine to what extent this observance may reasonably and rightly be enforced. That it is desirable that the Sabbath be nationally observed, may at once be admitted. But, unless the nation generally consent thereto, it cannot be efficiently carried out. And yet, even where the majority of the nation agree to this, it is unreasonable to coerce those to observe it who object to do so. On the other hand, their non-observance of it should not be permitted to interfere with the observance of it by those who desire to keep it strictly, especially when the former constitute a decided majority of the nation. The true and correct principle in this case appears, therefore, to be that every one should have the full opportunity of observing and keeping the Sabbath in the way that he thinks best. And that although no one should be compelled to join with him in this observance of it, or to the same extent, or in the same mode; yet that no one should be permitted to interfere with this observance, by either doing himself, or requiring to be done by others, acts which are inconsistent with it. Every person should be free to neglect the observance of the Sabbath if he determines to do so, but so that his liberty in this respect does not tend to abridge the liberty of others in an opposite direction. The aim of state interference, here, should, in fact, be, not to coerce any, but to allow and to secure the greatest amount of liberty to all. The same principle appears equally applicable with regard to the national observance of days of general relaxation and festival.

It might not perhaps unreasonably be provided in regard to travelling on Sundays, that on the one hand this should not be altogether prohibited, and on the other hand that it should not be allowed to interfere with the discharge of their religious duties by others. The Jewish code of Theocratic legislation may afford us

a hint here, and the limit of "a sabbath day's journey" might fairly be instituted, fixing in this case with regard to the time rather than the distance. For instance, travelling by railway or otherwise on Sundays might be restricted to the hours of between six and ten in the morning, and those after seven in the evening, so that persons only who are necessitated to travel would do so, and their journeys would not interfere with the rest or religious requirements of others.

Those who work hard during six days of the week, should, least of all, by pharisaical Puritans, be prohibited from the innocent relaxation and enjoyment, whether physical or intellectual, on the remaining seventh day, which it was the express object of the institution of a sabbath to procure and secure. Those who are most forward to prohibit so reasonable and so necessary a relaxation, are not unfrequently those who habitually violate the context of the command, which not merely directs us to rest one day in seven, but directs us also to earn the right to do so by working on the remaining six.

The progress in building in all large towns, which has been effected during the last few years, especially in the Metropolis, renders it absolutely necessary that some means should be adopted for the recreation and amusement of the working classes. And the advancement in education which has been made, renders it both desirable and practicable that such holidays as are proposed should be availed of for their mental and moral cultivation. They are at present, moreover, deprived of many recreations and amusements which their ancestors enjoyed; while from the increase in their numbers, and the arduous nature of their duties, there is the greater necessity both for training them aright, and for affording them relaxation. In addition to this, they are now more than ever in danger of being led astray, from the many haunts of dissipation which have sprung up, to allure those who have no proper legitimate source of recreative employment and enjoyment,

such as it is imperative on those who rule in the state, and who desire to promote the civilization and best interests of the people, to provide. It is, moreover, from the want of suitable games and sources of amusement for the people generally, that so many of them are driven during their hours of leisure to resort to those of a demoralizing or degenerating tendency, such as betting and gambling. The moral effects of games are very extensive, perhaps equally so with the more important avocations of life, corresponding of course with the character of such games.

The establishment of national holidays is not even a new principle in our constitution. It is only the revival of an old custom, which the mercenary spirit of modern days has endeavoured to exterminate, but which the exigencies of the present times more than ever require to be restored. Before the era of the Commonwealth, these holidays were regularly established and observed. The Puritans, in 1647, after abolishing them, directed the second Tuesday in every month to be kept in their place. The rebellion which swept away the throne, swallowed up also the rights of the poor. Both in Greece and in Rome, and in their best days, holidays were duly commemorated, and made national institutions; and amusements were provided for the people on those occasions. The principle of securing recreation from labour, and of celebrating certain days by the observance of holidays, has moreover long been established in our public schools, as also in the public offices, where regularity and strict economy in the management of time are duly regarded. If such a system is correct and expedient, and has been found to work well there, why should it not be adopted also in the state, the active members of which need it as much, and to whom it would be quite as beneficial, both mentally and morally, and also as respects their physical well-being?

The appointment of some special days for recreation of this nature appears, therefore, not only reasonable, but essential; and is supported not merely by the example of

other great civilized nations, but ample precedents for it are afforded by the institutions of our own country. It is necessary that these days should be generally observed in order that the full effect of them may be obtained. It is also advisable that particular days of note should be fixed upon for the purpose, instead of some being merely taken at specific intervals, so as to make them not only recreative but commemorative. Amusements should moreover be provided on these occasions, such as will be both improving and agreeable to all. These festivals should also be made national, so as to be uniformly kept throughout the nation, and sanctioned by the state as national institutions.

The most direct and efficient mode in which the authority of the state may be exercised to promote the general observance of national holidays, is by rendering them inoperative, as is already done in the case of Sunday, Christmas Day, and Good Friday, for the transaction of professional and commercial business, and by declaring invalid all negotiations effected on those days.

On the whole, however, it appears desirable to leave to the church the celebration of holy-days, set apart for the commemoration of great events in the history of religion; and to have these continued as days, not of recreation, but of religious observance. And, indeed, it is in every way expedient to keep distinct the two kinds of festivals; to observe them differently, as they are appointed for different reasons, and with different objects in view. Thus, both the recreative and the religious interests of the nation will be promoted. The establishment of periods for the due observance of holy-days, will enable the people to devote their days of festivity more entirely to the mental and moral and recreative pursuits appointed for them. The establishment of holidays, or days of recreation, will leave the people to devote holy-days, as they ought, mainly to religious observance.

But some may contend that the observance and object of these festivals of different kinds should be blended to-

gether, and religion and relaxation, and mental and moral improvement, ever united and followed in conjunction. However this may be to a certain extent expedient, yet still a leading character should be given to each festival, whether devoted to commemorate some religious event, or one in our national history. Thus also Sunday, which it is most desirable to observe as a holy-day, is now kept by many as a holiday merely, owing to its being their only day of recreation. This, indeed, serves to evince how much holidays are needed in this country, and in others no less, both on their own account, and to insure the due observance of holy-days as well.

It is, however, not only important that in every nation a number of holidays should be appointed as days of recreation and relaxation from toil, and to afford opportunities for mental and moral improvement; but, as already observed, they should be so selected as that they may also produce their due effect as commemorative of the anniversaries of great occurrences in our national history, and which, like national monumental tributes, may be the means of recalling to the attention and the remembrance of the people at large, the achievements or persons so celebrated; or correspondingly with the pictorial illustrations to a book, serve to impress particular events more forcibly on the national mind. The days for commemoration thus chosen, should be of a mixed character. They should consist, in part, of days famous from the occurrence of leading transactions in our national career; in part, of those renowned as being the anniversaries of some remarkable productions in art, science, or literature; and the natal days of those who have proved the chief ornaments of our country, may be well observed in this manner. On the other hand, all commemorations and fêtes that tend to keep alive animosities and jealousies either between different sects and parties in a nation, or between different nations, ought to be abolished and prohibited as inimical

to civilization. The observance of victories and revolutions should on this account be discouraged; and the celebration of the discovery of the Gunpowder Plot on the 5th of November, might with propriety be changed into a commemoration of the discovery of gunpowder, and honoured by a display of fireworks and other exhibitions of this class, in which gunpowder mainly aids. So also the victory at Waterloo might be merged into the celebration of the concession of Magna Charta, the anniversary of which is on the day after.

As regards the selection of appointed periods for commemoration, it is of importance, on many accounts, that these days should recur at stated intervals during the year, and that the number of them should be moderate. The following catalogue of renowned events, with the dates of their occurrence annexed, (some of which are of course only imaginary, as all traces of the real date have been long since obliterated), may serve to show what might be done with respect to the choice of days for national commemoration in the manner proposed :—

Great Men.	Birthday of Bacon	22nd January.
	Birthday of Shakspeare	23rd April.
	Birthday of Newton; (date of the publication of his 'Principia')	8th May.
	Birthday of Milton	9th December.
Great Events.	Establishment of the English Kingdom and Monarchy; (death of Alfred the Great)	27th October.
	Concession of Magna Charta	19th June.
	Union with Scotland	6th March.
	Union with Ireland	2nd August.
Great Discoveries.	Invention of the Compass; (death of Captain Cook)	14th February.
	Invention of Printing	6th July.
	Invention of Steam; (opening of the London and Birmingham Railway)	17th September.
	Invention of Gunpowder; (Gunpowder Plot)	5th November.

In addition to these, the birthday of the sovereign and

of the leading members of the royal family, will, in every nation where a monarchy is existent, be commemorated as state holidays, and kept accordingly. When any of these holidays falls upon a Sunday, the Saturday previous or the Monday following might be substituted for its observance.

Thus, twelve events of the greatest consequence in our national history, or in that of the world, would be duly celebrated, and the importance and nature of each event explained and enforced. Were there no other use for them, these holidays would be of considerable value as national acknowledgments that the acquisition of wealth is not the sole end of man's existence, and that something is due to his intellectual being, as well as to his material benefit. Different classes are also by this means brought together, and for a time placed more on an equality. Nor do the bodies less than the minds of the people need such a relaxation, which, especially in large and crowded towns, is essential for their physical growth and development.

But, as already stated, these festivals cannot be expected to be completely effective, unless they are not only made recreative, but proper amusements are provided for the entertainment of those who are to enjoy them. On days set apart for the commemoration of particular events, it appears also fitting that the amusements appointed for those days should in their nature more or less correspond with the character of the events commemorated.

During the discussion of a former Element of civilization, was considered the establishment of certain National Institutions for the promotion of popular recreation and instruction. We have in this place to consider the nature of those amusements themselves, and of the leading principles by which they should be severally regulated, and how far they are available in conjunction with these Institutions.

The amusements of every country, especially those of a

national order, should be, as already stated, improving and refining. They should also be adapted to the genius and the character of the people; should be corrective of its peculiar national errors, and should vary according to its condition in civilization, and the particular influences which especially require to be promoted. Thus, in a warlike nation and age, while these amusements ought on the one hand to encourage the inhabitants in the pursuit of a science upon which they are dependent for their preservation and security; they ought, on the other hand, to refine and humanize them, and to correct the savage propensities in which, from the temper of the times, they may be too apt to indulge. In an age of civilization, on the other hand, when art and science are flourishing, while the recreations of the people should lead them to understand and to cultivate those pursuits, they should also serve to protect them from becoming too effeminate and refined. The amusements of a country have ever been found to exercise a great and perceptible influence on the national mind. As a corrective or counteracting agent, they may be made of the highest national importance; and it is perhaps more essentially for this purpose rather than for effecting any immediate or direct results, that they are mainly serviceable. Indeed, even the common domestic employments and enjoyments of the people of all ranks, are in this respect very influential.

It might, however, be made a reproach against civilized nations in general, and particularly against our own, that so large a portion of their public and most attractive entertainments consists in feasting, which directly ministers to the animal appetites, and treats the latter as objects of paramount importance. These entertainments, nevertheless, must be allowed, although open to this charge, to be of a highly civilizing nature so far as they conduce to intellectual intercourse, and to the promotion of friendly social feeling; and according as the latter or the former

is made the predominant feature in these proceedings, ought they generally to be characterized.

Both in ancient and modern times, it has been ever the custom, especially in entertainments of a public and national character, to combine sensual gratification with intellectual excitement and instruction; and the wine must be considered as contributing not so much to the palliation of the thirst, as to the stimulation of the wit and hilarity of those assembled. Among the Greeks, music and the song, followed occasionally by certain other amusements, enlivened their feasts; and among us harmony is thus resorted to, while interchange of ideas in conversation, and both instruction and the highest intellectual gratification from the oratory that is poured forth, cause us almost to forget the sensual pleasures offered, in the delights afforded to the mind.

The social benefits resulting from the assembling together, for the purpose of festive enjoyment, of people of the same community, cannot be doubted. And even the highest of Christian commemorations, and one which directly enjoins the promotion of mutual benevolence and good feeling among mankind, is celebrated, by Divine command, in the form of a feast. The turning water into wine to increase the supply for a convivial entertainment, was the first miracle wrought by our Lord. The multiplication of food to furnish a repast, was one of the few miracles which he ever repeated. Admitting, however, that feasting cannot of itself be considered to be in any way directly conducive to civilization, although indirectly it undoubtedly is, so far as it contributes to the promotion of intellectual and social intercourse; yet there is nothing which is so surely and so strikingly indicative of the condition of civilization in any country, as the mode in which its feasts are conducted. In nothing, moreover, do civilized people differ from barbarians more essentially than in the regulation of their meals. The distinction

here is far greater than that which exists either in their dress, their habitations, or their language.

As regards, however, the general order and course, and the class of rational amusements to be provided for persons of different pursuits; it should, as far as possible, be contrived that each of those engaged, whether in mental or in manual occupations, be on such occasions supplied with those peculiar recreations which are best suited at once to afford them both the particular information or cultivation, and the particular physical or intellectual relaxation of which, from the nature and tendency of their general occupations, they may especially stand in need. Amusements for the people may have the effect of not only improving their material condition, but their intellectual and moral state also. For instance, many mental recreations, such as music and viewing galleries of works of art, may conduce to the health of the body as well as to that of the mind. The general character of these amusements should, consequently, as already observed, be regulated both by the character of the people and that of the times, and by the nature of the influences which require more especially to be counteracted. In cold climates like ours, convivial entertainments may be advantageous, as corrective of that moroseness and want of sociability which the condition of the climate has a tendency to foster; and may serve to develope and stimulate the better feelings and dispositions of our nature, especially when we are in society, and may thus prove an important auxiliary agent in the progress of civilization.

The sports and games pursued by any particular people serve very efficiently to reflect alike their peculiar character, and also their comparative condition and progress in civilization, inasmuch as these are mainly regulated by the temper and feeling of the people, and are ever subject to modification and change, in order to suit and adapt themselves to those different states.

To the popular recreations, education, and every other Element of civilization should also have reference. Plato says that "even the measures of music are never altered without affecting the most important laws of the state."* And as in the state, so in the man, it is very essential that intellectual and physical pursuits should proceed contemporaneously, and should co-operate together. The Grecian games consisted mainly in trials and exhibitions of physical skill. In the present advanced age of society and of civilization, the triumphs of art and science, and exhibitions of intellectual skill, appear both more becoming to our character, and better adapted for national recreation. Games of skill are preferable to games of chance, and are in themselves directly conducive to civilization, as immediately tending to develope the powers and energies of the people, and are capable, if properly managed, of combining pleasure with instruction. Emulation in these cases, without occasioning jealousy or ill-will, excites a wholesome stimulus to exertion, in the absence of which excellence in any effort cannot be attained.

But it may perhaps be contended that there is a danger in the excitement of emulation, even in play and among friends, that it may in time, especially if keenly called forth, (when alone it is of any real value), or by chance, create discord, and so prove inimical to, instead of conducive to civilization. In reply to this I may, however, remark that rival efforts in play among amicable social neighbours, if properly regulated, will tend to cement, not to break friendship; and that it is both the end and the duty of civilization so far to subdue the passions and lower endowments of our nature, as to prevent their being excited and provoked by causes such as those alluded to. Friendly contests of this kind are, therefore, in reality, very useful as tests whether civilization has

* Republic, book iv., c. 4.

completed her work here, and very serviceable to complete it, if not already done.

What, however, are the legitimate objects of recreations in general, and the leading results, at which they aim? The first object of a recreation, appears to me to be relaxation from severe labour, either mental or manual. The second object I should consider to be the supply of entertainment and agreeable occupation to the mind. Of course, the more useful in itself, and the less noxious in its consequences, any recreation can be rendered, the more desirable appears its adoption. Among the Romans, the contests of their amphitheatres were productive of a brutalizing effect, not only from their cruelty, but also as leading to the admiration of mere physical brute force; and a worse tendency still is produced through the bull-fights of Spain, by inuring the public mind to the use of the dagger, and to stabbing and bloodshed, and to which in some measure is no doubt to be traced the common occurrence of assassinations in that country. In this nation too, the exhibition of bull-baiting, and bear-baiting, and other cruel sports once so common, were found to have a barbarizing effect upon the popular mind. Indeed, many things which seem at first sight very remote from civilization, may nevertheless have an indirect influence upon it of great importance. Sir Thomas More, in his 'Utopia,' does not allow the citizens to be slaughterers of their cattle, on account of the brutalizing tendency of such an occupation; nor is any filth suffered to collect in their streets, the consequences of which are no doubt morally as well as physically noxious. Although in this country there are few if any public spectacles of a national character, the direct tendency of which is degenerating and inimical to civilization; yet there may be exhibitions which, though not of the class alluded to, are essentially injurious in their effects, however intended they may be to produce quite a contrary result. Such appears to be

especially the case with regard to the public executions of criminals,* which, although not meant to be spectacles to gratify the curiosity, or to call forth the morbid feelings of the public, have nevertheless a strong tendency in that direction, and are very baneful from their liability to harden and debase them. Here the agonies and death of a man, which should never be even comtemplated without the most solemn feelings, are exhibited to the gaze of a rude mob, and are made the subject of indecent levity. Indeed, all spectacles which accustom the mind to view with indifference deeds of violence and horror, are barbarizing in their tendency, even when the exhibition is, and is felt to be, only fictitious. But where the deed itself is witnessed, the effect is more deleterious in proportion as it is more powerful, and as the impress of the reality necessarily far exceeds that of the representation. On this account, the public execution of criminals is in every way most injurious and brutalizing to the public mind. Moreover, the general effect of public executions, instead of creating in the spectators an abhorrence of crime, is to familiarize them with it; and in the place of detestation of the criminal and horror at his offence, arises too frequently a morbid sympathy with the former, and a half-admiration of the latter. What ought to be considered as a painful, awful, and humiliating solemnity, is converted into an exciting tragedy; and the wretched subject of it is attempted to be raised from a malefactor to a martyr. Religious spectacles, on the other hand, whatever be the occasion for their celebration, when conducted with due dignity and solemnity, have a refining and ennobling tendency; are civilizing in themselves, and add extensively to the power of Religious Influence in this respect.

Field sports and shooting matches, of which live animals are the victims, may be regarded as, and doubtless are,

* These have been happily abolished in this country, since the first edition of this work appeared.

brutalizing, so far as they accustom the mind to receive pleasure from the pain and death of an animal. This, however, is by no means their direct and essential object, but is only an incidental circumstance connected with them; the main end being the physical exercise they produce, which is healthful and exhilarating, if not actually directly civilizing in its tendency, and the cultivation of that scientific skill calculated to be serviceable for higher and more important ends, which is required for their successful pursuit. Nor are the feelings that such sports excite those of anger and revenge, which ordinarily accompany deeds of violence and bloodshed among mankind, and which directly tend to debase the mind.

It has already been observed* that luxury tends as directly and as surely to the corruption and degeneration, as civilization does to the refinement and invigoration of a people. Whatever pursuits or amusements are calculated to produce idleness, to amuse simply without instructing or improving, are luxurious in their nature. Indeed, all pleasures have a tendency in one direction or other, either to enlarge and invigorate, or to weaken and degenerate the mind. Those games especially which do not contribute either to promote wholesome bodily exercise and recreation, or mental or moral improvement, are almost always luxurious and pernicious. Of this class especially are those particular diversions which come under the general denomination of gambling, to which a morbid excitement is ordinarily attached, as though it were sought thereby to compensate for the wholesome stimulus which improving pursuits produce, in a manner analogous to the excitement through certain alcoholic liquors, by which they appear to atone for the want of the invigorating effects of those of a wholesome kind. Gambling, indeed, so far as it is to be considered as strictly such, consists in following games of chance, on the determination of which money is

* Essence of Civilization, *ante*, p. 45.

staked, and in conducting which there is no exercise of skill whatever; or where the happening of an uncertain event, and not the skill of the person engaged, is what mainly decides the issue. Where fraud is introduced, this cannot of course be considered as a part of the game, but is quite independent of it, and its only object is to defeat the proper aim of the latter, and to divert it from its legitimate purpose. Recreations generally which are of the gambling class, tend alike to debase and enervate both individuals and nations. In many cases, however, where gambling is followed, not for its own sake, but in the hope of bringing gain, it perhaps resolves itself rather into a degenerate commercial occupation than into an actual recreation.

As regards the general character of popular amusements, it is unnecessary, as being indeed superfluous, to state here that whatever recreations contribute immediately to promote vice, ought to be discouraged as much as possible, if not strictly prohibited, as alike inimical to civilization, and corruptive of good morals. And if their tendency is in this direction, such is sufficient to warrant the condemnation of the pursuit, as the tendency alone, where that is clearly shown, is that by which we are able to determine. Nor are recreations which induce to idleness any more to be encouraged than those which lead to vice. Amusements of themselves, when exercised in moderation and conducted fairly, cannot be reasonably deemed to be of this character. On the contrary, they are not only necessary where severe labour is followed, but it is alone by taking occasional recreation that undertakings of great ardour can be accomplished, or a life of constant hard work endured. In addition to this, previous toil, whether mental or bodily, is as essential to the real enjoyment of recreation, as hunger is to that of appetite.

It is the unquestionable and imperative duty of the

state, to provide for, and to a certain extent to regulate also the recreation of its members, both as regards their everyday diversions, and their amusements at appointed festivals. Unless this want is adequately supplied, its place will be filled by allurements of a pernicious and profligate tendency.

On the days selected for festivals and commemorations, museums and picture galleries, and places of recreation, ought to be thrown open to the public. The theatres too might be made free to all at the cost of the state, those plays only of a strictly moral and improving character being allowed to be performed. Thus, both the drama would be encouraged, and its character raised. Music should also be provided in all public resorts; and conveyance by steamboats and railways at a reasonable rate, at the national expense, supplied on those occasions. Indeed, another mode, which is very agreeable and very improving, both to mind and body, of passing holidays and enjoying general recreation, is that of travelling or making excursions to places of interest, and for which the present accommodation offered by railways, especially by cheap excursion trains, affords full opportunity. By fixing upon holidays and days of commemoration for such expeditions, not only would the public be enabled, by being at liberty, to avail themselves of such means; but these holidays, on the other hand, would serve to ensure to the railways a sufficient number of passengers on such occasions, so as to induce and enable them to supply excursion trains. In large and crowded cities, both the recreation and improvement of the people are best and most directly effected by expeditions into the rural districts, where they may enjoy the beauties of nature; as, on the other hand, those who live in the country may most advantageously spend their holidays in visiting the large towns, and exploring the various monuments of art. Thus might health, and enjoyment, and improvement, physical, social, and

intellectual, be simultaneously provided for all classes alike; and the state become at once the dispenser of these good gifts to its members, and reap in return the fullest benefit from the results of their increased civilization.

VII.—DIGNITIES AND HONORARY REWARDS.

The national acknowledgment and requital of the services of those individuals who by their achievements or their virtues have rendered extensive benefit to, or have commanded the admiration of their fellow-countrymen, or of mankind in general, which is effected by conferring upon them certain state Dignities, or public Honorary Rewards, of the nature here considered; is another very important and very efficient Element in the promotion of civilization.

All men are, indeed, by nature, as much upon an equality as are the different days in the year. But this is no reason why some particular individuals, like some particular days, should not be distinguished and marked out as of more importance than the generality; and in the case of both, the promotion of civilization may be effected by the maintenance of such distinctions in the manner already described. The institution of different orders and degrees of honour in a state, is, moreover, in reality, but carrying out the dictate of nature, expressed in the very earliest stage of society, which, whenever men are assembled together, induces them by mutual and voluntary consent to exalt some persons above others, according to their particular qualities conferring claim to such elevation. Indeed, almost every natural attribute and endowment common to man, contributes more or less by the various proportions in which it is possessed by different persons, to promote this inequality of station and influence among the several members of the same society, and to raise certain individuals above the rest. According as these

particular qualities are valued, will the possessor of them be exalted in rank corresponding with the degree in which he is endowed with them. And the relative estimation in which they are respectively held, will depend on the state of society at the time, and its peculiar tastes and exigencies. In the establishment, therefore, of civil Dignities, civilization in this, as in many other instances, merely directs the impulses of Nature in the right course, and demands that these Dignities and Rewards shall be obtained only by real merit, and be in their quality substantial and certain, instead of trivial and arbitrary.

Even by the law of nature, he who has achieved great undertakings for the good of society, is entitled to claim from society a fair recompense for those efforts. Whatever return exceeds such fair recompense, amounts to a reward. If it is a simple recompense, it is a return only, not a reward. We adopt the principle of giving rewards for virtue, in the case of peerages and pensions, although we omit to carry it out where it is perhaps most needed, in the establishment of encouragement to good conduct among the masses, and for whom discouragements from bad conduct, in the shape of punishment, without any civil incentives to good, are held out. Rewards may also fairly be given for those meritorious actions which render the performer of them liable to loss or injury, or which have entailed pain, or labour, or other sacrifices in the performance. There is a special need of rewards in the case of the masses, in order to counteract those direct incentives to vice and dishonesty, which necessarily exist in every civilized state of society.

Nevertheless, a reward, as a reward, by no means depends for its desirableness on its intrinsic value. A wreath of laurel at the Olympic Games, has been prized more than many a crown of gold, inasmuch as in these cases it is the credit attached to the gift, not the gift

itself, which constitutes its worth. Rewards should, however, be adapted alike to the circumstances of the individual, and the character of the act to be rewarded. Rank for the wealthy, and emolument for the needy, appear the most suitable in their nature. And the rewards for martial exploits should of course be very different from those for triumphs in literature or art. Care should, moreover, be taken in the institution of rewards, so to frame them that they may stimulate not only success but merit. They should not merely create rivalry, but excite to worthy actions. The people will also do well to guard with a jealous eye, against the state rewards given by the government being bestowed, not in reality for services rendered to the country, but for services rendered to the members of the government individually, which possibly to the state itself may be baneful rather than beneficial.

It will generally, if not universally, be found in all ages of the world, and in all countries, that those particular qualities and virtues, whether allied to wisdom or valour, which are most requisite at those particular times, will be those which are most in request, and will be also those which are the best requited. Mere virtue in itself can hardly, however, be considered as entitled to reward, as mere vice cannot be made the subject of punishment. But all such virtue as directly contributes to the well-being of the state, or of society, and all such vice as directly contributes to their injury, may, and ought to be the subjects of reward and punishment.

Rewards which are intended as encouragements for acts tending to civilization, should in their own nature also, independent of and in addition to the acts which they stimulate, directly tend to promote civilization, and should never, even indirectly, tend to retard it.

It is, nevertheless, as impossible actually to add to a man's mental or moral, as it is to his material stature, by

any artificial contrivance or institution. The differences formed by Nature are still the only essential varieties between them. The minutest natural distinction, whether of mind or body, either in educational resources, power of speech, physical strength, size, or agility, makes more real difference between men, than the widest variation in point of dignity or wealth. As riches can annex nothing to the person, so a title can add nothing to the mind. The only solid claim to superiority arises from talent and worth. Dignities do not, moreover, of themselves create distinctions, but they serve merely to mark those already existent, and are symbolical of their acknowledgment by the state which confers the rank, and of the homage rendered to the achievements which occasioned its creation. A title changes not the nature or character, but only the civil position of the person to whom it is given. When, therefore, national honours of this kind are bestowed upon an individual, it is not the man, but his virtues or talents, to which the homage of the state is offered. And he is rewarded not for the worth which he possesses in himself, but for the benefits which he has conferred upon the nation.

The civilizing influence possessed by the present Element of civilization, consists in the admiration which it contributes to excite among all classes for those men who are eminent for their talents or their virtues. And admiration here leads at once to imitation. Hence, each person is induced to place before his view a model of this class as his guide. Even if he does not emulate, or copy as a whole, the object of his homage, he does so with respect to some of his great qualities, and endeavours here to follow, if not to equal him. And an admiration of virtue necessarily induces a corresponding hatred of vice.

There is also a great moral effect produced by the institution of state dignities, in the establishment and

inculcation of the principle, as a national axiom, that wisdom and worth, and not mere wealth, are what entitle a man to precedence, and really raise him to social and civil rank among his fellows. Wealth of itself can, indeed, no more make a man noble, than nobility can make him wealthy. Both, however, tend to make him influential; and when he possesses the two, his power is necessarily considerable. And as merit, and not money constitutes the claim to state dignity, so actual desert alone should command the respect of the nation. If, therefore, it be objected to the principle of conferring national honours by titles as a reward for merit, that such an institution is fitted only for a barbarous age, when symbols alone are intelligible to the multitude, and the reality is not understood; I would reply that every age, however civilized, is sufficiently barbarous to render what is obvious and discernible of more influence and effect on the public mind, than what is discoverable only after severe scrutiny, and is uncertain and disputable. Public honours are, consequently, of equal influence in all ages. That which mainly savours of barbarism relative to these dignities is, that in a refined age they should be restricted to the achievements appreciated in a rude age, and denied altogether to the far higher triumphs of civilization.

In our instructorial institutions for the education of youth, where the greatest care is taken to frame a proper and efficient system of mental and moral discipline, and to stimulate by wholesome emulation; the principle of dispensing honours and rewards for good conduct, as also of inflicting punishment and degradation for the neglect of duty, has been long established, and with the desired effect. If, however, the system is recognized, and is successful in the latter case, why should it not be so also in the economy of a state, which is only an assembly of persons of maturer age and experience, but where the influences are the same, although of greater importance?

The true object of all honorary distinctions and nobility, and the legitimate end of civilization, are alike the exaltation of the higher, and ennobling, and refining influences of ability and virtue, over the lower impulses of our nature. And the only legitimate foundation of civil titles, is the superiority, either intellectual or moral, of those who bear them, to the common herd of mankind. These artificial distinctions serve as representations or imitations of those real titles to admiration and respect which the superior talents, and achievements, or worth, of certain great men have won for themselves. Thus, some have acquired by their works, claims to immortality and to fame more lasting and more extensive than any civil honours that could be bestowed upon them. Artificial dignities are, however, of great use and influence both as public testimonies to the merits and virtues which they reward, and as establishing in the men so ennobled, and in their descendants who succeed them in their titles, living monuments of those performances, which are by this means ever kept in remembrance in the national mind. The favours thus shown, and the encouragement thus afforded to those who have conferred honour on their country, or on mankind, testify the national approval of these good deeds.

A nobility is, moreover, of considerable importance, as an established body or order, to the civilization of a country. By its institution, patrons are supplied to learning, and art, and science, in men of superior rank, wealth, and education, who are diffused throughout the nation, and who take a lead in all its concerns. As in a barbarous age, the aristocracy are ever foremost in the field as the leaders and directors of martial exploits, and the protectors of the land; so in time of peace are they equally useful and influential in promoting the arts of peace, and the extension of civilization. And in addition to the directly civilizing influence exercised by a nobility in the

encouragement of learning and the patronage of genius; their mansions in different parts of the country, are receptacles for treasures in science and literature, and exhibit productions of taste and refinement by which the popular mind is affected. Although these possessions are the material property of but a few, they are open to the public at large, and intellectually benefit and civilize the whole nation.

In the same way, the rich and valuable collections of books and manuscripts, and other materials for history, in the possession of many of our old and noble families, are in reality so many treasures possessed by the nation itself; inasmuch as the nation at large, equally with the actual possessors, reaps the rich fruits which are gathered from them when they are made available for historical or other literary purposes.

As, however, a considerable portion of the civilizing influence of an aristocracy in a nation is derived from their wealth, which enables them to become patrons of art and learning, and to have ample leisure to devote to their own cultivation and improvement; and as it is, moreover, most desirable that such a body should possess a stake in the interests of the country; it appears essential that means should be adopted by the state to prevent so influential and important an institution belonging to it from becoming impoverished, and thus liable to corrupt influence, or to the suspicion of any such failing, in itself degrading and detrimental. This could be effected by annexing landed estates of a specified extent to each title conferred, so as to descend with it in perpetuity, and be unalienable altogether. Upon the grant of any new peerage, it might be made a condition that the recipient should permanently settle upon it a certain quantum of property, either in land or money, for its due maintenance. In favour of peerages insufficiently provided for, or where the estate annexed to them has become dilapidated, and

indeed in favour of peerages generally, the law against perpetuities might also reasonably and advantageously be repealed, so far as to enable them to accumulate and to retain property to a certain fixed amount.*

Dignities and honorary titles are not, however, by any means exclusively confined to peerages and other hereditary honours. Indeed, the grand division of the people in a civilized nation is into two main classes, consisting of the order of Gentility, and the vulgar order. And this division, which is established by custom and general consent, is far more arbitrary, and more strictly observed, than any artificial arrangement as to civil rank in society. Thus, the humblest gentleman and the sovereign may meet on terms of comparative equality; while the humblest gentleman and the highest below that station could not do so without a violation of what is considered as propriety and decorum. And yet this term Gentility, which is deemed so essential to determine the boundary between these different ranks, is of itself most difficult to define with certainty and accuracy. Nevertheless, that which, on the whole, really in any individual constitutes his essential claim to gentility, is his civilization, considering this not merely as education, much less as wealth, but in the largest and most comprehensive sense in which the word can be understood; implying his refinement in mind, and manners, and feeling, as well as mental cultivation.

Gentility is in fact the polish, the finishing touch of education. It adds refinement to intelligence, and to feeling as well, which directs and corrects the conduct of those who are thus endowed. It is the completion, the head-stone as it were, of civilization. Nevertheless, Gentility is by no means the consequence of, or confined to birth, wealth, or position. Princes may be found

* See this question more fully discussed in 'The True Theory of Representation in a State,' pp. 71–73.

as vulgar as the lowest paupers, and paupers possessed of the refinement of mind and feeling which would adorn any peer.

Gentility, moreover, exercises a very extensive moral and civilizing influence throughout the nation. Honorary titles, too, are of many different degrees and orders; and consist not only of dignities, but the various ranks in the several professions have their titles annexed to them. These honours, which are open to every one, are of immense use and influence in promoting a laudable emulation among all classes, and should be distributed so as directly and efficiently to stimulate talent, and exertion, and virtue, in each department. Provided the actions of a public man are beneficial to the state, it matters not to the state from what motives they proceed. Many of the best deeds have been done from the worst motives, as some of the most valuable medicines are extracted from poisonous herbs.

If all men were independent, virtue might safely be left to be its own reward. It is so indeed very often, but not always, in the case of the great and the affluent; although even here there are incentives to vice which require to be counteracted. In the case of the poor, the dependent, the masses, the rewards which virtue itself brings are but trivial in comparison with the repulses that it has to encounter, which if not direct incentives to vice, are, at any rate, direct discouragements to virtue, and which ought, at least in every perfect condition of society and of civilization, to be counterbalanced, however impossible or impractical it may be to do away with them altogether. Honorary titles of various kinds, which have no political or direct social duties attached to them as in the case of a peerage, may well be conferred as the rewards of literary or scientific merit, especially in those pursuits where from time to time such distinctions appear most requisite. A title is a sort of counterfeit to a nickname. A nickname is an opprobrious appellation, on account of some defect,

attached by a society to an individual. A title is an honourable appellation on account of merit, attached by a nation. In an advanced age of civilization like our own, eminence in various important undertakings deserves as much to be encouraged as does skill in martial enterprise during a warlike era.

Care should however be taken that the duties of patriotism towards their country, do not lead men to neglect their private, but prior duties as citizens; and above all that their duties as citizens do not lead to the neglect of those which are paramount of all, those which they owe as parents, and heads and members of families. Bad children seldom if ever make good citizens. And bad members of the social community, can never be expected to shine as the directors of public affairs.

Dignities, indeed, even of the highest kind, were originally sometimes conferred as rewards for efforts in the cause of civilization. So far back as the comparatively barbarous Saxon era, peerages were given on account of skill in navigation, and for exertion in making discoveries. How much greater, therefore, is the obligation upon us, in the present age, when dexterity in martial exploits is happily so much less demanded, to render these honours conducive to the mental and moral improvement and civilization of the nation. Of such importance, indeed, did Aristotle deem the due distribution of honours in a state, that he considered the stability of the government to depend mainly on the three following circumstances:—1. The respect due to age and experience. 2. The distribution of honours and offices according to evident and approved method. 3. An education accurately adapted to the pattern of the commonwealth. In his Politics, this great philosopher and politician observes,—"In the contest therefore for civil pre-eminence, education and virtue seem fairly entitled to the first honours, because of all things education and virtue most contribute to the perfection of civil

society."* If, therefore, the due distribution of these honours is so important; surely it must be of correspondingly great importance that the objects to be encouraged by them should be rightly selected, and with a proper regard to the condition, and state of civilization, and mental and moral exigencies of the nation. If, in a martial age, titles, and estates, and pensions, are conferred on those who have successfully led the forces of the country against the enemy; surely, in an age of peace and civilization, those who exert themselves for the extirpation of barbarism and ignorance, and effect mighty and splendid triumphs in works of genius and science, ought not to be neglected.

A hero, in the strict sense of the term, is an individual who, possessing both talents and endowments above the common order, has devoted them to the service of his fellow-creatures instead of for the benefit of himself, and who on this account deserves to be held up to general admiration, and to be pointed to as an example for imitation. Surely, therefore, a man who has achieved important conquests, or effected great discoveries, in art or science, where, although the perils to life are not so immediate as on the ocean or on the field of battle, the danger to bodily health is quite as imminent; is as fully entitled as one who adventures in the latter, to have his services acknowledged by the nation, and to be honoured by those dignities which are bestowed as the peculiar marks of approval by the state. Nor does there seem to be any cause why the names of dignities and titles of honour should not as well be chosen from grand achievements in science, as from certain spots on the earth's service; or why an original invention should not as fairly be honoured in this manner, as the name of a city or a plain where a victory was won. More especially, if peerages were conferred as rewards for scientific or artistical distinction,

* Book iii.

instead of for success in physical enterprise, would such a mode of deriving their designation appear in every way reasonable. The most appropriate and honourable way of selecting a title for men eminent for their efforts or their attainments, would in that case be to take it from the name of the work which they have achieved, or from the branch of art or science in which they have effected any great enterprise, and which would at once denote the claim to the honour, as well as indicate the precise nature of the dignity. Indeed, in many cases even now, it seems palpably absurd in the bestowal of a peerage to assume a title from a place over which the ennobled person has not only no dominion, nor acquires any by his dignity, but with which it frequently happens that he has no connection of any kind. We ridicule the Emperor of China for styling himself the Brother of the Sun, and yet some of the titles of nobility conferred by our own Sovereign are as empty and as unmeaning.

Nevertheless, although the system upon which nobility is conferred may be to a certain extent exhausted and out of date, and even many of the direct objects of the institution itself no longer attainable; yet the results of the establishment of such an order, and the indirect advantages derived from it, which are in many cases far more important and more influential than those which are direct, are of immense, and indeed incalculable value. The main question, however, at issue here is, whether by certain modifications in the system of creating peerages, the institution itself might not be made more entirely, more essentially, and more extensively serviceable to the requirements of society and of civilization in this country. And more especially whether an order which in a martial age was originated and intended mainly as the reward of martial exploits; in a civilized age ought not to be adapted and applied to the advancement of civilization.

The distribution of minor honours, such as knighthood, among persons of middle rank in the state, as was formerly the custom, is of great influence as regards the binding together the different orders of society, and strengthening the nobility by the buttresses thus planted around it. On this account it is to be regretted that they are not more generously dealt out, especially to those in civic offices, and in the provincial cities and towns in various parts of the country; and that in a commercial kingdom like ours, there is not a class of dignities expressly adapted and intended to be conferred on men engaged in commercial pursuits, and who are filling responsible corporate and other inferior civil posts. Knighthood, which was once the honour ordinarily bestowed upon persons of this class, is now generally reserved for more special occasions. And yet it is in many respects of great consequence that people in the position and station alluded to should share in, and should be thus directly influenced by the honorary dignities which the state has to award.

Whether a new order of dignities especially reserved for those who are distinguished in art, science, or letters, might not very advantageously be constituted, appears deserving of grave consideration; and thus an institution of "able"-men as well as "noble"-men, would be existent in the nation: a body, moreover, that might well be entrusted with the disposal of many important social, commercial, intellectual, and moral questions, which although not strictly of a legislative character, it is of great consequence to the state to have fairly discussed and determined.

In an age so different as is the present, in all its leading characteristics, from that in which peerages were originated, it appears on many accounts extremely desirable to institute some new degrees more expressly adapted to serve as rewards for achievements in the arts of peace.

Now, more than ever, such distinctions are influential, and now, more than ever are they requisite.

For the purpose of conferring dignities on those who have eminently distinguished themselves either in art or science, by great literary efforts, or by original inventions, and which honours they may be proud to hand down to posterity; might not the ancient titles of Thane and of Vavasour be advantageously revived, which living now only in the romance and literature of our country, and being so associated with the poetry of its history, would aptly be availed of to honour, in an age of civilization, its intellectual heroes, as in a rude and martial age they ennobled its warriors? These dignities might give a seat in the Upper House of the Legislature to the holders of them, when such was desired; or in other cases, like baronetcies, they might confer no exclusive privileges on the possessors, but would be marks of distinction only to them and their descendants; the title of Thane serving as the honorary dignity for distinction in poetry and literature, and that of Vavasour for eminence in philosophy and science.

If objections be raised to rendering honorary titles for intellectual merit hereditary, on the ground that the talents and acquirements of the first possessors of them do not descend to their posterity with their rank; I would reply that, by rendering these dignities hereditary, you keep alive the remembrance of the men thus distinguished, and preserve their representatives to remote ages, which contributes more than anything to excite a laudable stimulus in the public mind to emulate their good deeds. And even in cases where the memory of their fame does not require to be thus perpetuated, it is at any rate advantageous, and conducive to civilization, to perpetuate the remembrance of the national homage which was rendered to it. In those instances, moreover, where a particular title of nobility has acquired great distinction on account

of the splendid qualities of the bearer, but such title has afterwards become extinct; it seems very desirable that it should be revived by being selected as a title of some newly created peer of less renown personally, by means of which a representative of the individual so distinguished would always be preserved, and the remembrance of these great deeds kept continually alive.

It is considered desirable that with the descent of a peerage should be ensured to the inheritor the wealth also of the first possessor. How much more essential is it that those far more valuable qualities of talent and virtue, as a reward for which the peerage was conferred, should be rendered heritable. To some extent this is sought to be effected by the careful education which is bestowed on the expectant inheritor of these honours.

It is, however, well worthy of consideration whether, in addition to the dignities already proposed, some new order of nobility, such as that of peerages for life, might not in some cases very advantageously be granted to men eminent for their intellectual acquirements, or for their achievements, and whose presence in the Upper House of the Legislature would both grace that assembly, and add much to the value of its deliberations, besides furnishing a suitable mode of encouraging and honouring such attainments; the possessors of which might not, however, be endowed with hereditary wealth, which is quite independent of their personal qualification for the title in question. This might be effected either by limiting the peerage to the life of the person ennobled, or by annexing peerages to certain state offices, as in the case of Bishoprics, which the holders of them for the time might enjoy.*

It is no argument against the extensive mental and moral influences which may be produced by the institution of

* See also on this subject, 'The True Theory of Representation in a State,' pp. 73–76.

titles and honorary degrees, whether by nobility or by minor distinctions, that the greatest names in each department of art and science, in martial enterprise and in the history of the nation, have acquired the highest fame, and have gained immortal honour, without any such rank, and far beyond what the latter could have procured. We may admit, indeed, that the peerage granted to the author of the 'Novum Organum,' added nothing to his reputation, and that the name of Francis Bacon is nobler in our ears, and will endure longer than that of Viscount St. Alban's. Shakespeare, too, would have obtained no renown by the highest title that could have been bestowed upon him; and no coronet on the brow of Newton or of Milton could have added to the lustre of their glory. But all this is not because nobility and civil distinctions do not confer honour on those so exalted, but because there are some so dignified by nature as to be incapable of civil exaltation. The ornaments not only of their country but of their kind, the distinguishing lights not merely of the century in which they shone, but who will be the beacons of all successive ages; they require no aid from the institutions of man to make prominent and permanent illustrious names, which are as luminous as the planets in the heavens, and as durable as the elements of Nature. Talents such as theirs it is vain to emulate, and their wisdom it is hopeless to teach others to equal. Their virtue nevertheless may excite admiration, and by the praise of their good deeds, we may aspire to move others not only to applaud, but to follow. And it is in humble imitation of the great and noble dignities which they have thus earned, originated and conferred by Nature herself, and whose influence is so important and so beneficial, that the various civil dignities and honorary distinctions of the kind already alluded to, have been founded among states, by the sagacity of their rulers, for the civilization of the people.

Not only, however, ought the nation to take under its patronage, and to bestow honours on those who have successfully distinguished themselves either in art, science, or literature, or have otherwise conferred real benefit upon mankind; but even those also who have unsuccessfully pursued the same course may occasionally and even equally deserve state bounty and reward, provided that their productions are possessed of actual merit, and that their failure was owing not to deficiency in the latter, but to circumstances wholly independent of any such considerations. As already remarked, the discoverers of new inventions of the utmost value frequently fail to reap the reward of their talents. And many whose genius was neglected and unacknowledged while they were alive, and who were consequently left to linger in obscurity, when the grave has closed over them have been duly honoured by posterity. It is also to be here borne in mind, that the highest efforts in art, and the most meritorious and useful discoveries in science, by no means necessarily ensure any adequate pecuniary recompense, or even protect the achievers of them from the cravings of poverty. As Milton's immortal 'Paradise Lost' decreases nothing in value as a product of genius, from the insignificance of the sum which was paid for the copyright; so poverty in purse is no proof of paucity in intellect of any person. Hence, those men of distinguished merit and acquirements, and whose talents have been devoted to the good of mankind, but who are wanting in the wealth of others engaged in the same honourable career, may be aptly and advantageously rewarded with pensions, or other pecuniary provision, by the state. They are, indeed, peculiarly fit objects for such endowments, as, without directly benefiting themselves, they have directly benefited their country, and have sacrificed personal gain to enrich mankind at large. Indeed, intellectual exertion, especially of the highest kind, but seldom leads to riches

and men of the noblest genius are least of all adapted to obtain them. The sordid acquirements produced by every-day occupations, they leave to others, for whom they provide treasures which no wealth can purchase. Not seldom, however, are they the means of ensuring to the rest of mankind, by the discoveries which they unfold, pecuniary as well as mental gain. Intellectual enterprises, moreover, although the pursuit of them may ensure the utmost satisfaction to their followers, as regards their enjoyments of that class, produce, frequently, also a large amount of misery, both from the injury to health which they occasion, and the neglect of worldly affairs to which they oftentimes lead.

A book is the fruit of the mind of the author, which he gives to the world, but which, as in the case of that springing from a tree, while it contains the essence of what is good in the latter, impoverishes its own being, although it enriches him who gathers it. An author's works constitute as it were the cream of his mind. In them are concentrated the choicest of his ideas; but they deteriorate the remainder of his stock of thoughts. Hence, great authors in ordinary society, are often observed to be very commonplace men. Works, whether literary or scientific, which are of national importance, may reasonably not only be rewarded and patronised, but in certain cases should be undertaken at the national expense; and that not merely on account of their value to the country, but because they are too vast for individual enterprise. For the accomplishment of these efforts, state pensions might not only fairly but advantageously be granted, and an annual sum out of the public revenues very properly devoted to so desirable a purpose.

In a nation where a perfect system for the extension of civilization is pursued, the rewards by the state which are conferred for intellectual efforts, should be the highest, and should far exceed those for mere manual

labour, or where results of a physical kind only are attained. But it should at the same time be borne in mind that pecuniary rewards are neither so high nor so honourable as those of a titular class; and that where circumstances admit of it, intellectual enterprises should ever be requited by some donation more correspondent with their own quality than money, such as dignities adapted for the purpose. There is no reason, indeed, why, in cases deserving of and requiring them, both pension and dignity should not be granted to the same individual; the one being given to him as a recompense for the toil he has undergone for the good of the nation, the other as a mark of the respect and honour with which the nation regards him. Professional services, which are ordinarily of a laborious nature, though more or less demanding intellectual effort of a certain amount, are very properly requited by money, as that forms the standard of all material recompense, although it would ill reward high intellectual exertion. Money serves very well to pay for the bestowal of medical or legal skill, which should strictly, as in ordinary services, be paid in kind, by rendering again services of the same nature. But as this would be always inconvenient, and often impossible, money is given, which in its value represents the return of services. Money, too, indirectly, to some extent, serves as a reward for intellectual labour, as it supplies the wants and necessities to which every man, however intellectual, is more or less subject. Beyond this, however, it is wholly unadapted for intellectual recompense; much less is it to be considered as the ultimate aim of intellectual efforts. Professional men are properly paid by money, as that, or what money represents or will procure, is their ultimate object in following their profession. But money is not the proper reward of philosophers and poets, as neither money, nor that which money represents, is their ultimate object.

They prefer what they gain in honour and reputation to any pecuniary reward.

Nevertheless, as professional men more or less desire to derive some fame and reputation, as well as pecuniary recompense, from the skill which they exert; so ought men engaged in intellectual efforts to obtain, along with the reputation which they acquire, some substantial pecuniary recompense, especially as this is essential for their ordinary comfort, and consequently for the due carrying on of their enterprises. But with them this pecuniary recompense ought ever to be considered not as their main, but only as a collateral object. Professional men seek to benefit individuals only. Men of intellectual effort aim to benefit all mankind. The state is therefore the proper rewarder and patron of the latter, as their clients and patients are of the former.

Care should, however, be taken in the dispensation of rewards for literary efforts, lest, as has occasionally happened, the bestowal of the reward, which was intended for encouragement to future exertion, as well as a requital for past achievements, by satisfying the desire of the individual so remunerated, operates as a means of preventing all further endeavours, now that the coveted distinction is attained, or the pressure of want is withdrawn; so that, what was here meant as a stimulus to new enterprise, has the contrary effect of extinguishing it altogether. Pecuniary rewards are of course more open to this objection than are those of a purely honorary kind. But where real genius instigated the exertions of the individual in question, it is hardly to be apprehended that his ambition would be so easily quenched, or that his highest ulterior aim would be merely the procurement of a means of comfortable subsistence. Where his efforts are carried on solely for the latter object, it is probable that the suspension of them would occasion but a trifling loss to the community.

It is much to be regretted, not only that literary pensions have not been established upon a more liberal scale than is at present the case, but that they have not been dispensed upon a more systematic and equitable plan. To some extent perhaps the insignificance of the sums appropriated for this purpose, occasions a corresponding neglect as to the correct mode of their being apportioned. Nevertheless, the claims of literary and scientific men are, in reality, generally far more certain and defined, and more clearly distinguishable, than are those of rival candidates for advancement in the same profession, but whose deserts are, in ordinary cases, even as regards their promotion, much more equitably rewarded. To most of the professions, indeed, there are offices of dignity and emolument attached, to which eminent and successful practitioners in them may hope eventually to be raised. Literature and science, as such, having no preferment of this nature annexed to their pursuit, the state is bound to supply the omission, and to reward by pecuniary pension those whose wants and whose merits render them worthy of such a recompense.

In the distribution, moreover, of the professional preferment and other civil appointments belonging to the state, its rulers should be ever careful to select the most deserving objects, as regards their ability and their eminence in their respective departments. As in each country there will be men of every variety in talent, and character, and age; so it should be the especial aim of the government not only to enlist in its service the ablest and the best, but to employ each in the particular offices which they are peculiarly and best qualified to fill. This is, indeed, the real secret of securing success, not merely in any great undertaking, but in the general and ordinary conduct of affairs; although perhaps, especially in the affairs of states where it is most needed, there is no principle more neglected. Men of each character and kind

of talent may be made useful in their several ways if engaged in their proper departments, and the deficiencies of one may be corrected by the acquirements or virtues of others. And men of whatever talent may prove useless if employed in those departments for which they are the least qualified. By a strict attention to its duties as regards the distribution of its patronage, the state may accomplish much in the promotion of civilization, which is of course as essentially dependent on the skill and learning with which the various professions carried on in the nation are conducted; as their skill and learning, if not actually dependent upon, are at any rate affected by the manner in which the higher qualities of its professors receive encouragement from the state.

In addition, however, to the dignities conferred upon, and the pecuniary rewards given to men of distinguished literary and scientific merit, or who have rendered eminent services to their country; there ought to be established in every civilized state an order if not of dignities, at any rate of rewards, corresponding with and applicable to people of the lower ranks, and which might be offered to, and would hold out a constant stimulus to persons of that class, as the return for signal acts, either of heroism or of virtue, or for extraordinary merit of any kind, either mental or moral. Sometimes even inferior virtues and qualities, especially among the humbler orders, deserve and require peculiar encouragement by the state. Thus, physical courage, which is after all but an animal quality, and has no intellectual endowment about it, demands to be patronized, and developed, and rewarded; and indeed is so by all nations who engage much in war. This characteristic, it is most important for the army to possess as a body, which in the state represents the *brutum fulmen* of the man; depending for its head, and scientific direction, and energy, upon its generals, with whom wisdom and discretion, rather than valour, is mainly essential,

although with them the latter as well is doubtless indispensable. Integrity, too, especially in a commercial country, it is expedient thus publicly to encourage. Indeed, in each nation, that peculiar virtue or quality which, from whatever cause, most needs to be cultivated, should be countenanced and nurtured by the government. Such stimulants to good conduct as those referred to, are surely equally as necessary for people in the lower, as for those in the higher ranks of society; and probably a great deal more so, as extraordinary incitements to efforts of the class here mentioned, will be far less frequent among the former than among the latter. They are, indeed, generally and mainly requisite, not so much to excite to good deeds those who perform them, and who would be disposed thus to act wholly independent of such considerations; as to proclaim to the common herd of mankind, who require to be influenced in this mode, the merit of such achievements, and the respect paid to them by the nation.

VIII.—MORAL JURISPRUDENCE.

Another very essential and very influential Element in the promotion of civilization, the consideration of some branches of which has been already embraced in certain of the preceding Elements,* is that which may most aptly be included under the term Moral Jurisprudence, by which I mean the general regulation, framing, and administration of such laws and legislative acts as directly affect and influence the civilization and moral condition of the nation. All law, indeed, tends indirectly more or less to the promotion of civilization, as contributing to terminate anarchy, which is essentially inimical thereto; but Moral Jurisprudence alone directly promotes civili-

* *Vide ante*, Elements V. and VI.

zation. Moreover, the more advanced is the condition of civilization in any country, the more exalted will be the aim of its jurisprudential code. And the more exalted is the aim of its jurisprudential code, the more extensive will be the care which is devoted to that department of legislation which seeks to secure a high tone of morals, and of which Moral Jurisprudence forms the leading portion.

In legislating for people of different nations and different classes, we ought to consider at once both the coincidences and the contrarieties which exist between them. While human nature is everywhere the same, no two men either are alike, or act alike. In each case it is man that has to be regulated; but although the feelings, and passions, and dispositions of man are everywhere alike; yet the different modes in which these, and each of them, are operated upon by circumstances, according to the country, position, and character of the individual, must each be estimated in the calculation. In the framing of the laws, and in the general regulation of a state, consequently not only the intellectual capacities, but the moral endowments, and also the passions and emotions of the people ought to be taken into consideration; and certain of these are not only to be guarded against and counteracted, but to be availed of and turned to account in the regulation of this very complicated engine. Indeed, a system of government is like a well-constructed machine, in which some of the wheels are intended to accelerate motion; others to regulate it, and for that purpose occasionally even to retard it. So some departments of government are to set the laws in motion; others to direct their operation.

Every state, however, must be governed by two ruling powers, whether these powers be vested in one, or in two or more persons. The first of these is the legislative power, or the power to make laws to regulate the state, whether this resides in the sovereign, the people at large,

or a body delegated by them. The second of these is the executive power, by which the observance of the laws is enforced, whether vested personally in the sovereign, or in persons delegated by him for that purpose. In each state there will be several distinct and independent derivative and secondary legislative and executive powers, adapted for the several purposes they are designed to serve; some national, others local; some general, others limited. Two things are, however, alike, and equally essential to the perfection of every legal constitution: 1. That the authority of the state be maintained inviolable. 2. That the protection of the meanest subject be rendered equally secure with that of the most exalted. The maintenance of the laws is indeed as essential to the poor as it is to the rich, and is as conducive to the safety, the liberty, and the due enjoyment of the property of the one, as it is to those of the other. It is, moreover, requisite for the stability of a government, that the interest of the rulers and that of the ruled be identical. Whenever the ruled are no longer benefited by the law, its vitality departs, decomposition commences, and destruction soon follows.

It is not, however, a paradox to assert that the more perfect is the jurisprudential system, and the general civilization of any country, the less are the laws needed, inasmuch as it is then, and then only, that the people are completely fitted to govern themselves. Good laws may, no doubt, do much to produce a wholesome moral condition in a country; but it far more frequently happens that this wholesome moral condition is that which is productive of good laws. Each, no doubt, reciprocally influences and acts upon, though neither of itself alone produces the other.

What Solon said of his laws, is more or less applicable to legislation generally, not only in our day, but in all ages, and in all countries. "They are not the best that might have been framed, but they are the best the Athe-

nians are capable of bearing." Few legislative measures are perfect; but their imperfections are frequently, if not generally, owing to the fact that more perfect measures would not have been adopted; or, if adopted, could not have been enforced, or would not have been strictly obeyed.

The degrees are very various, both as to the nature and the extent to which man is able to possess dominion and property over objects and matters terrestial. The immediate subject of man's dominion and property, is his own corporeal person. But even here he is unable to control many of its motions, and in its substance and organs he can effect no change. His property over the land, and over the goods which are termed his own, consists merely in determining who shall enjoy them, by exercising a certain control over them for a time, in common with himself, and in the power to forbid certain persons their use. The changes that he can effect in their essential character and quality, are very limited indeed. Sovereign dominion is still less extensive, and cannot even deprive others of the territory over which the prince rules. In the case of the Deity alone, His property and His dominion are alike complete. He can command the disposition and the actions of every subject, and can change their substance and very nature at His will.

As civilization is essential to the prosperity of a state, so civilization should be a leading object with every government, the main end of which is the prosperity of the people governed. This principle, although obvious as a truism, is generally disregarded: so that, like many other truisms, however perfectly undisputed, it is at the same time practically denied. Indeed, governments, while they often indirectly retard, but seldom directly promote civilization.

Although in every state the laws are necessarily constantly changing, their principle is unvarying and im-

mutable. They are, like the planets, ever in course of revolution round their centre, which remains fixed and changeless. Their very change is, nevertheless, a proof, and a consequence, more or less essential, of the absolute fixity of their centre, and in order to preserve unchanged, as far as possible, their relation to it.

Laws of every kind, but more especially moral laws, must not only be adapted to the precise purposes they are intended to serve, but should aim only at ends which are within their legitimate scope. While some objects cannot be effected without the aid of law, others are entirely beyond its aid, and which moral influences alone can reach. Thus, the mere intentions of the mind, not carried into actual operation, which, however bad in themselves, have never become matured, are not within the scope of the law. It is, nevertheless, the intention of the mind, and not the act of the body, which in reality constitutes the essence of crime. The former is the soul, the latter the mere material frame of the transaction. The design of the intellect is that which alone is intentional and willing. The carrying out and completion of that design are the result of chance and of circumstances which are beyond his control. So those acts which do not either affect society, nor are contrary to the laws of God, nor are known to others besides the doer of them, or which are committed by persons out of the jurisdiction of the realm, are beyond the pale of jurisprudence. The state has nevertheless a right to declare certain acts to be unlawful and punishable as such, which although not contrary to the principles of morality, or the laws of Nature, are, or are deemed to be, injurious to society, or at variance with the established economy of the nation. Nothing, however, tends so much to destroy the general influence of the law, as its proved inefficiency in any particular case. It should never aim but where it has the power to strike. Threats which cannot be enforced,

expose us to mockery, not only when we use them as bugbears, but also when we are in earnest. The state should, moreover, be both lenient and liberal as regards the framing of its laws; but, when once enacted, their observance ought to be rigidly enforced. Their material should be such that though it will bend before the gentlest breeze, it will never break beneath the most violent storm.

Justice and right are principles which not only belong to a state of natural as well as to one of artificial society, but they form the foundation of all society. It is not the province of civilization to abolish or repudiate these principles, but only to render their application more perfect. And although the means for attaining this object may be more complicated in a civilized than in a rude condition of society; in the former the end ought ever to be effected with more certainty, and more satisfactorily. If justice and right are in some special cases more perilled in a state of civilization than during barbarism, they at least have the opportunity, in the former case, of being practically carried out to a far higher degree of perfection. Nevertheless, as there are some topics quite beyond the reach of our knowledge, so there are some matters wholly beyond the sphere of legislation. These it may be difficult to define, or to point out the precise principle of demarcation by which they are limited. Matters of practice, and those which immediately concern the public weal, are ordinarily within the strict pale of the law; while those of opinion and speculation, or whose conduct does not affect society, are not adapted to be dealt with in this manner.

Moreover, if on any topic precision and certainty of language are required, they are unquestionably essential in the framing of laws, where doubt or ambiguity may not only be of consequences the most pernicious, but even defeat the very aim and purpose of the law itself.* Yet

* The Parliament of this nation having, in its august wisdom

on no subject have these defects been suffered to prevail to so great an extent as in our legislative enactments; and, as might have been expected, all the evils to be calculated upon as the result, have ensued. In some instances, our laws have failed to attain the very objects which were specially intended to be brought within their scope. In others, they have been determined to apply to topics with which their framers had no intention of dealing. In nearly every case, doubt and uncertainty have marred the efficiency of our legal code, upon whatever subject, owing to their having been so loosely and unscientifically constructed.

There are certain distinct and independent branches of jurisprudence which may be with propriety especially comprehended under the term Moral Jurisprudence, as having reference more particularly to those matters which concern the mental and moral condition and civilization of a state. Such are the laws relating to and regulating all topics connected with education, religion, and the liberty of the press, which have already been considered here. In addition to these, the laws which determine the form of government and political institutions of a state, those relating to marriage and other social relations, those respecting crimes and their punishment, the administration of oaths, and the institution of disabilities from moral causes, together with other laws which are either directly or indirectly of a moral nature in themselves, or as regards their influence on civilization, may be here included.

But the real and true essence of Moral Jurisprudence consists not so much in the enunciation or design of any

---

from time immemorial up to the present period, adopted an exactly opposite principle to the one here laid down; it is perhaps somewhat presumptuous, if not actually incurring a high breach of privilege, for me to question its soundness.

particular code of laws, as in the quality of the leading principle by which all laws, of whatever nature, should be more or less directly or indirectly pervaded, and which should serve to give a high moral tone and spirit to legislation in general.

The grand principle to be kept in view as regards Moral Jurisprudence, is consequently as follows:—That the moral as well as the material wants of a people ought to command the care, and to form the subject of legislation. That these moral wants are of superior importance to those which are material. That in every legislative measure, there is involved a moral as well as a material consideration. And that, important in its results and influences as is legislation, there are, nevertheless, moral causes ever in operation which are far more powerful, and which during the process of legislation ought always to be taken into calculation.

With respect to the particular principles of legislation to which I have already referred as more especially connected with Moral Jurisprudence, the subject may be considered in a two-fold manner:—I. As regards the form of government established in any particular country, and its peculiar adaptation for the promotion of civilization. II. As regards the particular laws which may be enacted in any country, bearing either directly or indirectly on civilization.

I. The object of a constitutional free form of government, is to ensure the establishment of such a code of laws as will secure the greatest amount of freedom to the generality, without encroaching on the liberty, safety, or enjoyment of individuals. Where the liberty of individuals is abridged for the former purpose, the gain to the state ought to be so great as fully to compensate for the loss thus sustained; and for this measure of freedom so subtracted from particular persons, should be returned to the members of the community, generally and individually,

a portion at any rate as large as that of which the persons who suffer abridgment of their liberty for this end are deprived. The utmost extent of personal liberty which any man has a right to enjoy, amounts to this: that he be allowed to follow the dictates of his own will, so far as his doing so does not encroach upon, abridge, or interfere with the liberty or well-being of others.

Liberty consists, indeed, not in securing to each individual what is best for him, but what he wills and determines to be best for himself. A man is not free who is compelled against his will to do what is most conducive to his own interest. But a man is free who is allowed to do that which is injurious to himself; although in this case, from inability to use that freedom aright, it may prove a bane instead of a blessing. It is nevertheless, and not a whit the less so, freedom still. So also a man who is forcibly restrained from committing suicide, has really and essentially as much violence done to his will, as the man who is compelled by force to undergo execution as a criminal.

Moreover, liberty is not only the most perfect, but the most natural condition of man. It is not merely that state which affords the fullest opportunity for the complete display of all his powers and energies; but it is that in which he was originally placed, and in which he will always remain unless deprived of it by some external cause or agent. To maintaining itself in this position, and to a restoration to it when deprived of it, the mind will also ever spontaneously tend. And this is the only condition in which the genius, and taste, and capacities of each individual in the nation can obtain ample development. Tyranny, on the other hand, consists in the exercise of authority by the stronger over the weaker, so as to prevent the latter from acting according to the impulse of his will or determination, or so as to cause him to act contrary to them.

There is, indeed, a great and essential difference between subjection to rule, and subjection to slavery. In the one case, a man obeys a fixed and reasonable law in common with his fellow-men, and in order to secure the common good, and the common liberty of all. In the other case, he obeys an uncertain and arbitrary rule, which exists only for the good of the ruler, and to the injury and injustice of the person obliged to submit to it. Obedience to law is voluntary; to slavery it is compulsive. Every man subjects himself to legitimate rule in the discipline which he imposes on his own conduct, and over his own passions and appetites. Every one resists and abhors slavery, and recoils from it as injurious alike to society and to his own individual interests. In the one sense, therefore, every man is free. In the other, every man is in bonds.

Thus, too, there may be anarchy in an individual as well as in a nation, which results whenever a person throws off all rule, and all due moral discipline and restraint, and not only contends for entire liberty of action, but conducts himself without regard to order or decorum. This, however, is the condition and the course of action, not of a civilized or of a free man, or even of a man in a state of nature, but of a maniac.

Civil governments of every description may be divided into two classes:—Those where the supreme authority and influence in the state are vested in one person, as in the case of monarchical governments; and those where they are vested in several persons, as in the case of representative and republican governments.

A country which is ruled over, and whose affairs are directed by an absolute monarch, who follows exactly the bent of his own genius in whatever he prescribes; has the most complete opportunity of reaping all the advantages which the wisdom and the goodness of such a person can confer, and which he has the amplest means of carrying out without being in any way thwarted or interfered with.

Indeed, there can be no doubt that, in theory, an absolute monarch is the best and most perfect ruler that a state can possess, provided, of course, that the wisdom and patriotism of such a king are as complete as his authority. This is, moreover, the form of government which every man adopts in his own household and his own professional or commercial establishment, of which he constitutes himself the absolute ruler, allowing no one to share or dispute his authority, however anti-monarchial or democratic he may be as regards state affairs. A king ought therefore, according to this principle, to be in intellect, as well as station, the first among his subjects. This, however, is seldom to be attained, and probably would not in most cases be for the real good of the state. Consequently, as the great majority of men, and even of monarchs, are not endowed either with capacities or with inclinations to adapt them to be rulers of this order, and as states suffer correspondingly as their rulers are wanting in perfection in this respect, and fall below this high standard; so, in a limited monarchy, an attempt is made to afford the opportunity for the exercise of such beneficial influence on the part of the soveriegn, as regards his desire to benefit his subjects; and also to aid the monarch as regards his capacity so to act, by supplying apt statesmen and counsellors who may devise such measures and proceedings as the ability of the monarch may fail to originate. To a certain extent therefore this intellectual superiority is secured to the sovereign by the superiority of the advisers whom he calls to his councils, and who are, or ought to be selected out of the wisest and best men who adorn the country. What is consequently mainly essential in a sovereign, is the discretion to make choice of such men, and the good sense to be guided by the advice which they tender. These may be but moderate, but they are truly sterling and invaluable royal qualities for a monarch to possess, and they are moreover precisely those for which

education and training for his duties are calculated to confer.

One immense advantage possessed by a sovereign, and of which the nation reaps the full benefit, is that, from his high and commanding position, he is able to secure for the service of the state all the ablest and sagest men in the land, and of whose counsel he is made the receptacle; so that if he be but a person of only ordinary capacity and judgment, he has the best possible means of arriving at a right conclusion on these very important matters. From the probability of his succeeding to the throne, the amplest opportunities are also afforded for qualifying by education, in the most advantageous manner possible for those onerous duties, the heir who is next to fill that exalted post.

On the sovereign the eyes of the whole nation are fixed, he is their polar star or pilot, to whom they ever look for guidance, and by whose actions those of the state are to be directed and regulated. How important therefore it is that the character of the sovereign should be commensurate with such important duties!

Nevertheless, the only government, of which we have any experience, that is at once perfectly absolute and perfectly good, is that of the Deity, as He alone can do all that He wills, and all that He wills and does is the best. His sway, moreover, exhibits and reflects everywhere, and in numerous ways, His complete and infinite perfection. All other absolute governments bear the impress and variously exhibit the manifold imperfections of their rulers.

The moral influence, and power to promote civilization in a state, possessed by the sovereign, is in every case very extensive, and much may be effected by his individual exertions in this respect. Our Alfred the Great is a noble instance of what a monarch may do here; and sovereigns of the present age have been found to follow his illus-

trious example. The personal inclination of the sovereign directly animates the court; and is, as it were, reflected from him on the nobility, who in like manner govern the circle within their sphere. From them it is communicated to the different ranks throughout the realm, each member of which, as the head of his little community or family, exercises in the same way, although in a less degree, a sway corresponding with that of his superiors. Probably, in modern times at least, the real essence of a sovereign's power consists in this moral influence which he is enabled so extensively to exert, and which gives him more authority than the most absolute command over the persons of his subjects could confer. By this means, indeed, he controls not their bodies but their minds, and thus extends his rule over their very wills and desires.

What is vulgarly called fashion, is in reality but a species of the moral control which is effected by the example and personal influence of some individuals of high authority, such as that which the sovereign exercises in certain matters, on all ranks throughout his dominions. This is immediately experienced in trifling concerns, such as manners, and taste in dress, because these are the easiest to be effected, as a straw flung up into the air shows at once in what direction the wind is blowing. But the same influence is extended insensibly also to matters of far higher import; and ultimately topics of the gravest nature, subjects of deep importance in literature, science, morals, and religion, are brought under its control. Just as the same wind which agitates the dust at our feet, will in its course, and in those regions where the current has its full sway, lay prostrate the trees of the forest, animate the sails of stately men-of-war, and raise the ocean into a foam.

A depraved court will have a tendency to make a depraved people. But it is more common that a depraved court is the consequence, instead of the cause, of the

people being depraved. Sometimes the body is diseased because the head is out of order; but far more frequently the disorder of the head is produced by some disease in the body.

Each of the rulers in the kingdom, as well as its supreme governor, ought to be men of superior talent, education, and virtue; and, as already observed, it is the predominance of persons of this class, that is essential to the civilization and the right constitution of a state. As in a nation the more highly cultivated portion of it should rule the lower; so in those who are themselves appointed to rule, the higher endowments and powers should prevail over the animal propensities and feelings.

The moral influence which the different rulers of a people possess over the nation, must necessarily be very extensive, both as regards the public measures they originate, and the example they afford; inasmuch as the eyes of the multitude will be ever attentively directed to their movements, and their conduct will actuate many. And although those in authority may not themselves be able to make laws, yet they may neglect the observance of them, and may neglect to punish such a breach in others. For good or for evil, therefore, their influence is most important. But after all, those of the middle class, as Aristotle observes,* constitute the mainstay of a nation, as the ordinary powers and faculties of the mind are of the most general practical use, and best serve the common purposes of life.

When the authority of the state becomes vested in a person or a body without the consent of the nation, and without being responsible to it, a tyranny, and not a government, is that which is established. A tyranny may be constituted by a single person, a small body of men, or by several persons. The tyranny of a despot is no doubt galling, but that of a multitude is far more appalling. A

* *Ante*, p. 9.

ruling power of the latter kind, is restrained by no fear, and held in check by no moral feeling, such as curbs the exercise of authority in the case of an individual. And the most tyrannical and arbitrary proceedings, are those which are enacted by popular decree, as the severest injuries are those which we inflict on ourselves. Against the tyranny of despots there is a remedy, as also against that of foreign oppressors. But as regards the oppressions which arise from the act of the people themselves, the tyranny is at once the most severe, the most hopeless, and the most unendurable.

It is in republican and representative governments that the rulers of a state possess the most extensive moral influence, as the whole power of the nation is vested in this body; and springing from the people, they are accountable to them, and their actions are very closely watched as matters in which the people have a direct interest.

A government of whatever kind, in which representation forms a leading part, is necessarily extensively favourable to civilization, as each person having a voice in public affairs, is induced to study and make himself acquainted with them, and to exercise his mind in the principles and practice of government, which is a branch of education that is both very improving to each, and for which each is more or less well adapted. Representative governments are consequently best fitted for enlightened and advanced ages in the world, and for those in the career of each particular nation, and can only be efficiently carried out by a people in a comparatively high state of civilization. Dark and uncivilized times, when the people are blinded by ignorance or superstition, require a despotic ruler, not only to be their director, but to compel them to follow the right path.

In framing a representative government or body, especial care should be taken that the great and leading interests

of the nation, its worth, and intelligence and property, and not the mere predominance of numbers, be the basis on which it is formed.* And as in a representative assembly, each member when elected, although returned by one particular district only, represents each district in the country, and the whole nation; so, by whatever interest he is delegated, he should consider himself the representative and protector of each of the great national interests alike. In every state moreover which is possessed of a representative assembly, the electoral body should comprise the essence or choicest part of the whole nation, the representative the essence of the electoral, and the ministerial the essence of the representative.† This essence should consist in, or be constituted by the selection of the choicest men as regards their virtue, their ability, and their wealth. It is most important that this grand principle be kept in view in the formation of a representative system, whatever kind of government exists in the state; and in proportion as this principle is regarded and pursued, will that system be more or less perfect.

Nevertheless, important as it is to establish a correct principle of representation, yet, on the other hand, so vigorous is the *quasi* instinctive desire in every nation to work out for itself an efficient representative system, that be the plan of it what it may, so long as a representative body, however framed, exists, men who are generally aptly representative of the nation, will be found there. And singular as the fact may appear, nearly the same set of men will be found in the representative body, whatever form the elective machinery may assume. However that may change, the class of persons eligible for, and who aspire to be the representative body, will be nearly the same.

* See this principle more fully explained and advocated in 'The True Theory of Representation in a State.'

† 'True Theory of Representation in a State.'

But however a representative assembly is constituted, no one can doubt the importance of the great and leading interests of virtue and intelligence and property possessing their due influence there. And the more democratic, and less representative of any one of these interests, the House of Commons becomes, the more essential to the state are the existence, and the free independent action of the House of Lords, which is directly representative of these great and important national interests.

Governments which are either wholly or partially representative, so far as to possess an independent legislative body of their own, have this great advantage as regards the moral influence of their laws in general; that the people consider that these laws are made by themselves, and that they are not only therefore the more strictly bound to obey them and to assent to all their provisions, but that it may reasonably be inferred they are expressly adapted to their particular exigencies.

Governments of a mixed form, like the British constitution, possess many of the advantages, as regards the extension and encouragement of civilization, both of a monarchy and of a representative state. The influence in favour of civilization of the aristocratic branch in the British constitution, has already been adverted to in the preceding Element. It may here be remarked in addition, that an important civilizing effect is produced by the co-existence in the nation of two independent legislative bodies, which are not only rival to each other, but are so differently constituted that by their joint operation every legislative question becomes thoroughly sifted, and is viewed in all its bearings according to the various points of observation from which it is surveyed. These two bodies being differently constituted, and composed of men of different orders and qualities, become moreover mutually corrective of each other, although they are not necessarily antagonistic, the one being wholly representative, and, as a

consequence, but imperfectly deliberative; the other wholly deliberative, but only partially representative, merely of particular, though perhaps the highest interests, the intelligence and virtue of the state. In a mixed form of government, therefore, the different constitutional powers and bodies in the state, when they duly work together, at once rival and stimulate, and also aid the operation of each other. The sovereign and the two branches of the legislature emulate one another in the promotion of those ends which conduce to civilization; and they at the same time enable one another to discharge their legitimate duties with more efficiency, by relieving them from attention to those which do not fall strictly within their province. Each branch also checks the other, and restrains it from any improper or undue exercise of its functions. And even further than this, it may be observed that one of the characteristics of a mixed form of government,—highly favourable alike to civilization and to freedom,—is the extensive party feeling that it engenders; different interests springing up in opposition to each other, the real root of which is the rivalry existing between the various branches of the state. Thus, in our own country, the popular party originates in or takes root from the representative branch in the government. The aristocratic party springs from the influence of the House of Lords. That which is most favourable to prerogative, may be traced to the influence of the Crown. These parties, however, in the progress of their growth intermingle one with the other, and vary in their principles according to circumstances. Each party, indeed, like an individual and like a state, has its different ages; its youth, its manhood, and its decline. Certain diseases, too, are incident to each, and to each at particular periods. In the history of parties, both in politics and religion, this is observable.

II. The primary object of all laws may be said to be threefold. 1. The maintenance of order. 2. The main-

tenance of property. 3. The maintenance of liberty. The primary effect of moral laws should be, in conjunction with those already specified, to exalt the higher over the baser influences in a state; and to encourage and reward ability and virtue, and to discourage and punish licentiousness and vice. Under moral laws are comprehended, —1. Rewards. 2. Restrictions. 3. Punishments. Moral laws mainly concern,—1. Religion and morals. 2. Manners and customs. Laws of this kind, in common with others, fail mainly from three causes:—1. From being impracticable, as unfitted for the objects aimed at. 2. From being inefficient, as, however well adapted for the objects in view, not reaching the end to be attained. 3. From being inoperative, as contrary to the spirit and feeling of the people.

In every nation, and in the same nation at different periods of its history, some main leading principle, according to circumstances, will, nevertheless, be referred to to direct its general legislative economy. In certain rude nations, the love of liberty has been adopted as this principle. In such a country, the same principle may continue to predominate through the later ages of its history, but it will then be blended with other principles, such as the maintenance of order, and of justice, the promotion of commerce and science. Besides, liberty in itself is very different in one stage and condition of society to what it is in another; and becomes much more complex and extended as the wants and desires of society spring up. As a general rule, however, the freedom of the government, and the share of liberty which it allows to the people, especially as regards matters of opinion, and religion, and politics, at whatever period of its progress, have a considerable influence on the civilization of the nation. Some laws must be, moreover, adapted for some particular countries only, and have reference to their peculiar situation and condition. Those relating to a

naval force, for instance, or to harbours, could not easily be made applicable to a country entirely inland, and destitute of either. Thus also was it with many of the laws prescribed to the Jews.

The aid of legislation to effect moral objects, is chiefly sought for in those instances where certain express moral duties have to be prescribed, or the commission of certain immoral acts is sought to be prohibited. Laws relating to religion and morality, which punish open breaches of them, are of this nature. Like medicine in the case of physical disease, they should nevertheless be resorted to only to correct the evils and disorders arising out of an artificial state of society, and merely to aid reason and nature in resuming their legitimate sway. Thus, they should protect the weak against the strong, and the peace or liberty of the many from being encroached upon by the powerful or turbulent few. Such laws ought, however, never to aim at changing by compulsion or constraint, the natural and legitimate habits or pursuits in which the people of any country have been accustomed to engage.

The jurisprudential system of a state should work in silence, and be unseen and unfelt, like the mechanism of our own bodily frame when in a healthy condition. The true secret of our sovereign's power is its unobserved operation in this manner, its vast strength being founded on the feeling of the nation in its favour. While it appears so fragile, it is in reality of very great force. Laws should, moreover, entrench as little as possible on the natural rights of the people, and should never tend to the deprivation of what is necessary either for their enjoyment or their use.

It has been laid down by some writers on Jurisprudence, that no civil enactment which is directly contrary to the law of God, is binding on the members of a state. It may be presumed, however, that no Christian state would make such a law; or, at any rate, a law which it

deemed and interpreted to be of this character. And as the interpretation, and the determination of the character of a law, rest entirely with the state; it is difficult to say how it is to be decided to be of this nefarious nature so as to absolve the people from its subjection. If any private individual might claim exemption from a law by merely expressing his own opinion of its contrariety to religion, there are few laws but what might stand in peril of becoming inoperative, and that probably as regards those who most need to be bound by them.

The most perfect jurisprudential system, alike in theory and practice, is doubtless that where civil and natural law not only coincide, but each contributes to confirm and enforce the enactments of the other. Such laws will be ratified and supported alike by nature and the state, will have the cordial assent and assistance of both, and will be acquiesced in by the people with whose opinion and feelings they entirely accord. Where Nature does not originate laws, its assent to them should nevertheless in each case be presumable. Against laws which are contrary to Nature, Nature will ever be found rebelling.

As regards the law of Nature therefore, no law directly contrary to this ought to be sanctioned. But here also the state, which makes the law, must determine as well the question of this contrariety or consistency. Sometimes, however, while the law apparently annuls what the higher laws alluded to have prescribed, it re-enacts them in another and more practical form. Thus, every man has a right by the law of Nature to support his existence by the food which the earth produces. By entering into society, although he gives up his claim to select his portion where he will, yet at the same time he acquires in return a right to support from the state; and to which he has also an additional claim from his contributions towards its maintenance, which every one either directly or indirectly renders to some extent, in the taxes which he

pays in the consumption even of the most ordinary article. On this principle, therefore, every member of the community has constitutionally an inherent, indisputable, and unalienable right to support from the nation, so far at least as extends to the providing him with the necessaries of life, both as regards food and clothing, and to which he is absolutely entitled as a citizen of that state, and in return for the obedience which he renders to it, the aid he is ready to give, and the portion of taxation which, however humble, every individual, indirectly at least, daily pays.

The ultimate end of law in general should be not to deprive men of their natural rights, but to extend and to maintain them. Whatever man gives up to society of this, the most precious of all his inheritances, he does so to obtain something in return of equal or greater value. These concessions to society are but the tax on insurance which we pay for rendering the rest of our rights entirely secure.

As is the case with each of the other Elements of civilization, the Moral Jurisprudence of a state should have immediate reference to the character of the people, as also to its condition in civilization, and the various causes by which it is affected. As each people is adapted only for the species of civilization suitable to its nature; so in like manner should the legislative and general government of every country be specially in each respect adapted alike to the wants, the disposition, and the general character of the nation.

The genius and character of a nation are, on the other hand, never more fully exhibited than in its laws. These show at once the turn of the national mind, its pursuits, its virtues, and its failings. The ability and the wisdom of its greatest men are also here exercised, and are tested by the results which they achieve. In one sense, indeed, the whole civilized world is cemented into one vast,

legislative nation, all, alike, owning and being regulated by the law of Nature, the same grand principles of liberty and justice, and order, being acknowledged by each, and the general frame of society and the interest of mankind at large, being knit together by the mighty influences of civilization.

In every nation, and in every department of jurisprudence, it is also of the utmost importance that the law should be in strict accordance with reason, and that it should appear and be felt to be so. Nevertheless, it must necessarily sometimes happen that the general principle of the law may be in strict accordance with reason, while the application of the principle to particular cases may fail to be so; or, at any rate, (of itself an evil, however unavoidable,) may fail so to appear.

The laws relating to marriage are of the highest importance to the social and moral well-being of every state. Such laws embrace mainly three objects:—1. Declaring what marriages shall be valid as regards the contracting parties. 2. Declaring the ceremonies that shall be required to constitute a marriage. 3. Determining what acts shall operate to terminate this connection. The main principle to be kept in view in these cases is, to afford a due and adequate security for the proper observance and fulfilment of the rite, with the least possible restraint on the parties concerned, together with the proper maintenance of the relation thus constituted.

In addition, however, to the express legislative enactments regulating the forms, and restricting the celebration of marriage; we must also here take into account the mode in which the usages of society operate as powerfully, or even more so than does the law, in the restraint of marriage according to the dictates of Nature, and the social and moral consequences which ensue from such unnatural restraint. Civilization here, as in other cases, should correct the evil in question, and should aim to

restore to Nature that prerogative of which the barbarous innovations of society, at variance alike with Nature and with civilization, have contrived to rob her.

Connected with the laws relating to and regulating marriage, are those which are intended to discourage and punish breaches of chastity, and all other crimes of this class, which should at once be effectual to check the vice in the mode most desirable, and yet not too severe to deter the public from putting them in force.

The influence of women in a state, is favourable to civilization in the earlier periods of it, but to a limited extent only. It has a tendency to polish the manners of a rude and warlike people, as the occupations and habits of the softer sex are more refined and civilizing than are those of the men. In a more advanced age of society, however, and for carrying civilization to its highest point, the influence of women will be found less beneficial. But little has been done by them for the advancement of learning and science; while on the other hand, they have done much to encourage and to foster luxury. Their influence on the whole, has been more important in correcting and counteracting barbarism, than in directly aiding or extending civilization.

As regards the education of women, it is laid down by Aristotle, "nothing proves more ruinous to a state than the defective education of the woman,"* and the same great writer observes with respect to the treatment of women in different nations, "If women are by barbarians reduced to the level of slaves, it is because barbarians themselves have never yet risen to the rank of men,—that is, of men fit to govern."† As it is the characteristic of a barbarous age for the women to be the slaves of the men, and to be treated with brutality; so is it the characteristic of an age of luxury and voluptuousness for the men to be the slaves of the women, and for the superior wisdom and sagacity

* Politics, book ii. † *Ibid.*, book i.

of the former to give way to the whims and frivolities of the feebler sex. In a rude state of society, the women are considered as mere cattle. In a luxurious age, the men degenerate into women. In a civilized age, each assume their proper place and sphere. And probably this affords one of the surest tests as to the real civilization of any particular country. Aristotle justly remarks, "Nothing proves more ruinous to a state than the defective education of the women."* To the women, indeed, is committed the early education of the men; and their influence here is most beneficial, corresponding with that which they exercise in the early career of a state.

In the framing of regulations, whether jurisprudential or social, which have reference to one only of the sexes, the relative position, and character, and the peculiar temptations, and particular duties of the party ought to be taken into strict account. Each of the sexes has, indeed, its duty to perform, however different those duties may be. The proper influence of each sex is moreover extensive and beneficial, alike on itself, on the opposite sex, and on the nation generally. And it may happen that when in civil society, one sex neglects its duty in some particular point, that duty may be performed by another, and the state may be saved by such interference. Extraordinary emergencies call for extraordinary exertions, which are however not to be resorted to except on occasions really extraordinary; and however beneficial in these extreme cases, they become pernicious if adopted as ordinary precedents.

The effect of conceding the suffrage to females, must be the infusion into the constituency of the special characteristics belonging to the female mind bearing upon the principles of legislation and representation. The qualities of this nature, which mainly predominate, are those of caution, refinement, and tenderness, which both the electoral and the representative body will be more largely

* Politics, book ii.

endowed with, and the results of which must be necessarily more or less apparent both in the character of our electoral representative bodies, and in that of the measures which the latter produces, influenced by the former. If we allow to women the same intellect in amount, although differing in quality with men, and if they have the same interest in the making of our laws, whether as regards property or personal liberty; there can be no doubt that they have, if they demand it, a corresponding right to the possession of the franchise equally with men.

A very high state of civilization is, nevertheless, not always found favourable to female purity, as the luxuries which frequently accompany it often lead to immorality. Luxuries, however, belong not to the perfection, but to the corruption of civilization.

Laws for the repression of luxury are very conducive to the growth, and still more so to the preservation of civilization, but are extremely difficult to enforce; and they seldom carry with them public opinion. Indeed, moral influences alone can both control this vice, and also regulate and restore the condition of society out of which it springs.

Considerable influence upon the morals of a country is also produced by the laws relating to debtors and creditors, by which honesty and dishonesty are either encouraged and protected, or discouraged and punished, according to the scope, and spirit, and operation of these laws.

In certain respects civilization has a tendency both to increase and to diminish crime. It affords facility for the commission of crime where skill is required in the perpetration, as in the cases of forgery and poisoning; and it also induces and calls into existence particular crimes, which in a condition of barbarism can hardly exist. On the other hand, civilization is directly preventive of crime by diffusing correct moral principles among all classes, as also through the sound rules of legislation,

especially in regard to crime, which it inculcates; in addition to which it affords the fullest opportunity for the detection of crime of each kind.

In a perfectly civilized state, as we see in the case of a perfectly regulated family, which is but a state in miniature, neither want nor crime will exist. One of these is generally the cause of the other. The result of civilization is to abolish want, while the abolition of want is the surest mode of abolishing crime. The main strength of crime, however, is the weakness of the law. Where the law cannot extend, crime roams fearless and unmolested. Where the dominion of law is established, crime exists only as an outlaw, and keeps out of sight and out of contact. Crimes that the law cannot reach ought not, however, to be included in a criminal code. By doing so we needlessly expose the law to hopeless defeat and continual insult.

The consideration of the laws relating to crimes, and providing for their punishment, forms an important branch of moral jurisprudence. This subject admits of a twofold division into the questions,—1. What crimes ought to be punished. 2. How they ought to be punished. Those crimes, however, and the result of punishments, so far only as they regard civilization, can be discussed here. The maintenance of good order and security is essential to civilization. Crimes in direct violation of religion and morality, nevertheless, are what mainly affect civilization in the way in which I have here considered it, as capacitated to exalt the higher over the lower influences in a state. But this is a topic which is at once too comprehensive to admit of being fully examined in this place, and too important not to have been amply treated of in the various dissertations on criminal law.

The moral effect of particular crimes also deserves attention here, as many offences, comparatively trivial in themselves, may be of extensive injury to the morals and civilization of a state.

Crimes which are of the class most directly contrary and inimical to the civilization of any country, although, perhaps, not possessing the baneful moral influence of many others, are those of brutal violence, which at once set the law at defiance, and tend to outrage every institution of civilization. But of all vices of this kind, such as are in any way either sanctioned by the authority of persons in high position, or are calculated to excite any undue admiration on their behalf, are the most pernicious in this respect, alike from their demoralizing and their anti-civilizing tendency. On this account, duels and combats between different persons ought strictly to be prohibited and punished. At the present period, when proposals are made for submitting even the disputes of nations to arbitration, so as to put an end to war and bloodshed throughout the world; it seems especially imperative upon us to endeavour to devise some means to prevent questions of social and domestic relation being the subject of brute force. If chivalry,—whose particular province it was to take cognizance of all such topics, above all of those where the honour of the parties is involved, or called in question,—has fallen into disuse, surely some arrangement should be made for establishing a tribunal for the adjudication of these important matters. And for this, peculiarly, ought Moral Jurisprudence to provide. Courts of chivalry expressly constituted to arbitrate on points of honour, so as to supersede entirely all occasion to resort to duelling as a means of satisfaction, are the more to be recommended, as it is the grand effect and aim of civilization to submit to the authority of rule and order, whatever in a natural state of society was decided by brute force, and to subject to reason what before was determined only by passion.

The general governing principle on which punishment for crime is based, is the opinion that repentance for the wrongful act done is effected and ensured through annexing

a penalty to the commission of the crime as a certain consequence of such commission; and, indeed, thus making it an essential part of the crime itself. The penalty should be so far painful as to outweigh every advantage that might result from the crime; and thus the sorrow for incurring the penalty becomes, in effect, transformed into sorrow for the commission of the crime. Many, indeed, will judge of the quality of a crime, not by the crime itself, but by the punishment attached to it. Annex a degrading punishment to a crime, and you at once thereby render the offence itself degrading.

Repentance is rightly, according to reason, held to amount to an atonement for transgression, inasmuch as, in the first place, it constitutes a direct and determined revocation of the decision of the will from which the offence itself originally sprang, and through which it was perpetrated; and in the next place, the sorrow thus occasioned for the sinful act, which forms an essential part of repentance, may be accepted as a sort of set-off against the pleasure which was caused by the commission of the crime. Wherever practical, and in order to complete the repentance, a return or compensation ought also to be made to the party injured, to the full extent of the wrong, both direct and indirect, which he has sustained from the act in question.

Insanity altogether exonerates the person afflicted with it from every crime of which its existence may be supposed to be the immediate and the producing cause, and relieves him from the jurisdiction of the law so far as he would be otherwise amenable to punishment, except only as regards the protection from his acts, of society in general, by subjecting him to strict corporeal restraint so long as his infirmity continues. Their deficiency in self-control, and their inability to fulfil the ordinary duties of life, exempt lunatics entirely from ordinary punishment.

As regards punishments in general, and those adapted

for ordinary individuals, they may be classed under two kinds, being either physical or moral: physical, where corporeal punishment is inflicted on the offender; moral, where correction of a moral nature only is imposed. The object of punishment is threefold,—1. To prevent crime, by deterring others from following the example of the criminal. 2. To effect a moral reformation of him. 3. To degrade the culprit from a position of influence to one of a lower rank.

The punishments inflicted by law are of seven several kinds,—1. Death, or capital punishment. 2. Corporeal pain, such as flogging. 3. Corporeal restraint by deprivation of liberty, as imprisonment. 4. Penal servitude, or service in bondage to the state for a certain period. 5. Corporeal banishment, such as transportation. 6. Deprivation of property, as fine and forfeiture of each class. 7. Moral degradation, which is a consequence of punishment of every sort, but which may be, and sometimes is inflicted alone, as when a man of rank forfeits his honours, or a professional man is expelled from his profession. Each of these kinds of punishment may also be varied both as regards its nature and the mode of its application.

The origin of civil punishments generally as retributions for crime, may be traced to two sources—1. The desire to adapt the nature of the punishment as nearly as possible to that of the crime itself. 2. The means at hand most ready for the infliction of punishment.

1. In each case, as we may observe in the economy of the human frame, where transgression against the law of nature is followed by some particular corresponding disease, the character of the punishment should bear direct relation to that of the crime to be repressed. Thus, violence ought strictly to be requited by corporeal chastisement; robbery by fine, or by loss of liberty where no property belongs to the criminal so as to enable him to undergo deprivation of property; and idleness should be

corrected by compelling the culprit to engage in active labour. Indeed, as idleness is one of the chief causes of crime, so excessive toil may be very appropriately selected as the mode of punishment for offenders whose transgressions may be traced to the former. Moreover, in the Divine system of rewards and punishments, even in this life, we may remark that crime of different kinds is generally followed by punishment of a character closely corresponding with it, as in the case of loss of health from dissipation, loss of substance from dishonesty, loss of credit from unfair dealing; and this which is the perfection of all systems, should human systems ever attempt to imitate, and in proportion as they succeed in doing so, will be their comparative excellence. It is also desirable that degrading vices be visited with punishments of a degrading and humiliating character. In all these instances, indeed, the system of Nature, and that adopted in the jurisprudential code revealed by the Deity, should as far as possible be followed, and be made the guiding principle. Not only, indeed, by the law of Nature are particular classes of offences requited by their particular classes of punishments, but it not unfrequently happens, as in the case of over-indulgence of the appetites, that the very organs themselves through which these propensities were gratified, are the members of the body which suffer disease and pain as the punishment of the sin which they were made instrumental in committing.

2. That particular punishments were often adopted, in the earlier ages of society, on account of the means ready at hand for inflicting them, will be obvious to every reader of history. The Asiatic punishment of throwing criminals to wild beasts, originated in the abundance of those animals in that part of the world. The Tarpeian rock afforded to the Romans a ready means of capital punishment by hurling criminals from that height. The proximity of seas and large rivers induced particular people

to have recourse to drowning as a capital punishment. And it was during their sojourn in the stony desert that the Children of Israel first resorted to stoning as the means of putting malefactors to death, and which they continued long after they had left the wilderness. It is indeed remarkable to observe in the Jewish law,* which was framed by Divine wisdom, how fully both these principles were carried out.

Nevertheless, in a highly civilized state of society, where crimes as well as the transactions of communities are very complicated, it will be found difficult, if not impossible, to continue the strict application of these principles, however desirable the recurrence to them may be in any attempt philosophically to trace the origin. and to define the true doctrine of punishments in general. In such a state of society it will probably be more prudent and more practical to adopt as nearly as possible one general system of punishment for all offences that are not capital, in the mode I shall presently propose.

The moral effect upon the community of particular punishments, and their influence upon civilization, seem to have been very little, if at all, taken into calculation. On the other hand, the various refinements of punishments, and the modes of inflicting torture, resorted to, appear mainly to prove that the ingenuity of man has been far more strenuously, and more successfully exerted to produce than to prevent pain; and that one of the fruits of civilization has been the invention of new modes of adding to the misery, and barbarizing the minds and the feelings of mankind.

Civil punishments should be so contrived that they are at once sufficiently severe to deter from crime, while at the same time they are of such a nature as not to operate injuriously on the public mind by violating or brutalizing the feelings of the people. It occasionally happens,

* Exodus, chs. 21, 22; Levit. ch. 24.

indeed, that punishments are in themselves more directly injurious to civilization than are even the very crimes they are intended to repress, although they may be at the same time very effectual to deter from crime. Such was the case with many of those cruel punishments practised by the ancients, and during the middle ages. Such, too, were public executions in our own country. Nevertheless, hanging and other capital punishments are not directly or necessarily barbarizing in themselves, but they are only barbarizing when they are made a public and popular spectacle. There appears, however, to be no more reason why hanging than why flogging should be in public; and there seems to be no solid argument against having it within the walls of the prison, before proper officers appointed to witness it. Originally, and in old times, executions were thus conducted. And there is this greater reason now why they should be private than there was formerly; that the trials are now always conducted publicly and openly, which was not generally the case during the periods alluded to. If the trial and condemnation are in public, there can be no objection to the execution, which is a necessary consequence of the condemnation, being private. The only objects of public executions are to produce a wholesome effect on the public mind, and to satisfy the public that the culprit has not been unfairly consigned to his doom. In the former respect they have entirely failed. And as regards the latter, all that the public have a right to know is that the condemned criminal has been put to death in the mode in which the sentence publicly passed upon him prescribed.

That capital punishment should be inflicted in cases of murder, appears to be in accordance both with reason and nature. It seems, also, to be obvious that in all other cases, penal servitude, proportioned and adapted in its extent, nature, and severity, as precisely as is practical, to the particular offence, would be the most efficient

punishment, as being at once the most effectual to deter others from crime, the best calculated to reform the offender, and the least likely to barbarize the public mind.

In certain cases, indeed, death may not be the punishment which is most dreaded, or which would most deter from crime; but it alone removes the offender from society which he has outraged, and of which he is no longer fit to be a member, and effectually prevents a repetition of his offence. Other punishments might be resorted to which would be more felt, and which might act more effectually by terror to prevent crime; but from being repugnant to the general feeling of the nation, they would lose their moral effect. Such are mutilation of different kinds, putting out the eyes, cutting off the hands or feet, as has been practised in some countries and ages. Even capital punishments may be varied according to the magnitude of the offence, being in some cases simple death; in others death accompanied by extreme torture, as crucifixion; and in others by ceremonies degrading to the criminal, as burning or dissecting the body. When, however, the punishment savours of cruelty, and occasions unnecessary or excessive agony, it is calculated to create a revulsion of feeling, which might ultimately operate in favour of the criminal, and so loses its effect.

Punishments in their application may be directed, as counteracting influences, either to the causes of crime, or to their commission, that is, to the crime itself, or to the character and position of the criminal. Certain punishments which would be light to one man, are grievous to another; and what to one are overwhelming, to another are trifles. Hence the punishments for infringements of the law inflicted upon the rich and on the poor should in many cases be different: not that both ought not equally to be punished, but it should be borne

in mind that what is efficient in the one instance may fail entirely in the other. For example, a pecuniary fine may be no punishment to the rich, but ruinous to a poor man. Imprisonment, on the other hand, may be an advantage rather than a punishment to destitute persons; while to a rich man of rank it may be an infliction of the severest kind. Where, however, the object of the punishment is limited to causing injury to the criminal without his reformation being also aimed at, as in the case of capital punishments, it is strictly perhaps rather vengeance than punishment that is dealt out. Vengeance is, in fact, the severest and ultimate penal proceeding to which the law resorts. Capital punishment nevertheless, in reality and strictness, consists not so much in the infliction of death, which must arrive sooner or later to every one; as in abridging the period of life which would intervene between the present time and that appointed for the death of the criminal in the ordinary course of nature.

The true theory of punishment as a preventive to crime, as already observed, is carried out by the artificial annexation to the pursuit from which we seek to deter, of some pain or discomfiture, that will in all likelihood be produced by the perpetration of the offence in question. In the case of children, for instance, we annex the fear of corporeal punishment, causing physical pain, to a breach of discipline. In the case of adults, we annex the fear of loss of liberty or property. In all cases, however, punishment should as far as possible be contrived not only to follow crime, but to be blended with it. It should also serve to strike the mind of the culprit, not merely as a consequence of his crime, but as an essential part of the act. The two should be looked upon as one and the same operation. In nature, indeed, we see this system very perfectly carried out; as in the instance of voluntary drowning, or taking poison, when the pain and death

which ensue are not considered as an independent consequence of the act of the party, but the whole transaction is regarded, and spoken of, and comprehended in the one act of suicide.

As the moral effect of dignities and honorary rewards, is to exalt the person receiving them, and to endow with dignity the acts which he has done, or rather, to mark the sense of their worth and dignity entertained by his fellowmen: so the moral effect of punishments is to degrade the person who undergoes them, and to debase and render ignoble the acts of which he has been guilty; or rather, to mark the opinion of mankind as to their baseness and degradation.

The general moral effect of punishments, more especially as regards civilization, is very extensive. In this, as in other cases connected with civilization, should not only be considered their influence on the mind to deter from the particular crime, but also their result on the dispositions and feelings as a preventive of crime in general. The moral effect of punishments in preventing crime, is also to be viewed as respects their entire influence on the sentiment and habits, and on the civilization of a nation. Crimes may in many cases be prevented by rendering them odious and revolting through the punishments annexed to them; but this, on the other hand, has a degrading and brutalizing effect on the national mind, as in the case of public executions* and public floggings, however serviceable they may be as regards the attainment of the direct end at which we aim. Some degradation of the criminal is, nevertheless, a very wholesome accompaniment to his direct punishment, and nothing is so efficient to deter others from following in his course. On this account the village stocks, now unwisely almost fallen into disuse, had really a more powerful moral influence than the county gallows. The main point to be avoided in the

* *Vide ante*, Element VI., p. 207.

infliction of degrading punishments, is affording a spectacle for the gratification of brutal excitement or curiosity, instead of raising a feeling of abhorrence for the crime which is being punished.

Nor is it reasonable to object to the adoption of any particular form or species of punishment, on the ground that it is degrading to the person suffering it, inasmuch as this is essential to the constitution and to the efficiency of any infliction of a penal nature, and without which it fails absolutely in its object. Absence from our native country, or excessive toil in a particular pursuit, which are forms of degradation resorted to in certain cases, may in others be by choice adopted as an honourable and beneficial recreation. So also many give as a voluntary donation, a sum much exceeding what is imposed on others as a severe pecuniary fine. It is the penal nature of the act, which really renders it degrading, and not the act itself that is so.

As the reformation of the criminal is one of the chief objects at which his punishment aims, so for the purpose of carrying out this reformation, no efforts should be spared in the legislative code of every civilized country. A gaol, indeed, should be a sort of moral hospital, where diseases of this kind are watched and eradicated, and a healthy constitution is restored to the patient. Care should, however, be taken in our correction and treatment of criminals, lest in our humane attempts to ameliorate their condition, we bestow upon them more favour than is shown to those who have never gone astray; besides which, it will be considered that they owe all the comforts they are enjoying entirely to the circumstance of their having transgressed. While, therefore, we ought to be far from discouraging every endeavour to reform criminals, yet in so doing they should ever be treated as criminals still; and the humanity and kindness shown to them, render additionally necessary this course. In another part of this

work,* has been advocated the expediency of supplying state rewards for the encouragement of the good, as well as means for reforming the bad. The rewards to the good should, for the reasons here adverted to, be of so substantial a nature as considerably to exceed those which are bestowed on persons who are reclaimants from crime.

Crime is, on the whole, one of the greatest enemies to civilization, as civilization is to crime. Legislative measures relating to this subject are, however, rather negative than positive, as regards their influence on civilization; aiming more to remove obstacles against, than to afford aids in favour of its progress.

The main defects of punishments generally, are, that they are,—1. Uncertain, both as respects the want of certainty that the offender will be reached, and also the absence of certainty that the punishment, if inflicted, will really be regarded as an evil either by the offender himself, or by those whom it is intended to deter. 2. That they are inefficient, as being contrary to the opinions and feelings of the people, either as respects their nature or extent, by which the moral effect of them is entirely destroyed. Both transportation and imprisonment fail from the first of these defects; and it is from the latter that capital punishments for ordinary crimes cease to operate, and to have a due influence on the public mind. Indeed, justice should never be called upon to act in its severest form, unless an adequate occasion exists to demand such an exertion. The law is in danger, when this rule is not observed, of being regarded as either tyrannical or unjust.

Aristotle well observes, that the greatest crimes are committed not from want, but for obtaining the objects of ill-regulated desires, and senseless insatiable passions; and that tyrants do not cover themselves with blood to avoid

* *Vide ante*, Element VII., p. 232.

cold or hunger.* This consideration appears especially desirable to keep in view in framing laws to deter men from crime.

The jurisprudential system of a perfectly civilized country should imitate religion in its economy as well as its justice, in working by rewards as well as by punishments. This is to some extent attained as regards the effect already adverted to,† which is produced among the higher classes by the distribution of honours and dignities as encouragements to merit. But the state ought, as also observed,‡ to be the rewarder as well as the punisher, alike of the poor and of the rich. In a highly civilized nation, indeed, virtue is to some extent its own reward, in the approbation that it ensures to its possessor; and on the other hand, only great and defined virtues and crimes can be taken cognizance of by the law. How far encouragements to and rewards for good conduct among people of the lower class might be advantageously bestowed by the state, either in the way of honorary certificates or pecuniary donations, or by both these modes, is, nevertheless, deserving of consideration. Indeed, in the preceding Element‡ reference was made to the desirableness of instituting a scale of rewards applicable to persons of the middle and lower ranks in society. And in every country where civilization is perfectly established, the rewards for virtue should be as abundant and as efficient as are the punishments for crime. Hand-in-hand with the warnings not to commit evil, should be the incentives to do good. As degradation of some kind, should ever follow vice, so exaltation as regards the respect entertained for the individual, should ever be the fruit of virtue.

Reference was, moreover, made in the preceding Element, to the state policy of encouraging in each nation those peculiar qualities and virtues which, from various causes,

* Politics. † *Vide ante*, Element VII. ‡ *Ante*, p. 232.

are most valuable to it, and most conducive to its interests. A corresponding rule should also be adopted as regards the discouragement and punishment of those peculiar vices which are either most frequent, to which there exist the greatest temptations, or which are most pernicious to the well-being of the nation. For instance, a breach of discipline or an act of cowardice, which in a domestic servant may be productive only of inconvenience, and should be punished merely as a misdemeanour; in a soldier may be attended with the most disastrous and even fatal results, and may therefore require to be punished capitally. So, on the other hand, dishonesty, which in a confidential servant is a most serious crime, and wholly destructive of his value as such; in a soldier may not be of vital consequence, or even actually lessen the value of his services. Drunkenness, whenever it leads to acts of open violence or indecorum, ought to be criminally punished in every well-regulated civilized state.

Very nearly allied to, and directly bearing on the subject of criminal moral jurisprudence, is that of oaths in courts of justice, a branch of law which has an important and extensive influence on the moral condition of a people, and which in its turn is greatly dependent for its efficiency upon the moral condition of that particular nation. As regards oaths in general, it may be concluded that that form of oath, in whatever country, or under whatever code of laws, must necessarily be most efficient, most satisfactory, and most proper, which in the opinion of the person taking it, be its wording or manner of administration what it may, is the most binding upon his conscience, however this form may vary among different people, in different nations, and even in the same nation among persons of different opinions. An appeal to honour can never be so efficient as an oath, although in certain cases it may be binding enough to secure the veracity of the deponent, and which is all that the most solemn oath can ensure. But while the one is

an appeal merely to the uncertain verity of man, the latter is an appeal to the infallible truth of God.

Immediately connected with this subject, it may be remarked that perjury is a crime which, although it inflicts no bodily injury on any individual, and may not affect his worldly possessions; yet it is, nevertheless, so utterly destructive to the well-being of society, and to its highest interests, by annihilating all mutual moral confidence between its members, which is the very basis alike of society and of civilization, as also being a positive violation of the laws of God, that it demands to be repressed by the laws of every civilized state, and deserves to be visited by the severest and most degrading punishment.

As a state as well as an individual, may perform great and good actions, or be guilty of great crimes; so a state, like a man, may have a conscience, and in both cases alike certain causes will contribute to improve, to weaken, or to stimulate that conscience. The tribunals of justice constitute the conscience of a state, and questions of justice are referred to the former, as in the case of an individual, all moral questions are referred to his conscience. States, too, like men, are liable to be arraigned for their crimes before other states, and to suffer punishment for their misdeeds.

In addition, however, to the express enactments contained in a criminal code, a due and proper degree of dignity attendant upon the administration of justice produced upon the mind of the nation quite as much moral effect, and exercises as extensive an influence, as do the laws themselves. Indeed, while the precise nature and provisions of the latter are known to and practically experienced by but very few, the former more or less affects and acts upon all; and by this, moreover, the power and dignity of the laws themselves, are, as it were, reflected. It is in reality, not the law, but the ceremony, which is its shadow, that the multitude revere.

A difference in costume may be but a trifle in itself, but if it serves to mark out, and to impress upon the multitude the difference in rank and functions, from the generality, possessed by particular individuals, it surely cannot be unimportant. In the animal creation throughout, the difference in their properties and endowments is manifested by their difference in size, and shape, and attire. In borrowing from them in this respect, although we are descending to copy beings below man, yet it is at the same time from the universal law of nature that we learn, and the lesson is taught by the Author and Governor of the universe Himself.

Too great a regard for, and a total disregard of forms, and ceremonies, and the trappings of office, are alike erroneous and unphilosophical. Those who make the efficiency of a rational being to depend on his dress, set up a machine instead of a man to keep their fellow-creatures in awe, and make embroidery instead of brains the test of fitness for office. On the other hand, those who contend that all distinctions of dress in cases of this sort are utterly futile, and that the plainer the attire, the more impressive the appearance of the functionary, can only have their argument satisfied to the full by the officer presiding in public without any habiliments whatever!

Not only, however, is it essential that good and equitable laws of different kinds should be made, but that those laws, when made, be brought fully into operation, and on all requisite occasions, be applied. For this purpose, a public officer, as prosecutor, or director of the machinery so constituted, is absolutely necessary, without which many laws, especially those of a penal nature, and which concern the public welfare rather than the private rights of individuals, may never be enforced for want of such functionary, whose business and duty it is to set them in motion, and on account of the odium which acting in such matters is apt to excite against private persons.

The institution of civil disabilities among any class of people in a nation, owing to some moral disqualification, and in order to prevent some moral evil accruing to the state, may be comprehended under Moral Jurisprudence. These disabilities are imposed,—1. From want of religion altogether, which degrades the individual, and unfits him for being an influential member of a civil society. 2. From a difference in religion to the generality in the state, which incapacitates him from acting harmoniously with them. 3. From want of morality, as in the case of a person convicted of crime, which also degrades the individual, and unfits him to have civil authority in a state. The foundation of each of these disabilities consists in the desire to promote the exaltation of the higher and nobler over the baser influences in the nation. On the other hand, the existence of laws in a state which allow of the causeless degradation and oppression of any portion of the community, such as the maintenance of slavery, has a demoralizing and degenerating effect on the whole nation, both on the slaves themselves and on those who enslave them. The moral tone and feeling of the entire community is corrupted by this means. In the cases, however, alluded to above, no restraint is imposed upon the liberty or privileges of any individual, except so far as it prohibits him from interfering with or injuring the general interests of the nation, or that portion of them to which he is opposed.

There are also some specific regulations which, to a certain extent, come within the scope of Moral Jurisprudence, although apparently remote from the subject of morals and civilization. Such are particular laws relating to the disposal of property and of money, as those of mortmain and usury; fiscal rules, which bear directly, in many instances, both on morals and education; and the laws referring to the maintenance of the poor. Each of these topics, although not strictly within the sphere of

Moral Jurisprudence, is more or less adapted for the application to it of the spirit and principles belonging to this branch, already defined.

An injurious moral tendency is often produced by the laws relating to the Excise, not, however, from anything contained in those laws themselves, but from the great difficulty of regularly and duly enforcing them; the temptations to persons of all classes fraudulently to evade them, which are constantly being excited; and the bad moral effect resulting from their frequent and systematic violation. Having been habitually guilty of dishonesty of this kind, people eventually feel less scruple in the committal of dishonesty of a more general character.

The laws which regulate the raising of the public revenue, in many instances exercise an important and injurious moral influence on a nation, although this is perhaps rather of a negative than of a positive kind, by the restrictions which they place on certain pursuits and undertakings, especially in matters of art and science, through the obstacles that they impose upon their cultivation. Of all the taxes which operate most perniciously as regards the advancement of civilization, those which affect directly the dissemination of learning, such as the duties on paper and on foreign books, are the most prominent. Laws which impede the circulation of ideas and the spread of information, hinder their progress in the same way that a logger does the motions of an animal, or as turnpikes do that of a traveller. They are not absolutely preventive, but obstructive. They render every step irksome, and curtail every expedition that is not necessary. The extension of knowledge should be like that of thought, free and unrestrained. Taxes of this description are shackles on the mind for the benefit of our material wants. Intelligence ought to be rendered as cheap and as accessible as the most ardent pursuers after it can desire. Food for the soul is really as much its right by nature, as is food for the body

the right of the latter. Both are alike essential, although the necessity for both is not equally acknowledged.

The framing and regulation of the laws, relating to copyright and patents, and other products of the mind, come also strictly within the scope of Moral Jurisprudence. Although these laws are in their nature necessarily restrictive, prohibiting the appropriation by mankind at large of what belongs of right to a few only; yet their ultimate result is not only to improve and preserve the quality of the article to be availed of, but to secure its general use to the public, and that in the most advantageous manner; so that in the end the nation, equally with the proprietor of the invention, are benefited by the exclusive privilege which he is allowed to possess.

The leading moral principle which should regulate legislation on the subject of the poor laws, is this:—To provide adequately for all those who are really necessitous, and for those only; and at the same time to protect from imposition those who are called upon to make this provision. And also to prevent the fact of affording this relief from producing any moral degradation in the recipients, who, as already observed, partake of it not as a charity but as a right.

It may perhaps appear to some persons that under the head of Moral Jurisprudence ought to be included sanitary laws, which affect so extensively, although perhaps only indirectly, the moral well-being of a people. But as cleanliness is no part of, and is not actually essential to civilization, though doubtless collaterally conducive to it—certain highly civilized people have been observed to be very uncleanly, while some very cleanly people are extremely uncivilized;—so the laws which contribute to and regulate the promotion and preservation of health and cleanliness, cannot strictly be comprehended in a code of Moral Jurisprudence. Indeed this is a subject which concerns directly not our intellectual or moral, but only

our physical well-being, however indirectly, as in the case of nearly every other matter of a physical nature, it may influence the former.

Changes in the laws and jurisprudential system of a country are also to be considered as regards their moral effects. These are always bad, without sufficient reason, both in themselves directly, and in their consequences. The more civilized is any particular age, the less favourable is it to organic alterations in the laws, or in the principles on which they are founded. There are, in all such cases, many institutions and interests, whose roots have entwined themselves one with another too deeply to admit of either being destroyed without affecting the whole. In some instances, however, the benefit resulting from the change may so far counterbalance the bad effects incident to it as to render it at all events desirable. Another point of great importance to be considered, besides the change itself, is the mode of making it. Many changes in themselves beneficial become injurious simply from the manner in which they are carried out, as being too sudden, or done at an unfit time, or in an unskilful way. An operation may be very requisite in a human body; but if done clumsily, or at an improper period as regards the condition of the patient, or with too much haste, instead of proving ameliorating, it may become fatal. So also is it in all respects as regards changes in the laws and constitution of a state. It is, moreover, very much, both with forms of government and with systems of religion, as with the professions in life which different men select. When a man has once adopted a profession and settled down in its pursuit, he will probably lose more by following a new one apparently better adapted to his capacities and taste, than by adhering to the old one, irksome and often difficult as a due devotion to it may be. So in the case of nations, when a form of religion or of government has become once thoroughly established, and the

institutions of the country have been moulded and accommodated to it; they will ordinarily lose more by an alteration as to either, although a decided improvement in itself, than by adhering firmly to the old and accustomed mode.* This observation does not, of course, apply to those cases where the system to be changed is so radically bad, as to be of itself an evil far beyond any alteration that could be made.

In the carrying out of all laws, much depends on the opinion and the habits of the people; and it is most difficult, and most impolitic also, to give active enforcement to a law that is directly repulsive to the general disposition and inclination, especially to the moral sentiment of the nation. Indeed, laws which fail or cease to be in accordance and harmony with the spirit, and feeling, and exigencies of the time, very soon cease to command respect, and to ensure observance. They are little more than the shadow, or rather, lifeless frame of what once lived and acted; and the sooner they are obliterated from the national code, the better both for the rulers and the ruled.

Laws may, however, be repugnant to the public feeling, not because bad in themselves, but, as already observed, from the punishment annexed to a breach of them being considered as disproportionate to the offence; on account of which there is a general disinclination to put them in force, and they consequently fail in their object. This was the case with regard to the laws in this country which formerly inflicted capital punishment for forgery, and for other offences of a much less serious nature. Indeed, laws, the spirit of which is opposed to the feeling of the people, are not only simply inoperative and powerless; but they often serve to create a prejudice in favour of the very acts which it is their direct aim to discourage and punish, and in this respect become positively pernicious as regards their moral effect.

* See also on this subject, *ante*, Element V., p. 189.

The operation and scope of laws in general are after all, however, but limited, both as regards the objects which they embrace, and their power of attaining even the very ends at which they immediately aim. They are, moreover, almost always of the prohibitory kind; or are, at any rate, for the most part, inefficient to enforce any prescriptions that are of a positive nature. Moral causes are consequently far more powerful in their operation, and are calculated to supply fully the defects of jurisprudential enactments in both these respects. The ultimate object, indeed, of Moral Jurisprudence is to accomplish by certain specific regulations those results which no ordinary law, or code of laws can directly effect. In this respect, and so far only, it not merely assists but supersedes all other law, by creating those influences which operate in its stead, and which are far more potent.

IX.—INTERNAL COMMUNICATION.

As the civilization of mankind is directly promoted by, and is largely dependent upon the intercourse which is carried on by the different members of each society with those about them; so what I have here designated by the term Internal Communication,—in order to distinguish it from that more extensive communication which is comprehended under the head of International Intercourse, and which forms a distinct Element of civilization,—must be allowed to be one of the essential Elements for its advancement. The interchange of sentiment that almost necessarily results from personal communication between people of the same nation, is in most cases directly calculated to conduce to their progress in civilization, corresponding, indeed, with the progress of knowledge in the mind of each individual which results from the comparison of ideas. Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged that mutual intercourse between people of the same nation

can effect but little if indeed anything, towards civilizing them, unless accompanied and aided by Education, and by certain at least of the other Elements of civilization already considered. Indeed, unless these Elements are some of them combined with that now proposed for discussion, the result of the application of the present Element may, in particular cases, be the entire reverse of civilizing. For instance, although, as I observed when inquiring into the Essence of Civilization, that some philosophers have supposed and contended that mutual communication was absolutely necessary for the progress of civilization, and certain of them even appear to deem it the one essential Element; yet, on the other hand, unless those individuals with whom this intercourse is held, have been educated and refined,—which is effected by the application of the Elements of civilization already considered, and which are appropriate for this purpose,—but little benefit as regards civilization can be derived from this intercourse. Hence, Internal Communication, although, like Education, it is a very valuable Element in the promotion of civilization, yet it is also, like Education, valuable and really efficient only when it is combined with the other Elements which are necessary to its promotion and ultimate perfection.

Intercourse between different persons is, however, so far of itself favourable to civilization as advancing knowledge, which is necessarily communicated by such intercourse. Although knowledge is at once derived from intercourse with the informed, ignorance is happily incommunicable; so that a man of information loses nothing by his intercourse with an ignorant man, though he gains nothing, as the latter does from him. Ignorance is simply negative and inactive; knowledge is both positive and active. But on the other hand, although ignorance is incommunicable, barbarism is communicable, and that to a large extent; and it is consequently possible that, in certain

cases, a civilized community may suffer and be deteriorated from its intercourse with one that is uncivilized.

By joining in society, people are not only brought together as regards their physically associating in one body, but they are also mentally and morally united into one being. A mutual intercourse as regards ideas, and an interchange of feeling, takes place between all the different members; and the results thus produced on the character of the whole, are preserved and transmitted from one generation to another, so that the society itself never dies, but is one perpetually existing intelligent body or community. This is not the case with animals, except to a very limited extent, so far as regards their corporeally herding together and sharing in common any feeling of alarm which may excite them. But they are wholly destitute of the power of interchanging ideas, or of transmitting the record of any events to those who come after them, which is the prerogative alone of intelligent beings. Nor is anything effected towards the civilization of animals by their congregating; except so far as this tends to quicken their instinctive powers, and to increase their activity and watchfulness. The establishment of mutual intercourse between human beings of the same country, is not only, therefore, directly calculated, in all ordinary cases, to contribute of itself towards their civilization; but it also leads them to resort to, and to avail themselves of, those other Elements of civilization which I have here considered as essential to its promotion and completion, more especially those of National Education, Religious Influence, and the Cultivation of Art and Science. It may consequently be concluded that however man may be naturally disposed and innately urged on to improve his powers, as an independent being, and which is essential for the attainment of individual civilization, the necessary precursor and producer of that which is national; the stimulus to do this is much increased by his

entering into society, and becoming a member of a social community. He is thenceforth led to do so both by the example of others, as also from a feeling of emulation not to be excelled by them, as well as by his own natural desire of improvement. Society, moreover, induces each person in it to develope his higher endowments, which alone directly contribute towards the attainment of civilization; and to subjugate to them the lower influences.

In order to ensure the excitement of a wholesome emulation conducive to civilization, it is, however, not only necessary that societies be formed, but that social communication and intellectual intercourse between the different members of them be carried on. And the greater the means for free communication throughout the nation that are afforded, the greater will be the progress of civilization among the people. By this means, indeed, the whole nation will be knit, as it were, into one society; the metropolis of the empire, which is the headquarter of civilization, communicating with each part of it, and each part of the nation both with the other districts and also with the metropolis.

Indeed, one of the peculiar features observable during an uncivilized condition of society, is that each separate herd, or clan, or department in a country, is not only independent of, but at constant enmity with, and wages war against the other. Civilization binds them all into one community, and converts rivalry into friendship, and acts of hostility into offices of mutual aid. Probably also, the more free and the more constant is the communication which is carried on between the different departments in the state, the less liable will they be to attempt, or even to desire to establish themselves into distinct rival communities.

This intercourse between the various communities in a nation, is analogous to that which is carried on between various individuals in the same community. In each

case, different minds are brought together, ideas are communicated from one to another, varieties of character are exhibited to each, knowledge of several kinds is diffused. and a full acquaintance with the nature and resources of the country is acquired by all. In nothing, moreover, is the analogy between a man and a state, which has been already adverted to,* better or more fully exemplified than by the constant, rapid, and unreserved communication which ought to be maintained between the various members of both of them, and between every part of each. A state, indeed, resembles a man the more in proportion as by its advancement in civilization it is perfect in this respect. In the man, the different nerves impart intelligence with the utmost rapidity to the brain from the senses and other organs, as also from the brain to them. And in the state,—whose noblest model is the man, as Nature most accurately regulates the economy of the latter, —civilization, which is its highest, and indeed its most natural condition, is perfect only when free intercourse between each of its members is completely established. The communication between the various points in the nation, as also between the remotest of them equally with those which are contiguous, should, moreover, correspond with that in the human frame, both as to the information and the impulses to immediate action which are conveyed, each member communicating with and acting upon the other with the utmost celerity, ease, and freedom. And, as in the human frame an entire facility of intercourse is established not only between the brain, which is the seat of intelligence, and those organs of the body which are immediately exerted in our intellectual operations, but with those organs also which are employed in merely common physical efforts; so also the intercourse in a nation should be carried on not only between those of the same attainments and rank, but also between persons

* *Vide ante*, Essence of Civilization, pp. 3, 5.

who differ one from another the most widely in this respect. Not alone between the rulers and the ruled, and the learned and unlearned, but between the rich and the poor should this communication be fully and freely maintained. Indeed, as regards intercourse in general, that which most directly tends to the complete civilization of a nation, is the establishment of free and friendly relation between the rich and the poor, by which the knowledge and refinement of the former are communicated to the latter, and the latter are bound by feelings of gratitude and respect to the former. In many respects the effect of this intercourse is beneficial and civilizing to both parties, as not merely do the rich learn many lessons of practical wisdom from the lips of the poor; but the exercise of acts of charity and benevolence has a high moral, humanizing, civilizing influence, and brings to those who thus act, its own precious reward.

Not only, indeed, is the intercourse between those of different ranks favourable to civilization, but intercourse also between persons of different professions and pursuits is in this respect advantageous to each other, all parties alike deriving benefit from the experience and information thus mutually communicated.

The establishment of a free and expeditious intercourse between the different parts of a country, is, moreover, of the same vital importance to its interests and to its proper regulation, as is the promotion of circulation and communication between the different limbs and organs of an animated body, of the motion of its fluids, and of its nervous and other impulses. Napoleon the First, who of all modern rulers and statesmen best understood the real exigencies of a nation, was pre-eminently distinguished for the care which he displayed in the construction of roads necessary to establish a complete connection between the various departments of his kingdom. And the noble efforts of the Romans in this respect, are among the

most remarkable and enduring records of their wise and comprehensive policy.

The means of communication which are established between different parts of the same country, must, however, be necessarily very various both in their actual nature, and as regards the ends they are intended to accomplish; and must, more or less, each of them depend upon the character of the people among whom they are followed, the condition of the country in which they are to be carried on, and the comparative degree to which civilization has attained perfection in that particular state. These modes of internal communication may be defined to be mainly of the six following kinds, which comprise all those that are at present in use. They are,—1. By Roads. 2. By Railways. 3. By Rivers. 4. By Canals. 5. By the Sea. 6. By the Air. The subjects of communication are threefold:—1. Persons. 2. Intelligence. 3. Goods.

1. Roads are availed of to connect different parts of the country together, but especially the metropolis with the several districts, and the various towns one with another. By their means, communication of each of the above subjects is maintained. 2. Railways are also established on the same principle as common roads, and as the medium of communication for the same subjects. For the purpose of establishing intercourse between far-distant points, they have almost superseded the other. 3. Rivers are the earliest and the natural modes afforded for communication; and, unlike artificial contrivances for this object, beautify and invigorate, instead of disfiguring and deteriorating the country through which they flow. 4. Canals are the artificial imitation and extension of rivers as a means of intercourse, but are mainly used for goods, and they penetrate districts where rivers do not run. 5. The sea affords another natural means of communication for the subjects of each kind, both with the different seaports of the island, and with its colonial possessions; and

travelling by sea is one of the earliest modes in use. By these different means together, communication of each kind is rendered complete throughout the kingdom; and for that of intelligence, especially, the establishment of a post, (which is a branch of the communication by roads and railways,) makes this intercourse between communities analogous to that by language between individuals. 6. Communication by air, (except as regards the ancient mode of conveying intelligence by carrier pigeons,) is yet in its infancy; and the effort to establish it by means of aërial machines or balloons may either degenerate only into a speculative experiment, or supersede the other modes of communication for the subjects of each kind, according as the science of future times may be found inapplicable to, or may be brought to bear upon this invention.

From the very slow progress, if progress there has been, which has of late years been made in aërial navigation, it is almost to be apprehended that instead of the science being merely in its infancy, it is in reality but a confirmed dwarf, never destined to advance in growth beyond its present dimensions. And yet, like other sciences, it is founded on nature, and there are types in nature which it might follow. All that is required is to imitate the machinery which we see exhibited in certain living animals, and so to modify it, as we have done in several parallel cases, as to adapt it for practical application by man.

Indeed, the use of balloons as a means of communication both of persons and intelligence during the late siege of Paris, has not only proved them capable of practical application, but of very great value in an extreme emergency, and when no other means could be availed of. Surely this decided proof of their importance demands as an apt return that the attention of men of science should be turned to the accomplishment of those improvements in

these machines, and in their means of conveyance, of which they doubtless are capable, and which they may be destined ultimately to attain.

All great undertakings in a nation that are for the national benefit, such especially as the artificial means of intercourse between its different parts, should be effected by the nation, and with due regard to those which are naturally formed or already subsisting. The national debt of this country has in no way been more pernicious to its interests, than in debarring it from entering into necessary national works of this kind, which have thus been left to chance or private speculation to accomplish, and have been therefore carried on without due regard to the national exigencies, or have been determined by mere local considerations; while the speculation engendered by these enterprises, which are too gigantic for any but states to engage in, has tended to generate a spirit of gambling, as injurious to the moral, as the incompleteness of the scheme was to the material interests of the nation. This has been peculiarly seen in this kingdom, not only in the formation of railways, but also in that of roads, canals, and other public works. If the rulers of Great Britain in the nineteenth century had only been imbued with the same comprehensive genius and spirit of enterprise for carrying on national undertakings in the heart of the empire, which the Romans possessed for effecting them even in a remote colony, how different would be the condition of this country now as regards its various means of communication! Among the Romans, national roads were constructed with due regard to the requirements of the kingdom as a whole, and to serve as a means of intercourse throughout each part of the land. An opportunity for following their example in applying the noblest invention of the age to supply one of the first wants of a great commercial and highly civilized nation, we have seen lost, and abandoned to private speculation; and the enrichment of the speculators

made the leading consideration, in the place of the real interests, intellectual and moral, of the state.

But, although railways extensively contribute to promote intercourse between the distant points of a nation, they frequently have the effect of checking that between adjacent districts, by destroying all communication of an ordinary kind. And perhaps, indeed, the kind of communication which they destroy, is exactly that which is most important in a social and moral point, and as regards the extension of civilization, being that which takes place between the people of neighbouring towns who are familiar with one another. The passengers brought by a railway are most of them strangers, and pass rapidly through a district, without either effecting or receiving any impressions of a social and moral nature. The facility and constancy of intercourse between different parts of a nation, in order to advance its civilization, should however not merely afford means for the travelling of passengers, or the forwarding of goods for commercial purposes; but should supply opportunities for transmitting information, and furthering the spread of knowledge from one place to another, either verbally, by letters, or by newspapers and books. Of all the various kinds of intercourse tending most directly to civilize a nation, that which is of a social nature, as by familiar conversation and private letters, has the most powerful result in this respect; and the greater and more easy are the means for this communication, the more efficient will they be for the promotion of civilization. Of these modes of intercourse, probably, that which is carried on by epistolary correspondence is the most influential, contributing as it directly does to the development alike of the intellectual and moral powers and feelings of the writers, and to the production of amicable relations on both sides. Consequently, the cheaper and more expeditious is the national postage of any country, the more conducive it is to its civilization.

Of a very different class to the one last named, is the communication of intelligence through the country by means of newspapers, already alluded to in a former Element,* by which information of the greatest variety is spread through every department, effecting thereby a general intercourse as regards the interchange of ideas between all the districts of the empire.

Nor must we here omit to refer to another mode of communicating information, although resorted to only on extraordinary occasions, and the invention of which is one of the wonders, as it is doubtless also among the most important scientific achievements of the age. I allude to the conveyance of intelligence by the electric telegraph, through which it may be sent to the most distant parts of the country, and even from one country to another, with the utmost facility and celerity.

This manner of expediting dispatches between different parts of a nation, seems directly analogous to the means of conveying impulses from one part to another in an animal frame. As a general medium of intercourse, it is of course from its nature but little resorted to; while from its immense value in the special cases where it is availed of, it is of great service, and in many ways, to the cause of civilization.

The internal communication that is required to be kept up in a civilized nation, is of a fourfold kind:—1. Between the metropolis and the other towns. 2. Between the metropolis and the different parts of the kingdom. 3. Between the different towns and the different parts of the kingdom. 4. Between the mother-country and the colonies of the empire.

Every civilized country is divided into a certain number of separate independent districts, all of which are distinct as regards themselves, but all alike have relation to the common country to which they each belong,

* *Vide ante*, Element V., p. 168.

and all have equally relation to one another, as portions of that common country; just as the several members of a community are at once distinct and independent of, and yet connected one with another.

The origin and object of these divisions in the case of a state, are of six several different principal kinds, and are —1. Natural, such as nature herself effects, as in the case of islands and portions of a country divided by rivers and mountains. 2. Civil, or those which are ordained for the purpose of government, as counties, hundreds, and parishes. 3. Commercial, such as those made for the purpose of trade, as boroughs, manors, tithings. 4. Intellectual, such as are made for educational purposes, as those relating to universities, colleges, and schools. 5. Moral, such as are instituted for moral and religious purposes, such as dioceses and parishes. 6. Economical, or such as are resorted to for the purpose of raising money by rating, such as counties, hundreds, cities, boroughs, parishes, and other divisions for objects of this kind.

Cities originated in the same causes as castles and fortified houses,—protection against attack by either enemies, robbers, or wild beasts. And this object in originating cities, influenced their situation, which was either on a rock, or an island, or on the banks of a sea or river. In course of time the pursuit of commerce, as well as protection, formed an object both in establishing and resorting to cities; and occasionally both these ends combined, influenced their situation. Rivers, especially the mouths of them, and the coasts of the sea where natural harbours existed, were selected on this account, which afforded at once both shelter for ships, and a ready means of communication through them to different places.

Capital cities are not only the most important towns in a nation from their size and population, but they are pre-eminently distinguished as being the most important spots in the countries in which they are placed, and to which

people resort from other towns and districts. Mere extent of population does not of itself constitute a capital city of any country, nor does even the greatness of its commerce, nor the wealth of its inhabitants. With all these advantages it may as regards its mental and moral influence on the rest of the empire, be still unimportant. What gives a capital its influence and consequence is correspondent with that which confers influence and power on the individual man. This he derives not from his bodily strength, his corporeal size, or his pecuniary wealth; but from his intelligence and enlightenment, and his moral character. So what gives rank and influence to a capital is the concentration within its limits of the talent, and learning, and intelligence of the nation, which is mainly occasioned by making it the seat of the government, the legislature, and the judicial functions of the empire. These constitute as it were the soul of the kingdom; and in this respect it necessarily has the pre-eminence above all other cities in the nation.

The metropolis of every country should consequently be not only its chief city, but should combine in itself the essence of the empire. From hence should emanate its leading civilizing influences, of which it is the source. Such is London to England, and, indeed, in some degree to the world; as is Paris to France, and to the Continent. Such, also, were Athens to Greece: and Rome not merely to Italy, but to Europe. Such, moreover, although to a less perfect extent, ought to be to every province its chief town. The principal city of a state should, also, not only contain the largest mass of the population, but should be its head and source of action; and also its capital as regards intellect, and art, and science, as well as in wealth and commerce. The metropolis of a nation being the occasional resort of a vast portion of the people belonging to the latter, more especially of its leading and most important members, and

its condition influencing more or less that of the whole nation; its institutions and public buildings, which belong rather to the kingdom than to this particular city, may claim to be supported at the national cost. Its libraries are the resort of all the learned of the land. Its works of art and models of genius, instruct not merely the inhabitants of the metropolis, but the national mind. Consequently, the capital of each state forms its centre of civilization. From hence the rays are diffused to each part. It is at once the seat of government, of law, of religion, of art, science, learning, and commerce. From this point therefore, proceeds the influence which each of these exercises on the nation.

But although the capital forms the focus of civilization in a nation, the provinces may be more favourable for developing individual talent. In the capital a single intellect is in danger of being lost in the constellation which there blazes. In the provinces he shines out like a lone star. Men of intellect are consequently in general produced, or rather discovered, not in the capital but in the country. In the capital, however, they are brought to maturity, which like a sun attracts and ultimately absorbs all the lesser and wandering planets.

If it be objected that the complete establishment of the means of communication between the metropolis of a country and its different parts may, and often does, have the effect of spreading the vices of the capital to the hitherto comparatively immaculate rural districts; it may be replied that it is solely owing to the imperfect condition of our civilization that this can ever be the case. The intelligence of the people in cities is no doubt much greater than what is possessed by the inhabitants of the country; and so the former ought, considered independently, if intelligence conduces to virtue, to be the most virtuous. But then, on the other hand, the temptations to vice are far more numerous and more powerful in cities

than in the country, so that although the people possess greater power to resist crime, they are assailed by stronger incitements to commit it. When civilization has accomplished her entire work, Education and Religious Influence having produced their proper result, the cities will no longer be the hotbeds of vice as they now are, but the receptacles of knowledge and virtue, and the purest and most powerful springs of civilization. Even at present, the real fact is that although there is more vice in the cities than in the country, there is also more virtue; consequently, it is not that the rural districts are more virtuous, but that they are less vicious than the towns. In a highly civilized and duly regulated state, the communication between its different parts will serve alike to correct the errors, and to supply the deficiencies of each.

The different towns in the nation, correspondingly with the metropolis, although less powerfully, each contribute to promote the civilization of the districts around them, and as the satellites of the capital, serve to reflect its light. Towns are, indeed, essential to civilization; and it is here not only that learning and art are preserved, but it is here chiefly that the sciences both originate and advance; and according to the natural position, advantages, or productions of many of these localities, different inventions will be pursued, and the benefit of them both diffused through the nation, and a beneficial emulation excited between these various communities.

The occupation and condition of the people in the rural districts of the empire, are ordinarily very different from those of the town population. Civilization, in general, is at a much lower ebb in the former; but by the establish ment of intercourse between them, each becomes improved. The rustics acquire the arts of civilization from the towns, while most, if not all of the natural resources of a country, are drawn from its rural districts.

But if the difference in pursuits and in productions is so extensive in the rural and urban districts of a nation, will not only a variety, but an opposition of interests between them, be necessarily created, which the establishment of free communication will tend to foster? Although differing in interest, these various parts of the same country ought, however, never to be opposed to the welfare of one another. In certain cases, indeed, a difference of pursuit may enable them the more efficiently to aid the interests of one another. Thus, what the rural districts produce, the towns consume in manufacture; and while the country supplies food to the cities, the cities disperse their wealth through the country in return. The more free is the communication established between the two, the more perfectly will this interchange be accomplished. In all cases, however, although the various interests in the state may fairly compete with, they should never aim, or be permitted to oppose or injure each other. Wholesome rivalry between them, producing emulation, conduces to the welfare of each; and it is one of the advantages of free communication to promote this feeling. Hostility, on the other hand, is injurious to all alike, and only retards their progress. The common interest of the state, which every patriotic citizen must regard above all other considerations, should serve in these cases to cement a community of interests among all rival bodies. And, indeed, as belonging alike to the nation, each of these interests is concerned indirectly and ultimately in the success of each other. The different members of the same family, between whom the utmost desire exists for each other's welfare, may be to a certain extent competing, but ought never to be hostile aspirants in the same pursuit. While the friendly competitor seeks only to outstrip, and thereby increases the speed of him against whom he runs; the envious rival endeavours not merely to overtake, but to overthrow, his opponent.

Different cities and communities in the state, possessing different interests, should, as in the case of the national representatives elected by different districts, consider themselves bound to promote the general welfare of the country, and of all its interests alike. The neglect of this principle has proved fatal to the prosperity of many great states.

Some communities and interests appear, nevertheless, to be quite as intent on the injury of one another, as on promoting the welfare of themselves. This, however, is a most dangerous, and, indeed, destructive policy. As impossible is it to do good to one part of the body by deteriorating another part, as to advance one interest in the nation by ruining another. The real foundation of the strength and vitality of the state is the mutual union and co-operation of all its varied interests.

A balance between its contending interests should, moreover, be maintained as far as possible in every state, and is as essential to secure peace among them, as is the maintenance of the balance of power among rival nations. And, in each case, the strict preservation of this balance is the surest means of promoting harmony, and of preventing suspicion and jealousy, which mainly operate to hinder those rivals from becoming benefactors to each other.

It is impossible, however, wholly to repress the rival energy of the contemporaneous interests in a state. Even the very existence of industry in any community or nation, which in ordinary cases is a most valuable quality, may, under peculiar circumstances, be converted into a bane. Over-activity, whether in a mind, in a body, or in a people, may be the cause of direr evils than the utmost want of activity can occasion. Insanity in the first, fever in the second, and rebellion in the third, will be its consequences. Much must, nevertheless, depend on the quality of the activity in question, and still more upon its application.

Activity in one mind may induce great results, in another only great ravings. One man's activity may be that of a man of business. The activity of another may be that of a thief or an assassin. The activity of a people may turn either to commerce or war, or to sedition and rapine. So the activity of the various interests in the nation require control and direction, equally with that of the activity of the population.

The impetus to civilization afforded by a great nation whose career is in a considerably advanced stage, extends, however, far beyond its own natural territories, and must, necessarily, more or less influence all connected with it by the mere ties of intercourse. This is, indeed, especially the case with those countries which are annexed to it as its colonial offshoots or dependencies. And it is of essential consequence that the communication between the mother-country and the colony should be as free and as constant as possible. The colony receives from the mother-country an important influence favourable to civilization, and derives from it mainly its arts, and learning, and laws, and science, as do the different districts in a nation from the metropolis. On the other hand, the mother-country may derive proportionally as much from the colony in resources and natural productions, as the towns do from the rural districts.

Owing to the insular position and the limited dimensions of this country, arises the necessity for establishing colonies in different parts of the world, in order to accommodate and to find occupation and territory for her increasing population. And indeed, one of the immediate effects of civilization and of the increased facility of travelling, is to extend the boundaries of any nation. In early barbarous times, several independent states existed in England. As civilization advanced, the whole country became united under one sovereignty. With the further progress of civilization, Scotland and Ireland became included in the

empire. And colonies of vast extent have been annexed to this kingdom as its civilization has continued to grow. So also was it with the states of old. But nations which form part of a great continent, are able either to expand their territory by encroaching on their neighbours, as we have seen in the case of Russia, and some other countries; or their population becomes mixed with and absorbed by that of the adjacent countries, through which the surplus portion of it is gradually relieved.

By the establishment of colonies in different parts of the world, the natural limits of our island kingdom, are for all practical purposes vastly extended, and its ramifications are made to spread to the remotest corners of the globe, whence they at once draw nourishment from the parent trunk, and it still continues to afford vitality and stability to them.

Colonies form a sort of medium between the different departments of a nation, and the foreign states with which it holds amicable intercourse. They lie locally beyond the shores of the country, and yet they are substantially united and attached to it, by living under the same government. To a certain extent only they have a community of interest, which lasts as long as the dependence on the mother-state continues; but when this is shaken off, of which there is always a prospect, at any rate a possibility, they become then merely friendly foreign states as regards the nation from which they originated.

The occurrence of the late outbreak in India, affords a proof of the necessity of not only civilizing our colonies but of binding them to, and incorporating them with the mother-country, by a union of interests, of institutions, of feelings, of religion, and of affection. The more completely this end is accomplished, the greater is the aid which this nation will derive from its colonies, as the greater also is the benefit which its colonies will derive from this nation. Indeed, a union of the nature alluded

to, is the only sound and real cementing principle between parent countries and their colonies.

Being exposed to aggression by foreign powers, colonies, as regards their influence in preserving peace among states, have a corresponding result with the possession of property and children by individuals, which operate as hostages to prevent them from molesting or interfering with one another, from fear of the consequences, either to themselves or to those so closely connected with them, which might ensue. Nevertheless, perhaps in each case, it is something relating to these close connections which constitutes the most frequent occasion of outbreaks between them. And in addition to this, the circumstance of any country possessing colonies or remote dependencies, tends to destroy that independence as regards its relation with foreign nations, by whom these colonies may be attacked.

No fixed and definite principle appears ever to have been determined as to the proper relation between the parent-country and her colonies, and the degree and nature of the allegiance, and support, and dependence, and connection which ought to subsist between them. Here, it seems to me, as in many analogous cases, that nature supplies the best and most perfect example, and that from her system a correct and satisfactory principle may be deduced, through following that which subsists between parents and children, and that not only in the human, but in the animal creation, where duty, justice, and interest are blended together, and aid each other. Thus the parent aids the child so long as this is needed, training it nevertheless gradually to a state of self-control and self-support, rendering it assistance where this is necessary; and in time, when it has attained maturity, leaving it to shift for itself, but still maintaining the connection and allegiance which should ever continue, both from gratitude and interest. The two eventually become independent, but they should, nevertheless, ever

be united by those strongest of ties, interest and parental affection. Thus should it be with the colonies, following here the perfect pattern of nature. The mother-country should nurture and aid the infant colony, so far as to enable it to mature itself, and develope its resources,—but not beyond this. And the colony should own friendly allegiance to the mother-country, in return for the benefits thus rendered,—but not beyond this. The ultimate relation between the two, should be that of a full-grown and independent son established in business, to the parent who nurtured, educated, and set him up in the world.

Moreover, in the government of our colonies, their good, as well as that of the mother-country, ought ever to be kept in view; and on that account they should be fully and directly represented in the legislative body of the mother-country. When we act for our children, we act for their welfare as well as for our own. We draw produce from our colonies, and in return ought to award them protection when they require it; and this on the reciprocal principle, which forms the basis of all commercial and indeed all other transactions in civil society, of each rendering to the other in exchange what each most requires.

The result of steam navigation and the electric telegraph, in not merely uniting different parts of the same country, but the distant colonies and the parent state, and in effect bringing them together, as regards their intercourse of every kind, as though actually located near to one another; amalgamating, as it were, the various scattered portions of the empire, spread through so many regions and climes, into one compact and accessible country; must doubtless be very important as regards the civilization of each. And, indeed, if the different great nations of the earth go on increasing, as they are now doing, both by the annexation of new territories, and the acquisition of fresh colonies, it appears not improbable

that the world will eventually be divided, not into four quarters, but into four nations only.

As regards the civilization of colonies, the maintenance of free and constant communication between them and the parent state, must obviously be a matter of the highest importance; as by this means they participate in the superior advancement and enlightenment of the latter, and derive directly from it many of the most essential Elements of civilization. On the other hand, intercourse with the colonies contributes also in its turn to advance the civilization of the mother-country, not only from the productions of various kinds which it affords, but also from the information of great variety that it yields, the strength and wealth that it is the means of ensuring, and the stimulus to enterprise and exertion of each kind which it supplies. Indeed, the maintenance of this intercourse between the mother-country and her various colonies, as also between the colonies themselves, and the complete carrying it out, are quite as essential for the advancement of civilization, as is the securing the means of Internal Communication between different parts of the same country, and tend more than anything else to cement the union between the colonies and the mother-country, and the colonies one with another. The discovery and application of steam navigation, and of the electric telegraph, are consequently an immense boon to England, so rich in her colonies; and in this respect probably she profits by them beyond any other nation in the world.

It appears necessary, therefore, for the due dissemination of the influence of civilization throughout a nation, both that the before-mentioned means of communication, of each of the five first kinds at least, should be fully established, and also that the subjects of each nature should be freely transmitted thereby. Thus alone can the influence of civilization be largely exercised; the superior enlightenment and cultivation of the metropolis be extended to the

promotion of a corresponding civilization in the other parts of the empire; and the resources of the rural and colonial districts be completely developed through the superior knowledge and advancement of the metropolis.

As mutual intercourse between different persons has been supposed by some writers to be the original mainspring of civilization in each country, and the sole Element requisite for its promotion,—although the latter notion, as I have endeavoured to show, is without foundation in reason,—so it is in reality that which is necessary to the perfection of civilization throughout the whole population of any particular nation. It is the medium by which its diffusion is extended to all parts of the empire. And as the establishment of this communication is, on the one hand, essential to civilization; so, on the other hand, is civilization essential to the perfect establishment of Internal Communication. And as this Element is extensively dependent on certain of the other Elements for its efficiency in promoting civilization; so there is no Element which so extensively contributes to aid the operation of those Elements which aid its own operation. This is more especially to be traced in the case of the Elements of National Education, National Religious Influence, National Instructory Institutions, and the National Cultivation of Art and Science.

The freedom of intercourse and intercommunication here contended for, however, like civil freedom, requires to be properly controlled, and to be exercised in moderation only, otherwise it will be in its effects pernicious instead of beneficial to the state as regards its influence on civilization. Thus, while a reasonable degree of activity among the people, and the free and constant transit and communication from one part of a country to another, are desirable to be kept up, and constitute one great feature in the economy of a civilized nation; yet, on the other hand, a habit of restless activity, which induces persons to be ever

wandering about from place to place so as hardly to have a settled home, is directly inimical instead of conducive to civilization; and is in reality a condition which belongs rather to a state of barbarism, than to the economy of a well-ordered, highly civilized community. So also as regards the intercourse one with another which men in general carry on, this should not of course be so incessant as to preclude all other and more improving occupations, but should take place at proper intervals only, and under due regulation.

X.—INTERNATIONAL INTERCOURSE.

While inquiring into the nature of the preceding Element, we considered the influence and effects of communication of different kinds between persons of the same nation, as regards the advancement of civilization. In examining the Element now proposed for discussion, I intend to inquire into the result and efficiency, for the same ends, of the intercourse between the people of one nation and those of another, which is in reality an Element in its essential characteristics very similar to that which precedes it, and has by some persons, indeed, been included with it, as though a part of the same Element. Nevertheless, there are important distinctions between the two, both as regards their quality and their tendency; and the present Element is so much more extensive and more comprehensive in the range of its operation and the scope of its results than the other, as almost of itself to create a difference from it as regards its very nature.

It was observed during the consideration of the preceding Element, that, while in a state of barbarism, the various districts of a nation are not only separated from one another as regards their mutual intercourse, but are in the habit of waging war against each other; and that civilization draws them together and renders them friendly.

This principle is applicable not merely to different communities in the same country, but also, and perhaps equally so, to different countries lying adjacent to, and capable of holding intercourse with one another. Civilization, and civilization alone, unites them; and the result of civilization is to convert feelings of rivalry and hatred into amicable relations and offices of friendship.

Foreign or International Intercourse, although I have placed it the last among the Elements of Civilization, as it appears in our present state of society the least directly to conduce to that condition; is probably the earliest Element which contributes to its production in many rude nations, who not only imbibe the first notions of various kinds which lead them to cultivate different civilized pursuits, from their intercourse with the inhabitants of foreign countries; but, what is even of greater importance, from this intercourse proceeds the first stimulus to their advancement. Accordingly, as already remarked, the original spring of civilization among individuals is mutual intercourse. The next stage in their progress, and which further conduces to their advancement in civilization, is the intercourse between different tribes and bodies in the same country. And the third and last incipient producer of and stimulus to civilization, is the intercourse which they acquire with foreign nations.

Not only, indeed, upon civilization, but also upon art and science, the influence of International Intercourse has been supposed by some writers to be productive of the most extensive benefit; and it appears to have been believed by them that to this and this alone have their origination and their rise been owing. Here, however, as in the case of civilization, it was not the intercourse itself which generated or promoted the pursuits in question, but the knowledge, or experience, or education, which was obtained through this intercourse.

The immediate and direct civilizing effect of Inter-

national Intercourse upon any particular country, is, moreover, here to be considered quite independent of the assistance which such intercourse always indirectly affords to civilization, by aiding the operation of its other Elements; as where Education is stimulated by the superior accomplishments of the foreigners who visit it; where Art or Science are promoted by imitating the productions, or copying the inventions of another nation; or where customs conducive to civilization are introduced by the new country to which the inhabitants of the other had until then been strangers. We have here only to regard the influence on the progress of civilization which foreign intercourse itself independently exercises, more especially as respects the mental stimulus and general awakening and excitement to emulation and exertion which it produces among a people; the sharpening of their faculties, and the development of their energies by this means.

Indeed, the grand, immediate, and most important effect of communication and intercourse, whether as regards that between different individuals, different communities, or different nations, is this excitement of stimulus of some kind or other, by which the powers and resources of each are at once fully developed. The truth of this proposition is particularly illustrated in the case of those children who are brought much into communication with others, by which their faculties are greatly sharpened, and their energies are extensively excited, in comparison with those who have been educated with but few companions. So also is it with respect to communities and nations, intercourse between which calls forth the resources and energies of each, and stimulates them to develope their various powers and capacities. Influence of this kind is, moreover, not only extensive but durable, and is of each order, intellectual, moral and social. Thus, the influence which the Egyptians exercised upon the Jews during their sojourn in Egypt, mental, and more especially religious, has con-

tributed to exert an authority, and to communicate an impulse to the mind of that people even to the present time.

Nations, moreover, like individuals, are not only greatly improved, as regards their advancement in civilization, by the establishment of mutual intercourse; but they are also extensively benefited in a variety of ways, corresponding also with the case of individuals, by the maintenance of union and friendship one with another: and perhaps most of the social evils among men, and the political evils among states, are to be traced to the neglect of this simple and almost obvious principle. In the case, too, both of men and states, certain important advantages can be conferred only by foreign aid, being beyond the power of the individuals themselves to secure. By this union together in the league of friendship, of different foreign nations, alone can ultimately be attained not merely the civilization of a particular country, but that also of the whole world.

Civilization increases the wants of a people, but it increases the means of supplying those wants in an equal, and probably a greater proportion. This is particularly the case as regards International Intercourse. Possibly each country produces enough of every thing that is actually required to supply its own natural necessities. But as those necessities are extended and increased by Civilization, we resort to other countries to supply them; and from them obtain, and to them give in return, all that each requires.

An important influence on national character is, moreover, produced by International Intercourse, and that in several respects, physical, moral, and intellectual, corresponding with the change occasioned in individual character by individual intercourse. This result nevertheless, in the case both of individuals and nations, is more extensive and more important as regards the develop-

ment and course of conduct thereby occasioned, than with respect to any actual alteration that takes place. Indeed, the establishment of intercourse with others, and especially the particular nature of the communication carried on, materially affects the policy and the action alike of men and of states. This we may observe in the different persons around us, and also in the several nations of the earth, who, according to their social or geographical position, and the consequent opportunity which they possess for holding intercourse with other individuals or countries, vary both in their character and their career.

If it is our duty to regard our colonies as the children of the mother country, and to treat them accordingly, we ought to consider foreign nations with whom we hold intercourse, as our neighbours and friends, with whom it is desirable to maintain an amicable relationship, but at the same time expedient not to be too familiar or too closely connected: we should do our best to continue our alliances with them, but should on no account render ourselves in any respect their dependents: we should be ever willing to exchange good offices with them, but should never consent to put ourselves in such a position that we are necessitated to look to them for aid, either martial, commercial, or civil. We should neither be too eager to intermeddle in their affairs, nor to allow them to intermeddle in ours. We should be ever ready to render our assistance where it is needed, and to avail ourselves of that of others when we really require it.

A question nevertheless of some difficulty arises as to the cases in which, and the extent to which foreign interference by one state in the affairs of another, when fully justified, may be exercised. Nations are not only warranted in interfering, but are bound to interfere in quarrels between nations in all these cases where their interposition is likely to have the result of putting an end to the disagreement, and

restoring the blessings of peace, where such a result cannot be looked for without such interference. Although each nation is independent of the other, as each man is of every other man; yet as each man is a member of society, so each nation is a member of the great society of nations, and as such is interested in the welfare of each member of that society, and is more or less, directly or indirectly, affected by it, and as such is bound alike by duty and by interest to interfere, when it can do so with a reasonable prospect of beneficial results. Such interference should be conducted in the most conciliatory and equitable manner towards both the contending parties; and a reference to arbitration of matters in dispute, appears the fairest mode of terminating the quarrel.

We should, nevertheless, be ever careful about interfering in the quarrels of our neighbours, both individual and national, unless we have the most urgent reasons for such intervention. For our own credit we should never do any thing to provoke them. For our own interest it is seldom desirable that we should interfere even to end them. Whoever meddles in a quarrel, at once makes himself a party to it. And it very often happens that the only reward of him who benevolently steps forward to prevent two infuriate foes from tearing each other to pieces, is that they both fix their fangs in him instead, and he thus reaps a double portion of what he vainly strove to avert the infliction of by one upon the other.

The only circumstance, indeed, which can confer on one nation an absolute right to interfere either in the disputes or the internal constitution of another, is the case of their being in some way or other directly injurious to, or otherwise affecting the condition of the country so interfering; in a manner analogous to the case which in society confers on one man a right to interfere in the domestic concerns of another, as when he so conducts his affairs as to become noxious or injurious to his neighbours. As in society, so

among governments, each individual is to consider not only his own interest, but the interest of all connected with him, so far at least that his conduct, respecting which full liberty is otherwise allowed him, do not prove injurious to other members of the same community.

The principal, natural, and original causes of the separation one from another of different nations, are the partitions effected by seas and rivers, those made by chains of mountains and forests, the distinctions arising from the difference in climate and natural productions, and those occasioned by a dissimilarity in language. Nature no doubt very wisely instituted this division of various countries, which in an earlier state of society and of civilization was in many respects desirable. But as civilization, by softening the manners and regulating the habits of mankind, fits them for more extensive intercourse, and thereby renders this severance no longer necessary; so is it also the first to break down these barriers, and its tendency is to unite those who have hitherto been separated, from whatever cause. The sciences introduced by civilization contribute, moreover, to enable us to overcome those obstacles to mutual intercourse between nations which Nature had imposed; and in some instances they even make them available, as in the case of seas and rivers rendered navigable, for means of communication. So also a variety in natural productions, which at first operated to deter the people of a different nation from settling in any new country, may eventually, when civilization has advanced, be the main inducement to visit its shores. In like manner, mountains and forests, by the supplies which they afford for the uses of civilized life, instead of separating people one from another, actually draw those of various nations together who are each bent on procuring the same commodity. A difference in language, which constitutes an intellectual, as the others formed physical boundaries between adjacent nations, as intellectual pro-

gress advances, ceases to be an obstacle to mutual intercourse, and those of each nation learn the language of the other; and this very variety of tongue may ultimately in many cases be of itself a motive for visiting the foreign country with a desire to acquire its language. Thus it will be seen that, as civilization fits men for International Intercourse, so it chiefly contributes to annihilate the barriers against carrying on this communication; and that International Intercourse owes as much to civilization, as civilization does to International Intercourse.

Aristotle remarks that "to the external action of a state, a wide field lies open in the diversity of genius and character of the surrounding nations."* Countries in different stages of civilization are naturally drawn together, the more advanced being as eager to receive from the other its natural resources, as the other is to share in the wealth and arts of the more refined.

Religion, which, when it is duly cultivated and genuinely carried out, contributes more than anything to unite mankind, whether members of the same community or of various nations, as all alike joined together in the common fraternity of fellow-creatures, the offspring of the same Creator, and the subjects of the same Almighty Sovereign; by the numerous differences of opinion to which it gives rise, seems to be one of the leading intellectual and moral causes for separation, and for preventing free intercourse between them. As Religious Influence is an important Element in civilization, so when civilization itself has become perfected, then and then only will religion,—which has hitherto been not merely one of the main and strongest occasions of division, but which has preserved its power while the mighty barriers of separation occasioned by seas, and rivers, and other natural causes, have been surmounted,—become the surest and only absolute bond of union.

* Politics, book iv.

At an early stage in the career of the civilization of most nations, the pursuit of commerce and of general products of this kind contributes to draw them closer together; although many of these undertakings frequently prove, on the other hand, the occasion of suspicions and differences between them, and afford topics for disagreement. Civilization, however, has a powerful effect in uniting both individuals and nations, by rendering them more dependent one on another for mutual aid and commodities, and also by refining their social habits. Variety of climate has occasioned variety of productions, and variety of productions has originated commerce, and commerce has caused general communication between different nations. If all the various nations of the earth were of the same climate, their productions would all be the same, and the necessity for international commercial communication would not exist. By the interchange of natural productions, various communities are also bound together, especially in the earlier stages of civilization; although this may also lead to jealousies and disputes. The establishment of free and friendly communication between different nations, especially for purposes of trade, adds in effect essentially to the riches of each, as thereby every state which is in this position is enabled to derive something from the resources of the other, as well as to dispose of its own superfluous produce. This consideration should operate as an additional inducement to the maintenance of amicable intercourse.

It is further to be observed that, as it is with regard to different rival bodies in a state, so is it with respect to different foreign nations; there are certain benefits to one which are benefits to the whole, and certain injuries to one which are injuries to the whole. Such are great discoveries in science, grand achievements in art, the scarcity or abundance of provisions, and the like. Each nation should therefore endeavour, as far as possible, to assist

every other nation in relation to these matters, which in reality are the property not of particular states, but of all people and countries alike; and are the gifts not of one man to another, but the common gifts of God to all mankind. Indeed, as each individual lives, or should live, not for himself alone but for others as well, and should be ever striving to benefit them as well as himself; so each nation should, in a corresponding manner, carry on its affairs, not for its own advantage only, but for that of the whole of the nations by which it is surrounded, and by whose condition it is ever itself necessarily more or less affected.

Commerce, therefore, contributes extensively to promote intercourse with foreign nations, as well as to unite them together. Commerce and International Intercourse,—indeed, commerce and Internal social Communication—appear naturally to spring up almost contemporaneously, commerce being the immediate result of intercourse, while both tend to support each other, whether the intercourse be international or only internal. In ages long past, commerce was the means of inducing foreigners to visit our shores from far distant lands, and it still continues to operate in the same manner. Commerce seems to make some atonement for the sordid influence which it directly exercises, by the civilizing tendency that its intercourse produces, and by its effect in binding together in one vast chain of fellowship so many different nations of the world. The interchange one with another, according to the wants and natural or artificial productions of each, leads to a corresponding interchange of ideas and sentiments. A moral bond of union thus becomes formed, whose strength no wars can entirely sever; whose length extends through the wide territory of the civilized world; and by which alike the most polished nations, and those of the fiercest and rudest nature, have been drawn together.

Our own country is indebted for its earliest civilization,

to its intercourse with the nations around it; and, as already observed,* it owes much to its geographical position, and its proximity to the continent of Europe, and to surrounding nations, who have furthered its progress in civilization. To this fact also have been greatly owing its commercial advantages, and its skill in navigation. Every country is no doubt largely influenced in its pursuits and character, correspondingly with the case of an individual, by its particular adaptation, and the circumstances by which it is surrounded. Its geographical position may often do much to determine the policy of a country, and that policy should ever be in strict accordance with what Nature so dictates. Thus, France, from her situation, is eminently qualified to exercise an important influence over the various great countries with which she is so closely connected by geographical affinity; and it is her true policy to pursue a political course accordingly. England, on the other hand, from her insular position, is no less adapted to stand independent; and independence of other nations should be therefore the basis, and leading and prominent characteristic of her policy as regards foreign states. Particular localities in a country will also be characteristically distinguished according to their situation. Thus, Dover is naturally fitted as a port to the continent for travellers; Hull for commercial continental traffic; London, from its accessibility by water, and inland position as well, to be the metropolis of the empire.

Britain was first civilized by its continental neighbours, and as a colony of Rome its further progress in this respect was extensively promoted. In later periods also, its connection with that seat of arts and learning did much to accelerate its career. It has subsequently advanced independently in the march of civilization, influenced nevertheless at each step more or less by the nations with which it has held intercourse, until at length it has reached its

* Essence of Civilization, *ante*, p. 20.

present position among the states of Europe, although much doubtless remains to be done to render its civilization complete. It is also engaged in extending the influences and the blessings of civilization to the various nations of the earth with whom it carries on communication, who are less favoured in this respect; a debt of gratitude that it owes to the great cause of civilization, for the large benefits which in its earlier history it derived from its intercourse with other countries.

Those nations which, as in the case of the people of England, live upon an island, in many respects lie under great disadvantages as regards the constancy and the intimacy of their intercourse with their foreign neighbours, compared with countries that are placed on a vast continent, with which the neighbouring nations maintain unreserved communication, and between whom a continual interchange of ideas takes place; so that all the improvements effected in one kingdom are at once made known to the other, as though the aggregate of these nations formed but one great social community. On the other hand, although people residing upon islands are deprived of this constant and intimate intercourse with the lands lying near; yet they possess a much greater facility of intercourse with those countries which are distant, and enjoy a far wider range of intercommunication than do continental inland nations, whose communications are almost entirely confined to their immediate neighbours. The sea, although it doubtless much restrains free and unbroken intercourse between nearly adjacent countries, yet it affords the utmost facility for communication between nations which lie far apart from each other, and brings a much greater variety of people into communion than without its aid would ever have been enabled to hold any intercourse at all. This, therefore, which in the earlier ages of the world formed the principal barrier between different countries, and mainly impeded all travelling between different provinces, is what

now mainly promotes and facilitates this communication; and by the power of steam, results alike wonderful and influential in the moral advancement and civilization of the world, have been achieved, reducing the ocean to one vast traversable plain, annihilating the obstacles of space, and invading even the mighty barriers of time.

Indeed, if the world, instead of being intersected by seas, had been constituted of one mighty continent, not only would not the natural separation of countries one from another, and the division of mankind into different races and species, which is for numerous reasons so essentially desirable, ever have been effected; but, on the other hand, intercourse between nations which lie far distant one from another, would have been physically impossible. Vast oceans are, however, traversed without inconvenience, and traffic is conveyed over them which could never have been transported by land. Such, moreover, is the difficulty of travelling by land beyond that of transit by water, that, with all the aid of science, the interior of some of the largest continents is as yet unexplored.

But, although the means of travelling over the globe are so much extended beyond what they were in the earlier ages of society; yet, as civilization advances, nations have become far more established in their own territories. They no longer consist of homeless tribes; yet they mix more than ever one with another. And, although facility both as regards Internal Communication and International Intercourse greatly contributes, if, indeed, it is not essential to the civilization of a nation; yet if this facility in either case tends to induce people to acquire a desultory, unsettled habit of life, so as to have no fixed abode or home, it retards, instead of advancing, civilization. Wandering tribes are even more uncivilized than lone islanders. Perpetual friction, equally with rust, is the cause of waste.

Allusion was, indeed, made at the conclusion of the

preceding Element, to the necessity for its due regulation; and it was observed that, although occasional communication and intercourse with other places and persons are desirable, yet that constant communication and intercourse are unsettling and uncivilizing. This principle is yet more applicable to the Element of International Intercourse than to that of Internal Communication. As we prefer our own homes to all other places, so should we prefer our own country to all other nations. And although occasional communication with foreigners is desirable, both for the sake of deriving information from them of different kinds, and for dispelling homebred prejudices; yet to be always going among them, deprives us too much of our cherished national feelings and habits, and instead of merely rooting up undue predilections, is too apt to leave us without any fixed principles at all.

The means of communication and of intercourse which are established between the people of different states, must necessarily vary extensively from those between the people of the same country, both as to the particular mode resorted to for this purpose, and the end which is sought to be attained. In the case of each nation, moreover, they will vary according to the character of the people themselves, and the nature of the countries with which they desire to hold communication. Both as regards Internal Communication and International Intercourse, the invention of steam navigation, of railroads, and of the electric telegraph, has done much for the cause of civilization; and in each nation, more or less, although not, perhaps, an equal amount, has been effected. Not only are the people of different departments and states thus drawn closer together, but the barriers against free intercourse are effectually broken down. The general improvement as regards the travelling accommodation in almost every country, and the establishment of international laws for different purposes, but which all alike contribute to bind

together those of various nations who are subject to them, whether their object be the prevention of crime, the promotion of trade, or the protection of efforts of genius: directly tend both to encourage and extend International Intercourse, and to advance civilization.

War is the physical offensive action of one nation against another, being the attempt to repel by force the aggressions of a hostile state. It is the last remedy to be resorted to, and should be availed of not merely when all others have been tried, but when all others have failed. This is a remedy which, although it may remove the particular evil complained of, does so only by substituting a worse. And it is one of those transactions from which both parties are sure to be sufferers. War is a state not only inimical to civilization, but it is the condition most opposite to it. Nations the most uncivilized, are also the most warlike. In some barbarous nations, almost continual warfare prevails. On the other hand, certain highly civilized nations are often at war one with another. Among mankind quarrels occur between the educated as well as the ignorant; but it is not often among the former that resort is had to brute force, which is analogous to war between nations. A condition of complete civilization, will, it is hoped, be one also of permanent and solid peace.

Occasional war, like an occasional quarrel, is nevertheless an evil almost inevitable. But perpetual war, like perpetual quarrelling, is a sure proof of brutality, and productive of certain ruin. The existence of others around us, necessitates some differences of opinion. But it should induce also mutual forbearance and amity as conducive to the interest of each. Animals of different species wage war with, and prey one upon another. But man is bent mainly on the destruction of man. And in the case of each individual it often happens that his direst foe is himself.

The outbreak of war between different nations, is there-

fore analogous to the occurrence of quarrels among men. In the case of both, moreover, the disagreement tends to develope the energies of the contending parties; but it puts a stop to all social and intellectual intercourse between them. The powers of each are exerted to the utmost, but the progress of civilization is at the same time impeded. In the place of endeavouring to benefit, their only object is now to injure one another. While in the former case they imitate the conduct of angels, in the latter they follow only the course of demons. Nevertheless, as in the civil punishment of an individual we aim not at his injury but his improvement—or at any rate the latter is the ultimate, although the former may appear to be the direct object in view—and we hope at once to correct his future conduct, and to afford warning to others not to transgress in a corresponding manner; so in going to war with a state, we should aim not at its destruction or deterioration;—except incidentally, and in the same way that we endeavour to give pain in order effectually to inflict punishment on an individual,—but merely to bring it to a sense of right, to compel it to act with justice for the future, and also to deter other countries from following its bad example. Indeed, as is the case between different rival bodies in a state, so different foreign nations have no legitimate right to attempt, even in war, the injury of one another, further than what is necessary to promote the general benefit of the whole family or confederacy of nations, in preventing or repelling aggression through the unjust ambition of one state, by restraining the undue assumptions of such a state. The only admissible excuse for going to war, is the restoration of the balance of power among rival nations, and which of itself affords the surest guarantee for the permanence of peace.

If civilization were generally established in every country, and its spirit animated all their rulers, not only would each of the nations of Europe, indeed of the world,

be as forward to assist and improve, as they now are to injure and attack one another; but in the maintenance of their mutual relations, the welfare of each and of the whole body of them would be considered, and but few occasions for ruptures between them would be afforded. By conventional treaties and fair discussion, instead of by resort to arms—by the heads of the wise, instead of by the hands of the strong—would all matters in dispute then be decided; and, it might fairly be hoped, far more equitably than by the result of brute force. Not only, indeed, in an advanced state of general civilization, ought conventions to take the place of, and in fact entirely to supersede, contests by arms; but the only sound pretext for resorting to contests by arms, is the desire to enforce conventions, and to compel their due observance and complete carrying out; and this is the point towards which all martial efforts should be directed, and to attain which they should be concentrated.

War is either directly or indirectly inimical to nearly every Element of civilization. Education is much impeded by it. To Religious Influence it is extensively injurious; as also to the prosperity of the different National Institutions, to the progress of Art and Science, and the celebration of peaceful fêtes. Dignities it diverts from being the encouragement and the rewards of civilization, but they are resorted to only to incite to feats of arms. Laws are on many accounts, then, more stringent, and are less devoted to moral ends; while liberty of speech and communication are restrained. Friendly foreign Intercourse is in such case, of course, necessarily much abridged. Nor are the indirect injuries inflicted upon civilization by war much less numerous than those which are direct. Of this class are the ravages which it creates, causing the destruction of many noble works of art, and the hindrance that it occasions to all progress in improvements of this nature. Vast sums are then re-

quired to carry on war, which would otherwise be applied in great national undertakings, or in efforts of social progress. In addition to this, the minds of the most able and active are then diverted from the civilizing arts of peace to the exigencies of war.

In civilization, however, as in many other matters, the most opposite results will sometimes be produced by the same cause. Thus, war, which is so extensively destructive, as regards its direct effect, to many of the pursuits of peace; in the erection of castles and forts, has raised the finest of architectural structures. And the events of war, while they spread ruin on art and literature, have supplied the noblest themes to the poet and the historian. In two respects, moreover, in the earlier period of the world's career, war indirectly tended towards, if it did not directly promote, civilization. 1. By causing the greatest activity, both mental and bodily, among different and distinct people, which had a powerful effect in advancing civilization, and to a certain extent developed some of its Elements; as also by creating a spirit of rivalry between various people and nations, the stimulus produced by which was highly favourable to civilization. 2. By war different people were brought together, and by war they became acquainted with the skill and science, and the contrivances of the nations with which they contended. Nothing, moreover, tends so directly or so powerfully as does war, to develope the energies and resources of any nation.* The only true and correct principle applicable to war and its effect upon the civilization of any country, appears, therefore, to be this,—that it either furthers or retards civilization according to circumstances. In the early ages of society, it is favourable to it, while in more advanced times it is inimical to its progress. Thus, in the former periods, it encourages civilization to a certain extent, by inducing people to visit

* Vide *ante*, "Essence of Civilization," p. 15.

foreign countries, and to acquire intercourse with them. It also acts as a stimulus to science, and to many inventions applicable to martial exploits. On the other hand, it retards the advance of civilization by destroying domestic security, hindering foreign commerce and travel, and calling off attention from the arts of peace. In each nation, however civilized, war is always a period of comparative barbarism. Nevertheless, as war ordinarily originates in civil contention, so civil intervention should be resorted to, and should be efficient to terminate it. At such periods, when hostilities have once broken out, too much excitement prevails to allow people to reason calmly on the points in dispute. Arms alone are then resorted to, to the neglect of those pursuits which contribute mainly to the glory of civilized nations.

As in a rude state of society, men resort to physical force, and to that only, in order to repel individual attack, even when that is not of a physical kind; and when society has become more civilized, not only moral but physical aggression is sometimes withstood by moral force: so, in a corresponding manner, as a nation progresses in civilization, it may reasonably be inquired whether national as well as individual violence, such as a state inflicts on another, might not in all cases be repulsed by moral instead of physical force. With respect to this question it may, however, be remarked that, in the first place, it would be required for all nations alike to be in a very perfect condition of civilization in order to carry out the proposal. Even among men in the present state of society, the attacks of the rude and lawless are ordinarily repelled by physical power, and are generally punished by physical inflictions. So must it also be among nations, until civilization is fully established. And even then occasions will arise when physical force must be the ultimate resort, as may sometimes be the case among highly civilized individuals. One essential distinction between men and

animals is, that the former contend and decide their animosities by moral, the latter by physical efforts.

In the early history of the civilization of the world, each petty state, and indeed each society within that state, was regulated or represented by the congress of its members deputed for that purpose. As civilization increased, and the Element of Internal Communication was more cultivated, these congresses became national instead of provincial, and one served for the whole nation, instead of there being one for each district in the country. As civilization yet farther progresses, and the Element of International Intercourse as well as of Internal Communication is cultivated, congresses become not only national but international; and their aim is to regulate not merely the affairs of individual cities and of individual nations, but of nations generally, and of the world at large, which is thus united by its representative into one grand assembly or conclave. Care should, however, be taken in these cases that in providing for the due representation, and the interests, of the whole body of nations, individual nations are not neglected or overwhelmed in the consideration of the constitution of such representative assembly. And that in the place of settling controversies and preventing contests, they do not originate and provoke the very evils they aimed or professed to guard against.

Where men are really desirous of union and agreement, the difficulties at arriving at this are seldom insuperable; while, on the other hand, the most trifling pretext may serve as the excuse for an outbreak of hostilities, where either party is actually determined to go to war. Moreover, if rival states, instead of waging war one with another, could consent to settle their differences one with another by arbitration and congress, a far more equitable basis for a firm and permanent peace would be established through their deliberations, where truth and equity prevail, than by the chances of war, where might,

not right, decide who is to obtain his claims. War indeed, as already observed, ought to be resorted to only to compel refractory states to acquiesce in the decisions of national congresses, and to enforce obedience to their just and equitable decrees; just as in states the aid of the sword is called in where necessary, to carry into effect the judgment of the courts of justice.

In the case of national punishment by war, as in the case of individual punishments, some definite limit ought nevertheless to be fixed by the laws of nations and of civilization, as to how far the punishment should be allowed to be carried; and at what point independent nations should be called upon to interfere in order to prevent war being resorted to, not as a reformatory punishment, but as an instrument of revenge, or a pretext for spoliation, by a conquering country. As societies never allow civil punishments to be carried to these excesses, so ought nations to prohibit national punishments by war exceeding these bounds. In the just maintenance of these limits, all nations alike are interested.

The promotion of civilization among, and the establishment of intercourse between different countries, has a powerful tendency extensively to humanize them as regards their conduct in war, and to effect a restraint on such occasions of those brutal excesses which are indulged in by barbarous people. Among civilized nations, the temples and monuments of art, and receptacles of learning, will be respected in whatever country and under whatever circumstances they may be seized, not only on account of their own nature, but for the common benefit which they may confer on those of all nations alike. Probably, indeed, the practical result of civilization is never more strikingly and more powerfully shown than in the mode of carrying on war, more especially as regards the manner in which we now avail ourselves of a victory,

which is an occasion when the greatest and freest opportunity of following out our own inclinations, and evincing our actual disposition, is afforded. Civilization most completely proves its power and efficiency by softening the rigours of war, and by repressing its barbarities. Generosity towards the vanquished, it causes to be exhibited in the place of reckless ferocity. Civilization indeed enables the most valiant nations not only to overcome their enemies, but to conquer themselves.

Nevertheless, with all the boasted civilization of the present century, and with that of two great continental nations whose civilization is considered to be very highly advanced, the late savage and sanguinary war between France and Prussia stands an appalling proof how little civilization has really after all effected in lessening the horrors, or restraining the barbarities of war, and that as regards its worst and most revolting features; and as a sad proof how much more vigorously the ingenuity of man has been directed to devise means to promote the injury and misery, than to procure the happiness of mankind.

Albeit, though war is the condition most directly inimical to civilization, yet on nothing more than on war has civilization effected greater changes, and that both in the mode of carrying it on, and in the manner in which our conduct in relation to it is regulated. Although wars are now far more devastating than they formerly were, from the aid of science being extensively brought into the contest, yet the issue is more speedily determined. And the way in which prisoners of war are now treated, contrasted with what was formerly their fate, affords a striking illustration of the progress of the world in civilization.

According to the mode, moreover, in which war is carried on by one nation against another, both as regards the power and ability evinced, and the honour and

clemency displayed, great effect is produced on the mind of the opposing nation, which may eventually be of important influence, alike in restoring and in preserving peace between them. It was a wary maxim of Machiavelli, always to treat your friend as though he would some day be your enemy. It would be a maxim more consistent with honour and humanity, and more conducive to civilization, and is one as applicable to dealings between states as to those between individuals, always to treat your enemy as though he would some day be your friend.

In carrying on warfare and other contentions, both between men and states, it should ever be borne in mind that acts essentially bad in themselves can never lose or change their character by the circumstances under which they were perpetrated, however these circumstances may operate for the moment to divert attention from them, to screen them from obloquy, or to avert the punishment which they deserve. Ultimately, nevertheless, the natural consequences of such deeds will certainly follow, and the offender will surely suffer in one way or other for the atrocities he has committed.

It is frequently remarked in our courts of justice, that the most ordinary incentive to commit theft arises from the fact of goods being unwarily exposed. As it is in the affairs of individuals, so is it also in those of nations; and no provocation to war is so ready or so common as that of a country, from its unguarded condition, offering a temptation to some other state which is well prepared to take advantage of its improvidence, to endeavour to invade it, and to subjugate it to its own power. The cause and the consequence are in each case the same, and both men and states do well to take warning from so constant and so natural an occurrence. While success in the art of directing attacks is that which is most serviceable for the promotion of, and in the carrying on of war; a knowledge

of the no less important, and certainly not less exalted science of defence, is that which is mainly requisite for the promotion and preservation of peace. The former is, for the most part, an active, the latter a passive, employment. But the latter requires quite as much skill as the former; and its end, as here considered, is surely far nobler. Both the character of the inhabitants, and the insular position of this country, seem to have coincided as regards the main method of warfare to be adopted by this nation, which is of the defensive rather than of the offensive kind; and is effected partly by its strong coast fortifications, partly by its navy, and partly by its army, more particularly as regards its protective operations by its rifle corps, to exercise in both which undertakings the natural genius of the people prompts them to practise and to excel.

An aggressive war, solely for the sake, and avowedly with the object of adding to the territory of the Power which commenced the war, is no more justifiable by a state than is an unprovoked assault by one individual on the person of another for the purpose of depriving him of his property. In both instances alike, the crime is that of robbery, although the degree of ignominy attached to it in the case of the state may not be so great as in the case of the individual, or the means of punishing the aggressor so readily available.

Morality is, indeed, as applicable to, and as binding upon societies as it is upon individuals, and upon states as fully as upon societies. Murder, robbery, dishonesty, and duplicity, may be perpetrated by nations as well as by man, and the crime is essentially in all respects as heinous in the one as it is in the other, although possibly not punishable with the same facility. A perfect code of international law should, however, provide for these exigencies; and the criminal state should be arraigned at the bar of the nations of the world, just as a criminal

man is arraigned at the bar of a criminal court in his own country. As already remarked, war is not only justifiable in a case of this sort to punish an offending nation, and should be resorted to for this purpose by the arbitrating states by which such nation has been condemned; but in a condition of complete civilization it is the only case in which its resort is at once expedient and just.

Although the people, not the sovereign of a state, have to bear the principal part of the calamity which war entails, yet how few wars are either desired or originated by the people themselves, or, conduce to their interest; but they have both originated with, and been carried on for the benefit of the sovereign, or to gratify his personal ambition or caprice, wholly independent of the national welfare or honour. And yet, on the other hand, some of the most unjustifiable as well as sanguinary wars have been originated by, and waged between republican states.

In political and personal, as well as in martial and national contests, the influence of civilization is extensively experienced in subduing and controlling those violent and virulent feelings of animosity and antipathy that, at one period, generally existed between rival competitors and heads of factions, as well as rulers of nations; which led them to regard each other as each alike intent upon, and equally desirous of one another's destruction, although really only differing in opinion as to the best means of promoting the actual welfare of their country, or of mankind at large.

Civilization, which in some respects contributes to weaken the mere physical power both of men and nations, yet confers on them a vast superiority over bodies endowed with brute force alone, by the dexterity which they acquire. Hence it is that civilized nations so far exceed barbarians in martial skill and efficiency. There is in this respect the same corresponding difference between a civilized and an uncivilized people, as there is

between a man and an animal. Although the animal may be of four times the size and physical strength of the man, it is speedily vanquished by the intellectual resources and scientific appliances of the latter. In the case of nations, as in the case of animals, is it not both possible and expedient, in certain extreme instances, to reduce the surplus of turbulent energy and irritability, which proves periodically detrimental to contingent states, by a process analogous to that of castration in the case of animal frames, through either dividing or diminishing the territory of such a nation, to an extent which will prevent it from being any longer formidable to its neighbours?

Not only, however, do science and civilization aid the carrying on of war, but the promotion and the maintenance of peace are also extensively furthered by their means. Thus, gunpowder and steam navigation, by placing different countries more on an equality both as regards their position and means of defence, have more completely reduced war to a science, and rendered its issue less uncertain than formerly; all which has contributed to discourage a resort to arms, and has opened opportunities for civil interventions.

The desirableness and duty of preserving peace, as far as possible, between different nations, appears strictly analogous to its maintenance between private persons. Peace is always of itself to be preferred, but should never be sought after at the sacrifice of right or duty, which is a worse evil than that which we aimed at preventing. So among individuals, friendships should be maintained, even at a considerable cost; although to effect this we are by no means bound to submit to injustice or oppression. In both cases, however, the surest and most efficient way permanently to preserve peace, is to be always fully prepared for war. Nothing so powerfully provokes attack both among individuals and nations, as the apparent destitution of all means to repel it.

It is also of great importance for the preservation of peace among different nations, that they should be each made to maintain the natural boundaries assigned to them as their proper territories, such as chains of mountains and great rivers afford, and by which Nature herself seems to have chalked out the limitations for each to observe, so as to prevent all causes for mutual aggression on this account. Equal or fair distribution of territory, according to the allotment made by Nature, is perhaps in each case the firmest foundation on which to proceed in fixing or restraining the limits of any country. Here, however, the increase of population in such a state, and the decrease of that of the adjacent nations, and many other causes, must, of course, occasion a deviation from these principles, which can be considered applicable only as general, leading, fundamental rules. Indeed, the true principle to pursue, alike to preserve peace and to follow in the paths of justice, is not to attempt to restrain the natural growth of any state, which it is alike unjust to attempt and impossible to effect; but to compel each state to restrain itself as regards its territory, within those certain and proper bounds which Nature has assigned to it, and the limits of which are unerringly defined and marked out by those natural fences, such as seas, and rivers, and chains of mountains, which God Himself has placed to separate countries one from the other. In fact, if acquisition and increase of territory by any particular nation are to be directly repressed as tending to disturb the equilibrium of power, it may be contended that the acquisition and increase of colonies also should be forbidden and prevented. And if the acquisition and increase of colonies may be prohibited or interfered with on this ground, may we not feel ourselves justified in interfering with also and prohibiting the growth of population as well? There is this essential difference, however, between the increase of a nation by population and

colonies, and by extending its boundaries, that in the two former cases this increase is effected without encroaching upon or diminishing the territory of other states, which alone could give them the right to interfere.

Although a state may to a great extent increase its territory, as in the case of Russia and Prussia, by absorbing and appropriating as part of itself other states adjacent or contiguous, yet unless such countries harmoniously amalgamate with it by affinity of interest and feeling, the union will prove but ill-assorted, and rather forced and feigned than friendly and real. Difference in religion, and language, and pursuits, on the part of the people thus united to a foreign nation, may prevent this union from ever being completely cemented. Certain elements, like oil and water, however closely brought into contact, will never really amalgamate, while others at once do so on being united. Compulsory unions are the greatest cause of dissension that can be effected.

Occasionally, indeed, nations, as it were, change their local position, and move from the spot where they were originally placed to an entirely new sphere; as where they invade and conquer an adjoining country, and settle in its provinces, and by which all their original relations to surrounding countries become at once entirely revolutionized. Thus, Prussia, if she were to invade and annex Belgium to her territory, would be entirely changed as regards her relation to Europe generally, and to England in particular. She would thereupon become a maritime instead of an inland country, and our next neighbour instead of one distant from us.

Of importance equal with, if not greater than that of the preservation of the natural boundaries of different states, is the preservation also of those frontiers and entrances from one country to another, which may be regarded as their natural citadels; and which serve to

resist the inroads of aggression, and are, in fact, the fortifications which maintain peace itself, as well as promote the security of the nation.

As in the case of the rival interests existing in the same state, so also among different rival foreign nations, it is desirable to maintain the due balance of power, by which suspicions and jealousies of one another become banished, and they are converted into mutual friends, and the promoters of the general welfare. It is, nevertheless, remarked by Mr. Wheaton,* that one of the main and most just reasons for the interference of one state with another, is the desire to preserve the balance of power between different states. And no doubt, indeed, the overthrow or disturbance, and even the danger of this, whether apparent or real, is the surest cause of the destruction of that harmony which ought ever to subsist between those states which hold intercourse one with another. It may not unreasonably, however, be doubted whether the efforts, real or pretended, to preserve the balance of power, do not tend more to provoke hostilities than the direst destruction of that balance that could ensue. Considering, moreover, how very seldom one nation either acts or wages war by itself independently, but has always some firm allies on whom it relies for mutual co-operation and assistance, and which it would be neither possible nor desirable to prohibit; the practical importance of preserving the balance of power between different states is in reality far less than it appears. The proportionate relative power of a particular nation as regards the other nations around it, depends, moreover, not only upon its individual strength and resources, but upon its position in regard to those nations, and which may serve to confer opportunities and advantages as regards both attack and defence, equal to those obtained by actual resources or martial power. The greater the advantages of any nation

* *History of the Progress of the Rights of Nations.*

in this respect, the greater is the necessity for limiting its power. Capacity of aggression, which is most pernicious in a neighbouring nation, may be harmless in one which is a long distance from us. In regard to the preservation of the balance of power among states, it should also be borne in mind that there are interests as well as forces which can be set off and balanced one against the other, and which may operate both to unite various nations together, and also contribute to the pacific and harmonious carrying on of the government in each particular country. As much as possible, too, corresponding also with the case of the various rival interests in a state, the several interests existing in separate nations should be made to contribute to the mutual welfare of one another. Civilization will thus serve to fuse into one great family not only the different people of the same land, but the various nations of the whole world.

As in the intercourse between individuals, so in that between nations, both pacific and hostile, especial regard should be had to the character and disposition of each, quite as carefully as, in forming an alliance with them, we consider the commercial products which each can supply advantageously to the other. As it is with individuals, so is it with nations, that some are naturally agreeable and friendly, and others are naturally disagreeable and hostile to one another. The true mode of politic dealing, both with men and states, is to know alike how both to take advantage of their merits and their defects; as also how to correct ourselves, and to supply our own exigencies by their deficiencies and their example.

Moreover, as in the case of individuals, so also in that of nations, there are certain among them which, owing to their peculiar character, intellectual, moral, or physical, their position, or some other cause, can never agree together, or feel mutual esteem or regard one for another.

But as in the case of the former, it may occasionally happen that circumstances occur which change their whole relation with each other, and induce them to agree with and regard one another; so in the case of nations also, whose character and position vary equally with those of individuals, events may take place which will alter their mutual disposition and feeling, and produce concord and amity where before there were only rivalry and hostility. Nevertheless, although nations do well to be united one with another, a dependence one upon the other is very far from desirable, whether for food, for protection, or for wealth. Independence is, indeed, in every respect, as great a virtue, and is of as much consequence to be maintained among nations as among individuals; and is absolutely essential for the extensive prosperity and advancement of each. The want of it is, moreover, experienced in every department of the state, and in every act both of individual and of civil life.

But, although mutual dependence between states is not desirable, yet the maintenance of alliances between them is on several accounts very expedient, and even essential. The principles which should guide and regulate the formation of national friendships and alliances, are somewhat akin to those which direct us in the formation of individual and private connections. In each case some similarity, or rather accordance of character appears necessary to unite the different parties, and the mutual advantage to each of the particular friendship, is a firm cement as to its duration. The local position of the parties must also have a material influence in the selection of an alliance, as will also a general correspondence in intellectual and moral character, in religion, and in habits and pursuits. On these accounts Great Britain, Holland, and Prussia appear to be the countries in Europe between whom an alliance is most feasible, alike from their similarity in character, religion, and pursuits,

the mutual advantages to be derived by each from such connection, and their several local positions. Prussia, a powerful nation, is not so near to Britain as to provoke jealousies, as in the case of France, and is yet sufficiently near to be accessible both for communication and for commerce. The products of Prussia are serviceable both to Britain and to Holland, as is the trade of Britain and Holland to Prussia; and the navies of Britain and Holland render these countries serviceable allies to Prussia, which can never be a naval country from its want of sea-coast. The Rhine flowing through both countries constitutes a natural union between Prussia and Holland, affording a direct means of communication. Alliances between other great European nations are based on the same principles, as between France and Belgium; Spain, Austria, Italy, and Belgium; Denmark and Sweden. America, although separated from England by a wide expanse of sea, is naturally and firmly united to it by a similarity of language, as also by commercial pursuits.

Treaties between different foreign nations, whatever be the nature of the relation or connection of such nations, ought, doubtless, to be as faithfully kept and as literally observed as are the ties of friendship and the conditions of intercourse between individuals, which it is equally the interest of all parties to respect. Thus regarded, a correct perception of the spirit of these agreements should in all instances be sufficient to enforce them, even when the strictness of the letter is found to fail. This, and and this alone, can preserve us against deceit either in social or in state Intercourse. Yet perhaps here, as in other cases already adverted to, that which was designed solely to prevent the possibility of dispute, proves in reality to be its most frequent cause.

Treaties, like all other compacts, are irrevocable, are binding on all the parties to them alike, and can, on no account or pretext, be violated or departed from, or even

modified, without the consent of all the parties to them. The utmost that can be allowed as regards their relaxation is the submission of a proposal for their revision by those who entered into them; the only pretext for which can be such an alteration of circumstances as entirely changes the state of things under which they were made. But even this affords no excuse for their violation without the consent of all who entered into them. The due observance of treaties is as essential for the maintenance of confidence and friendship among the society of states, as is that of promises for the continuance of respect and amity among men.

It must ever, moreover, be a matter of supreme importance for preserving that absolute freedom of intercourse between civilized states and the rulers of them, which ought ever to subsist, that the fullest protection be afforded to those who are sent as ambassadors by one state to another, and by which the utmost liberality of sentiment may be expressed by those officers to the sovereigns to whose courts they are deputed. Ambassadors are, as it were, the tongue of the nation they represent; and it is consequently most essential that they should speak with boldness, with freedom, and without reserve, and thus give vent to sentiments which, if concealed or pent up, may breed disorder of the most serious kinds between those different countries, but which will be harmless and even beneficial if divulged and explained. This liberty to the ambassador as the representative of his nation, must never, however, be permitted to be extended to him personally, so as to allow him to do acts in his own individual private capacity, which are offensive or insulting, under colour and protection of his ambassadorship.

The rapid progress of civilization during periods of peace, as contrasted with its advancement in time of war, is at once proved by reference to history, more especially that of the career of this country in the last forty years.

As Christianity is the most perfect condition of civilization, so universal peace will be one of the most precious moral fruits of Christianity. Among the main causes of the progress of civilization in time of peace, it cannot be doubted that the existence of mutual Intercourse between nations is one of the most powerful.

Nevertheless, as regards our Intercourse with foreign nations, it is a leading principle to be observed that, while that Intercourse should be as unrestricted as possible; at the same time every requisite precaution must be adopted in order to render it as free as we can from injury or danger to the state so communicating. As no great benefit is without its accompanying bane, so with our refinement we export to less civilized nations our vices also; and with their valuable products we obtain additional means of increasing our debasing luxuries. On matters, too, relating to religion, morality, legislation, education, and even taste; the correct principles of one nation may be vitiated or degenerated by the depraved or lax notions of the country with which it holds Intercourse. The best security, indeed the only safe guarantee against the corruptions of a people by this means, is the instillation of sound and correct principles on those subjects concerning which there is the most danger of their being unsettled. And the more completely this is effected, the more perfect will be the condition of their civilization.

It is fully as important to preserve a high standard of national morality and honour in a state, as it is to maintain personal honour and morality in the case of a man. As regards the different parties, too, in each particular nation, this principle should be observed. Neither states, nor individuals, nor parties, can deal freely and satisfactorily one with another, unless entire reliance subsists on each other's honour. A want of confidence as regards this, is consequently fatal to one branch of International Intercourse which is of a most important nature, being

that which is carried on by the different governments of different countries one with another, as the organs of communication of the people of those states. As the crimes of individuals against the code of society, in any particular nation, are punished through the mutual co-operation of the other members of society against the person proved guilty; so the crimes of a state against the society of states must be in a corresponding manner punished by means of a confederation of states against the guilty nation. War for this purpose is always justifiable; and its lawfulness is founded on the soundest of all reasons for war, the ultimate hope of securing a permanent peace, by terminating those excitements which provoke war. International laws serve as a kind of chain to bind together the people and the governors of different nations, who all acknowledge one common rule of right. They tend to prevent disruptions, just as the recognition of the same laws binds together the various subjects of the same country, and the acknowledgment of the same Supreme Being unites all Christians into one common brotherhood.

Moreover, although the general result of Intercourse, both Internal and International, is to promote civilization by stimulating the people to enterprise, and showing them what has been done by others, whose inventions they are induced to follow, as also to improve by these examples their own efforts; yet, on the other hand, one effect of this Intercourse of either kind will be to prevent men from relying on their own resources as regards the particular pursuits for which they are especially adapted, and for which they have manifested a peculiar genius. These pursuits will no longer engage that exclusive devotion which they did before, but other foreign inventions and works of skill will command attention in common with them; and in the endeavour to emulate what is new, and which on that account commands admiration, that for which they were especially qualified, and which sprang up indi-

genous in their minds, incurs neglect. Just so it is in the case of individuals, that when a man comes to mix with society at large, he disregards those particular pursuits or studies to which his own natural genius impelled him, in order that he may obtain proficiency in undertakings in which he sees the world around him to be occupied and to have acquired dexterity, and with whom he desires to place himself on a level.

There is an important branch of jurisprudence connected with the subject of International Intercourse, which demands here a passing notice, exercising as it does an extensive influence on the civilization of each country; and that is the regulation of the laws of different kinds affecting foreigners who may be either resident in a nation, or merely travellers through it, and whether as regards their personal freedom, or their commercial dealings. However desirous we may be to treat foreigners as friends, we must not at the same time forget that they are aliens. However pleased we are with our visitors, we ought not to consider them as a part of our own family. The distinctions proper in the treatment of each ought ever to be kept up, not only in order to secure our independence, but to preserve our friendship. As in the regulation of property, so in that of ceremony, nothing so soon leads to dispute as the neglect to observe the due distinctions essential to be maintained.

Alike various and important, therefore, are the results which are obtained by the establishment of a free and general Intercourse between nations, as regards their advancement in civilization. Education, art and science, literature and learning, jurisprudence and morals, commerce and discovery, are all extended, and all improved by this means. And in the pursuit of each, not only are many new suggestions gained, but many prejudices on several subjects become dissipated. As this communication between different nations is more firmly established,

the variety of language not only ceases to be a barrier between them, but by each learning the language of the other, many original ideas are conveyed to one another in the fresh turns of thought thereby disclosed. A new and most extensive mine of knowledge is thus opened, whose wealth, especially as regards that most precious of all knowledge, the knowledge of human nature, is almost if not wholly illimitable. Even if it were possible to establish a universal language which should serve as a means of communication between the people of every nation, the imperfection and constant liability to error of such a medium must be necessarily extensive in proportion to its comprehensiveness. Language in general is perhaps availed of nearly as much to confuse as to communicate ideas, and the more general and less specific are its terms, the more is it liable to this defect. As a medium of diplomatic communication, where the greatest precision and certainty are essential, and the want of which would be a constant source of contention, a universal language would be therefore most objectionable; while from the perfect acquaintance possessed by those who carry on such communications, of the language of foreign countries, it is not required.

The production in any country of great and sterling literary works is also of much value in the promotion of International Intercourse, as leading foreigners to the study of its language; just as the production of splendid works of art contribute also to this Intercourse by attracting the people of foreign countries to visit them. As speaking different languages is one of the strongest and most formidable barriers which was raised by Nature herself against the Intercourse between different nations, so the acquirement of a knowledge of the language of a country forms of itself a strong bond of Intercourse. Nevertheless, however desirable it may be to read in the original tongue the master-works of genius produced by each country, the advantage to the literature

of every land of possessing translations from the best foreign authors, and the benefit derived to the mind of the nation from their circulation, and its tendency to promote civilization, cannot be denied. By this means, mental communication with other countries is opened for those to whom ignorance of the language remains a barrier. In either case, indeed, an acquaintance with the literature of a nation constitutes intellectual Intercourse with its people.

The increase of Intercourse between different nations which has of late years taken place, has done much for the general advancement of civilization, although the results of this communication may in certain cases vary. While we extend to less civilized countries our arts and our refinement, we derive from them in return many products and commodities. Vast changes are by this means effected. Nevertheless, in our Intercourse with less polished nations, it should ever be our aim to communicate to them our civilization, without imbibing any portion of their barbarism in return; just as knowledge dispels ignorance, although ignorance cannot obliterate knowledge. Knowledge is, as we all know, happily communicable. Ignorance is happily incommunicable, although barbarism unhappily is not so. Of all moral, social, and national diseases there is none which is more infectious than is luxury, and which spreads from city to city, and from rank to rank, like plague or small-pox. Much, moreover, is to be gathered from each nation, as from each individual, either in the way of example, or wisdom, or warning; and the result here is as great among states as among persons. One great advantage, indeed, of Foreign Intercourse, corresponding with that of individual intercourse in society, is that each state may learn from the other something in the way of improvement in its arts, and institutions, and manners, and manufactures. Montesquieu* attributes in a great degree the power and

* *Reflections on Rise and Fall of Roman Empire.*

prosperity of Rome to the readiness of its people to adopt the customs of other nations whenever they found them better than their own. To rulers of nations, especially, this information is most important and valuable. By blending together these different influences, our aim should be to profit alike by our researches, our experience, and our new spheres of operation.

Now indeed the territory of civilization almost forms of itself one vast and mighty empire, the feelings, and habits, and desires of every individual being moulded alike, the same knowledge and pursuits animating each person; and through the whole civilized world are acknowledged the same grand principles of truth, and justice, and moral conduct. As it is when civilization is most perfectly established, that International Intercourse is most free and most general; so when International Intercourse is completely carried out, does it serve to communicate along with itself to the nations to which it is extended, each of the other Elements of Civilization, until at length, by degrees, all the earth becomes subjected to the influence of the latter. International Intercourse, moreover, contributes to aid civilization, wherever it reaches, correspondingly as civilization in its turn aids International Intercourse.

THE END RESULTING FROM THE COMPLETE ESTABLISHMENT OF CIVILIZATION.

Having considered in succession, one by one, the various Elements deemed essential to complete the civilization of a nation, we now proceed to inquire into the general result of their operation, in the aggregate.

That the Elements which I have set forth and described, are those, those only, and all of them those that are essential to effect civilization; is, indeed, obvious not merely from their operation in the civilization of states, but even

in that of individuals, among whom precisely the same, or exactly corresponding causes, are what produce or result in their civilization. And not only are all these Elements essential to perfect civilization in any nation, but their deficiency in it will be peculiarly characterized according to their want of any one of these Elements. Thus in Greece and Rome, the absence of the Element of a correct Religious Influence, was the cardinal defect in their civilization, as it must also be in the present day in that of Turkey.

In considering the End of Civilization, we ought, moreover, essentially to distinguish between civilization, and those partial and incomplete attainments of it which some mistake for general civilization, but which are in reality only the achievement of particular branches of it; and consequently, because the results which follow the entire accomplishment of civilization are not produced by the latter, we are led to deny to civilization itself due credit for the results which it can effect, and which it never fails, when properly carried out, to secure. Thus, certain communities have reached a high degree of perfection in art and literature; but from the other Elements of civilization being neglected, they have continued in a state of comparative barbarism as regards their general condition.

That Civilization, to a certain extent, and in a certain mode, has made great progress of late years, it is impossible to deny. As regards scientific research and discovery, its advances have been, and may probably continue to be, prodigious. But in art of each kind, and perhaps in literature generally, we have rather retrograded than advanced. Our actual growth in Civilization has been like that of a tree which sends out vigorous shoots on one side and in one direction, while its branches on the other side are withered and decayed, and cease to expand or show signs of life. To correct this deformity, and to regulate the due, and proper, and natural growth of Civilization,

should be the end of the science itself, and is the main object of the present work. Indeed, one of the principal, if not the chief of the obstacles to the real progress of Civilization, is the unequal manner in which its different elements are wont to be developed, and which produces an irregularity or deformity in the whole system, corresponding with the undue development or cultivation of one particular faculty of the mind, or of one single mental pursuit, to the proportionate neglect and deterioration of all the rest. Thus, particular branches of science are followed with such avidity, as to lead to the neglect of others, and of art generally. The reduction of Civilization to a science, and following it upon systematic and settled principles, may do much to correct the evil complained of, and is indeed the only efficient cure to be applied.

As in the case of an individual, a little knowledge serves only to puff him up, and renders him superficial, while depth in knowledge alone confers power; so in the case of a nation, while partial or limited civilization tends to develope but a few of its energies, its complete civilization alone can suffice to perfect alike its material and intellectual, as well as moral condition. And as in the education of the individual, it is essential to cultivate and to train each separate faculty and endowment, to store the memory, exercise the judgment, cultivate the taste, and subdue the appetites and passions, and for the attainment of which very different and even opposite appliances are resorted to; so in the civilization of a state, it is no less necessary that all the different ranks and societies of men within its territory should alike be brought under the influence of Civilization, however varying one from another; and which can be effected only by the application of each and all of the several Elements of Civilization here set forth.

It is in this place, however, important to define with clearness and certainty what is intended by the End of

Civilization, more especially as distinguished both from its Essence and its Elements, with the former of which, at least, it is apt by some persons to be confounded. Thus, they consider what civilization is, and what is its real nature, which constitute its Essence; and not what it actually accomplishes, which alone constitutes its End. The one is the agent employed, the other the act itself performed. As well, indeed, might we confound the vigour of our frames acquired by food with the food itself, as the End with the Essence of civilization. By the End of Civilization, is here therefore meant those active, powerful, and substantial effects which civilization produces in the condition of a people, alike material, mental, and moral, being the ultimate object, moreover, which was sought to be attained by the application of the principle; just in the same way as the production of a picture is the end of painting, the erection of an edifice the end of building, or the cure of a diseased person the end of giving him medicine. In each of these cases, the application and the means used, are clearly distinguishable from the end at which we aim.

As civilization is in many respects to a nation precisely what education is to a man, so the main End of Civilization is the entire development of the energies and resources of the nation, and the advancing it to that state where all those energies and resources will be fully matured, and which must, doubtless, be its most perfect, if not, indeed, its most natural condition also, being that which it was both adapted and intended ultimately to attain. The End of Civilization is therefore, in reality, no less than the perfection of the state, considering this in its largest, most extensive, and most complete sense, as that wherein all its most valuable qualities and properties will attain their amplest development. To this consummation, moreover, each of the Elements of civilization alike directly tend. And as civilization consists as regards its Essence, in ren-

dering the higher endowments predominant over those which are lower; so, as regards its End, this is fully attained only when all the most valuable resources and powers of the nation are completely matured and brought to perfection.

The End of Civilization, and the final object which it aims at effecting, may therefore be concluded to be as follows :—In the case of the individual, its result is to perfect and to develope to the full all his higher faculties and powers, and to subject to them the lower propensities and endowments. In the case of the state, its result is to exalt those influences in the community which are the highest and purest over those which are inferior and debasing; to develope to the full the resources of the nation, both natural and artificial; and to adapt the people in all respects for advantageously and completely availing themselves of these resources. Two distinct and independent Ends should, indeed, ever be aimed at both by Civilization and Legislation; and unless they are both attained, however in certain respects apparently opposed to each other, that Civilization and that Legislation is doubtless to such an extent and so far imperfect, and fails in its main object. These are the welfare, intellectual, moral, and social, of each individual in the state, independently and by himself; and the welfare, intellectual, moral, and social, of the whole body of individuals in the aggregate who compose the state. Both these objects should not only be aimed at, but both should be secured. Thus every individual member of the state should feel satisfied, not only that the state itself, but that he himself individually, is benefited, so far as is attainable, by his condition as a member of such state, and by the measures adopted in regard both to Legislation and Civilization. On the other hand, every care should be taken to avoid the introduction and enervating effects of luxury; which, instead of being as some appear to suppose, the perfection of civilization, constitutes

in reality its corruption and decay, being in fact the consequence of the subjugation of the higher influences to those which are inferior.

The End of Civilization is, in fact, analogous to the aim and object of Art in relation to Nature; the result of the application of which should not be to thwart the due progress, or divert the legitimate course of Nature, but to restore it to its proper channel, and to clear away those obstructions which prevent the regular flow of the current.* By the influence of civilization, Nature, so far from being checked or restrained, is only aided and invigorated, and enabled to attain its most perfect condition. Consequently we may conclude that the End of Civilization, and that state of it which is most mature, consists in and results from having all the different Elements of it completely developed, and completely blended together. When this is efficiently accomplished, then, and then only, will civilization in its perfect form ensue.

If, however, the promotion of civilization, which is to be effected mainly by the extension and application of the several Elements of it already examined, be a matter of such importance and benefit to the nation, as from a consideration of its End appears to be the case; it is surely deserving of being made an object of national support. Instead of now waging war, as in ruder times, against our Continental neighbours, we should unite with them to wage war against ignorance and crime; and our national expenditure, and our national energies, should be devoted to the arts of peace, and the progress of civilization. Indeed, another great End of Civilization, is the union which it directly and powerfully tends to effect among all the tribes of the human race,—a union of intelligence, a union of interest, and a union of moral sentiment. As superstition vanishes, truth and virtue must necessarily triumph, and must then each aim at the same purposes;

* *Theory of the Arts*, vol. i., p. 249.

and as barbarism is exterminated, every member of the human race is led to desire and to promote the happiness of the other, and of the whole community.

The three main practical objects that are ever aimed at, which are fully capable of being attained by civilization, and which may be resolved into the ultimate design or End of it already specified, are the promotion of the virtue, the promotion of the happiness, and the promotion of the security of a nation. Virtue is promoted by the inculcation of correct principles, and the discouragement of vice. Happiness, by raising and improving the general condition of the people, and enlarging their capacities for exertion, and their means of enjoyment. Their security is increased by civilization, because they are thereby freed from the dangers of superstition and error which mislead an ignorant people, and are rendered as a body more vigorous, capable of greater undertakings, and of cordially and efficiently co-operating together.

The happiness of societies and of nations closely corresponds with, and is produced by causes nearly analogous to those which occasion the happiness of individuals. In the case of each, it is their natural condition; and health is consequently essential to its extensive possession. And as civilization is the highest natural condition of society and of nations, so civilization must necessarily be conducive to their happiness.

It appears, nevertheless, to be incorrect to assert that "the happiness of individuals is the great end of civil society."* This end is not the happiness, but the welfare of the members of such a society; although, doubtless, the promotion of their welfare does more than anything else to secure their happiness also. And both the welfare and the happiness of nations are extensively advanced by their civilization. Moreover, forms of government do not of themselves produce the happiness of nations, though

* Ferguson's *History of Civil Society*, p. 95.

doubtless they may be largely conducive thereto, according as they are suitable and conformable to the character, and circumstances, and condition of such nations; just as a particular occupation may, according to the same principles, contribute to the happiness of an individual. Civilization in the one, and intellectual endowments and cultivation in the other, will be found far more powerful than any form of government for this end.

It seems to me to be also erroneous to assert that happiness is the main, or the ultimate end of either Society, Civilization, or Legislation. Their real end is their complete well-being; and well-being and happiness are not only not synonimous, but totally different, and may be occasionally diametrically opposed. Some persons are never happy but when they are under the influence of intoxication. But surely such a condition is not one of welfare. A spendthrift is probably never quite happy except when his wealth is being fully and rapidly exhausted; but in this case his prosperity diminishes proportionally as his happiness, or the cause of it, extends.

There may doubtless be much happiness with welfare, although, on the other hand, it is very possible to be in a state of great welfare, and yet very unhappy, or to be very happy and yet very unprosperous. Happiness is indeed the result, not of our actual condition, but of our opinion upon, and our feeling with regard to that condition, which is fickle and uncertain, and entitled to but little regard. That which should therefore be the end alike of Society, Civilization, and Legislation, is not the happiness, but the welfare, real, substantial, and permanent, of the person or people with whom we have to deal.

One particular negative result of civilization deserves here to be especially noticed, and which may appear to be quite different to what might have been calculated upon; and that is that the attainment of civilization, however refining and purifying it is to the mind, does not tend in

its turn to enervate or weaken the powers of the body. On the contrary, as was observed indeed in Element X.,* by increasing the resources of the mind, it adds greatly also to the physical power at our disposal. Moreover, by subjecting the body to the mind, it enables us to resist groundless fear. Hence civilized soldiers are far less liable to terror than are savage troops. Luxury, indeed, enervates; but this, as has been already shown, is but the decay of civilization, and enervation is ever a proof, not of civilization but of luxury.

Moreover, with the progress of society, of that of discovery, of science, and of civilization generally, many material changes in our social and general condition have been effected, which must in their turn occasion moral changes equally great; while great moral changes have been made, which are calculated to produce material results quite as extensive. The two, indeed, must ever reciprocally act upon each other; and it is seldom or never that either can operate quite independent and alone.

It is important, however, for the full and complete development of civilization, not only that each of the foregoing Elements should be availed of, but that they should be all of them brought into operation together. Like the senses in an individual, they severally aid the other in their course of action; and the loss or incapacity of any one of them deranges the entire system. As in a university, or in a school, the different teachers and classes in their several departments, although inculcating distinct and even opposite pursuits and studies, nevertheless each together contribute to the general progress of education; so in a state should the different institutions and other Elements of Civilization here adverted to, alike and altogether contribute to the general civilization of the nation. The loss or want of either, causes a defect in the system; and there is not one but what conduces

* Vide *ante*, p. 327.

essentially to the efficiency of the other, and to the perfect operation of the whole.

The complete accomplishment of civilization is consequently mainly dependent upon, and principally effected by this union and co-operation of its different Elements, each one of them regulating and correcting the action of the others. Not only, moreover, should they each be availed of in the same country, but the same individuals should also be induced to cultivate them all. By this means, not merely is civilization promoted and completed, but luxury, which is the decay of civilization, is prevented and averted. Hence, therefore, it is alone by this conjunction of the several Elements of civilization, that its real End can be efficiently attained.

And as the civilization of each particular nation is completely effected only through the application and joint co-operation of all these different Elements of it together; so in a corresponding manner, the entire civilization of the world will be effected only by the co-operation of a number of civilized nations, each, it may be, differing widely in character, and condition, and pursuits, but which circumstance is of itself of extensive importance when they are united. The Civilization of the one will be reflected and will act upon that of the other, and upon the whole, so that in time the entire mass will become completely cemented and civilized.

Another point of great importance, is the precise manner in, and the actual extent to which the different Elements of civilization operate upon and influence one another, and that in various modes. This is observable at once as regards Education and Religious Influence. Education of each kind should, moreover, be followed by every individual, as well as adopted in every system. Art, too, both acts upon and influences alike Education and Religion, as it is also acted upon and influenced by them. Upon religion the effect of Art is as powerful, as

is that of Religion upon Art. Art, moreover, aids commerce in various ways. Upon Education the influence of Art is necessarily very extensive as regards its effect in refining and ennobling the mind, and with respect to the facilities that it affords for supplying ideas of many subjects which could not without its aid be clearly communicated by books. Art also in many cases aids Science, as Science, in its turn does in a variety of instances the carrying on of Art. Nor is the reciprocal mutual effect upon each other of the different Elements of civilization less real and powerful, although it may be less obvious. Thus, the Press corrects the regulation of our National Institutions. Moral Jurisprudence supplies principles for the governance of both. And the influence of Internal Communication and of International Intercourse, alike contributes to enlighten our views, and to enlarge our notions with regard to these matters. Civilization, indeed, binds both nations and mankind together, especially the great men of various nations, by facilitating the means of Intercourse, and by increasing those objects for securing which Intercourse is maintained, and which render it most desirable and indeed essential.

Contemporaneously with the introduction of a system of Education into any country, it is essential that the various National Institutions necessary to provide for its practical application, and for the cultivation of the power that it unfolds, be established. Art and Science must also be duly diffused, in order to furnish the expanding mind, and to direct its resources to useful purposes. It is one End, and an important result of civilization, not only to perfect Art, but to promote the cultivation, contemporaneously therewith, of other pursuits of a more invigorating nature, which prevent it from becoming in its influence too refining and effeminating, which it is apt to be when followed by itself alone; while, on the other hand, it is really more advantageous for itself as well as for the nation

in which it is established, and is more beneficial for both, that other studies, even though they be of an opposite nature, be adopted in conjunction with it. Liberty of free discussion being allowed to all, abuses would be prevented, and knowledge spread through every portion of the empire. Religious Influence is, moreover, much extended by the security of liberty of conscience and complete Toleration. Opportunities at once for needful recreation and mental cultivation should be afforded by the Commemorations and Festivals which occur at stated intervals. Merit and talent in each department should be encouraged by the Honours and Rewards conferred by the state; and the highest moral ends made the first object of law. Communication should be rendered accessible throughout the kingdom, and to every portion of the nation intelligence should be rapidly diffused. Foreign nations, no less than our own, may be made to contribute to our general advancement in civilization.

If, on the other hand, we proceed to regard each of these different Elements of civilization as independent of the other, and to treat them accordingly; we should be acting like a person who, for different diseases of the body, applied various remedies to each limb, which counteracted the effect of one another, instead of considering the good of the whole frame, and adopting a method by which the disease might be eradicated altogether. As in the system of the human body, so is it also in the system of a nation, that the sympathy is so strong between the several parts, that whatever affects one member of it, affects every portion. The development of each faculty and disposition in an individual, and of each Element of Civilization in a nation, depends greatly on their being properly and efficiently and simultaneously called forth. It is the duty alike of the parent in the case of the individual, and of the government in that of the nation, to provide duly for this development, and not to leave so important a measure to mere chance.

From the due application, however, of each of the various Elements of civilization here enumerated, the most extensive and important results may not only be anticipated, but securely relied upon. We have, moreover, the example of nations of old to illustrate the effects of civilization generally; and to evince also those produced by their decline in civilization.

The principal and leading practical results of civilization, may be said to be threefold, corresponding with the nature of its general effects, being mental, moral, and manual. It improves the character of the national mind; it raises the tone of the national morals; and it contributes to the development of the national resources and materials. Upon individuals in the nation, it produces also effects corresponding with those produced on the nation at large. Its results may be also considered in a twofold view:—1. As regards the remedies to be effected. 2. As regards the improvements to be made.

I. The mental results, as regards the remedies to be effected by the extension of civilization, are the banishment of ignorance and error, which lead to many moral delinquencies, to crimes and misdemeanours of several kinds, both national and individual. Most of the mistakes committed, both in the common practice of life, and in the conduct of states, by which extensive evils are entailed on each, will be corrected by this means. Nor less in the due application of the national resources, or in the private economical arrangement of individuals, will this conduce to the removal of abuses and mismanagement of various descriptions.

Nations, like individuals, are, as has already been observed, subject to many diseases; and in both, moral as well physical diseases are the cause of great misery and evil. Diseases in states of a moral kind, are such as concern especially its advancement in civilization. Both in men and in states, diseases originate in some disorgani-

zation or derangement of the system, and are occasioned as much by omissions as by positive acts. Moreover, both in men and in states, diseases change at different periods, assuming new forms and varieties, one disease disappearing, and its place being supplied by another; such changes originating, however, not in the diseases themselves, but in a certain transformation in the condition of the being who is subject to them, and not unfrequently the cure of one disease operating as the producing cause of another.

The diseases which affect states as regards their civilization, arise mainly from some defect in connection with the foregoing Elements, either with respect to their existence, their development, or their imperfect operation; and which fully, in each case, admit of the application of their appropriate remedy.

II. The mental improvements that would be effected by the extension of civilization throughout the nation, are as follows:—Each individual in the state becomes a more able and exalted, because a more cultivated being; and that state, which is constituted of individuals, becomes, in a corresponding degree, more vigorous and enlightened, and advances equally in refinement and intelligence. The moral improvements that would result, are no less extensive: and as in the individual, the lower impulses are subdued by cultivation, and those which are higher are rendered paramount; so in a nation, by civilization its lower influences are decreased and subjugated to those of a more exalted nature, which then gain the ascendency. And as in an individual, his manual dexterity and professional resources, and means of benefiting himself, are largely increased by cultivation; so in a state, its national resources, and powers, and real strength, are alone fully developed by civilization.

The ideal of a perfect state, as regards its attainment of a condition of complete civilization, can only be arrived

at from the consideration of what a state would be when, according to the theory already enunciated, these threefold grand results ensue: its highest interests entirely predominate, its lower influences are efficiently subdued, and its whole resources are fully developed. Here, however, it is to be observed, as has indeed already been pointed out, that, although these highest interests ought to predominate, they ought not to rule uncontrolled; and though the lower impulses are to be subdued, they are to be by no means extinguished; but their legitimate exercise is still essential in a state, in a manner corresponding with that in which the influence of the animal appetites and passions, duly regulated and subdued, is available in the economy of the human frame. The resources, too, of the nation, do not necessarily demand to be ever in operation, but need only to be developed so as to be ready for action when required.

In the case probably both of individuals and of nations, the grand point to be aimed at is the complete development of their energies, so that the resources of each may at any time when required be brought into full play, and availed of to their utmost legitimate extent. Until this is effected, neither the individual nor the nation has attained its zenith, and its real power is as yet unascertained. When this is accomplished, the fullest advantage should be taken of the opportunity for action which occurs, and which in such case may prove that "There is a tide in the affairs" of states as well as of men which "taken at the flood" is calculated to carry them on at once to greatness and to glory, but which if neglected, and allowed to ebb, may never return. Ascertain first what your resources really are. Ascertain next how they may best and most completely and advantageously be turned to account.

In a completely civilized state, each of the foregoing Elements of Civilization will not only be duly developed

but each contemporaneously, and each will co-operate with the other. Thus, the people will be generally and systematically Educated, not only as regards storing their minds with knowledge, but by the inculcation of right principles, the extirpation of error, and the adapting them for the respective callings they are required to pursue. Not only is Education itself improved and stimulated by having certain of the other Elements of Civilization blended and followed in conjunction with it, by which the essential Education as well as the general and real Civilization of the man is perfected; but Civilization is complete only when these Elements are all blended together, which mutually alike aid, and correct, and enlarge, and stimulate the operation and effect of each other. Each of the different National Institutions in the country, will be then properly availed of, and highly prized by its citizens of all ranks. The Arts and Sciences will be generally understood, and not only cultivated by, but in their turn will cultivate and influence those of every class. As the Arts and the different Institutions for their encouragement, and for the promotion of learning, become better appreciated by the people at large; will they not only be more liberally supported by them, but their influence on the national mind will be also correspondingly more extensive. Their neglect is in ordinary cases owing to their real nature not being perceived, or to their value not being duly estimated. The influence of the Press is of great utility to correct this defect, and to instruct the people in the use and application of their various public Institutions.

Another important result of civilization, arises from its influence upon the general habits and manners of a people. It might perhaps be urged that manners of themselves constitute an independent Element of Civilization. On the whole, however, it appears that, in reality, they do not of themselves conduce to it, but merely spring from it.

They are rather an evidence than a cause of civilization, serving more to reflect what is already existent, than to produce anything new. Manners, indeed, are a consequence of refinement of mind, which results from civilization generally; though at the same time extensive refinement of manners is quite consistent with a very low condition of civilization; and a very low condition of civilization is quite consistent with extensive refinement of manners. The extension of Education, and the maintenance of Degrees of Honour and Rank in a state, are both conducive to refinement of manners, although they no more necessarily produce it, than refinement of manners tends directly to extend Education, or to the establishment of Degrees of Honour and Rank. Refinement of manners in any people must, however, on the whole, be regarded both as a decided proof of, and as the direct result of civilization.

Not only, however, a refinement of manners, which is an external proof and result of civilization, but a higher tone of morals, which is in its nature internal, is at once produced by the general advancement of civilization, and to which each of its Elements will more or less either directly or indirectly contribute. This will also extend itself to, and be exhibited alike in the tone and spirit of our laws and customs, in the various usages of society, and in the sentiment of our literature.

That "nations are not primarily ruled by laws,"* is a maxim of the highest importance, to be ever kept in view. There are, indeed, as already observed,† moral causes, especially those connected with and springing out of the civilization of a country, which are in their effect and result far more extensive and more powerful than any laws can ever be. Not only, indeed, are the influence of those about us, and moral causes generally, far more powerful and more efficient in the direction of human conduct, than

* Burke. † *Ante*, Element VIII., p. 280.

any laws can ever be; but in most cases it will be found that laws owe their main efficiency, and their principal support to these causes. Moreover, laws are in general rather prohibitory and restrictive, than calculated to induce people to any particular course of action; to which however they are urged on by moral causes. And in order to insure the enactment of wise and salutary laws, a corresponding spirit must animate not only the rulers of the nation who propound these laws, but the body of the people whom they are to direct. It may also be observed that a vast proportion of the actual laws which are established in any state, both with regard to the general government of a country and the regulation of the conduct of the people, are really unknown to the great bulk of the population, who have neither the ability nor the opportunity to make them the subject of study. They are consequently guided in the main by their own sense of propriety, rather than by any arbitrary legislative rule. Hence, not laws, but some more immediate and powerful influence, is what controls and urges on the conduct of the nation in general. Civilization must, therefore, be far more important to any country than legislation, however fully the latter may be adapted for its purpose; and the more complete and extensive is the former, the better calculated it is to supersede the latter.

Civilization, moreover, not only to a large extent supersedes the action of law, but it qualifies men for self-guidance, so as not to require to be so strictly bound by legislative provisions as those whose conduct is not regulated by higher principles. Hence, another great boon which the complete establishment of civilization would serve to confer, is that thereby men are not merely fitted for the possession and the enjoyment of perfect civil liberty, but that alone by this means are they fully adapted to use it aright. Having from their youth been trained up under proper restraint, the exercise of obedience

and self-control becomes engrafted on their very nature, and they are thus enabled thoroughly to appreciate the value of such a course of conduct.

Not only, however, by civilization are the people led to revere the laws, but they are induced also to render their assistance to the government on all occasions of emergency, from possessing a due perception of the principles on which it is carried on, and from being persuaded of the propriety and necessity of affording it their support. Confidence in one another is then established among all classes, they duly estimate each other's position, and from motives both of duty and interest are ever ready to aid one another. Those of different ranks are thus drawn nearer together, and both the claims and the grievances of all are fully understood. Hence are they not merely each individually superior in point of wisdom and capacity, but they will each be disposed to co-operate together when occasion requires it, either for the good of themselves or of their common country. Both in peace and in war, a nation so circumstanced has in itself the surest elements of prosperity and of real greatness. And indeed, the grand and very extensive advantages that a state derives from civilization, are obvious in the history of the rise and progress of every important nation, whose real power and glory, and wealth, and happiness, and well-being, have not only been contemporaneous with, but closely connected with, and absolutely dependent upon its civilization.

It was the dying injunction of Henry the Fourth of England to his son Prince Henry, afterwards Henry the Fifth, not to allow the people to remain long in peace, which was apt to breed intestine commotions; but to engage them in war, by which all the restless spirits might find occupation and diversion. In a civilized state of society, and in the present enlightened age, the energies of the people should be devoted not to war and blood

shed, but to habits of industry, and to peaceful though not less active pursuits. The conquests of science should take the place of those of arms. Against ignorance and error should our forces be wielded. And our grand design, both as a nation and as individuals, should be to effect, not the destruction, but the general welfare of all mankind.

Not only, however, will the accomplishment of civilization be followed by grand results such as are here described; but its advancement will be also marked by certain outward symbols or manifestations, which serve to testify to the reality of its establishment. As it is impossible that there should be much fire existent without the exhibition of some flame; so if civilization in any country has made considerable progress, its results will doubtless be openly shown, and which are in most cases quite as obvious as they are important. The most prominent of the signs of civilization, are necessarily those which are in their nature material, such as taste in erecting the cities and buildings of a nation, the costume of the inhabitants, and their mode of travelling. Next to these, the general intellectual capacity and cultivation displayed by the people will strike the observer, which though not so immediately perceptible, are not less surely indicated than the other. A corresponding refinement will also be exhibited in the habits, and manners, and customs, and feelings of the population generally. Superior skill will, moreover, be shown in all their active efforts, whether domestic, industrial, or martial. Civilization, indeed, while in some respects it softens and enervates the material frame, confers power on the whole being, by invigorating and developing the faculties of the mind. While it refines the man, it also gives him resolution. With wisdom he acquires strength. And although his muscular power may be less, his martial appliances are considerably increased. Thus, although the physical frame of a civilized person is much more easily fatigued

than is the frame of a barbarian; yet the former, through the aid of his mental resources, is able to effect far more with the same amount of exertion than he could otherwise accomplish. And while the one can deal with matter more vigorously, the other is able to subject matter to his control.

Nor are the direct material and physical advantages derived by each country from civilization, less extensive, less obvious, or less important in their way than those which are mental and moral. Not only are the people then better fitted to avail themselves of the natural resources of the country, but these resources themselves are very extensively increased by the appliances of civilization. By the additional facilities for locomotion, persons are enabled to travel about with less labour and loss of time; and it is through the means which civilization supplies, that mankind are adapted to endure all the varieties of climate and temperature which different portions of the globe present, but which animals, who have no such aid from civilization, are frequently unable to withstand. As regards also food, civilization enables man both to improve its general quality, and to render much of it good and wholesome which without such resorts would be noxious and unpalatable.

There is, nevertheless, this important attendant circumstance connected with the progress of civilization, that although civilization supplies either directly or indirectly nearly every want which a state can experience; yet, on the other hand, as already remarked, numerous new and urgent wants are ceaselessly created by civilization, and which, moreover, imperatively demand to be supplied. If a condition of barbarism can boast of but few of the conveniences of life, it is but justice to it to say that it not only requires but few, but that it could not very well avail itself of more than it actually possesses. The exact opposite, however, is the case with civilization; and the

exigency so occasioned by it has an extensive and very valuable result in the strong stimulus which it excites and keeps up constantly, to further progress in civilization, in order to meet the necessity thus created, whereby alternately the want and the supply sustain each other, and each alike contribute to urge on the course of civilization.

A comparison was made while discussing the Nature and Essence of Civilization, between man as an individual, and nations which are but made up of men. Nations like men, as already pointed out, have their different periods of age, and consequently of growth and advancement. There is nevertheless one important and essential difference between national and individual growth, that while the man can never go back by growing younger, the nation may retrograde, at least as regards the condition of its civilization, and gradually sink into barbarism, a sort of national second childhood. But the man may also in this respect go backwards, and his second childhood, as in the case also of national second childhood, is accompanied with all the infirmity of infancy, without its healthful vigour; and what is most important of all, it possesses not, like primitive childhood, the principles of growth and progression, but only the opposite tendencies to retrogression and decay. In nothing, however, is the resemblance between the state and the man more striking, than in the results which are produced by civilization upon each, developing their powers, calling forth their energies, and directing aright their exertions. How different is the condition of any particular individual, whether on the one hand he lives and dies an uncultivated hind or a rude savage, all his mental faculties dull and imperfect through neglect and want of training; or whether he receives a regular and correct education, by which his capacities are duly cultivated and sharpened, and his habits properly trained. But great as is the difference produced by this variety of their treatment alone, in the savage and the

educated man, the difference between a rude and an uncivilized nation is not less extensive; and, indeed, in their relative position they closely resemble each other. To a certain extent, although Education is essentially different from civilization, and far less influential; civilization is to a nation what Education is to an individual. Nor can it be doubted that the individual who obtains a high degree of Education, is sure to obtain civilization therewith, by resorting to the other Elements of civilization, provided that they are placed within his reach, (the procuring which is the main object aimed at in this Treatise,) and to which he is at once instinctively stimulated by the desire for self-improvement which his Education generates. And the civilization of a nation necessarily includes the Education of the people, which is rather an essential part of it, than something that is occasioned or promoted by it, although in reality the one both furthers and aids the other.

But it may be said that civilization, together with the many benefits which it undoubtedly confers both on men and nations, brings also in its career a long train of evils of a very serious kind; and that in reality a large proportion of the vices, and diseases, and distresses which oppress mankind, are not only the products of civilization, but never would have existed in an uncivilized state of society: that savages are as much strangers to many diseases and crimes, as also to pecuniary embarrassment, as they are to philosophical research, literary occupation, or artistical employment.

Admitting it to be the truth that the evils alluded to exist alone, and to the full, in a state of civilization; yet, on the other hand, it cannot be denied that they are not only no necessary part of its perfection, but are radical defects in the system; that they are in reality signs not of its completion, but of its corruption, springing in many cases out of that luxury which has been already observed to be the surest cause of the decay of civilization, although

many persons have very erroneously regarded it as one of the certain proofs of civilization having reached its climax. True it is that these vices and diseases can thrive only in a comparatively civilized condition; but the main reason of this is, not that a barbarous state of society is more inherently virtuous than the latter, but because in such a case the soil is too barren to produce any vegetation at all. Weeds are ever more apt to spring up in rich than in sterile ground. But this is surely no solid reason why the earth should not be cultivated. It is a reason however, why that cultivation should be carried out to the full, by means of which the weeds will be exterminated, and the genuine plant only fostered. So also as regards the progress of civilization, although vices as well as virtues will be necessarily nurtured during its progress, and will receive that encouragement which in a barbarous state of society they could never have obtained; yet, when civilization is perfectly established, these vices, like weeds, will be thoroughly rooted out, and its legitimate products only obtain encouragement and patronage.

If among all the mighty empires of the world, concerning whose rise, and splendour, and decay, history records, no one example has ever yet been found of a nation in which civilization may be said to have reached absolute perfection, so as practically to illustrate the End which civilization should effect; this is surely no proof that such a condition is incapable of attainment. If the principles here maintained as to the Elements necessary to ensure the completion of civilization, be correct, the proper means for ensuring its acomplishment have been as yet unresorted to. But probably even among mankind, no one absolute model of excellence has ever yet been seen, either as regards his natural endowments, mental or moral, or the degree of cultivation to which these have been brought. By how much less, therefore, is this perfection to be looked for in the state, where so many

counteracting influences must always exist, in the various feelings and dispositions of its members. The truth of a principle is not impugned by the fact that it has never been carried out to the full. Nay more than this, the omission so to carry it out, may be mainly owing to the difficulty occasioned by the high and sublime standard of excellence at which it aims.

Indeed, the highest and most perfect condition of civilization, and that both as regards communities and individuals, will be attained only in eternity, when the soul will be disengaged from the debasing influence of the carnal body, and united to one of a spiritual and intellectual nature; and the state of society will be such that all the various obstacles which now militate against civilization, will be removed, and those influences only which conduce to its advancement and completion will be extended and invigorated.

So little has as yet really been attempted towards the accomplishment of a complete system of civilization in any one country, and there is so much which is capable of being practically carried out here; that the highest hopes may be entertained for the result when the experiment shall have received a full and fair trial, corresponding with the importance of the subject. Indeed, the effects that have been produced, both in our own country and in other nations, from the partial efforts to diffuse civilization, afford of themselves ample and practical proof of what may be done by well-directed measures in this great cause; and serve to evince that the anticipations here put forth are not founded merely on conjecture, but, on the contrary, well-tried experience assures us fully of their truth.

Singular it is, nevertheless, that in those Elements of civilization in which certain of the ancients mainly excelled, we have been especially deficient; while in turn we have far surpassed them in others. They were

as superior to us in Art and some branches of literature, as we are superior to them in Science, in Jurisprudence, and in all the means of carrying on Intercourse, both International and Internal. If the Elements of civilization availed of in both periods could be combined in one nation, civilization might at once be perfectly accomplished. And, surely, if these Elements have been proved, either singly or united, to be actually capable of practical application, and of such extensive influence, they may be so availed of again. It must, therefore, be admitted that those great nations in several respects considerably exceeded us in their approaches to that land of promise, although, on the whole, we may have far distanced them in our advancement in the same direction. As a land of promise, however, only, it still remains, whose shores have never yet been reached by the most skilful or adventurous navigator on that vast and illimitable ocean; and on whose coasts may not only mighty discoveries be unfolded, but the most delicious and precious fruits may eventually be gathered.

Those blissful shores which they in vain attempted to gain, we are now in full prospect of attaining, although hitherto we have been hindered through the want of proper charts and pilots from arriving there. But the majestic peaks and most prominent heights of that glorious land are at length discernible, of which the eye can trace the grand outline; and from thence to us have been borne some of the rich fruits which it so abundantly yields. We have full assurance, of seeing ere long, the stately trees and luxuriant vegetation which those fruits adorned, reared in this country, and made the natural products of British soil.

THE END.

LONDON: PRINTED BY WILLIAM CLOWES AND SONS, STAMFORD STREET AND CHARING CROSS.

INDEX.

"Able-men," proposed order of, 223.
Absolute government, (see Governments, and Monarchies.)
Absolute monarchy, 242.
Abuse, no argument for disuse, 140.
Accent, 35.
Accomplishments, *Pref.* x.
Achievements of the ancients, 40.
Activity, over, dangers from, 296, 302.
Acts of Parliament, (see Parliament.)
Addison, sacred poetry of, 149.
'Advancement of Learning,' the, 128.
Africa, unfavourably situated for civilization, 20.
Air, the communication by, 286, 287.
Alfred the Great, 200, 244.
Aliment, mental and moral, (see Food.)
Alliances, international, 332.
Ambassadors, intercourse through, 335.
America, people of, 34.
Amusements for the people, 68, 133, 192, 196, 197; necessity for, 196, 197, 201; adaptation and regulation of, 201, 204, 206, 209; pernicious, 204, 208; duty of the state in regard to, 209; by excursions, 210.
Analogy, between men and states, 3, 5, 284.
Anarchy, 242.
Anarchy, periods of, 8.
Ancients, vast achievements of the, 40.
Anglo-Saxon era, dignities during the, 220.
Animals, changes in character of, illustrative of changes in national character, 33.
Animals, independent and incapable of civilization, 4, 282, 361.
Animosities, national, discouragement of, 199; between sects and parties, 199.
Anniversaries, (see Commemorations.)
Appointments, ecclesiastical, 118.
Architecture, 143.
Aristocracy, influence of an, 216, 249, 250.
Aristotle, 39.
Aristotle, 'Politics' of, 4, 9, 48, 51, 81, 146, 220, 246, 257, 271, 310.
Arms should be superseded by conventions, 319.
Arnold, Rev. Dr., 143.
Art, influence of in civilization, 88, 141, 142, 143.
Art in Greece, 12; in Egypt, 12.
Art, pictorial, advantages of an acquaintance with, 145, 146.
Art, popular, 161.
Art, progress of, 39.
Art and science, national cultivation of, 141, 323; their influence, national and individual, 141, 350; classification of pursuits, 143; refining influence of, 146; aid of, to religion, 146; pictorial art, 147; music, 147; poetry, national and devotional, 147; monuments, 151; national edifices, 157; national disfigurements, 159; ornamental gardening, 159; provi-

sion for support of the arts, 160; popular cultivation of art, 161; music, 161; decay of the arts, 161; reciprocal influence of art and science, 162; encouragement for achievements in, 220, 221; influence of intercourse upon, 304.
Articles of the church, efficiency of the, 111.
Artificial dignities, (see Dignities, civil.)
'Arts, Theory of the,' reference to, 64, 88, 146, 157, 160, 161, 162.
Asia, early civilization of, 19.
Aspersions on the stage, unjust, 138.
Assemblies, representative, framing of, 247, 248.
Athenian intellect, the, 25.
Athens, 292; poverty of, 48, 51; theatre of, 134.
Atonement for crime, what constitutes, 260.
Attack, martial, the science of, 325.
Attica, climate of, 25.
Authors, claim of, to state patronage, 228.
Avarice, 49.

Bacon, Lord, 128, 152, 200, 226.
Balance of interests, 295, 296, 297.
Balance of parties, 172.
Balance of power, preservation of, 318, 331.
Balloons, communication by, 287.
Barbarism, communicability of, 281, 340.
Barbarous age, honours suited to a, 215, 220; treatment of women in a, 255.
Barbarous times, advantages of, 363.
Barriers, national, 309; maintenance of, 330.
Benefits, international and universal, what are, 311.
Benevolence, Christianity promotes, 85.
Bible, (see Scripture,) favourable to civilization, 43, 85.
Birthdays, royal, commemoration of, 200.
Bishops, regulations respecting ordinations by, 118.
Boundaries, national, 309; maintenance of, 330.
Britain, geographical position of, 20, 21, 22.
Britons, the ancient, 22, 26.
Buckle's 'History of Civilization,' 55.
Buildings, (see Edifices.)
Burghley, Lord, 152.
Burke, Edmund, 152, 357.
Burns, sacred poetry of, 149.

Canals, communication by, 286.
Causes, moral, (see Moral causes,) 357.
Capacity for civilization, national, 2.
Ceremony in religious services, value of, 95.
Changes, in men and states, 10.
Changes in national character, (see Character, national.)
Change in national religion, effect of, 189, 278.
Changes, jurisprudential, 278; mode of effecting, 278.
Changes, resulting from civilization, 349.
Character, influence of education on, 65.
Character, national, 28, 29, 30; and national laws, 254; on what dependent, 31; changes in, 32, 333, 353; influence of intercourse upon, 333; regard to, in forming alliances, 333; improved by civilization, 354.
Character of the press, 174.
Chaucer, Geoffrey, 152.
Childhood, in men and states, 6, 7.
Children, education of, 81.
Chinese, the, 41, 143.
Chivalry, 260; influence of, 44.

Chivalry, courts of, 260.
Christianity, its influence on civilization, 42, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 91, 193.
Christianity owes much to freedom of discussion, 175.
Christianity, universal peace, the fruit of, 336.
Church, the 42, 73, 107, 108, 110, 116, 171.
Church of England, tolerant spirit of the, 186, 187; intolerance of some of its members, 186, 187.
Church, a true, intolerance no test of, 185.
Church establishments, 106, 107.
Church celebrations, 198.
Church government, 118.
Citadels, national and natural, 330.
Civic offices, honours suited for, 223.
Cities, great, recreations for people in, 210.
Civil duties, inculcation of, 65.
Civilization, the influence produced by, 2, 3; different kinds of, 2; origin of, 11, 14; the natural condition of man, 4, 14, 15; stimulus to, 13; essence of, 15, 17; requisites to, 16; diffusion of, 17; division as regards the several kinds of, 18; elementary principles of, 18; ancient and modern, 37; decay of, 44, 353; to be ranked as a science, 51; duty of the state in promoting, 53; constituents of, 55; elements of, 55; education and, 57, 58, 59, 60, 344, 362, 363; knowledge the keystone of, 57; Christianity, highly favourable to, 85; religious influence different from civilization, 89; effects of Christianity upon, 88, 89, 90; promoted by certain institutions, 103, 106, 107, 119; amusements greatly influence, 133; effect of art and science upon, 141, 144, 146, 147; of monuments, 151, 153; of music, 144, 146; of liberty of the press, and toleration, 163; of commemorations and festivals, 192, 193, 203; of dignities and honorary rewards, 211, 213, 214; influence of moral jurisprudence upon, 233; of liberty upon, 233; its influence upon crime, 241, 242; crimes, directly affecting, 268; moral effect of punishments in regard to, 264; crime directly inimical to, 270; promoted by intercourse, general, internal, and international, 280, 281, 304, 338, 339; and promotes this intercourse, 280, 281, 282, 303; its influence on societies, 282, influence of postal communication upon, 289; intercourse a great stimulant to, 280; severance of natural barriers, 309; influence of commerce upon, 310, 312; early, of this country, 312, 313; influence of war upon, 319, 320, 321; its influence upon war, 324; in subduing animosities, 324, 327; confers strength, 325; promotes peace, 325; peace promotes, 328; of the world, 341, 350.
Civilization, the end of, 341; definition of, 343, 344, 345; incomplete and unsystematic, 342; threefold objects of civilization, 345; threefold results of, 353; remedies, 353; improvements resulting from, 353; ideal of a completely civilized state, 354, 355; manners and habits of the people, 356; morals, 357; law superseded by, 358; men qualified for civil liberty by, 358; national greatness, 359; symbols of civilization, 360; stimulus to progression, 361; no example of a completely civilized state, 364; in eternity alone will exist, 365; anticipations for the future, 365.
Civilization, evils attendant on, 422.

Civilization, incomplete conditions of, 396.
Civilization, symbols of, 360.
Classical studies, 62.
Classification of pursuits, 143.
Clergy, guidance by, 188.
Clergy and ecclesiastical bodies, 118.
Clerical labour, division of, recommended, 117.
Climate, influence of, 24, 26, 27.
Climate, varieties of, man able to endure, 361.
Coast, extent of, as influencing civilization. 21.
Codes, criminal moral, 259.
Coercion, inefficacy of, 178, 179.
Coleridge, 'Constitution of Church and State,' by, 20.
Colonies, 90, 297, 298, 313; principle of relationship to, 299; establishment of, 297; use of, 298; communication with, 297, 298, 299, 300, 301; protection of, 299.
Colonial possessions, influence of on civilization, 22.
Commemorations, national, 192, 199; influence and effect of, 192; by the church, 198; commemorative anniversaries, 199; days to be appointed, 200; amusements to be provided on days of, 209, 210.
Commerce, its influence on civilization, 21, 143, 311, 312; international, 311.
Commercial ranks, honours adapted for the, 223.
Commonwealth, the, 197.
Communication, internal, (see Internal communication.)
Compass, influence of the invention of, 37, 38, 200.
Concentration of population, effect of, on civilization, 17.
Concerts, popular, sacred, recommended, 147.
Conduct, regulation of, 16.
Conflicting influences, 8, 9.
Congregating for religious worship, moral effect of, 108.
Conscience, liberty of, 168, 177, 178, 179, 188, 191.
Continent, our proximity to the, 22, 314, 315.
Continents, why unfavourable to civilization, 22, 314, 315.
Conventions, should supersede arms, 321, 322.
Conviviality, how far to be encouraged, 202, 203.
Cook, Captain, 200.
Co-operation of Elements, (see Elements.)
Copyright, laws relating to, 277.
Corrective effects, 64, 202, 205, 302.
Corrective Elements, 109, 171, 302.
Corruption, precaution against, 336.
Costume, influence of, 143.
Counteractive effects, 64, 105, 202, 204.
Courage, encouragement of, 232.
Covetousness, influence of, 49.
Cowardice, punishment of, 272.
Cowper, sacred poetry of, 149.
Crime, 64.
Crimes, freedom from, 18; those most inimical to civilization, 18.
Crime, influence of civilization upon, 259, 260; influence of, upon civilization, 260, 268.
Crimes, causes of, 270.
Crimes, laws relating to, 239, 259, 270.
Crimes, moral effect of particular, 259.
Crimes, national, 337.
Crimes, punishment corresponding with, 262.
Criminal states, 325, 326.

Danes, 30.
Death, infliction of, 262, 265.
Debt, national, influence of, 50, 288.
Decay of states, 6, 7.
Declamation, use of, 170.
Decline of art, 161, 162.

Decline of civilization, 43, 44, 208, 258, 346.
Defence, martial, the science of, 325, 326.
Degradation, infliction of, 262, 265, 267, 268, 269.
Deity, perfection of the Government of, 244.
Demosthenes, quotation from, 6.
Design, art of, 145.
Development, tendency of civilization to promote, 344.
Diffusion of civilization, necessity of, 17.
Dignities and honorary rewards, 211, 319; moral effect of, 214, 215; object of, 216; at an early period of our history, 220; conferred as rewards for achievements in civilization, 220; suited to a civilized age, 221; mode of selecting and designation for, 222; distribution of minor honours, 223; proposal for new order of, 223; revival of extinct orders, 223, 224; desirableness of rendering hereditary, 225; life peerages, 225; moral influence of dignities, 226; accompanied with pensions, 227; to men of middle rank, 232.
Disabilities, civil, 239, 275.
Discipline, breach of, punishment for, 272.
Discoveries, aid of new, 162, 227.
Discoveries, influence of, on civilization, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42.
Discussion, free, purifying effect of, 175.
Discussion, liberty of, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 175, 176.
Diseases, national, 6, 7, 26, 353.
Disfigurements, national, 158.
Dishonesty, punishment of, 272.
Distinctions, civil, origin of, 211.
Divines, monuments to, 154.
Divisions, national district, 290.
Dress, 26, 143.
Drunkenness, punishment of, 272.
Duelling, prevention of, 260.
Duty of the state, in promoting civilization, 53, 73, 74.
Duties, civil, inculcation of, 65, 70.
Duties, clerical, division of, 117.

Edifices, religious, 97; national, 157; private, 158; art and science applicable to, 158; style of, general, 360.
Education, 57, 219, 240, 280, 281, 294, 319, 350; compulsory, *Pref.* ix.; not the sole requirement of the age, *ib.* vii., viii.; only one of several aids to civilization, *ib.* vii.; what it comprehends, *ib.* ix.; of the people generally, 57; as compared with civilization, 57, 343; education and civilization, 57, 363; the keystone of civilization, 57; knowledge and education, 58; different kinds of, 59; mental, 59; moral, 59; manual, 59; object of, 58, 59, 62, 63; quality of, 64; principles of, 65; corrective effects of, 64; necessity of systematic principles in, 64, 343; crime and education, 65; education in after-life, 67, 78; does not tend to lead the poor astray, 67; protects them against pernicious principles, 68; does not unfit them for their station, 72; brings different classes together, 73; national education a national duty, 73; state provisions and regulations for this purpose, 74; examinations, 77; ornamental, 78; education should continue through life, 78; Spartan system of, 79; stimulus to education, 80; education of children, 81; religious education, 82; threefold results of education, 82; only one Element in civilization, 83; what it ought to effect, 83; of women, 256; necessity for a systematic plan of, 64.

Electric telegraph, (see Telegraph.)
Elementary principles of civilization, 18.
Elements of civilization, co-operation of, *Pref.* vii., ix., 63, 171, 192, 202, 280, 282, 303, 305, 340, 341, 349, 350, 351, 352, 363, 365; classification of, 18; each should aid the other, 62; correct enumeration of, *Pref.* vii., ix., 18; experience of application of, 352.
Emulation, excitement of, 80, 205.
Encouragement of inventions and experiments, 151, 162.
Encouragement, national, to literature and art, 162.
Energies, national, development of, 354.
Enervation, civilization does not tend to, 15, 25, 44, 45, 208, 258, 353, 360.
England, proper foreign policy of, 313.
English monarchy, establishment of the, 200.
Engravings, popular issue of, proposed, 161.
Epithets, use of, 36.
Equality, natural and artificial, 211.
Error, banishment of, 175, 353.
Errors, education corrective of, 64.
Essence of a state, a representative assembly should contain, 247.
Essence of civilization, 14, 15.
Euripides, 26.
Europe, situation of, favourable to civilization, 19.
Evils attendant on civilization, 363.
Examinations, public, efficiency and expediency of, 75, 127.
Excise, laws relating to the, 276.
Executions, public, demoralizing effects of, 207, 265.
Exercise, bodily, necessity for, 62.
Exhibitions, theatrical, (see Theatre.)
Experience of the effects of civilization, 364.
Experiments, national encouragement of, 162.
External intercourse, (see Intercourse.)
Extinct orders of nobility, proposal for revival of, 224.

Fabric-worship, 93.
Faculties of the mind, each should be cultivated, 124.
Fallacies, educational, 71.
Fanaticism, 109.
Fashion, definition of, 245.
Feasting, entertainments consisting of, 202, 203.
Female franchise, 257.
Ferguson's 'History of Civil Society,' 347.
Festivals, national, 192, 193, 197, 199, 210; object and influence of, 193, 196, 197, 203, 209.
Field sports, moral effect of, 207.
Flowers, civilizing effect of study of, 159.
Food, influence of, 26, 27.
Food, intellectual, necessity of, *Pref.* ix., 64, 130, 276.
Force moral, 323.
Force physical, 323.
Foreign influences, precautions respecting, 336.
Foreign intercourse, (see Intercourse, international.)
Foreigners, laws respecting, 338.
France, foreign policy of, 313.
Franchise, female, 257.
Frontiers, national, preservation of, 330.

Galileo, 180.
Galleries of art, 107, 132, 210.
Gallows, the, punishment by, 268.
Gambling, tendency of, 208.
Games, 196, 206; Grecian, 205, 286.
Gardening, ornamental, 159.
Gauls, the, 28.
Generosity to enemies, civilization productive of, 324, 325.
Genius, the English, theatrical turn of, 137.
Gentility, 58, 218

Geographical position, influence of, 21, 22, 314, 315.
Germs of national character, 33, 34.
Gibbon's 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire,' 162.
God, enactments contrary to law of, 252.
Goods, transmission of, 286.
Government, civil, 240.
Government, object of a free, 240.
Government, restraint on discussion of principles of, 172.
Governments, absolute, 242, 244.
Governments, representative, 247; principles in framing, 247; moral influence of, 248.
Governments, republican, 247.
Grants, educational, 74.
Greatness, national, 359.
Greece, 290; religion of, 85.
Greece, art in, 12; situation of, 21, 24, 25; Muller's Literature of Ancient, 25; orators of, 170; festivals of, 203; civilization in, 342.
Guizot, M., 'History of Civilization,' by, 14, 15, 43.
Gunpowder, influence of the invention of, 37, 38, 40, 200, 328.
Gunpowder Plot, commemoration of the, 200.

Habits and manners, 356.
Happiness, national, 347; promoted by civilization, 347; not the end of civil society, 347.
Hardwicke, Lord Chancellor, 152.
Harvey, W., 152.
Heber, Bishop, sacred poetry of, 149.
Henry IV., dying injunction of, 359.
Heresy, not nurtured by toleration, 183.
Hero, definition of a, 221.
Heroes, monuments to, 151.
Heroism, encouragement of, 232.
Holidays and Holy-days, 198.
Holidays, national, 197, 198; means to secure the observance of, 198.
Honour, appeals to, 272.
Honour, national, 336.
Honorary rewards, (see Rewards.)
Human nature, study of, 10.
Humanity, civilization conduces to, 323, 324.
Hunter, John, 152.
Hypocrisy, 138.

Ideal of a perfect state, 354.
Idleness, amusements tending to encourage, 208, 209.
Idleness conducive to crime, 262, 263.
Ignorance, incommunicability of, 281.
Ignorance, popular, no safeguard, 71; no plea for intolerance, 190.
Impoverishment of the nobility, proposed provision against, 217.
Imprisonment, punishment by, 262.
Improvement, intellectual capacity of man for, 1.
Independence, national, desirableness of maintaining, 333.
India, 90; civilization of, 298.
Indifference, religious, productive of toleration, 188.
Influence, religious, national, 83, 294, 319, 342, 350; mutual effect between that and education, 84; extent of this influence, 85; different kinds of, 86; different modes of promoting civilization, 87; its civilizing effect, 88; aids the other Elements, 90; immensity of its influence, 91; pagan and heathen systems of religion, 91, 92; personality and materiality in religion, 92; priest-worship and fabric-worship, 92, 93; instruction in evidences of religion, 94, 95; ceremony in religious services, 98; character of religious edifices, 97; atheistical men and nations, 98; duty of the state in promoting religious influence, 99; state honour to religion, 100; the protection of religion, 100; repulsiveness in religious services, 102; style of

Scriptures a model for the latter, 102.
Influences, conflicting, 8, 9.
Influences, foreign, precautions respecting, 336.
Influences, reciprocity of, 143, 171; rival and conflicting, 9; moral, 11.
Insane, punishment of the, 261.
Instinctive intelligence, 1.
Institutions, charitable, 119.
Institutions, instructory, 103, 163, 215, 319; what ought to be deemed national, 103; requirements of, 104; exclusive privileges of, 104; principles regarding, 105; different kinds of, corresponding with education, 106; liability to corruption, 109; religious and charitable institutions, 119; end they ought to serve, 120, 121; systematic plan of instruction required in them, 123; requisites in them, 127; what they ought to effect, 131; duty of state to provide, 133, 189; use of, in connection with other Elements, 201.
Institutions, learned, intercourse between, 128.
Institutions, national, for promoting civilization, 103.
Instructors, qualifications of, 74.
Instructory institutions, (see Institutions.)
Insular position, influence of, 20, 297, 314.
Integrity, encouragement of, 232.
Intelligence, communication of, 286.
Intelligence, influence of, in a representative assembly, 248.
Intelligence, laws restricting the spread of, 276.
Intentions, mere, not within the scope of the law, 237.
Intercourse between learned societies, 128.
Intercourse between rich and poor, 12, 13, 201, 285.
Intercourse, general, influence of, 12, 13; external, 13, 20, 21.
Intercourse, international, 20, 21, 303, 350; to be considered independent of other Elements, 305; stimulus created by, 305; natural barriers against, 309; influence of religion upon, 310; of commerce, 311; early civilization of this country by, 313; the sea, as a medium of, 314, 315; regulation of, 315; various modes of, 315; influence of war upon, 319, 323; consideration of character in establishing, 332; precautions respecting, 336; leads to neglect of national pursuits, 337.
Intercourse, marine, influence of, 314.
Intercourse, promotion of, 171.
Interference, foreign, principle of, 308.
Interests, leading, ought to predominate in a representative assembly, 248.
Interests, rival, balance of, 295, 296.
Interests, rural, 295.
Intermixing with foreigners, influence of, 22.
Internal communication, 280, 351; effects resulting from, 281; creates a stimulus to civilization, 282; intercourse between ranks and classes, 284; internal communication, analogous to animal circulation, 284; varieties of internal communication, 286; a national object, 288; points of, 290; with colonies, 297; communication of each kind should be maintained, 301; proper application and regulation of this Element, 302.
International intercourse, (see Intercourse, international.)
Interventions, civil, superseding war, 321, 322, 323.
Inventions, aid of new, 162, 228.

Inventions, influence of certain, 37, 38.
Intoleration (and see Toleration), 109.
Ireland, union with, 200.
Italy, situation of, 19, 20.

Jews, civilization of, 22, 33, 34; national character exhibited in, 34; laws of, 252.
Judicial proceedings, early, 30.
Jurisprudence, leading principles of, 240.
Jurisprudence, moral, (see Moral jurisprudence.)
Jury, trial by, 30.
Justice, mode of administration of, 273.

Keble, Rev. J., sacred poetry of, 149.
Knighthood, rank of, 223.
Knowledge, communicated by intercourse, 281.
Knowledge, its necessity in civilization, 16, 57; the keystone of education, 57.
Knowledge, political, for the people, 70, 71.
Knowledge, religious, 62, 65.

Labour, human, employment of, 144.
Language, 35, 36, 142; influence, of, 36, 309; national, reflective of national character, 35; universal, 392; knowledge of foreign, 340; requisite precision of, in legal enactments, 238, 239.
Law, its influence upon civilization, 233; province of, 233, 234, 237; duty of state in framing, 234, 235; language of, 238; threefold object of, 237; maintenance of, 251; moral, under what comprehended, 252; causes of failure of, 252; leading principle of, 252; proper operation of, 252; repugnant to religion, 252; to nature, 253; accordance of with reason, 254; of marriage, 255; relating to crime, 259, 260; relating to oaths, 272; relating to the poor, 277; relating to the revenue, 276; of copyright, 277; sanitary, 277; repugnancy of national sentiment to a, 279; limitation to operation and scope of, 280, 357; whence its authority derived, 87.
Laws, nations not ruled by, 357.
Laws, respecting foreigners, 338.
Laws, international, 338.
Laws, national, and national character, 254.
Lawyers, monuments to, 152, 154.
Lectures, 41, 62, 125, 126.
Legislation, in reference to civilization, *Pref.* vi., 142, 233.
Legislation, Sabbatarian, principles of, 195.
Legislative bodies, rival, 250.
Lessons, in church services, proposal respecting, 118.
Letters, use of, 34.
Liberty, restraint of, 164, 165, 241; liberty, physical and intellectual, 165; civil, 165, 241; its influence on civilization, 166; and education, 166; liberty of conscience, 167; of discussion, 168; security of, 169; definition and essence of, 241; the natural condition of man, 241; love of, 251; varies in different societies, 251; civilization qualifies men for, 358; civilization the safeguard of, 358.
Liberty of the press, (see Press.)
Liberty of thought and speech, 164, 168, 169.
Liberty, religious, 167, 170; political, 167, 170.
Libraries, 106, 130, 131.
Licentiousness not liberty, 174.
Life-peerages, 225.
Literature and art, encouragement of, 160.
Literature for the lower classes, want of a, *Pref.* viii., 66, 74, 130.

Literature, pensions to men engaged in, 227.
Locke, John, 68, 152.
London, 290, 313.
Lower classes, want of a suitable literature for the, *Pref.* viii., 66, 74, 130.
Luxury, 15, 26, 44, 45, 208, 259, 345, 349, 360.

Magna Charta, commemoration of, 200.
Man, as an individual, 1, 2, 3; in the aggregate, 3, 4; as the type of a state, 3, 5, 362; capacity of for intellectual improvement, 1; threefold consideration of, 3.
Manners, 61.
Manners and habits, 356, 357, 360.
Mansions of the aristocracy, 217.
Manual education, 59, 77.
Manual institutions, 106.
Maps, as aids to education, 62.
Marine intercourse, influence of, 314.
Marriage, laws relating to, 240, 255.
Martial exploits, dignities for skill in, 220.
Masses, rewards for the, 213.
Materiality in religion, 92, 93, 94.
Mechanical power, supply of, 144.
Medicine, progress of the science of, 39.
Melody, sacred, defective state of, 147.
Memorials not monumental, 156.
Men and states, analogy between, 3, 5, 284, 362.
Mental education, 59.
Mental institutions, 106.
Merit, the only foundation of rank, 211, 212, 213.
Merit, rewards to men of, 227, 232.
Metropolis, civilizing effects of a, 290, 292, 293; communication with, 290, 293; position of a, 313; progress of building in the, 196.
Microscope, use of, 39.
Middle Ages, the, 43.
Middle rank, honours to men of, 223; rewards to, 232, 271.
Middle ranks, influence of the, 8, 9, 246.
Milton, John, 152, 200, 226, 227.
Mind, national, 1.
Minds, great influence of in civilization, 9, 56.
Mixed governments, advantages of, 249.
Models for imitation, importance of, 91.
Monarchies, absolute, 242.
Monarchy, English, establishment of the, 200.
Money, state grants of, 74.
Monuments in the Houses of Parliament, 152.
Monuments, national, 151; influence of, 151; neglect to erect, 152; Wordsworth on, 153; Napoleon on, 154; not dependent on art, 156; their influence on civilization, 153.
Moral causes, 357.
Moral causes, the influence of, 11, 280.
Moral education, 59.
Moral effect of state dignities, 213.
Morals, effect of civilization upon, 357.
Moral influence of sovereigns, 244, 245, 246, 249; of a nobility, *ib.*; of rulers, 246, 249.
Moral institutions, 106.
Moral jurisprudence, *Pref.* vi., 233, 351; definition of, 233, 239; proper sphere of, 237, 275; principles of, 240; regarding forms of government, 240; in relation to crime, 259; ultimate end of, 280.
Moral objects, aid of legislation to effect, 250.
Morality, 18, 98, 275.
Morality, disability from want of, 275.

Morality and religion, 98.
Morality, national, 336.
More, Sir Thomas, 'Utopia' of, 206.
Mountains, chains of, separating different countries, 309, 329.
Museums, 106, 107, 132.
Music, popular, the state should supply, 161, 210.
Music, influence of, 102, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 161, 203, 210.

Napoleon I. on civilization, *Pref.* vii., 159; on national monuments, 154; promoted internal communication, 285.
National character, (see Character.)
National commemorations, (see Commemorations.)
National dignities, (see Dignities.)
National edifices, (see Edifices.)
National education, (see Education.)
National religion, effect of change of, 189.
National religious influence, (see Influence, religious.)
National theatre, (see Theatre.)
Nature, (see Human nature,) the system of, to be followed, *Pref.* vi., 54, 226, 262, 346; dictates of, 211; operation of, in relation to rewards and punishments, 263; influence of contemplation of, 159.
Naval force, 21, 22; British, 328.
Navigation, the position of this country promotes skill in, 312.
Navigation, dignities conferred for skill in, 20.
Newspaper, the, 171; as a public institution, 171, 290; general character of, at the present day, 174.
Newton, Sir Isaac, 152, 200, 226.
Nobility, (see Dignities.)
Nobility, moral influence of, 245.
Nobility, proposed provision against the impoverishment of, 217.
Nobility, system of, not superannuated, 222.
Numbers, influence of, in a state, 248.

Oaths, laws relating to, 262, 272.
Offices, civil, appointment to, 75.
Opinion, freedom of (and see Liberty of the press, and Toleration), 179, 180.
Opinion, public, 171.
Opposite results from the same cause, 320.
Orators, Grecian, 170.
Order, maintenance of, 250.
Organs of public opinion, 168, 171.
Origin of civilization, 11, 12.
Origin of civil punishments, 262.
Ornamental education, *Pref.* x., 78.

Pacification, religious prospects for, 113, 114, 115.
Painting, 143.
Papists, vices of, 109; tolerance of some, 176.
Parliaments, the holding of, 30.
Parliament, the, and the press, 171.
Parliament, acts of, loose phraseology of, 238.
Party-feeling, whence favourable to civilization, 249.
Patents, laws relating to, 277.
Patrons of art and science, 216.
Patronage, necessity for, 144, 160; objects of, 160, 162.
Paul, St., on avarice, 49.
Peace, civilization promoted by, 333, 360; universal, one of the fruits of Christianity, 336; maintenance of, 319, 323, 325, 328, 329.
Peerages, (see Dignities.)
Peerages, early, 220.
Peerages for life, 225.
Pensions, state, 227.
Perfect state, ideal of a, 354.
Performances, popular musical, 146, 147, 161.
Perjury, punishment of, 272, 273.
Pernicious amusements, (see Amusements.)

Pernicious publications, (see Publications.)
Persecution, inefficacy of, 191.
Personality in religion, 93.
Persons, communication of, 286.
Physical force, 321, 349.
Pictures, as aids to education, 62.
Plato, Republic of, 205.
Poetry, 144; national, 147; religious and devotional, 147; doggrel. 149.
Poetry, Jewish, 147, 148.
Poetry and rhyme, distinction between, 147.
Poets, monuments to, 153.
Points of communication, different, 290.
Political knowledge, (see Knowledge.)
Pomp in religious services, effect of, 95.
Poor-laws, principle of the, 277.
Pope, Alexander, 151.
Popular tyranny, 246.
Position, geographical, 19; of this country, 20, 21, 22.
Position, insular, influence of, 20, 297, 314.
Postal communication, influence of, 289.
Poverty no proof of want of genius, 227.
Poverty, national, 49.
Power, civilization increases, 327, 345, 349, 360.
Power, balance of, preserving the, 318, 331.
Prayer-book of the Church of England, 148.
Preaching, qualifications for, 117.
Precautions, respecting foreign influences, 336.
Precision, necessity and neglect of in legal enactments, 238.
Preferment, state, dispensation of, 231.
Prejudice, influence of, 31.
Press, liberty of the, 164, 240; value of a free press, 168; especial advantages possessed by the press, 169; inefficiency to punish, 170; has superseded the theatre as a censor, 170; the Parliament and the press, 170; as a public instructor, 171; aiding the other Elements, 171; basis of the power of the press, 171; legitimate restraints on the press, 172; licentiousness not liberty, 174; present character of the British press, 174.
Priest-worship, 93.
Principles of education, (see Education.)
Principles, systematic, necessity of, 64.
Printing, influence of the invention of, 38, 39, 125, 200.
Profaneness, restriction of, 172.
Professional, services, requital of, 229.
Professorships, suitable endowment of, 122.
Progress, 14; periods of, 42.
Progression, stimulus to, 361.
Property, maintenance of, 250.
Property, national and individual, 10.
Prosecutor, public, necessity for a, 274.
Protestants, vices of, 109; intolerance of some, 176.
Provisions, state, for the promotion of civilization, *Pref.* xii., xiii., 67, 73.
Psalms, the, 147, 148; authorized version of, 148; desirableness of a new authorized version of, 149.
Punishment, power of the press to inflict, 170.
Punishment of criminal states, 326.
Punishments, 251; principle of, 260; preventative, 262; origin of, 263; application of, 264; true theory of, 267; moral effect of, 268, 269; main defects and failure of, 270; capital, 263, 265, 266, 267; corresponding with crimes,

263; cruel, 264; degrading, 265, 268, 269; varieties of, 262, 266; objects of, 264; corporeal, 264.
Public prosecutor, (see Prosecutor, public.)
Publications, pernicious, how to avert the effects of, 67.
Puritans, the, 196, 197.
Pursuits, classification of, 142.

Qualities, requiring state encouragement, 233.
Qualities, physical as well as moral deserving of consideration, 75.
Qualities, natural, 211, 212.
Qualities, original natural, of a people, 29.
Quatrefages, Professor De, 23.

Races, mixture of, 22, 23, 25, 28.
Railways, influence of, 41, 288, 289; excursion trains by, 302.
Railways, as a means of communication, 286, 288, 289, 290.
Rank, natural and artificial, 211, 213, 214.
Rank and honours, civilizing effect of, 48, 357.
Ranks and classes, intercourse between, 73, 201, 285, 359.
Reading for the people, recreative, the want of, *Pref.* viii., 65, 67, 68, 130.
Readings, public, 126.
Reason, right exercise of, 177, 188, 189.
Rebellion, the Great, 197.
Recreations for the people, (see Amusements.)
Recreative reading, (see Reading.)
Refinement, 16.
Reformation, criminal, 269, 270.
Reformatories, 269; treatment of criminals in, 269.
Regulations, educational, 74.
Relaxation, national, (see Amusements.)
Relaxation, bodily, necessity of, 62, 201, 209, 210.
Religion, aided by art, 144, 145.
Religion, its influence in relation to international intercourse, 310.
Religion, influence of upon civilization, 42, 82, 294.
Religion, fundamental principles of, 86.
Religion, heathen systems of, 85, 91, 92.
Religion, free discussion respecting, 177, 239; instruction in evidences of, 94; reverence to, 99.
Religion, laws repugnant to, 252.
Religion, restraint on discussion of principles of, 172, 173.
Religion, disabilities from want of, 275; from difference in, 275.
Religious bodies, rival, 112.
Religious education, (see Education.)
Religious influence, (see Influence, religious.)
Religious knowledge, (see Knowledge.)
Religious societies, (see Societies.)
Repentance, 260.
'Representation, the True Theory of,' reference to, 218, 225, 248.
Representative assemblies, (see Assemblies, and Representative governments.)
Repugnancy of national sentiment to certain laws, 279.
Repulsiveness in religious services, avoidance of, 102.
Requisites to civilization, 16, 17, 18.
Resources, national development of by civilization, 345, 353, 355, 356, 360, 361.
Restraints on liberty, legitimate, 164, 165, 166, 172, 173, 176, 177, 178, 241, 242, 275.
Restrictions, 251, 276.
Results, opposite, from the same cause, 320.
Retrogression, national, 362.
Revenue, laws relating to the public, 276.

Reverence to religion, 100.
Rewards, working by, in legislation, 271.
Rewards, honorary and pecuniary, 211; to unsuccessful men, 227; correspondent with objects, 229; for intellectual efforts should be the highest, 229; pecuniary, 229, 230; care to be taken in dispensing, 230; to men of letters, 230; to men of middle rank, 223, 272; government should work by, 271.
Rewards and punishments, the Divine system of, 271.
Rhyme, distinction of from poetry, 148.
Rich and poor, different punishments for, 266.
Ridicule, use of, 170.
Ridicule of religion, 100.
Rifle corps, the English, 326.
Rival legislative bodies, 250.
Rival parties and opinions, 172, 249, 250.
Rival powers, in men and states, 7, 8, 22, 249, 295, 296.
Rival religious bodies, 112, 186; toleration towards, 186.
Rivalry, religious, may have been ordained by God, 190.
Rivers, as a means of communication, 286; as barriers of separation, 309, 329, 330.
Roads as a means of communication, 286, 289.
Robbery, national, 326.
Rome, 27, 85, 292, 313; holidays in, 197; civilization in, 342.
Romans, roads made by the, 286, 289.
Rulers, moral influence of, 245.
Russia, encroachments of, 298.

Sabbath, establishment of the, 193; its influence on civilization, 193; principles of legislation for, 195, 196.
Sanitary laws, 277.
Satire, legitimate use of, 170.
Savages, low condition in civilization of, 13.
Saxons, the, 30.
Saxon era, dignities during, 220.
Scenery, protection of from disfigurement, 159.
Scholastic establishments, 103, 121.
Scholastic institutions, requirements of, 127.
Schools, 121; principle of holidays adopted in public, 197.
Science, claim of civilization to be ranked as a, 51.
Science, elementary principles of a, 51.
Science, influence of in civilization, 141, 142, 144.
Science and art, (see Art.)
Scotland, union with, 200.
Scriptures, belief in the, 111, 115, 116; style of the, 102; discussion of the veracity of, 176, 179, 180, 181.
Sea, the, communication by, 286, 315.
Seas, aids to international intercourse of, 314, 315; separate different nations, 309.
Security, national, promoted by civilization, 345.
Sentiment, the national, repugnancy of to certain laws, 279.
Separation, causes of geographical, national, 309.
Sermons, 41, 102, 117, 118, commonplacedness, cause of, 117; proposed substitutes for, 118.
Services, religious, 102; constituents of, 96.
Shakespeare, 136, 200, 226.
Sight, protection of enjoyment of, 159.
Sincerity in religious instructors, importance of, 91.
Slander, prohibition of, 172.
Slavery, 166, 167; moral effect of, 144, 275; physical, 166; moral and intellectual, 165, 166, 167.

Societies, whence men join in, 3, 4, 282; amalgamation of, 283; religious, 106, 119.
Societies, educational, 119.
Societies, learned, intercourse between, 128.
Society, influence of upon its members, 282, 283.
Solon, 235.
Somers, Lord, 152.
Sovereigns, moral influence of, 243; advantages possessed by, 242.
Spain, bull-fights of, 206.
Spartan system of education, 79.
Spectacular institutions, 133.
Spenser, Edmund, 152.
Stage, (see Theatre.)
State, authority of in making prohibitory laws, 237.
State, duty of, (see Duty.)
State, duty of the, in promoting civilization, 53.
State, ideal of a completely civilized, 354.
Statesmen, monuments to, 151, 154.
Steam, invention of, 38, 200.
Steam-engine, influence of the invention of, 38, 39, 328.
Sternhold and Hopkins, poetry of, 147.
Stimulants to good conduct, 233.
Stimulus, influence of in civilization, 13, 74, 304, 361; to civilization, 13.
Stocks, the village, utility of, 268.
Streets, names given to, 156.
Studies, classical, 62.
Style of the Scriptures, 102.
Substitute for sermons, proposed, 118.
Success, secret of securing, 231.
Sunday, 193; mode of observing on the Continent, 194; travelling on, 195; proper mode of keeping, 196, 198, 199.
Sunday concerts, recommendation of, 147; of pictorial, scriptural exhibitions, 147.
Superstitions, 101; religious, 187.
Support, right of every member of the state to, 253.
Symbols of civilization, 360.

Talent, proper employment of men of, 231.
Taste, duty of the state to correct the public, 161.
Taste, national, 360.
Tate and Brady, poetry of, 147.
Taxation, 50.
Telegraph, the electric, 289, 300.
Telescope, the invention of, 39.
Temple, Rev. Dr., 43.
Territory, national, 330.
Tests, strict, inutility of, 111.
Thane, proposal for revival of title of, 224.
Theatre, the, 106, 133, 134; censorship of, superseded by the press, 170.
Theatre, proposal for a national, 134.
Theatres, the Greek and Roman, 134.
Theatrical entertainments, tendency of, 135.
'Theory of the Arts,' reference to, 64, 88, 146, 157, 160, 161, 162.
'Theory of Representation, the True,' reference to, 218, 225, 248.
Thought, freedom of, 163, 168.
Threefold nature of education, 59.
Titles, honorary, effect of, 214, 215.
Toleration, 100, 101, 164; basis of, 177; principles of, 176; in relation to civilization, 178; negative rather than positive, 178; essence of, 179; reasonable limits to, 181; does not aid error, 183; inefficacy of intoleration, 184; intoleration no test of truth, 184; toleration towards rival religious bodies, 187; degenerating into intoleration, 187; state benefits resulting from, 189; true principle of, 189; in regard to Sabbatarian legislation, 195.
Towns, communication with, 290, 294.

Translations, utility of, 339, 340.
Transportation, punishment by, 262, 268, 269.
Travelling, progress of, 40, 361.
Travelling, Sunday, suggestion of, regulation respecting, 195.
Treaties, construction of, 332, 334; inviolability of, 334, 335.
Truth, triumph of, 169; intolerance no test of, 183, 184.
Turkey, civilization in, 342.
Tyranny, definition of, 241; popular, 246.

Union, civilization tends to promote, 346.
Union, international, civilization of the world through, 350.
Union with Ireland, 200.
Union with Scotland, 200.
Universities, 106, 121, 122; professors in, 122, 123; requirements of universities, 123, 124; intercourse between, 128; local position of, 129.
Unsuccessful men, when deserving of state patronage, 227.

Vavasour, proposal for revival of title of, 224.
Vices, danger of spreading by extending communication, 293.
Vices, particular, to be discouraged by the state, 272.
Violence, crimes of, 260, 262.
Virtue, homage due to, by the state, 211, 212.
Virtue, promoted by civilization, 346.
Virtue, reward of, 211, 215, 216.
Virtues, requiring state encouragement, 233, 272.

Walks, public, 159.
Walpole, Sir Robert, 200.
Wandering tribes, uncivilized character of, 315.
War, 15, 37, 39, 50; definition of, 317; when justifiable, 318, 326; provocatives to, 299, 325; its influence upon civilization, 317, 319; opposite results produced by, 320; interventions should supersede, 318, 321; influence of civilization upon, 326; aggressive, 326; principles on which war should be conducted, 318, 323.
Warfare, modes of conducting, 323, 325; national, of this country, 326.
Waterloo, commemoration of the victory of, 200.
Watts, Dr., 43.
Wealth, influence of, 214, 215.
Wealth, national, 47, 48.
Welfare, individual and national, the end of civilization, 345.
Whately, Archbishop, on civilization, 11.
Will, freedom of the, the criterion of liberty, 241.
Will, restraint of the, 241.
Women, influence of, 255; education of, 256; treatment of, 256.
Wordsworth, W., 153; on national monuments, 153.
Works, literary, deserving of state support, 229.
World, civilization of the, 341, 350.
Worship, freedom of religious (and see Toleration), 176, 177, 178.

Zeal, religious, productive of intolerance, 182, 188.

THE END.

LONDON: PRINTED BY WILLIAM CLOWES AND SONS, STAMFORD STREET AND CHARING CROSS.

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LIBRARY
BERKELEY

Return to desk from which borrowed.
This book is DUE on the last date stamped below.

JAN 22 1948

6May'59BB

REC'D LD

APR 22 1959

DEAD

NOV 8 - 1966 60

RECEIVED
OCT 25 '66 -5 PM
LOAN DEPT.

NOV 10 1966 15

RECEIVED
OCT 31 '66 -1 PM
LOAN DEPT.

FEB 1 7 1972 85

REC'D LD FEB 4 '72 -9 AM I 8

JUN 23 1972 30

REC'D LD JUN 15 72 -5 PM 58

LD 21-100m-9,'47(A5702s16)476

HM101
.H3
1873
221335
Harris